REV. A. A. LAMBING.

No. 964

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O. A. Brownson

THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

HOLY GHOST FATHERS
SCHOLASTICATE
FERNDALE, CONN.

VOLUME IV.

CONTAINING THE WRITINGS ON RELIGION AND SOCIETY PRIOR TO THE AUTHOR'S CONVERSION.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

It is not without much hesitation that the present volume has been prepared for publication. It contains many false theories and much rationalism, naturalism, and hardly disguised atheism. Its starting-point is as far from Catholic truth as it is possible to get without openly denying all religion and even the existence of any being superior to man. Our Blessed Saviour is indeed admitted to be the Son of God ; but in the same breath it is claimed that all men are equally sons of God. The worship of God is restricted to the service of man, and the only means of attaining to a heaven hereafter is declared to be the creation of a heaven on earth. It is attempted to reconcile the aspirations of the soul with the desires of the body, spiritual and eternal with carnal and temporal interests, not by subjecting the latter to the former, the lower to the higher, but by declaring all equally great, holy, and important.

Such and similar doctrines the author was earnestly engaged for the rest of his life in refuting, and neither the eloquence of style nor the depth of thought with which they were advocated would be a sufficient reason for presenting them anew to the world. Whatever is likely to tend to spread false or erroneous views of God, the church, or society, is equally condemned by the laws of religion and by the dictates of reason. Hence, the question is simply whether the heterodox writings of Dr. Brownson, when collected in a volume by themselves, and placed nearly, if not quite, in the order in which they were originally produced, are suited to confirm or to refute the errors they contain.

They could confirm them only through the weight of his personal authority as a philosopher and a theologian, or else through the force of the arguments by which he supports them. But his personal authority must have the contrary effect, for every reader knows he has retracted and refuted all these errors. Nor can the force of his arguments mislead, for they are either refuted in this very volume or in the third volume of these works, as well as elsewhere in his writings. They cannot

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harm the Catholic reader, who is fore-warned; but what effect are they likely to have on the non-Catholic? If the author had been warring against the truth, trying to overthrow revelation or morality, his writings would naturally exert an evil influence on the reader. But such is by no means the case. He is sincerely seeking for truth and constantly eliminating from his theories the element of error contained in them. Starting from the borders of utter infidelity he advances slowly but steadily through the pages of this volume, to the threshold of the church; his thought grows visibly with each paper. Without intercourse with Catholics or their books, and without other premises than those supplied by Protestantism and rationalism, with no other tools than an earnest mind and a sincere love of truth, the author cuts for himself a path through the gloomy forests of infidelity, atheism, eclecticism, naturalism, humanitarianism, Fourierism, and communism, until he arrives at the open light of truth in the church of Christ. An unbeliever reading this journal, as it might be called, of a long struggle can hardly fail to be carried along with the writer, and the sympathies no less than the intelligence of the reader will lead him to the conclusion which the author arrives at in the last few pages, that the only medium of salvation is the Catholic church.

In *New Views of Christianity, Society and the Church*, the author maintains that Protestantism is merely the reassertion of materialism or paganism against the church. In this view he never varied. In later writings as in *Rome and the World*, (Brownson's Works, Vol. III., p. 324) it is repeated, but the accompanying error which is the main thought of the *Church of the Future* is pointed out, and it is shown that the conflict of material and spiritual, of the spirit and the flesh is irrepressible, and the service of God irreconcilable with that of Mammon.

The perfectibility of man contended for in the article, *Leroux on Humanity*, is true; but the error lies in supposing the means and end of progress are in the natural, not the supernatural order. Man's natural progressiveness is limited by the finiteness of his nature; but in the supernatural order, the order of grace, of regeneration, man is progressive even to the Infinite.

His sympathy with the laboring classes and his interest in them never abated ; on the contrary, his respect for them increased with his experience of their moral honesty, their disinterestedness, their power of self-sacrifice, and their love of country, which he contrasted with the hard-heartedness, avarice, and selfishness of the middle classes, the non-working classes, the bankers, brokers, speculators, and political leaders, from whom the greatest danger is to be apprehended to religion and society.

In all the earlier writings there is a truth of the greatest importance, not clearly distinguished from the errors with which it is associated, but it is steadily followed, and becomes clearer, and the accompanying errors are one by one refuted and rejected. The unbelieving reader, whatever his errors, will recognize them as held by the author, and will not be able to say, as so often is said to the professedly Catholic controversialist : "You do not understand our doctrine. That is not what we mean." Here, on the contrary, he will find them asserted from his own standpoint and in his own language, and he can hardly fail to be carried along with the author and to advance with him to the doors of the church.

To those who may be interested in the story of the author's conversion as related in *The Convert*, this volume will have an additional interest ; for although these writings are there analyzed and their errors pointed out, the earnest reader will desire to read the writings as they first appeared, and to judge them from the point of view from which they were written, as well as that from which the author regarded them after his conversion.

May all Catholics who read this volume be strengthened in love and esteem for Holy Mother Church, who gives them in the little catechism all that Dr. Brownson acquired after so many years of intense mental effort : and may all others who read it join him in seeking the only path by which they can attain to the Truth and the Life !

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NEW VIEWS OF CHRISTIANITY, SOCIETY, AND THE CHURCH.

PREFACE.

It must not be inferred from my calling this little work New Views, that I profess to bring forward a new religion, or to have discovered a new Christianity. The religion of the Bible I believe to be given by the inspiration of God, and the Christianity of Christ satisfies my understanding and my heart. However widely I may dissent from the Christianity of the church, with that of Christ I am content to stand or fall, and I ask no higher glory than to live and die in it and for it.

I believe my views are somewhat original, but I am far from considering them the only or even the most important views which may be taken of the subjects on which I treat. Those subjects have a variety of aspects, and all their aspects are true and valuable. He who presents any one of them does a service to Humanity; and he who presents one of them has no occasion to fall out with him who presents another, nor to claim superiority over him.

Although I consider the views contained in the following pages original, I believe the conclusions, to which I come at last, will be found very much in accordance with those generally adopted by the denomination of Christians, with whom it has been for some years my happiness to be associated. That denomination, however, must not be held responsible for any of the opinions I have advanced. I am not the organ of a sect. I do not speak by authority, nor under tutelage. I speak for myself and from my own convictions. And in this way, better than I could in any other, do I prove my sympathy with the body of which I am a member, and establish my right to be called a Unitarian.

In what I have written here, as well as in all I have written elsewhere and on other occasions, I have aimed to set an example of free thought and free speech. I ask no thanks for this, for it was my duty and I dared not do otherwise. Besides, theology can never rise to the rank and certainty of a science, till it be submitted to the free and independent action of the human mind.

It will at once be seen that I have given only a few rough sketches of the subjects I have introduced. Many statements appear without the qualifications with which they exist in my own mind, many parts are doubtless obscure for the want of fuller developments, and the whole probably needs to be historically verified. But I have done all I could without making a larger book, and a larger book I could hope that nobody would buy or read. I may hereafter fill up my sketches and complete my pictures; but it would have been useless in the present state of the public mind to attempt more than I have done.

For my literary sins I have a right to some indulgence. My early life was spent in far other pursuits than those of literature. I make no pretensions to scholarship. For all my other sins—except those of omission, for which I have given a valid excuse—I ask no indulgence. I hope I shall be rigidly criticised. He who helps me correct my errors is my friend.

Those who feel any interest in "The Society for Christian Union and Progress"—a society collected during the past summer, and of which I am the minister—may find in this volume the principles on which that society is founded, and the objects it contemplates. To the members of that society and to those who have listened to my preaching these views will not be new.

If any of my readers wish to pursue the subject touched upon in my Introduction, I would refer them to Benjamin Constant's great work *De la Religion considérée dans sa Source, ses Formes et ses Développements;* to *Religion and the Church*, a book by Dr. Follen, which he is now publishing in a series of numbers; and especially to Schleiermacher's work *Ueber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*, a work which produced a powerful sensation in Germany when it first appeared, and one which cannot fail to exert a salutary influence on religious inquiry among ourselves. A friend, to whom I am proud to acknowledge myself under many obligations, has translated this work in the course of his own private studies, and I cannot but hope that he may be induced ere long to publish it.

With these remarks I commit my little work to its fate. It contains results to which I have come only by years of painful experience; but I dismiss it from my mind with the full conviction, that he, who has watched over my life

and preserved me amidst scenes through which I hope I may not be called to pass again, will take care that if what it contains be false it shall do no harm, and if it be true that it shall not die.

Boston, Nov. 8 1836.

INTRODUCTION.

Religion is natural to man and he ceases to be man the moment he ceases to be religious.

This position is sustained by what we are conscious of in ourselves and by the universal history of mankind.

Man has a capacity for religion, faculties which are useless without it, and wants which God alone can satisfy. Accordingly wherever he is, in whatever age or country, he has—with a few individual exceptions easily accounted for—some sort of religious notions and some form of religious worship.

But it is only religion, as distinguished from religious institutions, that is natural to man. The religious sentiment is universal, permanent, and indestructible; religious institutions depend on transient causes, and vary in different countries and epochs.

As distinguished from religious institutions, religion is the conception, or sentiment, of the Holy, that which makes us think of something as reverend, and prompts us to revere it. It is that indefinable something within us which gives a meaning to the words venerable and awful, which makes us linger around the sacred and the time-hallowed, the graves of heroes or of nations,—which leads us to launch away upon the boundless expanse, or plunge into the mysterious depths of being, and which, from the very ground of our nature, like the Seraphim of the prophet, is forever crying out, "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory."

Religious institutions are the forms with which man clothes his religious sentiment, the answer he gives to the question, What is the holy? Were he a stationary being, or could he take in the whole of truth at a single glance, the answer once given would be always satisfactory, the institution once adopted would be universal, unchangeable, and eternal. But neither is the fact. Man's starting-point is the low valley, but he is continually—with slow and toilsome effort it may be—ascending the sides of the mountain to more favorable positions, from which his eye may sweep

a broader horizon of truth. He begins in ignorance, but he is ever growing in knowledge.

In our ignorance, when we have seen but little of truth, and seen that little but dimly, we identify the Holy with the merely terrible, the powerful, the inscrutable, the useful, or the beautiful; and we adopt as its symbols, the thunder and lightning, winds and rain, ocean and storm, majestic river or placid lake, shady grove or winding brook, the animal, the bow or spear by means of which we are fed, clothed, and protected; but as experience rolls back the darkness, which made all around us appear huge and spectral, purges and extends our vision, these become inadequate representatives of our religious ideas; they fail to shadow forth the holy to our understandings; and we leave them and rise to that which appears to be free from their limited and evanescent nature, to that which is unlimited, all-sufficient, and unfailing.

We are creatures of growth; it is, therefore, impossible that all our institutions should not be mutable and transitory. We are forever discovering new fields of truth, and every new discovery requires a new institution, or the modification of an old one. We might as well demand that the sciences of physiology, chemistry, and astronomy should wear eternally the same form, as that religious institutions should be unchangeable, and that those which satisfied our fathers should always satisfy us.

All things change their forms. Literature, art, science, governments, change under the very eye of the spectator. Religious institutions are subject to the same universal law. Like the individuals of our race, they pass away and leave us to deck their tombs, or in our despair, to exclaim that we will lie down in the grave with them. But as the race itself does not die, as new generations crowd upon the departing to supply their places, so does the reproductive energy of religion survive all mutations of forms, and so do new institutions arise to gladden us with their youth and freshness, to carry us further onward in our progress, and upward nearer to that which "is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."

CHAPTER I.—CHRISTIANITY.

About two thousand years ago, mankind, having exhausted all their old religious institutions, received from their heavenly Father through the ministry of Jesus of Nazareth a

new institution which was equal to their advanced position, and capable of aiding and directing their future progress.

But this institution must be spoken of as one which was, not as one which is. Notwithstanding the vast territories it acquired, the mighty influence it once exerted over the destinies of humanity, and its promises of immortality, it is now but the mere shadow of a sovereign, and its empire is falling in ruins. What remains of it is only the body after the spirit has left it. It is no longer animated by a living soul. The sentiment of the holy has deserted it, and it is a by-word and a mockery.

Either then Jesus did not embrace in his mind the whole of truth, or else the church has at best only partially realized his conception.

No institution, so long as it is in harmony with the progress of the understanding, can fail to command obedience or kindle enthusiasm. The church now does neither. There is a wide disparity between it and the present state of intellectual development. We have discovered truths which it cannot claim as its own; we are conscious of instincts which it disavows, and which we cannot, or will not, suppress. Whose is the fault? Is it the fault of humanity, of Jesus, or of the church?

Humanity cannot be blamed, for humanity's law is to grow; it has an inherent right to seek for truth, and it is under no obligation to shut its eyes to the facts which unfold themselves to its observation. It is not the fault of Jesus, unless it can be proved that all he contemplated has been realized, that mankind have risen to as pure, and as happy a state as he proposed; have indeed fully comprehended him, taken in his entire thought, and reduced it to practice. Nobody will pretend this. The fault then must be borne by the church.

The church even in its best days was far below the conception of Jesus. It never comprehended him, and was always a very inadequate symbol of the holy as he understood it.

Christianity, as it existed in the mind of Jesus, was the type of the most perfect religious institution to which the human race will, probably, ever attain. It was the point where the sentiment and the institution, the idea and the symbol, the conception and its realization appear to meet and become one. But the contemporaries of Jesus were not equal to this profound thought. They could not com-

prehend the God-Man, the deep meaning of his assertion, "I and my Father are one." He spake as never man spake—uttered truths for all nations, and for all times; but what he uttered was necessarily measured by the capacity of those who heard him—not by his own. The less never comprehends the greater. Their minds must have been equal to his in order to have been able to take in the full import of his words. They might—as they did—apprehend a great and glorious meaning in what he said; they might kindle at the truths he revealed to their understandings, and even glory in dying at the stake to defend them; but they would invariably and inevitably narrow them down to their own inferior intellects, and interpret them by their own previous modes of thinking and believing.

The disciples themselves, the familiar friends, the chosen apostles of Jesus, notwithstanding all the advantages of personal intercourse and personal explanations, never fully apprehended him. They mistook him for the Jewish Messiah, and even after his resurrection and ascension, they supposed it to have been his mission to "restore the kingdom to Israel." Though commanded to preach the Gospel to "every creature," they never once imagined that they were to preach it to any people but the Jewish, till the circumstances, which preceded and followed Peter's visit to Cornelius the Roman centurion, took place to correct their error. It was not till then that any one of them could say, "Of a truth, I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him." If this was true of the disciples, how much more true must it have been of those who received the words of Jesus at second or third hand, and without any of the personal explanations or commentaries necessary to unfold their meaning?

Could the age, in which Jesus appeared, have comprehended him, it would have been superior to him, and consequently have had no need of him. We do not seek an instructor for our children in one who is not able to teach them. Moreover, if that age could have even rightly *apprehended* Jesus, we should be obliged to say his mission was intended to be confined to that age, or else to admit that the human race was never to go beyond the point then attained. Either Jesus did not regard the future of humanity, or he designed to interrupt its progress, and

strike it with the curse of immobility; or else he was above his age and of course not to be understood by it. The world has not stood still since his coming; the church has always considered his kingdom as one of which there is to be no end; and we know that he was not comprehended, and that even we, with the advantage of nearly two thousand years of mental and moral progress, are far—very far—below him.

If the age in which Jesus appeared could not comprehend him, it is obvious that it could not fully embody him in its institutions. It could embody no more of him than it could receive, and as it could receive only a part of him, we must admit that the church has never been more than partially Christian. Never has it been the real body of Christ. Never has it reflected the God-Man perfectly. Never has it been a true mirror of the holy. Always has the holy in the sense of the church been a very inferior thing to what it was in the mind and heart and life of Jesus.

But we must use measured terms in our condemnation of the church. We must not ask the man in the child. The church did what it could. It did its best to "form Christ" within itself, "the hope of glory," and was up to the period of its downfall as truly Christian, as the progress made by the human race admitted. It aided the growth of the human mind; enabled us to take in more truth than it had itself received; furnished us the light by which we discovered its defects; and by no means should its memory be cursed. Nobly and perseveringly did it discharge its duty; useful was it in its day and generation; and now that it has given up the ghost, we should pay it the rites of honorable burial, plant flowers over its resting place, and sometimes repair thither to bedew them with our tears.

To comprehend Jesus, to seize the holy as it was in him, and consequently the true idea of Christianity, we must, from the heights to which we have risen by aid of the church, look back and down upon the age in which he came, ascertain what was the work which there was for him to perform, and from that obtain a key to what he proposed to accomplish.

Two systems then disputed the empire of the world; spiritualism* represented by the Eastern world, the old world

* I use these terms, Spiritualism and Materialism, to designate two social, rather than two philosophical systems. They designate two orders, which, from time out of mind, have been called *spiritual* and *temporal* or *carnal*, *holy* and *profane*, *heavenly* and *worldly*, &c.

of Asia, and materialism represented by Greece and Rome. Spiritualism regards purity or holiness as predicable of spirit alone, and matter as essentially impure, possessing and capable of receiving nothing of the holy,—the prison house of the soul, its only hindrance to a union with God, or absorption into his essence, the cause of all uncleanliness, sin, and evil, consequently to be contemned, degraded, and as far as possible annihilated. Materialism takes the other extreme, does not recognize the claims of spirit, disregards the soul, counts the body every thing, earth all, heaven nothing, and condenses itself into the advice, "Eat and drink; for to-morrow we die."

This opposition between spiritualism and materialism presupposes a necessary and original antithesis between spirit and matter. When spirit and matter are given as antagonist principles, we are obliged to admit antagonism between all the terms into which they are respectively convertible. From spirit is deduced by natural generation, God, the priesthood, faith, heaven, eternity; from matter, man, the state, reason, the earth, and time; consequently, to place spirit and matter in opposition, is to make an antithesis between God and man, the priesthood and the state, faith and reason, heaven and earth, and time and eternity.

This antithesis generates perpetual and universal war. It is necessary then to remove it and harmonize, or unite the two terms. Now, if we conceive Jesus as standing between spirit and matter, the representative of both—God-Man—the point where both meet and lose their antithesis, laying a hand on each and saying, "Be one, as I and my Father are one," thus sanctifying both and marrying them in a mystic and holy union, we shall have his secret thought and the true idea of Christianity.

The Scriptures uniformly present Jesus to us as a mediator, the middle term between two extremes, and they call his work a mediation, a reconciliation—an atonement. The church has ever considered Jesus as making an atonement. It has held on to the term at all times as with the grasp of death. The first charge it has labored to fix upon heretics has been that of rejecting the atonement, and the one all dissenters from the predominant doctrines of the day, have been most solicitous to repel is that of "denying the Lord who bought us." The whole Christian world, from the days of the apostles up to the moment in which I write, have identified Christianity with the atonement, and felt

that in admitting the atonement they admitted Christ, and that in denying it they were rejecting him.

Jesus himself always spoke of his doctrine, the grand idea which lay at the bottom of all his teaching, under the term "Love." "A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another." "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." John, who seems to have caught more of the peculiar spirit of Jesus than any of the disciples, sees nothing but love in the Gospel. Love penetrated his soul; it runs through all his writings, and tradition relates that it at length so completely absorbed him that all he could say in his public addresses was, "Little children, love one another." He uniformly dwells with unutterable delight on the love which the Father has for us and that which we may have for him, the intimate union of man with God, expressed by the strong language of dwelling in God and God dwelling in us. In his view there is no antagonism. All antithesis is destroyed. Love sheds its hallowed and hallowing light over both God and man, over spirit and matter, binding all beings and all being in one strict and everlasting union.

The nature of love is to destroy all antagonism. It brings together; it begetteth union, and from union cometh peace. And what word so accurately expresses to the consciousness of Christendom, the intended result of the mission of Jesus, as that word peace? Every man who has read the New Testament feels that it was peace that Jesus came to effect,—peace after which the soul has so often sighed and yearned in vain, and a peace not merely between two or three individuals for a day, but a universal and eternal peace between all conflicting elements, between God and man, between the soul and body, between this world and another, between the duties of time and the duties of eternity. How clearly is this expressed in that sublime chorus of the angels, sung over the manger-cradle—"Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace and good-will to men!"

Where there is but one term there is no union. There is no harmony with but one note. It is mockery to talk to us of peace where one of the two belligerent parties is annihilated. That were the peace of the grave. Jesus must then save both parties. The church has, therefore, with a truth it has never comprehended, called him *God-Man*. But if the two terms and their products be originally and essentially antagonist; if there be between them an innate hostility,

their union, their reconciliation cannot be effected. Therefore in proposing the union, in attempting the atonement, Christianity declares as its great doctrine that there is no essential, no original antithesis between God and man; that neither spirit nor matter is unholy in its nature; that all things, spirit, matter, God, man, soul, body, heaven, earth, time, eternity, with all their duties and interests, are in themselves holy. All things proceed from the same holy Fountain, and no fountain sendeth forth both sweet waters and bitter. It therefore writes "HOLINESS TO THE LORD" upon every thing, and sums up its sublime teaching in that grand synthesis, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and mind and soul and strength, and thy neighbor as thyself."

CHAPTER II.—THE CHURCH.

The aim of the church was to embody the holy as it existed in the mind of Jesus, and had it succeeded, it would have realized the atonement; that is, the reconciliation of spirit and matter and all their products.

But the time was not yet. The Paraclete was in expectation. The church could only give currency to the fact that it was the mission of Jesus to make an atonement. It from the first misapprehended the conditions on which it was to be effected. Instead of understanding Jesus to assert the holiness of both spirit and matter, it understood him to admit that matter was rightfully cursed, and to predicate holiness of spirit alone. In the sense of the church then he did not come to atone spirit and matter, but to redeem spirit from the consequences of its connection with matter. His name therefore was not the Atoner, the Reconciler, but the Redeemer, and his work not properly an atonement, but a redemption. This was the original sin of the church.

By this misapprehension the church rejected the mediator. The Christ ceases to be the middle term uniting spirit and matter, the *hilasterion*, the mercy-seat, or point where God and man meet and lose their antithesis, the Advocate with the Father for humanity, and becomes the Avenger of spirit, the manifestation of God's righteous indignation against man. He dies to save mankind, it is true, but he dies to pay a penalty. God demands man's everlasting destruction; Jesus admits that God's demand is just, and dies to discharge it. Hence the symbol of the cross, signifying to the church an original and necessary antithesis

between God and man which can be removed only by the sacrifice of justice to mercy. In this the church took its stand with spiritualism, and from a mediator became a partisan.

By taking its stand with spiritualism the church condemned itself to all the evils of being exclusive. It obliged itself to reject an important element of truth, and it became subject to all the miseries and vexations of being intolerant. It become responsible for all the consequences which necessarily result from spiritualism. The first of these consequences was the denial that Jesus came in the flesh. If matter be essentially unholy, then Jesus, if he had a material body, must have been unholy; if unholy, sinful. Hence all the difficulties of the Gnostics—difficulties hardly adjusted by means of a Virgin Mother and the Immaculate Conception; for this mode of accommodation really denied the God-Man, the symbol of the great truth the church was to embody. It left the God indeed, but it destroyed the man, inasmuch as it separated the humanity of Jesus by its very origin from common humanity.

Man's inherent depravity, his corruption by nature followed as a matter of course. Man by his very nature partakes of matter, is material, then unholy, then sinful, corrupt, depraved. He is originally material, therefore originally a sinner. Hence original sin. Sometimes original sin is indeed traced to a primitive disobedience, to the fall; but then the doctrine of the fall itself is only one of the innumerable forms which is assumed by the doctrine of the essential impurity of matter.

From this original, inherent depravity of human nature necessarily results that antithesis between God and man which renders their union impossible and which imperiously demands the sacrifice of one or the other. "Die he or justice must." Man is sacrificed on the cross in the person of Jesus. Hence the vicarious atonement, the conversion of the atonement into an expiation. But, if man was sacrificed, if he died as he deserved in Jesus, his death was eternal. Symbolically then he cannot rise. The body of Jesus after his resurrection is not material in the opinion of the church. He does not rise God-Man, but God. Hence the absolute Deity of Christ, which under various disguises has always been the sense of the church.

From man's original and inherent depravity it results that he has no power to work out his own salvation. Hence

the doctrine of human inability. By nature man is enslaved to matter; he is born in sin and shapen in iniquity. He is sold to sin, to the world, to the devil. He must be ransomed. Matter cannot ransom him; then spirit must,—and "God the mighty Maker" dies to redeem his creature—to deliver the soul from the influence of matter.

But this can be only partially effected in this world. As long as we live, we must drag about with us this clog of earth—matter—and not till after death, when our vile bodies shall be changed into the likeness of Christ's glorious body, shall we really be saved. We are not then saved here; we only hope to be saved hereafter. Hence the doctrine which denies holiness to man in this world, which places the kingdom of God exclusively in the world to come, and which establishes a real antithesis between heaven and earth, and the means necessary to secure present well-being and those necessary to secure future blessedness.

God has indeed died to ransom sinners from the grave of the body, to redeem them from the flesh, to break the chains of the bound and to set the captive free; but the effects of the ransom must be secured; agents must be appointed to proclaim the glad tidings of salvation, to bid the prisoner hope, and the captive rejoice that the hour of release will come. Hence the church. Hence too the authority of the church to preach salvation—to save sinners. And the church is composed of all who have this authority and of none others, therefore the dogma, "Out of the church there is no salvation."

The church is commissioned; it is God's agent in saving sinners. It is then his representative. If the representative of God, then of spirit. In its representative character, that is, as a church, it is then spiritual, and if spiritual, holy; and if holy, infallible. Hence the infallibility of the church.

The holy should undoubtedly govern the unholy; spirit then should govern matter. Spirit then is supreme; and the church as the representative of spirit must also be supreme. Hence the supremacy of the church.

The church is a vast body composed of many members. It needs a head. It should also be modelled after the church above. The church above has a supreme head, Jesus Christ; the church below should then have a head, who may be its centre, its unity, the personification of its wisdom and its authority. Hence the pope, the supreme head of the church, vicar of Jesus, and representative of God.

The church is a spiritual body. Its supremacy then is a spiritual supremacy. A spiritual supremacy extends to thought and conscience. Hence on the one hand the confessional designed to solve cases of conscience, and on the other creeds, expurgatory indexes, inquisitions, pains and penalties against heretics.

The spiritual order in heaven is absolute; the church then as the representative of that order must also be absolute. As a representative it speaks not in its own name, but in the name of the power it represents. Since that power may command, the church may command; and as it may command in the name of an absolute sovereign, its commands must be implicitly obeyed. An absolute sovereign may command to any extent he pleases—what shall be believed as well as what shall be done. Hence implicit faith, the authority which the church has alleged for the basis of belief. Hence too prohibitions against reason and reasoning which have marked the church under all its forms, in all its phases and divisions and subdivisions.

Reason too is human; then it is material; to set it up against faith were to set up the material against the spiritual; the human against the divine; man against God: for the church being God by proxy, by representation, it has of course the right to consider whatever is set up against the faith it enjoins as set up against God.

The civil order, if it be any thing more than a function of the church, belongs to the category of matter. It is then inferior to the church. It is then bound to obey the church. Hence the claims of the church over civil institutions, its right to bestow the crowns of kings, to place kingdoms under ban, to absolve subjects fuom their allegiance, and all the wars and antagonism between church and state.

The spiritual order alone is holy. Its interests are then the only interests it is not sinful to labor to promote. In laboring to promote them, the church was under the necessity of laboring for itself. Hence its justification to itself of its selfishness, its rapacity, its untiring efforts to aggrandize itself at the expense of individuals and of states.

As the interests of the church alone were holy, it was of course sinful to be devoted to any others. All the interests of the material order, that is, all temporal interests, were sinful, and the church never ceased to call them so. Hence its perpetual denunciation of wealth, place, and renown, and the obstacles it always placed in the way of all direct efforts

for the promotion of well-being on earth. This is the reason why it has discouraged, indeed unchurched, anathematized, all efforts to gain civil and political liberty, and always regarded with an evil eye all industry not directly or indirectly in its own interests.

This same exclusive spiritualism borrowed from Asia, striking matter with the curse of being unclean in its nature, was the reason for enjoining celibacy upon the clergy. An idea of sanctity was attached to the ministerial office, which it was supposed any contact with the flesh would sully. It also led devotees, those who desired to lead lives strictly holy, to renounce the flesh, as well as the world and the devil, to take vows of perpetual celibacy and to shut themselves up in monasteries and nunneries. It is the origin of all those self-inflicted tortures, mortifications of the body, penances, fastings, and that neglect of this world for another, which fill so large a space in the history of the church during what are commonly called the "dark ages." The church in its theory looked always with horror upon all sensual indulgences. Marriage was sinful, till purified by holy church. The song and the dance, innocent amusements, and wholesome recreations, though sometimes conceded to the incessant importunities of matter, were of the devil. Even the gay dress and blithesome song of nature were offensive. A dark, silent, friar's frock was the only befitting garb for nature or for man. The *beau ideal* of a good Christian was one who renounced all his connections with the world, became deaf to the voice of kindred and of friends, insensible to the sweetest and holiest emotions of humanity, immured himself in a cave or cell, and did nothing the livelong day but count his beads and kiss the crucifix.

Exceptions there were; but this was the idea, the dominant tendency of the church. Thanks, however, to the stubbornness of matter, and to the superintending care of Providence, its dominant tendency always found powerful resistance, and its idea was never able fully to realize itself.

CHAPTER III.—PROTESTANTISM.

Every thing must have its time. The church abused, degraded, vilified matter, but could not annihilate it. It existed in spite of the church. It increased in power, and at length rose against spiritualism and demanded the resto-

ration of its rights. This rebellion of materialism, of the material order against the spiritual, is Protestantism.

Matter always exerted a great influence over the practice of the church. In the first three centuries it was very powerful. It condemned the Gnostics and Manicheans as heretics, and was on the point of rising to empire under the form of Arianism. But the oriental influence predominated, and the Arians became acknowledged heretics.

After the defeat of Arianism, that noble protest in its day of rationalism against mysticism, of matter against spirit, of European against Asiatic ideas, the church departed more and more from the atonement, and became more and more arrogant, arbitrary, spiritualistic, papistical. Still matter occasionally made itself heard. It could not prevent the celibacy of the clergy, but it did maintain the unity of the race and prevented the reëstablishment of a sacerdotal caste, claiming by birth a superior sanctity. It broke out too in the form of Pelagianism, that doctrine which denies that man is clean gone in iniquity, and which makes the material order count for something. Pelagius was the able defender of humanity when it seemed to be deserted by all its friends, and his efforts were by no means unavailing.

Matter asserted its rights and avenged itself in a less unexceptionable form in the convents, the monasteries and nunneries, among the clergy of all ranks, in that gross licentiousness which led to the reformation attempted by Hildebrand; and finally it ascended—not avowedly, but in reality—the papal throne, in the person of Leo X.

The accession of Leo X. to the papal throne is a remarkable event in the history of the church. It marks the predominance of material interests in the very bosom of the church itself. It is a proof that whatever might be the theory of the church, however different it claimed to be from all other powers, it was at this epoch in practice the same as the kingdoms of men. Poverty ceased in its eyes to be a virtue. The poor mendicant, the bare-footed friar, could no longer hope to become one day the spiritual head of Christendom. Spiritual gifts and graces were not now enough. High birth and royal pretensions were required; and it was not as a priest, but as a member of the princely house of Medici that Leo become pope.

The object of the church had changed. It had ceased to regard the spiritual wants and welfare of mankind. It had become wealthy. It had acquired vast portions of this

world's goods, and its great care was to preserve them. Its interests had become temporal interests, and therefore it needed, not a spiritual father, but a temporal prince. It is as a prince that Leo conducts himself. His legates to the imperial, English, and French courts, entered into negotiations altogether as ambassadors of a temporal prince, not as the simple representatives of the church.

Leo himself is a sensualist, sunk in his sensual pleasures, and perhaps a great sufferer in consequence of his excesses. It is said he was an atheist, a thing more than probable. All his tastes were worldly. Instead of the sacred books of the church, the pious legends of saints and martyrs, he amused himself with the elegant but *profane* literature of Greece and Rome. His principal secretaries were not holy monks but eminent classical scholars. He revived and enlarged the university at Rome, encouraged human learning and the arts of civilization, completed St. Peter's, and his reign was graced by Michael Angelo and Raphael. He engaged in wars and diplomacy and in them both had respect only to the goods of the church, or to the interests of himself and family as temporal princes.

Now all this was in direct opposition to the theory of the church. Materialism was in the papal chair, but it was there as a usurper, as an illegitimate. It reigned in fact, but not in right. The church was divided against itself. In theory it was spiritualist, but in practice it was materialist. It could not long survive this inconsistency, and it needed not the attacks of Luther to hasten the day of its complete destruction.

But materialism must have become quite powerful to have been able to usurp the papal throne itself. It was indeed too powerful to bear patiently the name of usurper; at least to be contented to reign only indirectly. It would be acknowledged as sovereign, and proclaimed legitimate. This the church could not do. The church could do nothing but cling to its old pretensions. To expel materialism and return to Hildebrand was out of the question. To give up its claims, and own itself materialist, would have been to abandon all title to even its material possessions, since it was by virtue of its spiritual character that it held them. Materialism—as it could reign in the church only as it were by stealth—resolved to leave the church and to reign in spite of it, against it, and even on its ruins. It protested, since it had all the power, against being called hard names,

and armed itself in the person of Luther to vindicate its rights and to make its claims acknowledged.

The dominant character of Protestantism is then the insurrection of materialism, and what we call the reformation is really a revolution in favor of the material order. Spiritualism had exhausted its energies; it had done all it could for humanity; the time had come for the material element of our nature, which spiritualism had neglected and grossly abused, to rise from its depressed condition and contribute its share to the general progress of mankind. It rose, and in rising it brought up the whole series of terms the church had disregarded. It brought up the state, civil liberty, human reason, philosophy, industry, all temporal interests.

In Protestantism, Greece and Rome revived and again carried their victorious arms into the East. The reformation connects us with classical antiquity, with the beautiful and graceful forms of Grecian art and literature, and with Roman eloquence and jurisprudence, as the church had connected us with Judea, Egypt, and India.

CHAPTER IV.—PROTESTANTISM.

That Protestantism is the insurrection of matter against spirit, of the material against the spiritual order, is susceptible of very satisfactory historical verification.

One of the most immediate and efficient causes of Protestantism was the revival of Greek and Roman literature. Constantinople was taken by the Turks, and its scholars and the remains of classical learning which it had preserved were dispersed over western Europe. The classics took possession of the universities and the learned, were studied, commented on, appealed to as an authority paramount to that of the church and—Protestantism was born.

By means of the classics, the scholars of the fifteenth century were introduced to a world altogether unlike and much superior to that in which they lived—to an order of ideas wholly diverse from those avowed or tolerated by the church. They were enchanted. They had found the ideal of their dreams. They became disgusted with the present; they repelled the civilization effected by the church, looked with contempt on its fathers, saints, martyrs, schoolmen, troubadours, knights, and minstrels, and sighed and yearned and labored to reproduce Athens or Rome.

And what was that Athens and that Rome which seemed to them to realize the very ideal of the perfect? We know very well to-day what they were. They were material; through the whole period of their historical existence, it is well known that the material or temporal order predominated over the spiritual. They are not that old spiritual world of the East which reigned in the church. In that old world—in India for instance—where spiritualism has its throne, man sinks before God, matter fades away before the presence of spirit, and time is swallowed up in eternity. Industry is in its incipient stages, and the state scarcely appears. There is no history, no chronology. All is dateless and unregistered. An inflexible and changeless tyranny weighs down the human race and paralyzes its energies. Ages on ages roll away and bring no melioration. Every thing remains as it was, monotonous and immovable as the spirit it contemplates and adores.

In Athens and Rome all this is reversed. Human interests, the interests of mankind in time and space, predominate. Man is the most conspicuous figure in the group. He is everywhere, and his imprint is upon every thing. Industry flourishes; commerce is encouraged; the state is constituted, and tends to democracy; citizens assemble to discuss their common interests; the orator harangues them; the aspirant courts them; the warrior and the statesman render them an account of their doings and await their award. The *People*—not the gods—will, decree, make, unmake, or modify the laws. Divinity does not become incarnate, as in the Asiatic world, but men are deified. History is not theogony, but a record of human events and transactions. Poetry sings heroes, the great and renowned of earth, or chants at the festal board and the couch of voluptuousness. Art models its creations after human forms, for human pleasure or human convenience. They are human faces we see; human voices we hear; human dwellings in which we lodge and dream of human growth and human melioration.

There are gods and temples, and priests and oracles, and augurs and auguries, it is true; but they are not like those we meet where spiritualism reigns. The gods are all anthropomorphous. Their forms are the perfection of the human. The allegorical beasts, the strange beasts, compounded of parts of many known and unknown beasts which meet us in Indian, Egyptian, and Persian mythology, as symbols of the

gods, are extinct. Priests are not a caste, as they are under spiritualism, springing from the head of Brahma and claiming superior sanctity and power as their birth-right, but simple police officers. Religion is merely a function of the state. Socrates dies because he breaks the laws of Athens—not, as Jesus did—for blaspheming the gods. Numa introduces or organizes polytheism at Rome for the purpose of governing the people by means of appeals to their sentiment of the holy; and the Roman pontifex maximus was never any thing more than a master of police.

This in its generality is equally a description of Protestantism, as might indeed have been asserted beforehand. The epoch of the revival of classical literature must have been predisposed to materialism or else it could not have been pleased with the classics, and the influence of the classics must have been to increase that predisposition, and as Protestantism was a result of both, it could be nothing but materialism.

In classical antiquity religion is a function of the state. It is the same under Protestantism. Henry VIII. of England declares himself supreme head of the church, not by virtue of his spiritual character, but by virtue of his character as a temporal prince. The Protestant princes of Germany are protectors of the church; and all over Europe, there is an implied contract between the state and the ecclesiastical authorities. The state pledges itself to support the church on condition that the church support the state. Ask the kings, nobility, or even church dignitaries, why they support religion, and they will answer with one voice, "Because the people cannot be preserved in order, cannot be made to submit to their rulers, and because civil society cannot exist without it." The same or a similar answer will be returned by almost every political man in this country; and truly may it be said that religion is valued by the Protestant world as a subsidiary to the state, as a mere matter of police.

Under the reign of spiritualism all questions are decided by authority. The church prohibited reasoning. It commanded, and men were to obey or be counted rebels against God. Materialism, by raising up man and the state, makes the reason of man, or the reason of the state, paramount to the commands of the church. Under Protestantism, the state in most cases, the individual reason in a few, imposes the creed upon the church. The king and parliament in

England determine the faith which the clergy must profess and maintain; the Protestant princes in Germany have the supreme control of the symbols of the church, the right to enact what creed they please.

Indeed the authority of the church in matters of belief was regarded by the reformers as one of the greatest evils, against which they had to contend. It was particularly against this authority that Luther protested. What he and his coadjutors demanded, was the right to read and interpret the Bible for themselves. This was the right they wrested from the church. To have been consequent they should have retained it in their hands as individuals; it would then have been the right of private judgment and, if it meant any thing, the right of reason to sit in judgment on all propositions to be believed. To this extent, however, they were not prepared to go. Between the absolute authority of the church, and the absolute authority of the individual reason, intervened the authority of the state. But as the state was material, the substitution of its authority for the authority of the church was still to substitute the material for the spiritual.

But the tendency, however arrested by the state, has been steadily toward the most unlimited freedom of thought and conscience. Our fathers rebelled against the authority of the state in religious matters as well as against the authority of the pope. In political and industrial speculations, the English and Americans give the fullest freedom to the individual reason; Germany has done it to the greatest extent in historical, literary and philosophical, and to a very great extent, in theological matters, and France does it in every thing. All modern philosophy is built on the absolute freedom and independence of the individual reason; that is, the reason of humanity, in opposition to the reason of the church or the state. Descartes refused to believe in his own existence but upon the authority of his reason; Bacon allows no authority but observation and induction; Berkeley finds no ground for admitting an external world, and therefore denies it; and Hume finding no certain evidence of any thing outward or inward, doubted—philosophically—of all things.

Philosophy is a human creation; it is the product of man, as the universe is of God. Under spiritualism, then, which—in theory—demolishes man, there can be no philosophy; yet as man, though denied, exists, there is a

philosophical tendency. But this philosophical tendency is always either to scepticism, mysticism, or idealism. Scepticism, that philosophy which denies all certainty, made its first appearance in modern times in the church. The church declared reason unworthy of confidence, and in doing that gave birth to the whole sceptical philosophy. When the authority of the church was questioned and she was compelled to defend it, she did it on the ground that reason could not be trusted as a criterion of truth, and that there could be no certainty for man, if he did not admit an authority independent of his reason,—not perceiving that if reason were struck with impotence there would be no means of substantiating the legitimacy of the authority.

On the other hand, the church having its point of view in spirit, consulted the soul before the body, became introspective, fixed on the inward to the exclusion of the outward. It overlooked the outward; and when that is overlooked it is hardly possible that it should not be denied. Hence idealism or mysticism.

Under the reign of materialism all this is changed. There is full confidence in reason. The method of philosophizing is the experimental. But as the point of view is the outward—matter—spirit is overlooked; matter alone admitted. Hence philosophical materialism. And philosophical materialism, in germ or developed, has been commensurate with Protestantism. When the mind becomes fixed on the external world, inasmuch as we become acquainted with that world only by means of our senses, we naturally conclude that our senses are our only source of knowledge. Hence sensism, the philosophy supported by Locke, Condillac, and even by Bacon, so far as it concerns his own application of his method. And from the hypothesis that our senses are our only inlets of knowledge, we are compelled to admit that nothing can be known which is not cognizable by some one or all of them. Our senses take cognizance only of matter; then we can know nothing but matter. We can know nothing of the spirit or soul. The body is all that we know of man. That dies, and there ends man—at least all we know of him. Hence no immortality, no future state. If nothing can be known but by means of our senses, God, then, inasmuch as we do not see him, hear him, taste him, smell him, touch him, cannot be known; then he does not exist for us. Hence

atheism. Hence modern infidelity, in all its forms, so prevalent in the last century, and so far from being extinct even in this.

The same tendency to exalt the terms depressed by the church is to be observed in the religious aspect of Protestantism. Properly speaking, Protestantism has no religious character. As Protestants, people are not religious, but co-existing with their Protestantism, they may indeed retain something of religion. Men often act from mixed motives. They bear in their bosoms sometimes two antagonist principles, now obeying the one, and now the other, without being aware that both are not one and the same principle. With Protestants, religion has existed; but as a reminiscence, a tradition. Sometimes, indeed, the remembrance has been very lively, and seemed very much like reality. The old soldier warms up with the recollections of his early feats, and lives over his life as he relates its events to his grandchild,—

"Shoulders his crutch and shows how fields are won."

If the religion of the Protestant world be a reminiscence, it must be the religion of the church. It is, in fact, only Catholicism continued. The same principle lies at the bottom of all Protestant churches, in so far as they are churches, which was at the bottom of the church of the middle ages. But materialism modifies their rites and dogmas. In the practice of all, there is an effort to make them appear reasonable. Hence commentaries, expositions, and defences without number. Even where the authority of reason is denied, there is an instinctive sense of its authority and a desire to enlist it. In mere forms, pomp and splendor have gradually disappeared, and dry utility and even baldness have been consulted. In doctrines, those which exalt man and give him some share in the work of salvation have gained in credit and influence. Pelagianism, under some thin disguises or undisguised, has become almost universal. The doctrine of man's inherent total depravity, in the few cases in which it is asserted, is asserted more as a matter of duty than of conviction. Nobody, who can help it, preaches the old-fashioned doctrine of God's sovereignty, expressed in the dogma of unconditional election and reprobation. The vicarious Atonement has hardly a friend left. The Deity of Jesus is questioned, his simple humanity is asserted and is gaining credence. Orthodox is a term which implies as much

reproach as commendation; people are beginning to laugh at the claims of councils and synods, and to be quite merry at the idea of excommunication.

In literature and art there is the same tendency. Poetry in the last century hardly existed, and was, so far as it did exist, mainly ethical or descriptive. It had no revelations of the Infinite. Prose writers under Protestantism have been historians, critics, essayists, or controversalists; they have aimed almost exclusively at the elevation or adornment of the material order, and in scarcely an instance has a widely popular writer exalted God at the expense of man, the church at the expense of the state, faith at the expense of reason, or eternity at the expense of time. Art is finite, and gives us busts and portraits, or copies of Greek and Roman models. The physical sciences take precedence of the metaphysical, and faith in rail-roads and steam-boats is much stronger than in ideas.

In governments, the tendency is the same. Nothing is more characteristic of Protestantism, than its influence in promoting civil and political liberty. Under its reign all forms of governments verge towards the democratic. "The king and the church" are exchanged for the "constitution and the people." Liberty, not order, is the word that wakes the dead, and electrifies the masses. A social science is created, and the physical well-being of the humblest laborer is cared for, and made a subject of deliberation in the councils of nations.

Industry has received in Protestant countries its grandest developments. Since the time of Luther, it has been performing one continued series of miracles. Every corner of the globe is explored; the most distant and perilous seas are navigated; the most miserly soil is laid under contribution; manufactures, villages and cities spring up and increase as by enchantment; canals and rail-roads are crossing the country in every direction; the means of production, the comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of life are multiplied to an extent hardly safe to relate.

Such, in its most general aspect, in its dominant tendency, is Protestantism. It is a new and much improved edition of the classics. Its civilization belongs to the same order as that of Greece and Rome. It is in advance, greatly in advance, of Greece and Rome, but it is the same in its ground-work. The material predominates over the spiritual. Men labor six days for this world and at most but one for

the world to come. The great strife is for temporal goods, fame, or pleasure. God, the soul, heaven, and eternity, are thrown into the back ground, and almost entirely disappear in the distance. Right yields to expediency, and duty is measured by utility. The real character of Protestantism, the result to which it must come, wherever it can have its full development, may be best seen in France, at the close of the last century. The church was converted into the pantheon, and made a resting place for the bodies of the great and renowned of earth; God was converted into a symbol of the human reason, and man into the man-machine; spiritualism fell, and the revolution marked the complete triumph of materialism.

CHAPTER V.—REACTION OF SPIRITUALISM.

What I have said of the Protestant world cannot be applied to the present century without some important qualifications. Properly speaking, Protestantism finished its work and expired in the French revolution at the close of the last century. Since then there has been a reaction in favor of spiritualism.

Men incline to exclusive spiritualism in proportion to their want of faith in the practicability of improving their earthly condition. This accounts for the predominance of spiritualism in the church. The church grew up and constituted itself amidst the crash of a falling world, when all it knew or could conceive of material well-being was crumbling in ruins around it. Greece and Rome were the prey of merciless barbarians. Society was apparently annihilated. Order there was none. Security for person, property, or life, seemed almost the extravagant vagary of some mad enthusiast. Lawless violence, brutal passion, besotting ignorance, tyrants and their victims, were the only spectacles presented to win men's regard for the earth, or to inspire them with faith and hope to labor for its improvement. To the generation of that day, when the North disgorged itself upon the South, the earth must have appeared forsaken by its Maker, and abandoned to the devil and his ministers. It was a wretched land; it could yield no supply; and the only solace for the soul was to turn away from it to another and a better world, to the world of spirit; to that world where tyrants do not enter, where wrongs and oppression, sufferings and grief, find no admission; where mutations and insecurity are unknown, and where the poor earth-wanderer,

the time-worn pilgrim, may at length find that repose, that fulness of joy which he craved, which he sought but found not below. This view was natural, it was inevitable; and it could lead only to exclusive spiritualism—mysticism.

But when the external world has been somewhat meliorated, and men find that they have some security for their persons and property, that they may count with some degree of certainty on to-morrow, faith in the material order is produced and confirmed. One improvement prepares another. Success inspires confidence in future efforts. And this was the case at the epoch of the reformation. Men had already made great progress in the material order, in their temporal weal. Their faith in it kept pace with their progress, or more properly, outran it. It continued to extend till it became almost entire and universal. The eighteenth century will be marked in the annals of the world for its strong faith in the material order. Meliorations on the broadest scale were contemplated and viewed as already realized. Our republic sprang into being, and the world leaped with joy that "a man child was born." Social progress and the perfection of governments became the religious creed of the day; the weal of man on earth, the spring and aim of all hopes and labors. A new paradise was imaged forth for man, inaccessible to the serpent, more delightful than that which Adam lost, and more attractive than that which the pious Christian hopes to gain. We of this generation can form only a faint conception of the strong faith our fathers had in the progress of society, the high hopes of human improvement they indulged, and the joy too big for utterance, with which they heard France in loud and kindling tones proclaim *Liberty* and *Equality*. France for a moment became the centre of the world. All eyes were fixed on her movements. The pulse stood still when she and her enemies met, and loud cheers burst from the universal heart of humanity when her tri-colored flag was seen to wave in triumph over the battle-field. There was then no stray thought for God and eternity. Man and the world filled the soul. They were too big for it. But while the voice of hope was yet ringing, and *Te Deum* shaking the arches of the old cathedrals,—the convention, the reign of Terror, the exile of patriots, the massacre of the gifted, the beautiful, and the good, Napoleon and the military despotism came, and humanity uttered a piercing shriek, and fell prostrate on the grave of her hopes!

The reaction produced by the catastrophe of this memorable drama was tremendous. There are still lingering among us those who have not forgotten the recoil they experienced when they saw the republic swallowed up, or preparing to be swallowed up, in the empire. Men never feel what they felt but once. The pang which darts through their souls changes them into stone. From that moment enthusiasm died, hope in social melioration ceased to be indulged, and those who had been the most sanguine in their anticipations, hung down their heads and said nothing; the warmest friends of humanity apologized for their dreams of liberty and equality; democracy became an accusation, and faith in the perfectibility of mankind a proof of disordered intellect.

In consequence of this reaction, men again despaired of the earth; and when they despair of the earth, they always take refuge in heaven; when man fails them, they always fly to God. They had trusted materialism too far—they would now not trust it at all. They had hoped too much—they would now hope nothing. The future, which had been to them so bright and promising, was now overspread with black clouds; the ocean on which they were anxious to embark was lashed into rage by the storm, and presented only images of dismasted or sinking ships and drowning crews. They turned back and sighed for the serene past, the quiet and order of old times, for the mystic land of India, where the soul may dissolve in ecstasy and dream of no change.

At the very moment when the sigh had just escaped, that mystic land reappeared. The English, through the East India company, had brought to light its old literature and philosophy, so diverse from the literature and philosophy of modern Europe or of classical antiquity, and men were captivated by their novelty and bewildered by their strangeness. Sir William Jones gave currency to them by his poetical paraphrases and imitations; and the Asiatic society by its researches placed them within reach of the learned of Europe. The church rejoiced, for it was like bringing back her long lost mother, whose features she had remembered and was able at once to recognize. Germany, England, and even France became oriental. Cicero, and Horace, and Virgil, Æschylus, Euripedes, and even Homer, with Jupiter, Apollo, and Minerva were forced to bow before Hindoo bards and gods of uncouth forms and unutterable names.

The influence of the old Braminical or spiritual world, thus dug up from the grave of centuries, may be traced in all our philosophy, art and literature. It is remarkable in our poets. It moulds the form in Byron, penetrates to the ground in Wordsworth, and entirely predominates in the Schlegels. It causes us to feel a new interest in those writers and those epochs which partake the most of spiritualism. Those old English writers who were somewhat inclined to mysticism are revived; Plato, who traveled in the East and brought back its lore which he modified by western genius and moulded into Grecian forms, is re-edited, commented on, translated, and raised to the highest rank among philosophers. The middle ages are re-examined and found to contain a treasure of romance, acuteness, depth, and wisdom, and are deemed by some to be "dark ages" only because we have not light enough to read them.

Materialism in philosophy is extinct in Germany. It is only a reminiscence in France, and it produces no remarkable work in England or America. Phrenology, which some deem materialism, has itself struck materialism with death in Gall's work, by showing that we are conscious of phenomena within us which no metaphysical alchemy can transmute into sensations.

Protestantism, since the commencement of the present century, in what it has peculiar to itself, has ceased to gain ground. Rationalism in Germany retreats before the Evangelical party; the Genevan church makes few proselytes; English and American Unitarianism, on the plan of Priestley and Belsham, avowedly material, and being, as it were, the jumping-off place from the church to absolute infidelity, is evidently on the decline. There is probably not a man in this country, however much and justly he may esteem Priestley and Belsham, as bold and untiring advocates of reason and of humanity, who would be willing to assume the defence of all their opinions. On the other hand Catholicism has revived, offered some able apologies for itself, made some eminent proselytes, and alarmed many Protestants, even among ourselves.

Indeed everywhere is seen a decided tendency to spiritualism. The age has become weary of uncertainty. It sighs for repose. Controversy is nearly ended, and a sentiment is extensively prevailing, that it is a matter of very little consequence what a man believes, or what formulas of worship he adopts, if he only have a right spirit. Men, who

a few years ago were staunch rationalists, now talk of Spiritual Communion; and many, who could with difficulty be made to admit the inspiration of the Bible, are now ready to admit the inspiration of the sacred books of all nations; and instead of stumbling at the idea of God's speaking to a few individuals, they see no reason why he should not speak to everybody. Some are becoming so spiritual that they see no necessity of matter; others so refine matter that it can offer no resistance to the will, making it indeed move as the spirit listeth; others still believe that all wisdom was in the keeping of the priests of ancient India, Egypt, and Persia, and fancy the world has been deteriorating for four thousand years, instead of advancing. Men go out from our midst to Europe, and come back half Catholics, sighing to introduce the architecture, the superstition, the rites, and the sacred symbols of the middle ages.

A universal cry is raised against the frigid utilitarianism of the last century. Money-getting, desire for worldly wealth and renown, are spoken of with contempt, and men are evidently leaving the outward for the inward, and craving something more fervent, living, and soul-kindling. All this proves that we have changed from what we were; that, though materialism yet predominates and appears to have lost none of its influence, it is becoming a tradition; and that there is a new force collecting to expel it. Protestantism passes into the condition of a reminiscence. Protestant America cannot be aroused against the Catholics. A mob may burn a convent from momentary excitement, but the most protestant of the Protestants among us will petition the legislature to indemnify the owners. Indeed, Protestantism died in the French revolution, and we are beginning to become disgusted with its dead body. The East has reappeared, and spiritualism revives; will it again become supreme? Impossible.

CHAPTER VI.—MISSION OF THE PRESENT.

We of the present century must either dispense with all religious instructions, reproduce spiritualism or materialism, or we must build a new church, organize a new institution free from the imperfections of those which have been.

The first is out of the question. Men cannot live in a perpetual anarchy. They must and will embody their ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good—the holy, in some

institution. They must answer in some way the questions, What is the holy? What is the true destination of man?

To reproduce spiritualism or materialism, were an anomaly in the development of humanity. Humanity does not traverse an eternal circle; it advances; it does not come round to its starting-point, but goes onward in one endless career of progress towards the infinite, the perfect.

Besides, it is impossible. Were it desirable, neither spiritualism nor materialism can to any considerable extent, or for any great length of time, become predominant. We cannot bring about that state of society which is the indispensable condition of the exclusive dominion of either.

Spiritualism just now revives; its friends may anticipate a victory; but they will be disappointed. Spiritualism, as an exclusive system, reigns only when men have no faith in material interests; and in order to have no faith in material interests, we must virtually destroy them; we must have absolute despotism, a sacerdotal caste, or we must have another decline and fall like that of the Roman empire, and a new irruption like that of the Goths, Vandals, and Huns.

None of these things are possible. There are no more Goths, Vandals, or Huns. The north of Europe is civilized. Northern and central Asia is in the process of civilization through the influence of Russia; England is mingling the arts and sciences of the West with the spiritualism of India; France and the colony of Liberia secure Africa; the Aborigines of this continent will in a few years have vanished before the continued advance of the European races; merchants and missionaries will do the rest. No external forces can then ever be collected to destroy civilization and compel the human race to commence its work anew.

Internally, modern civilization has nothing to fear. It contains no seeds of destruction. A real advance has been made. A vast fund of experience has been accumulated and is deposited in so many different languages, that we can hardly conceive it possible that it should be wholly lost or greatly diminished. The art of printing, unknown to Greek and Roman civilization, multiplies books to such an extent, that it is perfectly idle to dream of any catastrophe, unless it be the destruction of the world itself, which will reduce them to a few precious fragments like those left us of classical antiquity.

There is, too, a remarkable difference in the diffusion of knowledge. In the best days of classical antiquity, the

number of the enlightened was but small. The masses were enveloped in thick darkness. Now the masses have been to school, and are going to school. The millions, who then were in darkness, now behold light springing up. The loss of one individual, however prominent he may be, is not felt. Another is immediately found to fill his place.

Liberty exists also to a much greater extent. The rights of man are better comprehended and secured. The individual man is a greater being than he was in Greece or Rome. He has a higher consciousness of his worth, and he is more respected, and his interests are felt to be more sacred.

Labor has become more honorable. In Greece and Rome labor was menial; it was performed by slaves, at least by the ignorant and brutish. Slavery is disappearing. It has only a small corner of the civilized world left to it. As slavery disappears, as labor comes to be performed by freemen, it will rise to the rank of a liberal profession, and men of character and influence will be laborers.

The improvements in the arts of production have become so extensive, and the means of creating and accumulating wealth are so distributed, and the amount of wealth has already become so great and is shared by so many, that it is impossible that there should ever come again a scene of general poverty and wretchedness to make men despair of the earth, and abandon themselves wholly to the dreams of a spirit-land. There must always remain something to hope from the material order, and consequently, whatever may be the influence of a sudden panic, or a momentary affright, always a check to the absolute dominion of spiritualism.

Nor can materialism become sovereign again. It contains the elements of its own defeat. The very dicipline, which materialism demands to support itself, in the end neutralizes its dominion. As soon as men find themselves well off in a worldly point of view, they discover that they have wants which the world does not and cannot satisfy. The training demanded to insure success in commerce, industrial enterprises, or politics, strengthens faculties which crave something superior to commerce, to mere industry, or to politics. The merchant would not be always estimating the hazards of speculation; he dreams of his retirement from business, his splendid mansion, his refined hospitality, a library, and studious ease; the mechanic looks forward to a time when he shall have leisure to care for something besides

merely animal wants; and the politician to his release from the cares and perplexities of a public life, to a quiet retreat, to a dignified old age, spent in plans of benevolence, in aiding the cause of education, religion, or philosophy. This low business world, upon which the moralist and the divine look down with so much sorrow, is not quite so low after all, as they think it. It is doing a vast deal to develop the intellect. It is full of high and expanded brows.

It is true that money getting, mere physical utility has at this moment a wide influence, and may absorb the mind and heart quite too much. Still the evil is not unmixed. That man, who tortures his brain, spends his days and nights to accumulate a fortune, is much superior to him who is content to rot in poverty, who has no courage, no energy to attempt to improve his condition. He is a better member of society, is worth more to humanity. It is a great day, even for spiritualism, when all the people of a country are carried away in an industrial direction. Speculation may be rife, frauds may be common; many may become rich by means they care not to make known; many may become discontented; there may be much striving this way and that, much effort to get up, keep up, to pull or to push down; but the many will sharpen their faculties, and gain the leisure and the means and the disposition to attend to the spiritual part of their being. It does my heart good to witness the industrial activity of my countrymen. I see very clearly the evils which attend it; but I also see every year the general level rising, and the moral and intellectual power increasing. So is it too with our political struggles. They quicken thought, give the people the use of language, a consciousness of their power, especially of the power of mind, and upon the whole they do much to elevate the general character. Those quiet times we look back upon and regret, either were not as quiet as we think them, or they were quiet because they had not enough of thought to move them. They were as still, but too often as putrid, as the stagnant pool.

The science which is now introduced into commerce, into the mechanic arts and agricultural pursuits, and which is every day receiving a greater extension and new applications, while it preserves the material order, also keeps alive the spiritual, and gives us a check against the absolute ascendency of materialism.

We cannot then go back either to exclusive spiritualism,

or to exclusive materialism. Both these systems have received so full a development, have acquired so much strength, that neither can be subdued. Both have their foundation in our nature, and both will exist and exert their influence. Shall they exist as antagonist principles? Shall the spirit forever lust against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit? Is the bosom of humanity to be eternally torn by these two contending factions? No. It cannot be. The war must end. Peace must be made.

This discloses our Mission. We are to reconcile spirit and matter; that is, we must realize the atonement. Nothing else remains for us to do. Stand still we cannot. To go back is equally impossible. We must go forward, but we can take not a step forward, but on the condition of uniting these two hitherto hostile principles. Progress is our law and our first step is Union.

The union of spirit and matter was the result contemplated by the mission of Jesus. The church attempted it, but only partially succeeded, and has therefore died. The time had not come for the complete union. Jesus saw this. He knew that the age in which he lived would not be able to realize his conception. He therefore spoke of his "second coming." The church has always had a vague presentiment of its own death, and the birth of a new era when Christ should really reign on earth. For a long time the hierophants have fixed upon ours as the epoch of the commencement of the new order of things. Some have gone even so far as to name this very year, 1836, as the beginning of what they call the millennium.

The particular shape which has been assigned to this new order, this "latter day glory," the name by which it has been designated, amounts to nothing. That some have anticipated a personal appearance of Jesus, and a resurrection of the saints, should not induce us to treat with disrespect the almost unanimous belief of Christendom in a fuller manifestation of Christian truth, and in a more special reign of Christ in a future epoch of the world. All the presentiments of humanity are to be respected. Humanity has a prophetic power.—"Coming events cast their shadows before."

The "second coming" of Christ will be when the idea which he represents, that is, the idea of atonement, shall be fully realized. That idea will be realized by a combination, a union, of the two terms which have received thus far

from the church only a separate development. This union the church has always had a presentiment of; it has looked forward to it, prayed for it; and we are still praying for it, for we still say, "Let thy kingdom come." Nobody believes that the Gospel has completed its work. The church universal and eternal is not yet erected. The corner stone is laid; the materials are prepared. Let then the workmen come forth with joy, and bid the Temple rise. Let them embody the true idea of the God-Man, and Christ will then have come a second time; he will have come in power and great glory, and he will reign, and the whole earth will be glad.

CHAPTER VII.—CHRISTIAN SECTS.

This age must realize the atonement, the union of spirit and matter, the destruction of all antagonism and the production of universal peace.

God has appointed us to build the new church, the one which shall bring the whole family of man within its sacred enclosure, which shall be able to abide the ravages of time, and against which "the gates of hell shall not prevail."

But we can do this only by a general doctrine which enables us to recognise and accept all the elements of humanity. If we leave out any one element of our nature, we shall have antagonism. Our system will be incomplete and the element excluded will be forever rising up in rebellion against it and collecting forces to destroy its authority.

All sects overlook this important truth. None of them seem to imagine that human nature has or should have any hand in the construction of their theories. Instead of studying human nature, ascertaining its elements and its wants, and seeking to conform to them, every sect labors to conform human nature to its own creed. No one dreams of moulding its dogmas to human nature, but every one would mould human nature to its dogmas. Every one is a bed of Procrustes. What is too short must be stretched, what is too long must be docked. No sect ever looks to human nature as the measure of truth; but all look to what they are pleased to call the truth, as the measure of human nature.

This were well enough if human nature had only been made of wax, or some other ductile material. But unfortunately it is very stubborn. It will not bend. It will not

be mutilated. Its laws are permanent and universal; each one of them is eternal and indestructible. They war in vain who war against them. Be they good or be they bad, we must accept them, we must submit to them and do the best we can with them.

But human nature is well made, its laws are just and holy, its elements are true and divine. And this is the hidden sense of that symbol of the God-Man. That symbol teaches all who comprehend it, to find divinity in humanity, and humanity in divinity. By presenting us God and man united in one person, it shows us that both are holy. The Father and Son are one. Therefore we are commanded to honor the Son as we honor the Father, humanity as Divinity, man as well as God. But the church has never understood this. No sect now understands it. Hence the contempt with which all sects treat human nature, and their entire want of confidence in it as a criterion of truth. They must correct themselves. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us."

To reject human nature and declare it unworthy of confidence as the church did, and as all sects now do, is—whether we know it or not—to reject all grounds of certainty, and to declare that we have no means of distinguishing truth from falsehood. Truth itself is nothing else to us than that which our nature by some one or all of its faculties compels us to believe. The fact that God has made us a revelation does not in the least impair this assertion. God has revealed to us truths which we could not of ourselves have discovered. But how do we know this? What is it but the human mind that can determine whether God has or has not spoken to us? What but the human mind can ascertain and fix the meaning of what he may have communicated? If we may not trust the human mind, human nature, how can we ever be sure that a revelation has been made? or how distinguish a real revelation from a pretended one? By miracles? But how determine that what are alleged to be miracles, really are miracles? or the more difficult question still, that the miracles, admitting them to be genuine, do necessarily involve the truth of the doctrines they are wrought to prove? Shall we be told that we must believe the revelation is a true one, because made by an authorized teacher? Where is the warrant of his authority? What shall assure us that the warrant is not forgery? Have we any thing but our own nature with

which to answer these and a hundred more questions like them and equally important?

If human nature has the ability and the right to answer these questions, where are the limits of its ability and its right? If we trust it when it assures us God has spoken to us, and when it interprets what he has spoken, where shall we not trust it? If it be no criterion of truth, why do we trust it here? And if it be, why do we disclaim it elsewhere? Why declare it worthy of confidence in one case and not in another? It is the same in all cases, in all its degrees; and whether it testifies to that which is little, or to that which is great, it is the same, and its testimony is of precisely the same validity.

If we admit that human nature is the measure of truth, —of truth for us, human beings—then we admit that it is the criterion by which all sects must be tested. It is then the touchstone of truth. Every sect must be approved or condemned according to its decision. No sect must blame humanity for not believing its doctrines. If after they have been fairly presented and fully comprehended they are rejected, they are proved to be false, or at least to be only partially true. It is no recommendation to advocate doctrines repugnant to human nature; nor is it any reproach to defend those which are pleasing to the natural heart. Humanity loves the truth and can be satisfied with nothing else. The sect, then, which ceases to make converts should abandon or enlarge its creed.

Sects in general are and will be slow to learn this truth. Each sect, because it has all the truth to be seen from its stand-point, takes it for granted that it has the whole truth. It does not even dream that there may be other stand-points, from which other truths may be seen, or the same truths under other aspects; and therefore it concludes when its doctrines are rejected, that they are rejected because human nature is perverse or impotent, because men cannot or will not see the truth, or because they naturally hate it. Let it change its position and it will soon learn that the horizon, which it took to be the boundary of truth, was in fact only the boundary of its own vision.

All sects, however, have their truth and are serviceable to humanity. Each one has a special doctrine which gives prominence to some one element of our nature, and is therefore satisfactory to all in whom that element predominates. But as that element, however important a one it may be, is

not the whole of human nature, and as it can hardly be predominant alike in all men, no sect can satisfy entire humanity. Each sect does something to develop and satisfy the separate elements of humanity, but no one can develop and satisfy all the elements of humanity and satisfy them as a whole.

Spiritualism and materialism are the two most comprehensive sectarian doctrines which have ever been proclaimed. But neither of these is comprehensive enough. Either may satisfy a large class of wants, but each must leave a class equally as large unsatisfied. One has always been opposed by the other, and mutual opposition has finally destroyed them both. Humanity is still sighing for what it has not. It is seeking rest but finds none. And rest it will not find, till its untiring friends gain a stand-point, from which, as with one grand panoramic view, they may take in all its elements in their relative proportions, and exact distances, in their diversity and in their unity, till they have gone up and down the earth and collected and brought together its disjointed members, which contending sects have torn asunder, and moulded them into one complete and lovely form of truth and holiness.

Where is the Christian sect that is engaged in this work? Where is the one that deems it desirable or possible? All the sects of Christendom, so far as it concerns their dominant tendency, fall into the category of spiritualism, or into that of materialism. Catholicism is virtually the church of the middle ages. It is but a reminiscence. It has no life, at least no healthy existence. It belongs to spiritualism, Calvinism, bating some few modifications produced by Protestant influence, is only a continuation of Catholicism. It is decidedly spiritualistic. Its prayers, its hymns and homilies are deeply imprinted with spiritualism. It repels the material order, and exhorts us to crucify the flesh, to disregard the world and to think only of God, the soul, and eternity.

In the opinion of the Calvinist, the world lies under the curse of the Almighty. It is a wretched land, a vale of tears, of disease and death. There is no happiness below. It is vain, almost impious, to wish it till death comes to release us from the infirmities of the flesh. As long as we live we sin; we must carry about a weary load, an overwhelming burthen, a body of death. Man is a poor, depraved creature. He is smitten with a curse, and the curse spreads over his whole nature. There is nothing good

within him. Of himself he can obtain, he can do, nothing good. He is unclean in the sight of God. His sacrifices are an abomination, and his holiest prayers are sinful. His will is perverted; his affections are all on the side of evil; his reason is deprived of its light, it is blind and impotent, and will lead those who trust to its guidance down to hell.

By its doctrine of "foreordination," Calvinism annihilates man. It allows him no independent causality. It permits him to move only as a preordaining and irresistible will moves him. It makes him a thing, not a person, with properties but without faculties or rights. Whatever his destiny, however cruel, he has no right to complain. Spirit is absolute and has the right to receive him into blessedness or send him away into everlasting punishment, without any regard to his own wishes, merit or demerit. Hence Calvinists always give supremacy to the spiritual order. They fled from England to this then wilderness world, because they would not conform to a church established by the state; and when here they constituted the church superior to the state. In theory the Pilgrims made the state a mere function of the church. In order to be a citizen it was necessary that one should first be a church member. And for the last twenty years the great body of Calvinists throughout our whole country have been exerting all their skill and influence to raise the church to that eminence from which it may overlook the state, control its deliberations, and decide its measures.

His doctrine of "hereditary total depravity" has always compelled the Calvinist to reject reason and to rely on authority—to seek faith, not conviction. Protestant influences prevent him in these days from submitting to an infallible pope, but he indemnifies himself by infallible creeds, councils, synods, and assemblies. Or if these fail him, he can ascribe infallibility to the "written Word." Always does he prohibit himself the free exercise of his own understanding, and prescribe bounds beyond which reason and reasoning must not venture.

By the dogma of Christ's vicarious death, he takes his stand decidedly with spiritualism, denies the atonement, loses sight of the Mediator, and rejects the God-Man. He cannot then build the new church, the church truly universal and eternal. It is in vain that we ask him to destroy all antagonism. He does not even wish to do it; before the foundations of the world, its origin and eternity were decreed.

God and the devil, the saint and the sinner, in his estimation, are alike immortal.

Universalism would seem to a superficial observer to be what we need. Its friends call it the doctrine of universal reconciliation, and they group around the love of God that which constitutes the real harmony and unity of creation. But Universalists do not understand themselves. They have a vague sense of the truth, but not a clear perception of it. As soon as they begin to explain themselves, they file off either to the ranks of spiritualism, or of materialism.

The larger number of Universalists, among whom is, or was, the chief of the sect, contend that all sin originates in the flesh and must end with it. The flesh ends at death, when it is deposited in the tomb; therefore, "he that is dead is freed from sin." Sin is the cause of all suffering; when sin ends, suffering ends. Sin ends at death, and therefore after death no suffering, but universal happiness.

This doctrine is as decidedly spiritualism as oriental spiritualism itself. If the body be the cause of all sin, it certainly deserves no respect. It is a vile thing, and should be despised, mortified, punished, annihilated. Universalists do not draw this inference, but they avoid it only by really denying that there is any sin, or at least by considering the consequences of sin of too little importance to be dreaded.

The body, however, according to this doctrine is a curse. Man would be better off without it than he is with it. It deserves nothing on its own account. Wherefore then shall I labor to make it comfortable? I shall be released from it to-morrow, and enter into a world of unutterable joy. Let my lodging to-night be on the bare ground, in the open air, destitute of a few conveniences, what imports it? Can I not afford to forego a pleasant lodging for one night, since I am ever after to be filled and overflowing with blessedness? Universalism, then, according to this exposition of it, must inevitably lead to neglect of the material order. Its legitimate result would be, not licentiousness, but a dreaming, contemplative life, wasting itself away in idleness, watching the motion of the sun, and wishing it to move faster, so that we may be the sooner translated from this miserable world, where nothing is worth laboring for, to our Father's kingdom where are music and dancing, songs and feasting forever and ever.

Universalists have, however, existing side by side with this exclusive spiritualism, some strong tendencies to mate-

rialism. Spiritualism and materialism are nearly balanced in their minds, and constitute, not a union of spirit and matter, but a parallelism which has no tendency to union. But when the true doctrine of the atonement is proclaimed, Universalists will be among the first believers. None will rejoice more than they, to see the new church rise from the ruins of the old, and none will attend more readily or with more zeal at its consecration.

Unitarianism belongs to the material order. It is the last word of Protestantism, before Protestantism breaks entirely with the Past. It is the point towards which all Protestant sects converge in proportion as they gain upon their reminiscences. Every consistent Protestant Christian must be a Unitarian. Unitarianism elevates man; it preaches morality; it vindicates the rights of the mind, accepts and uses the reason, contends for civil freedom, and is social, charitable, and humane. It saves the Son of man, but sometimes loses the Son of God.

But it is from the Unitarians that must come out the doctrine of universal reconciliation; for they are the only denomination in Christendom that labors to rest religious faith on rational conviction; that seeks to substitute reason for authority, to harmonize religion and science, or that has the requisite union of piety and mental freedom, to elaborate the doctrine which is to realize the atonement. The orthodox, as they are called, are disturbed by their memory. Their faces are on the back side of their heads. They have zeal, energy, perseverance, but their ideas belong to the past. The Universalists can do nothing till some one arises to give them a philosophy. They must comprehend their instincts, before they can give to their doctrine of reconciliation that character which will adapt it to the wants of entire humanity.

But Unitarians are every day breaking away more and more from tradition, and every day making new progress in the creation of a philosophy which explains humanity, determines its wants and the means of supplying them. Mind at this moment is extremely active among them, and as it can act freely it will most certainly elaborate the great doctrine required. They began in rationalism. Their earlier doctrines were dry and cold. And this was necessary. They were called at first to a work of destruction. They were under the necessity of clearing away the rubbish of the old church, before they could obtain a site whereon

to erect the new one. The Unitarian preacher was under the necessity of raising a stern and commanding voice in the wilderness, "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." He raised that voice, and the chief priests and Pharisees in modern Judea heard and trembled, and some have gone forth to be baptised. The Unitarian has baptised them with water unto repentance, but he has borne witness that a mightier than he shall come after him, who shall baptise them with the Holy Ghost and with fire.

When the Unitarian appeared, there was on this whole earth no spot for the Temple of the living God, the temple of reason, love and peace. For such a spot he contended. He has obtained it. He has begun the Temple; its foundations already appear, and although the workmen must yet work with their arms in one hand, he will see it completed, consecrated, and filled with the glory of the Lord.

CHAPTER VIII.—INDICATIONS OF THE ATONEMENT.

The church was the result of three causes, the Asiatic conquests of the Romans, the Alexandrian school of philosophy, and the Christian movement of the people.

By the Asiatic conquests of the Romans, spiritualism and materialism were brought together upon the same theatre, and placed in the condition necessary to their union. Eastern and western ideas were mingled in strange confusion throughout the whole of the Roman empire during the first three centuries of our era, and the attempt to unite them, to combine them into a regular and harmonious system could hardly fail to be made.

This attempt was made by the Alexandrian philosophers. These philosophers called themselves eclectics. Their avowed object was to unite the East and the West, European and Asiatic ideas, to reduce to a regular system the ideas of all the various schools of philosophy. They did it as perfectly as they could with the lights they had and the experiments they had made.

The Christian movement of the people was apparently very unlike that of the Alexandrian. The early Christians were the furthest in the world from being philosophers. They were inspired. They were moved by an impulse of which they asked, and could have given, no account. God moved in them, and spoke through them; gave them a lofty enthusiasm, a resistless energy of character, and prepared them to do, to dare, and to suffer any thing and every

thing. At his command they went forth to conquer the world, and they did conquer it; not, as it has been well remarked, by killing, but by dying.

We understand to-day what it was that moved the early Christians. What was inspiration in them is philosophy in us. They had an instinctive sense of the synthesis of spirit and matter. Yet they thought nothing of spirit and matter. They disturbed themselves not in the least with spiritualism and materialism, with the East and the West, with Europe and Asia. They saw mankind sunk in sin and misery, weary and heavy laden, and they went forth strong in the Lord to raise them to virtue, to convert them to Christ and to give them rest. They did not speculate, they did not reason—they saw and felt and acted.

These and the Alexandrians met, and the church was the result. The share of the Alexandrians in the construction of the church has always been acknowledged to be very great. Perhaps it was greater than any have suspected. Certain it is that they furnished the fathers their philosophy, and they may be pronounced without much hesitation, the real elaborators—not of Christianity, but of the dogmas of the church.

All men feel more or less the desire to account to themselves for what they are. For a time they may be carried away by a force not their own, and they may be so engrossed with varied and exciting action and events, that they have no time to think; but at the first moments of calmness and self-consciousness they will ask what has moved them, what was the power which carried them away and whither have they been borne. This was the case with the early Christians. The first excitement over, and the visits of inspiration having become less frequent, they desired to explain themselves to themselves, to give a name to the instincts they had obeyed, to the Divinity which had moved them, and to the destiny they had been fulfilling. The Alexandrians answered all their questions. They explained the Christians to themselves, and henceforth their explanations were counted Christianity.

These three causes of the old church, or analogous ones, reappear to-day for the first time since that epoch; and is not their reappearance an indication that a new church is about to be built?

The East and the West are again on the same theatre. The British by means of the East India company have

reconquered the father-land of spiritualism, and brought up from the graves of ages its old literature and philosophy, and mingled them with those of the West, the father-land of materialism. The church itself has introduced not a little spiritualism into Christian civilization, while Protestantism by encouraging the study of the classics has reproduced Greece and Rome. The two worlds, the two civilizations, the two systems to be atoned or united are now in very nearly the same relative condition as they were at the birth of the church. They are thrown together into the crucible.

Alexandria, too, is reproduced with the modifications and improvements which two thousand years could not fail to effect. Eclecticism is declared to be the philosophy of the nineteenth century. Not one of the exclusive systems, which obtained during the last century, has now any life. Materialism is a tradition even in France; idealism has exhausted itself in Germany, and England has no philosophy.

Schelling had at least a presentiment of eclecticism in his doctrine of identity; Hegel has greatly abridged the labors of its friends; Fries and his disciples observe its method, and Jacobi virtually embraced it. In our own country it has produced no great work, and perhaps will not; but it is avowed by many of the best minds among us, and is the only philosophy we have, that has not ceased to make proselytes.

In France, however, eclecticism has received its fullest developments. M. Cousin has all but perfected it. He has presented us the last results of the philosophical labors of his predecessors and contemporaries, and furnished us with a method by which we may construct a philosophy which may truly be called the science of the absolute, a philosophy which need not fear the mutations of time and space, and may be sure that its sovereignty will be complete and undisputed as fast and as far as it comes to be understood.

M. Cousin has not only given us, as it were, a geometrical demonstration of the existence of nature and of God, but he has also demonstrated that humanity, nature, and God have precisely the same laws, that what we find in nature and humanity we may also find in God, and that when we have once risen to God, we may come back and find again in nature and humanity all that we had found in him. This at once destroys all antithesis between spirit and matter, between God and man, gives man a kindred nature with

God, makes him an image or manifestation of God, and paves the way for universal reconciliation and peace. If God be holy, man, inasmuch as he has the very elements of the Divinity, is also holy. God and man may then unite in an everlasting and holy union, Justice and Mercy kiss each other, and—all antagonism is destroyed.

The third cause, the inspiration of the people, is no less remarkable now than it was in the first centuries of our era. When God would produce a great result, one which requires the coöperation of vast multitudes, he does not merely inspire one man; he does not speak plainly in distinct propositions to a few, and leave them to speak to the many; but he gives an impulse to the masses, and carries away all the world in the direction of the object to be gained. People seem to themselves to be acting from their own impulses, and to be obeying their own convictions; but they are borne along by an invisible and resistless power towards an end of which they have a vague presentiment, but no distinct vision.

This is the case now. The time has come for a new church, for a new synthesis of the elements of the life of humanity. The end to be attained is union. How would an inspiration designed to give the energy, the power to attain this end be most likely to manifest itself; in what way could it manifest itself but by giving the people an irresistible longing for union, and a tendency to unite, to associate on all occasions and for all purposes not inconsistent with union itself? And what is the most striking characteristic of this age? Is it not the tendency to association, a tendency so strong that it appears to the cool spectator like a monomania?

This tendency shows itself everywhere. All over Christendom, men seem mad for associations. They associate for almost every thing, to promote science, literature, art, and industry, to circulate the Bible, to distribute religious tracts, to diffuse useful knowledge, to improve and extend education, to meliorate governments and laws, to soften the rigors of the prison-house, to aid the sick, to relieve the poor, to prevent pauperism, to free the slave, to send out missionaries, and to evangelize the world. And—what deserves to be remarked—all these associations, various as they are, really propose in every instance a great and glorious end. They all are formed for useful, moral, religious, philosophical, philanthropical, or humane purposes. They may be

badly managed, they may fail in accomplishing what they propose, but that which they propose deserves to be accomplished. Sectarians may control them; but in all cases their ends are broader than any sect, than all sects, and they alike commend themselves to the consciences and the prayers of mankind. In some of these associations, sects long and widely separated come together, and find to their mutual satisfaction that they have a common ground, and a ground which each one instinctively admits to be higher and holier than any merely sectarian ground.

This tendency too is triumphing over all obstacles. Sects, which opposed this or that association because principally under the control of this or that sect, have slowly and reluctantly ceased their opposition, and have finally acquiesced. Individuals, who for a time resorted to ridicule and abuse to check associations, are now silent, and they stand amazed as did those who listened to the apostles on the day of Pentecost. Those who apprehended great evils from them now seek to withstand them only by counter associations. To resist them is in fact out of the question. One might as well resist the whirlwind. There is a more than human power at the bottom of them. They come from God, from a divine inspiration given to the people to build the new church and realize the atonement, a universal and everlasting association.

This tendency or inspiration will, in a few days, meet the eclectic movement, if it have not already met it; and what shall prevent a result similar to that which followed the meeting of the early Christian inspiration and the Alexandrian eclecticism? This inspiration is, indeed, at this moment, apparently blind, but it and modern philosophy tend to the same end. They have then the same truth at bottom. They must then have a natural affinity with one another. They will then come together. The philosophy will explain and enlighten the inspiration. They who are now mad for associations will comprehend the power which has moved them, they will see the end towards which they have been tending without their knowing it, and they will give to the philosopher in return zeal, energy, enthusiasm, and there will then be both the light and the force needed to construct the new church.

And I think I see some indications that this meeting of inspiration and philosophy is already taking place. Something like it has occurred in Germany, in that movement

commenced by Herder, but best represented by Schleiermacher, a man remarkable for warmth of feeling, and coolness of thought, a preacher and a philosopher, a theologian and a man of science, a student and a man of business. It was attempted in France, where it gave birth to "Nouveau Christianisme," but without much success, because it is not a new Christianity but a new church that is required.

But the plainest indications of it are at home. In this country more than in any other is the man of thought united in the same person with the man of action. The people here have a strong tendency to profound and philosophic thought, as well as to skilful, energetic and persevering action. The time is not far distant when our whole population will be philosophers, and all our philosophers will be practical men. This is written on almost every man's brow in characters so plain that he who runs may read. This characteristic of our population fits us above all other nations to bring out and realize great and important ideas. Here too is the freedom which other nations want, and the faith in ideas which can be found nowhere else. Philosophers in other countries may think and construct important theories, but they can realize them only to a very limited extent. But here every idea may be at once put to a practical test, and if true it will be realized. We have the field, the liberty, the disposition, and the faith to work with ideas. It is here, then, that must first be brought out and realized the true idea of the atonement. We already seem to have a consciousness of this, and it is therefore that we are not and cannot be surprised to find the union of popular inspiration with profound philosophical thought manifesting itself more clearly here than anywhere else.

The representative of this union here is a body of individuals rather than a single individual. The many with us are every thing, the individual almost nothing. One man, however, stands out from this body, a more perfect type of the synthesis of eclecticism and inspiration than any one else. I need not name him.* Philosophers consult him, and the people hear his voice and follow him. His connexion with a particular denomination may have exposed him to some unfriendly criticism, but he is in truth one of the most pop-

*Dr. William Ellery Channing, the person here referred to, was regarded by the Unitarians as their most prominent and genuine representative, at the time the *New Views* was written.—Ed.

ular men of the age. His voice finds a response in the mind and in the heart of humanity.

His active career commenced with the new century, in the place where it should, and in the only place where it could, —in the place where a republic had been born and liberty had received her grandest developments and her surest safeguards. There he has continued, and there he has been foremost in laying the foundation of that new church which will soon rise to greet the morning ray, and in which a glad voice will chant the hymn of peace to the evening sun. Few men are so remarkable for their union of deep religious feeling with sound reflection, of sobriety with popular enthusiasm. He reveres God and he reverences man. When he speaks he convinces and kindles.

When rationalism was attacked he appeared in its defence and proclaimed, in a language which still rings in our ears, the imprescriptible rights of the mind. After the first shock of the war upon rationalism had been met, and a momentary truce tacitly declared, he brought out in an ordination sermon the great truth which destroys all antagonism and realizes the atonement. In that sermon—the most remarkable since the Sermon on the Mount—he distinctly recognises and triumphantly vindicates the God-Man. "In ourselves are the elements of the Divinity. God, then, does not sustain a figurative resemblance to man. It is the resemblance of a parent to a child, *the likeness of a kindred nature.*" In this sublime declaration, the son of God is owned. Humanity, after so many years of vain search for a Father, finds itself here openly proclaimed the true child of God.

This declaration gives us the hidden sense of the symbol of the God-Man. By asserting the divinity of humanity, it teaches us that we should not view that symbol as the symbol of two natures in one person, but of kindred natures in two persons. The God-Man indicates not the antithesis of God and man; nor does it stand for a being alone of its kind; but it indicates the homogeneousness of the human and divine natures, and shows that they can dwell together in love and peace. The Son of Man and the Son of God are not two persons but one—a mystery which becomes clear the very moment that the human nature is discovered to have a sameness with the divine.

CHAPTER IX.—THE ATONEMENT.

The great doctrine, which is to realize the atonement and which the symbol of the God-Man now teaches us, is that all things are essentially holy, that every thing is cleansed, and that we must call nothing common or unclean.

"And God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good." And what else could it have been? God is wise, powerful and good; and how can a wise, powerful and good being create evil? God is the great Fountain from which flows every thing that is; how then can there be any thing but good in existence?

Neither spiritualism nor materialism was aware of this truth. Spiritualism saw good only in pure spirit. God was pure spirit and therefore good; but all which could be distinguished from him was evil, and only evil, and that continually. Our good consisted in resemblance to God, that is, in being as like pure spirit as possible. Our duty was to get rid of matter. All the interests of the material order were sinful. St. Augustine declared the flesh, that is the body, to be sin; perfection then could be obtained only by neglecting and, as far as possible, annihilating it. Materialism, on the other hand, had no recognition of spirit. It considered all time and thought and labor bestowed on that which transcends this world as worse than thrown away. It had no conception of inward communion with God. It counted fears of punishment or hopes of reward in a world to come mere idle fancies, fit only to amuse or control the vulgar. It laughed at spiritual joys and griefs, and treated as serious affairs only the pleasures and pains of sense.

But the new doctrine of the atonement reconciles these two warring systems. This doctrine teaches us that spirit is real and holy, that matter is real and holy, that God is holy and that man is holy, that spiritual joys and griefs, and the pleasures and pains of sense, are alike real joys and griefs, real pleasures and pains, and in their places are alike sacred. Spirit and matter, then, are saved. One is not required to be sacrificed to the other; both may and should coexist as separate elements of the same grand and harmonious whole.

The influence of this doctrine cannot fail to be very great. It will correct our estimate of man, of the world, of religion, and of God, and remodel all our institutions. It must in fact create a new civilization as much in advance of ours as ours is in advance of that which obtained in the Roman empire in the time of Jesus.

Hitherto we have considered man as the antithesis of all good. We have loaded him with reproachful epithets and made it a sin in him even to be born. We have uniformly deemed it necessary to degrade him in order to exalt his Creator. But this will end. The slave will become a son. Man is hereafter to stand erect before God as a child before its father. Human nature, at which we have pointed our wit and vented our spleen, will be clothed with a high and commanding worth. It will be seen to be a lofty and deathless nature. It will be felt to be divine, and infinite will be found traced in living characters on all its faculties.

We shall not treat one another then as we do now. Man will be sacred in the eyes of man. To wrong him will be more than crime, it will be sin. To labor to degrade him will seem like laboring to degrade the Divinity. Man will reverence man.

Slavery will cease. Man will shudder at the bare idea of enslaving so noble a being as man. It will seem to him hardly less daring than to presume to task the motions of the Deity and to compel him to come and go at our bidding. When man learns the true value of man, the chains of the captive must be unloosed and the fetters of the slave fall off.

Wars will fail. The sword will be beaten into the ploughshare and the spear into the pruning hook. Man will not dare to mar and mangle the shrine of the Divinity. The God looking out from human eyes will disarm the soldier and make him kneel to him he had risen up to slay. The war-horse will cease to bathe his fetlocks in human gore. He will snuff the breeze in the wild freedom of his native plains, or quietly submit to be harnessed to the plough. The hero's occupation will be gone, and heroism will be found only in saving and blessing human life.

Education will destroy the empire of ignorance. The human mind, allied as it is to the divine, is too valuable to lie waste or to be left to breed only briars and thorns. Those children, ragged and incrusted with filth, which throng our streets, and for whom we must one day build prisons, forge bolts and bars, or erect gibbets, are not only our children, our brother's children, but they are children of God, they have in themselves the elements of the Divinity and powers which when put forth will raise them above what the tallest archangel now is. And when this is seen and felt, will those children be left to fester in ignorance or

to grow up in vice and crime? The whole energy of man's being cries out against such folly, such gross injustice.

Civil freedom will become universal. It will be everywhere felt that one man has no right over another which that other has not over him. All will be seen to be brothers and equals in the sight of their common Father. All will love one another too much to desire to play the tyrant. Human nature will be reverenced too much not to be allowed to have free scope for the full and harmonious development of all its faculties. Governments will become sacred; and while on the one hand they are respected and obeyed, on the other it will be felt to be a religious right and a religious duty, to labor to make them as perfect as they can be.

Religion will not stop with the command to obey the laws, but it will bid us make just laws, such laws as befit a being divinely endowed like man. The church will be on the side of progress, and spiritualism and materialism will combine to make man's earthly condition as near like the lost Eden of the eastern poets, as is compatible with the growth and perfection of his nature.

Industry will be holy. The cultivation of the earth will be the worship of God. Workingmen will be priests, and as priests they will be reverenced, and as priests they will reverence themselves and feel that they must maintain themselves undefiled. He that ministers at the altar must be pure, will be said of the mechanic, the agriculturist, the common laborer, as well as of him who is technically called a priest.

The earth itself and the animals which inhabit it will be counted sacred. We shall study in them the manifestation of God's goodness, wisdom, and power, and be careful that we make of them none but a holy use.

Man's body will be deemed holy. It will be called the temple of the living God. As a temple it must not be desecrated. Men will beware of defiling it by sin, by any excessive or improper indulgence, as they would of defiling the temple or the altar consecrated to the service of God. Man will reverence himself too much, he will see too much of the holy in his nature ever to pervert it from the right line of truth and duty.

"In that day shall there be on the bells of the horses, *Holiness unto the Lord*; and the pots in the Lord's house shall be as the bowls before the altar. Yea, every pot in

Jerusalem and in Judah shall be Holiness unto the Lord of hosts." The words of the prophet will be fulfilled. All things proceed from God and are therefore holy. Every duty, every act necessary to be done, every implement of industry, or thing contributing to human use or convenience, will be treated as holy. We shall recall even the reverence of the Indian for his bow and arrow, and by enlightening it with a divine philosophy preserve it.

"Pure religion, and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and the widows in their affliction, and to keep one's self unspotted from the world." Religious worship will not be the mere service of the sanctuary. The universe will be God's temple, and its service will be the doing of good to mankind, relieving suffering and promoting joy, virtue, and well-being. By this, religion and morality will be united, and the service of God and the service of man become the same. Our faith in God will show itself by our good works to man. Our love to the Father, whom we have not seen, will be evinced by our love for our brother whom we have seen.

Church and state will become one. The state will be holy, and the church will be holy. Both will aim at the same thing, and the existence of one as separate from the other will not be needed. The church will not be then an outward visible power, coexisting with the state, sometimes controlling it and at other times controlled by it; but it will be within, a true spiritual—not spiritualistic—church, regulating the heart, conscience, and the life.

And when this all takes place the glory of the Lord will be manifested unto the ends of the earth, and all flesh will see it and rejoice together. The time is yet distant before this will be fully realized. We are now realizing it in our theory. We assert the holiness of all things. This assertion becomes an idea, and ideas, if they are true, are omnipotent. As soon as humanity fully possesses this idea, it will lose no time in reducing it to practice. Men will conform their practice to it. They will become personally holy. Holiness will be written on all their thoughts, emotions and actions, on their whole lives. And then will Christ really be formed within, the hope of glory. He will be truly incarnated in universal humanity, and God and man will be one.

CHAPTER X.—PROGRESS.

The actual existence of evil, the effects of which are everywhere so visible, and apparently so deplorable, may seem to be a serious objection to the great doctrine of the atonement, that all things are essentially good and holy; but it will present little difficulty, if we consider that God designed us to be progressive beings, and that we can be progressive beings only on the condition that we be made less perfect than we may become, that we have our point of departure at a distance from our point of destination. We must begin in weakness and ignorance; and if we begin in weakness and ignorance we cannot fail to miss our way, or frequently to want strength to pursue it. To err in judgment or to come short in action will be our unavoidable lot, until we are instructed by experience and strengthened by exertion.

But this is no ground of complaint. We gain more than we lose by it. Had we without any agency of our own been made all that by a proper cultivation of our faculties we may become, we should have been much inferior to what we now are. We could have had no want, no desire, no good to seek, no end to gain, no destiny to achieve—no employment, and no motive to action. Our existence would have been aimless, silent, and unvaried, given apparently for no purpose but to be dreamed away in an eternal and unbroken repose. Who could desire such an existence? Who would prefer it to the existence we now have, liable to error, sin, and misery as it may be?

Constituted as we are, the way is more than the end, the acquisition more than the possession; but had we been made at once all that is promised us by our nature, these would have been nothing; we should indeed have had the end, the possession, but that would have been all. We should have been men without having first been children. Our earlier life, its trials and temptations, its failures and its successes, would never have existed. Would we willingly forego that earlier life? Dear to all men is the memory of childhood and youth; dear too is the recollection of their difficulties and dangers, their struggles with the world or with their own passions. We may regret, do regret, suffer remorse, that we did not put ourselves forth with more energy, that the enemy with which we had to contend was not more manfully met; but who of us is the craven to wish those diffi-

culties and dangers had been less, or that the enemy's forces had been fewer and weaker?

God gave his richest gift when he gave the capacity for progress. This capacity is the chief glory of our nature, the brightest signature of its divine origin and the pledge of its immortality. The being which can make no further progress, which has finished its work, achieved its destiny, attained its end, must die. Why should it live? How could it live? What would be its life? But man never attains his end; he never achieves his destiny; he never finishes his work; he has always something to do, some new acquisition to make, some new height of excellence to ascend, and therefore is he immortal. He cannot die, for his hour never comes. He is never ready. Who would then be deprived of his capacity for progress?

This capacity, though it be the occasion of error and sin, is that which makes us moral beings. Without it we could not be virtuous. A being that does not make himself, his own character, but is made, and made all he is or can be, has no free will, no liberty. He is a thing, not a person, and as incapable of merit or demerit as the sun or moon, earthquakes or volcanoes. As much superior as is a moral to a fatal action, a perfection wrought out in and by one's self to a perfection merely received, as much superior as is a person to a thing, albeit a glorious thing, so much do we gain by being made for progress, by having a capacity for virtue, notwithstanding it be also a capacity for sin, so much superior are we to what we should have been, had we been created full grown men, with all our faculties perfected.

But moral evil, by the superintending care of Providence and the free will of man, is often if not always a means of aiding progress itself. The sinner is not so far from God as the merely innocent. He who has failed is further onward than he who has not been tried. The consequences of error open our eyes to the truth; the consequences of transgression make us regret our departure from duty and try to return; the effort to return gives us the power to return. Thus does moral evil ever work its own destruction. Rightly viewed, it were seen to be no entity, no positive existence, but merely the absence of good, the void around and within us, and which by the enlargement of our being, we are continually filling up. It is not then a person, a thing, a being, and consequently can make nothing

against the doctrine, which asserts the essential holiness of all things.

But men formerly supposed evil to be a substantial existence, as much of an entity as goodness. But then came the difficulty, whence could evil originate? It could not come from a good source, for good will not and cannot produce evil. But evil exists. Then all things do not come from the same source. One good and holy God has not made whatever is. There must be more gods than one. There must be an evil god to create evil, as well as a good God to create good. Hence the notion of two gods, or two classes of gods, one good and the other bad, which runs through all antiquity, and under the terms God and the devil, is reproduced even in the Christian church.

But this notion is easily shown to be unfounded. If one of the two gods depend on the other, then the other must be its cause, its creator. In this case, nothing would be gained. How could a good God create a bad one, or a bad god create a good one? If one does not depend on the other, then both are independent, each is sufficient for itself. A being that is sufficient for itself, that has the grounds of its existence within itself, must be absolute, almighty. There are then two absolutes, two almighties; but this is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms. This notion then must be abandoned. It was abandoned, and the evil was transferred to matter. But matter is either created or it is not. If it be created, then it is dependent, and that on which it is dependent is answerable for its properties. How could a good God have given it evil properties? If it be not created, then it is sufficient for itself; it has the grounds of its own existence within itself; it is then absolute, almighty, and the absurdity of two absolutes, of two almighties, is reproduced.

Still we need not wonder that men, who saw good and evil thickly strown together up and down the earth, the tares every where choking the wheat, should have inferred the existence of two opposite and antagonist principles, as the cause of what they saw. Nor is it at all strange that men, who felt themselves restrained, hemmed in, by the material world, who carried about with them a material body for ever importuning them with its wants and subjecting them to a thousand ills, should have looked upon matter as the cause of all the evil they saw, felt, and endured. As things presented themselves to their observation they judged

rightly. We may, by the aid of a revelation, which shines further into the darkness and spreads a clearer light around us and over the universe than any they had received, be able to correct their errors, and to perceive that the antagonism, in which they believed, has no existence in the world of reality; but we must beware how we censure them for the views they took. They saw what they could see with their light and from their position, and we can do no more. Future generations will have more favorable positions and a stronger and clearer light than we have, and they will be to us what we are to the generations which went before us. As we would escape the condemnation of our children, so should we refrain from condemning our fathers. They did their duty, let us do ours,—serve our own generation without defaming that to which we owe our existence and all that we are. All things are holy, and all doctrines are sacred. All the productions of the ever-teeming brain of man, however fantastic or unsubstantial their forms, are but so many manifestations of humanity, and humanity is a manifestation of the Divinity. The Son of Man is the incarnate God. He who blasphemes the spirit with which he works and fulfils his mission in the flesh, blasphemes the Holy Ghost. Silent then be the tongue that would lisp, palsied the hand that would write the smallest censure upon humanity for any of the opinions it has expressed, however defective, however far from embracing the whole truth, future or more favored inquirers may find them. Humanity is holy, let the proudest kneel in reverence.

This doctrine of progress, not only accounts for the origin of evil and explains its difficulties, but it points out to us our duty. The duty of every being is to follow its destiny, to seek its end. Man's destiny is illimitable progress; his end is everlasting growth, enlargement of his being. Progress is the end for which he was made. To this end, then, it is his duty to direct all his inquiries, all his systems of religion and philosophy, all his institutions of politics and society, all the productions of genius and taste, in one word all the modes of his activity.

This is his duty. Hitherto he has performed it, but blindly, without knowing and without admitting it. Humanity has but to-day, as it were, risen to self-consciousness, to a perception of its own capacity, to a glimpse of its inconceivably grand and holy destiny. Heretofore it has failed to recognize clearly its duty. It has advanced, but not

designedly, not with foresight; it has done it instinctively, by the aid of the invisible but safe-guiding hand of its Father. Without knowing what it did, it has condemned progress, while it was progressing. It has stoned the prophets and reformers, even while it was itself reforming and uttering glorious prophecies of its future condition. But the time has now come for humanity to understand itself, to accept the law imposed upon it for its own good, to foresee its end and march with intention steadily towards it. Its future religion is the religion of progress. The true priests are those who can quicken in mankind a desire for progress, and urge them forward in the direction of the true, the good, the perfect.

CONCLUSION.

Here I must close. I have uttered the words UNION and PROGRESS as the authentic creed of the new church, as designating the whole duty of man. Would they had been spoken in a clearer, a louder and a sweeter voice, that a response might be heard from the universal heart of humanity. But I have spoken as I could, and from a motive which I shall not blush to own either to myself or to him to whom all must render an account of all their thoughts, words, and deeds. I once had no faith in him, and I was to myself "a child without a sire." I was alone in the world, my heart found no companionship, and my affections withered and died. But I have found him, and he is my father, and mankind are my brothers, and I can love and reverence.

Mankind are my brothers,—they are brothers to one another. I would see them no longer mutually estranged. I labor to bring them together, and to make them feel and own that they are all made of one blood. Let them feel and own this, and they will love one another; they will be kindly affectioned one to another, and "the groans of this nether world will cease;" the spectacle of wrongs and outrages oppress our sight no more; tears be wiped from all eyes, and humanity pass from death to life, to life immortal, to the life of God, for God is love.

And this result, for which the wise and the good everywhere yearn and labor, will be obtained. I do not misread the age. I have not looked upon the world only out from the window of my closet; I have mingled in its busy scenes; I have rejoiced and wept with it; I have hoped and feared,

and believed and doubted with it, and I am but what it has made me. I cannot misread it. It craves union. The heart of man is crying out for the heart of man. One and the same spirit is abroad, uttering the same voice in all languages. From all parts of the world voice answers to voice, and man responds to man. There is a universal language already in use. Men are beginning to understand one another, and their mutual understanding will beget mutual sympathy, and mutual sympathy will bind them together and to God.

And for progress too the whole world is struggling. Old institutions are examined, old opinions criticised, even the old church is laid bare to its very foundations, and its holy vestments and sacred symbols are exposed to the gaze of the multitude; new systems are proclaimed, new institutions elaborated, new ideas are sent abroad, new experiments are made, and the whole world seems intent on the means by which it may accomplish its destiny. The individual is struggling to become a greater and a better being. Everywhere there are men laboring to perfect governments and laws. The poor man is admitted to be human, and millions of voices are demanding that he be treated as a brother. All eyes and hearts are turned to education. The cultivation of the child's moral and spiritual nature becomes the worship of God. The priest rises to the educator, and the school-room is the temple in which he is to minister. There is progress; there will be progress. Humanity must go forward. Encouraging is the future. He, who takes his position on the "high table land" of humanity, and beholds with a prophet's gaze his brothers, so long separated, coming together, and arm in arm marching onward and upward toward the perfect, toward God, may hear celestial voices chanting a sweeter strain than that which announced to Judea's shepherds the birth of the Redeemer, and his heart full and overflowing, he may exclaim with old Simeon, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation."

CHURCH OF THE FUTURE.*

[From the Boston Quarterly Review for January, 1842.]

It is not very customary for an author to be his own reviewer; and yet there is no good reason why it should not be. The reviewer might then always have the advantage, not slight, of reviewing a work which he has at least read, and a subject in which he most likely takes a warm personal interest. Our purpose, however, is not so much to review this little book which we published a few years since, as to bring its subject, with some additional developments, more distinctly before the public.

This little book, one of the earliest of our publications that we would not forget, is not without its faults, and some of them very grave; but we value it more than any thing else that we have published. It is, upon the whole, the most genuine statement of our whole thought, of the principles which we believe must form the basis of the future church, that we have made. It has been now some five or six years before the public, without having attracted much attention, although it has not failed to secure some warm friends. And yet its success has been all that could have been reasonably anticipated. It is hardly fitted to be a popular work; not indeed because its style and language want clearness and precision, nor because its subject-matter is beyond the reach of ordinary comprehension; but because it is altogether too brief in its developments, and too abstract and general in its statements; and also because it is written from a point of view foreign to the great majority of our countrymen.

The general scope and design of the work have in most cases been misapprehended; not altogether through the fault of the author, but through the want of familiarity on the part of its readers with the order of thought which it seeks on the one hand to develop, and on the other to combat. The design of the work was to state simply, briefly, but distinctly, the general principles which must govern the

*New Views of Christianity, Society and the Church. By O. A. Brownson. Boston: 1836.

religious and social future of the race; but so to state them as to refute the errors of a school becoming somewhat powerful in the old world, and which might possibly ere long find its way to our own country. In a word, the work presupposes in almost every page the writings of the Saint-Simonians, and especially Henry Heine's *De l'Allemagne*. The author writes with these works constantly before his eyes, and labors, on the one hand, to show the church that it may accept the truths they contain, without involving itself in their errors; and, on the other hand, to show their authors that they can accept Christianity without becoming responsible for the unquestionable errors of the church. But this, as it was done without any formal statement, could be apparent only to such as had read the writings in question; and as these were but few, comparatively speaking, the real purport of the book could not be generally conceived.

The Saint-Simonians as a religious body have been dissolved; but their doctrines in a modified form, are perhaps the only doctrines that are at the present moment really making any progress in either France or Germany. They are no ordinary doctrines, and their influence on the future of mankind cannot be easily calculated. They contain truths of the highest order, of the most comprehensive reach, and truths, too, which must and will rise to dominion. But these truths, perfectly harmonious with the principles of the Gospel, nay, which are but the growth of the fundamental principles of the Gospel, are brought out in opposition to Christianity, and supposed by their authors to involve necessarily its destruction. With them Christianity was a very good thing in its day; and in the development of the race, in the institution and growth of a higher order of civilization, it has served a very useful purpose; but the race has now outgrown it, and demands not merely a new church, but a new religion. Against this view of Christianity this book of ours was written. We saw that the ground of attack upon religion was shifted, and that therefore it had become necessary to shift the ground of defence. The old sneers and cavils, the old attempts to impeach the purity of its morals, or the completeness of its chain of historical evidence, was to be abandoned; and Christianity was to be accepted, not as a living religion, having the right and the power to command men's obedience; but as a religion of the past, divine and authoritative for yesterday, and

therefore to be held in grateful recollection; but worthless for to-day. We wished to prepare for this new species of warfare, indeed to prevent it, by separating the truths of the church from its errors, and the truths of this new school from its errors, and showing that the truths of both were coincident with the teachings of Jesus. This was our aim in the book, and time is fast showing that our precautionary movement was not uncalled for.

For the book itself we have the greater affection from the fact that it did not turn out to be precisely such a book as we contemplated when we sat down to write. We had contemplated accomplishing our purpose, by attempting little more than to establish the general fact, that all religions are progressive, and that the elements of Christianity are comprehensive enough for a religion adequate to any conceivable stage of human advancement. We had written some eight or nine chapters with this view, when one day, as we were writing, a sentence passed from the pen to the paper, which, as soon as it was written down and contemplated, seemed to be a key that unlocked the whole mystery of the historical development of the church. Suddenly, man's whole history, from the indefinite past to the illimitable future, seemed to lie open in the broad sunlight to the intense gaze of the writer. The whole book was given him in a glance, and in writing it, henceforth, he did little else than transfer to his pages what that glance revealed to him. The original plan was abandoned, and the chapters already written, condensed into the first four pages which serve as an introduction, and the book sent out as it is. This fact may be worth nothing to the public, but it is worth something to the author; and although he asks no respect to be paid to the book on account of it, yet this fact gives it additional authority in his own mind,—the authority due to veritable inspiration.

The book was published, the vision which remained till it was written vanished, and man and his history became as dark an enigma to the writer as ever. He lost sight of the great leading principle of the book, and continued his philosophical and historical investigations as before, and as if nothing had occurred. The result has been, that after five years of intense application, he has come to the same conclusions by a different process. He, therefore, finds the book once again in his experience, and reaffirms it.

The views here given, perhaps, should not be called new,

for taken separately, many of them may be found elsewhere; but the book, taken as a whole, in its leading principle, in its spirit and design, is truly original. It was at least original with the writer; and if others have taken similar views, we have not seen their statement of them. But the question of its newness, or of its originality, is of very little consequence. The only important questions concerning it are, what are these views? Are they true? Are they comprehensive, and likely to be fruitful in important results? For an answer to these questions we refer to the book itself. In what follows we shall endeavor to set forth some of them again, and in a form less abstract and general. The book in fact is faulty in respect to the form in which it states the views of the writer. His desire to say all, and his unwillingness to make a large book, induced him to adopt a form of expression which is altogether too abstract. More is meant than appears, and more than most readers can find, till they have learned in part the author's views from some other source.

Man lives only by virtue of some theory of the universe, which solves for him the problem of his existence and destiny, and prescribes a life-plan which he must endeavor to realize. This theory, whatever it be, or however obtained, is what man names *Religion*. It is always his highest conception of God and of the law of his own being. Religion is then the ideal and man's effort to realize it. To be religious man must act with his whole nature, and strive with all his strength, intelligence, and love, to realize the ideal in every department of life, in the individual, in the family, in the state, in the world, in industry, science, and art.

The church is the organization of mankind for the peaceable, orderly, and successful realization of the Christian ideal, or the ideal as beheld by the early followers of Jesus. The ideal as thus beheld was below the infinite, below that of Jesus even, and therefore could be only for a time. It could not be the ideal for the race through all the stages of its progress. The church, in its origin, though never embracing the true Christian ideal in its fulness, was nevertheless a genuine church of the ideal. It was far in advance of all preceding organizations of mankind, and must be redeeming and ameliorating in its influence, till it had brought the Christian nations up even with itself.

Up even with itself the church has now brought the

Christian world. The civilization it has created is in some respects even in advance of it. For a thousand years and more, it was the church of the ideal. It was the depositary of the intelligence, the wisdom, the virtue, the aspirations of the race. It proposed a work for humanity, and directed individual and social activities in the path of progress. But it now looks no more to the future. It has realized its ideal. It proposes no new labors for civilization, makes no new demands on the race in behalf of progress. It therefore loses sight of the end for which it was instituted, and must now turn its face once more to the future, embrace the ideal, or give way for a *new church*, which shall be an organization of mankind, not to retain the past, but to conquer the future. Humanity eternally aspires. It sees ever before it new heights to be scaled, new victories to be won, and is always eager to march. It cannot be stayed. Ever does the ideal hover before its actual position, commanding it to advance, and forbidding it to halt, much less encamp. If the church will not lead, humanity will displace it, choose a new leader, and go on without it in its career of battle and conquest.

The church was originally based on the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word, or the divine ideal, in the man Christ Jesus, and on that of the distinction of the two principles, spirit and matter, making spirit the principle of good, and matter the principle of evil.

The ancient philosophers, especially Pythagoras and Plato, conceived of the Logos or Word of God. But with them this *Word* was a pure idea. It existed, but merely in the abstract. It might be an object of contemplation, and of a sort of metaphysical admiration, to the few choice spirits able to rise to its conception; but it was hidden from the mass, without life, and without power to mould the character of the individual, or to direct the action of society to the common advancement of the race. Few only can rise to the abstract, and those few derive no life from it. The Word of God, however prominent a place it may hold in systems of metaphysics, cannot be the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation, until incarnated, clothed with flesh, and seen living and breathing, acting and loving, toiling and suffering, and dying and rising from the dead, for the redemption of man. God is for us only in his *Word*, and his *Word* is regenerating only as made flesh, and seen to "dwell among us full of grace and truth."

Men strive in their minds to form a conception of an infinite, all-perfect, abstract being, which they may call God; and in their hearts they strive to love and reverence him. Vain effort. There are no abstractions in absolute life. God is no abstraction, but an infinite concrete. He may be perceived, but only relatively, and the view which is taken of him must be always finite and inadequate. The finite, relative, inadequate conception we form of God is the ideal, the only God there is for us, and to this ideal we never attain by abstraction; to it we attain only so far as it is concreted, or revealed by the finite and relative beings falling under our observation.

The doctrine of the Incarnation of the *Word*, teaches us that for us there is no God, but God "manifest in the flesh." There is no God to love and reverence, but the God that lives and moves in, creates and sustains, what we actually see and know of the universe. God is to us *distinguishable*, but not *separable* from man and nature; as time is distinguishable from succession, but absolutely inconceivable without it; or space from extension, while without extension it were to us as if it were not. God, if we may so speak, is concreted in his works, a living God, instead of that cold, naked abstraction, which metaphysicians call God, satisfying the demands of a frigid logic it may be, but dead to the heart. Nevertheless, this living God, which we finite beings may know, love, and reverence, is not God in the infinite fulness of his being, but the *Word* of God, God *uttered*, and uttered merely to our finite capacities. The absolute God is too vast for our feeble intellects, too luminous for our obscure vision. No man hath seen his face at any time. Yet the living God, uttered in the living realities, we see and know, is in fact one with the Father. In knowing, loving, and reverencing the God thus made visible to us, we are in fact knowing, loving, and reverencing the absolute God, so far as our feeble faculties do or can attain to him.

The doctrine of the Incarnation also proclaims the dignity and worth of human nature, not of the human soul merely, but of man himself. The *Word* is made flesh in a genuine Son of Man. Jesus is born of woman. Marriage and maternity are thus declared to be holy, and human nature itself to be kindred with the divine. For what means this mystery of the "Word become flesh," if not that the highest and fullest manifestation of God, the most brilliant and

adequate representation of God, of the absolute God, is a genuine Son of Man, a true human being? Man was made after the image of God, is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person. He is the finite representative of the infinite God. He is then redeemed from the alleged degradation of his being, and declared to be worthy of love and reverence. The incarnation, since it was in a man, a real man, a man born of woman, proclaims the dignity of man, and the divinity of his nature.

God is known, loved, reverenced, only in his visible manifestation. Man is this visible manifestation. To know, love, reverence man, then, is to know, love, and reverence God, under the only possible form, and in the only acceptable manner. The love of God has no expression but in the love of man. Here is a basis, and a firm basis too, of a broad and genuine philanthropy, in view of which the angels, all pure and loving spirits, hovering over the cradle of the infant Redeemer, might well shout, "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace and good will to men."

The effects of this doctrine of the Incarnation, are visible everywhere in modern civilization, in great part are it, and are seen in its more generous and humane character over all the civilizations which preceded it; in its tenderness of human life; in the high rank it assigns to the virtues of meekness, gentleness, mercy, charity, modesty, chastity, and love; in the high value it places on man as an individual; in its emancipation of the slave, and general labors to promote liberty and social well-being.

The church, however, has but imperfectly comprehended this doctrine. She misapprehended it from the beginning; but her misconceptions of it were of a nature to do no harm in the actual state of things for a long series of years; but they now become mischievous and are to be corrected. The church was right in what she asserted, wrong in what she denied. When she asserted the incarnation of the ideal in Jesus, she asserted the truth; when she asserted that it was and could be incarnated in him only, she erred; and this latter error is the source of no small part of the hostility she encounters.

The church, by asserting the incarnation of the ideal in the Son of Mary, has declared him to be a true man, a genuine Son of God, and secured to him the love and reverence man owes to his God; but in restricting it to him, she

has disinherited in some sort all the rest of the sons of men. She has secured to him no more love and reverence than was his due; but had she properly interpreted the mystery of God made flesh, she would have commanded that the same love and reverence be paid to every man, for every man is, in proportion to the quantity of his being, an incarnation, a visible manifestation of the Divinity. This truth the church has overlooked in her intense admiration of Jesus; and of all the sons of men she has found but one she could dignify with the name of the Son of God.

Jesus was all that the church has alleged. He was verily the Son of God. He lived, toiled, suffered, and died, and rose again for the redemption of man. Of all the sons of men, in his epoch, he was eminently God's dear and well-beloved Son. He has been the father of a new age, the institutor of a new order of civilization, the giver of a new life to the world, the real Mediator between God and men, and the literal Saviour of our souls. But viewed as the Son of Mary, the sympathizing brother of the poor and afflicted, he is not separated nor separable from the rest of the sons of men. He was a true brother man. He was the Son of God. But we may say to-day, for to-day the truth can be apprehended, we are all sons of God, and therefore heirs of God, and joint heirs with Jesus. Not in Jesus alone does the divine ideal incarnate itself, but in every man, in all men, and therefore all men are brethren, and possessors of a divine nature.

This is the great truth which the church must now accept and bring out, a truth which is nothing but the generalization of the particular truth she has always contended for. The new church, the church of the ideal, will be based on this generalization, and will therefore prescribe to her members the duty of loving and reverencing all men, as we have heretofore loved and reverenced Jesus. We love and reverence God, when we love and reverence man. Religious duty will be made henceforth to consist, not in abortive attempts to love and reverence a metaphysical abstraction, a mere logical entity, nor yet in loving and reverencing one only of the sons of men, but humanity; nor yet humanity in the abstract, man in general and nobody in particular; but all the individual men and women who compose the race. This will not require us to love and reverence Jesus less, but his brethren more. All men will by this become sacred;

each man will be a living shrine of the Godhead, a visible, speaking, loving image of the Father.

The actual church is an organization for the worship of God as revealed in one individual; the church of the future will be an organization for the worship of God as revealed in all men. The ideal of the new church will be the redemption and sanctification of the race, as the ideal of the old church was the redemption and sanctification of the individual; or the new will add to the old the redemption and sanctification of the race. The new never lets go the old; but retains it, and enlarges it, by making that general which was before particular. "Think not I am come to destroy the law and the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill." The effect of the new church, or the new organization of mankind, for the express purpose of directing all activities, all intelligences, all sympathies, all industry, science, and art, to the realization of genuine love and reverence for all men, must baffle the most sanguine hope to calculate. The new church will realize the vision of the angels, and enable all men from all the earth, with sweet and harmonious voices, to echo their glad chorus. She will usher in the age of universal peace; and all man's energies, which have so often been turned against his brother, and into instruments for making the earth a vast field of blood, will be employed in the useful or ornamental arts, and in promoting universal well-being. The groans of this nether world will cease. Man will stand erect, the image of his Maker, and look forth in joy upon a world made beautiful by his love. This *shall* be. The old church will become the church of the ideal, or a new church will be organized for its realization. The heart of universal humanity cries out for it. Let him who hath ears hear.

The oriental religions, which preceded the church, all recognized the doctrine of two coeternal, coexisting, and mutually hostile principles, one the principle of good, the other the principle of evil. The church has never formally embraced this doctrine; she has condemned it even, in the Gnostic, and especially the Manichean heresies, and sought to reconcile the existence of evil with the origin of all things in the principle of good, by means of the dogmas of the revolt of angels and the fall of man. Nevertheless she has not wholly escaped it, but has reproduced it under the modified form of the original and inherent antagonism of spirit and matter, generating two classes of interests,

mutually destructive one of the other, termed the one class celestial, or spiritual interests, and the other class terrestrial, material, carnal, or temporal interests. The first class are regarded by the church as supreme, permanent, eternal, holy; the second class as low, variable, transitory, and essentially unholy. Hence, her constant effort has been to withdraw attention from the latter, and to fix it on the former; to rescue men from the slavery of the flesh, and to make them free in the spirit.

This distinction of interests, and this labor of the church, have not been without their good results. They have tended, in no slight degree, to purify the affections, to exalt the sentiments, and to promote the virtues of tenderness, meekness, gentleness, humility, chastity, and love. Men have been led to raise moral courage over physical, to prefer truth to riches, and poverty and obscurity to the pomp and majesty of the world. An army of true soldiers of the Cross has been reared and disciplined, eager to brave toil, suffering, danger, and death for the glory of God and the salvation of the soul. The history of missions and missionaries, from Paul to the Moravians, is a brilliant chapter in the history of humanity. The voluntary poverty of the mendicant orders and of the great body of the Catholic clergy, reveals a faith that overcomes the world.

This separation of spiritual interests from material interests involved necessarily a separation of church and state. When Jesus came, the state was in the hands of the military society, and was organized for no higher ideal than war and conquest; or at best, the maintenance of civil order by military force, against foreign and domestic enemies. He said, therefore, "my kingdom is not of this age." I must wait till a more auspicious period before mankind can be definitively organized for the peaceable and orderly pursuit of the ideal. Therefore "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Civil society could not then be brought into accordance with Christian principles. In order to effect that, a higher order of civilization was needed. The church therefore abandoned civil society to Cæsar, to rapine and violence, to ignorance and brutal passion; while she labored exclusively in the spiritual sphere for the creation of a new order of civilization, which should ultimately redress the state and bring it up to her own ideal. In this sphere she labored with untiring zeal and perseverance from the first century

to the fifteenth, and successfully laid the foundations of all that society now is. During the greater part of that period, by means of her superior intelligence and virtue, she ruled the state, modified its actions, and compelled its administrators to consult the rights of man, by protecting the poor, the feeble, and the defenceless. It is not easy to estimate the astonishing progress she effected for civilization, during that long period called by narrow-minded and bigoted Protestant historians the dark ages. Never before had such labors been performed for humanity. Never before had there been such an immense body as the Christian clergy, animated by a common spirit and directed by a common will and intelligence to the cultivation and growth of the moral virtues and the arts of peace. Then was tamed the wild barbarian and the savage heart made to yield to the humanizing influences of tenderness, gentleness, meekness, humility, and love; then imperial crown and royal sceptre paled before the crosier, and the representative of him who had lived, and toiled, and preached, and suffered, and died in obscurity, in poverty and disgrace, was exalted and made himself felt in the palace and in the cottage, in the court and in the camp, striking terror into the rich and noble, and pouring the oil and wine of consolation into the bruised heart of the poor and the friendless. Wrong, wrong have they been who have complained that kings and emperors were subjected to the spiritual head of Christendom. It was well for man that there was a power above the brutal tyrants called emperors, kings, and barons, who rode roughshod over the humble peasant and artisan,—well that there was a power even on earth that could touch their cold and atheistical hearts and make them tremble as the veriest slave. The heart of humanity leaps with joy when a murderous Henry is scourged at the tomb of Thomas á Becket, or when another Henry waits barefoot, shivering with cold and hunger for days at the door of the Vatican, or when a pope grinds his foot into the neck of a Frederick Barbarossa. Aristocratic Protestantism, which has never dared enforce its discipline on royalty or nobility, may weep over the exercise of such power, but it is to the existence and exercise of that power, that the *People* owe their existence, and the doctrine of man's equality to man its progress.

All that the church has really done for humanity was done during what are termed the dark ages. She then laid the foundation of modern civilization, breathed into it her

humane and gentle spirit, and animated it for an uninterrupted career of peaceful conquest. It was then she established schools and universities, founded scholarships, and prepared for a system of universal education. She emancipated the slave, declared all men equal before God, raised the bare-footed friar to the throne of Christendom, and made the rich sinner disgorge his misgotten wealth to feed the poor he had robbed and to serve the interests of humanity. Children, as we are, of what is called the reformation, and which was nothing but a rebellion against the church and the establishment of an insurrectionary government, we are too prone to forget the benefits of the church; and casting a veil over her struggles and her labors of love, we would fain make it appear that there was no light in the world till Protestantism was born, and nothing done for humanity till a German monk dared burn the papal bull. But all that has been done since is but the necessary development of what was done before. He is an undutiful son who curses his own mother, and no good can come of him.

Down to the fifteenth century the church was the true church, as true to the ideal as was possible in the circumstances in which she was placed. Down to that period she was the church of progress, and continued herself to advance. But in consequence of the broad line she had drawn between spiritual interests and material interests, she placed necessarily a term to her own progress. She could advance, or aid the advancement of the race, only till she had brought the civil organization in a spiritual point of view up even with herself. As soon as the state embodied as much wisdom, intelligence, justice, and humanity as she herself embodied in her own organization and canons, her mission in regard to civilization was ended. She could work on the state only through the individual conscience, and she could not, without abandoning her ground, make it a matter of conscience with individuals to organize the state for the indefinite progress of the race in relation to material interests. She became, then, a mere parallel organization with the state, having no longer in relation to society an ideal to realize. She had nothing to propose. She could no longer take the lead in civilization. From being the suzerain of the state, she was forced to become, as she has been for three hundred years, its vassal.

In point of fact, for three hundred years the state has been superior to the church and it, instead of the church,

has proposed and effected whatever social ameliorations have been proposed and effected. But so long as the old theory of a separation of interests remains, the supremacy of the state over the church is a monstrous anomaly. It is in theory nothing less than making the low, the transitory, the unholy superior to the high, the holy, and the eternal. It is making matter, declared to be the principle of evil, superior to the spirit, declared to be the principle of good; the body triumphant over the soul; and time over eternity. This is intolerable. It creates a disgust with some for the church, which makes pretensions she does not justify, and with others it prompts efforts to restore the church to her former position. But the restoration of the church to power would relieve no embarrassment. The church has realized her ideal. To give her supremacy would not be to make her again a church of the ideal, and therefore favorable to progress; but to arrest the progress of the race, and to place us back where we were in the fifteenth century. There is but one method by which churchmen can recover the dominion of the church, and that is the reverse of the method they pursue. The church was supreme, because she had a right to be. She had a loftier ideal than had the state. Now it is not so. The state, the creature of Christian civilization, is more Christian, in fact, than the church; and whoso would labor for the progress of humanity through any existing organism, must take the state instead of the church, and be a politician instead of a clergyman. In order that it should be otherwise, the church must show that she has an ideal, some work for civilization to propose, big enough for men's hearts, equal to their aspirations. Men are now uneasy and confined within her enclosures. They see immense evils obtain in the world, which they would gladly redress. Rich feelings kindle up within them; great thoughts swell in their hearts; a mighty energy is working in their souls; and they would go forth and act, lay hold of the ages, and shape them to the glory of God and the redemption of man. But they are bound, confined in a narrow dungeon. They rave, they foam, they pull at their chains, beat their heads against the dungeon walls, fall back wearied, exhausted, and die. There is a universal restlessness; men's great souls are seeking some mode of utterance, but find none. They burn to act, but yet are held back. Nothing is proposed equal to what they feel moving and working in themselves. There is no vent for the activity

which has long been accumulating in the soul. It but preys upon its possessor. Hence the deep pathos of our times, the wail of sorrow heard on either hand, the melancholy, the morbid sentiment, the suicides. In this state of things it is madness to attempt to revive the church on her old platform, and to convey us back three hundred years to do over again what has already been done.

The remedy will not be found in going back, but in going forward. The church can rise to power only by accepting the ideal. She must abandon the distinction she has made between spiritual interests and material interests, a distinction which has no existence in the nature of things, and recognize the fact that in actual life spirit and matter are one. The flesh is no more sin than is the spirit, and the soul is no more holy than is the body. Man is not tempted and drawn away into sin by his body, for without the soul the body were dead, and incapable of performing a single function. The soul acts never without the body, nor the body without the soul. One is not the other, but one is never without the other. The action of the one is, so long as there is life, absolutely indistinguishable from that of the other. The action and reaction of each are so harmonious, and one becomes so blended with the other, that in real life, there is for the two but one agent. Man should never, then, be treated as a twofold being, made up of soul and body, but as one simple being, made to live in a body, and through that in intimate relation with nature. He should then be taken as a whole, as one and identical in all his phenomena, however multiform, various, or variable they may be.

Man and nature are made of the same stuff. Spirit and matter are the same at bottom. The basis of the composite existence, termed matter, is not dead atoms, but living substance, endowed with force and perception. This living substance, or these living substances, into which all material bodies may be resolved, are kindred with that substance termed in man soul or spirit. Body is nothing but a continuity of points, each point of which is a living being, acting from its own centre, from its own inherent force, and representing the entire universe from its point of view, and is in itself as immaterial and as indestructible as the human soul itself.* No reason, then, can be assigned why matter

*The author here intended to follow the doctrine of Leibnitz. That every substance is a *vis activa* be continued always to hold; but not that the body is a mere continuity of points, each of which is an active force, for that would make the body a mere aggregation of substances, not a substance.—ED.

should be more sinful than spirit, or more the cause of sin. One God has created both, and both out of his own infinite fulness of being, and both for the communication of his own unbounded goodness.

Spirit and matter reconciled, declared to be one in the unity of actual life, all interests will become alike sacred and proper to be consulted. There will be no more lusting of the spirit against the flesh, nor of the flesh against the spirit. Spiritual interests and material interests will be held to be not only inseparable, but indistinguishable. There is no act that really promotes the welfare of the soul that is not also for the welfare of the body; there is no act demanded by the well-being of the body not also demanded by the well-being of the soul. What is for man's good in time is for his good in eternity; and the only sure way of gaining a heaven hereafter is to create a heaven on earth. What is for the good of man is for the glory of God. All interests are the same, then, in their character, and all acts which are proper to be done at all are religious acts.

The church of the future will be based on two great principles; the first, the generalization of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the other, the unity in actual life of spirit and matter. This makes the service of God and man one and the same service, and the service of man under the spiritual relation identical with the service of man under the material relation. God must be served by our labors for the good of all men; and the good of all men does not consist in a spiritual culture to the neglect of physical well-being, but in their redemption and sanctification under all the possible aspects of their being. The church of the future will, then, propose the amelioration of man under his material relations no less than under his spiritual relations. Material sufferings will touch her not less than moral sufferings, and oppressions in the state will be as much offences against her laws as the misdeeds of individuals. Her mission will not be merely that of fitting men to die and to gain a happier world, but fitting them to live and to make the earth itself an abode of plenty, peace, and love. She will not enjoin poverty, but justice, and so direct the industrial activity of the race, and establish such laws for the distribution of the fruits of industry, that all will have a competence, and none any temptation to abuse his possessions or to rob another.

By uniting all the interests of man and subjecting them

all to the same law, church and state will ultimately become one, and a new classification of the race obtain. There will not then be a spiritual society and a civil society, a religious society and an irreligious society. All society, all association will be holy, for all association will be for the worship of God. The state will become a church, and legislators and civil rulers ministers at the altar. For then God will not be worshipped by idle hymns and idler ceremonies; but by those substantial acts of piety and love which do really tend to the melioration of the condition of all men, especially of the poorest and most numerous class. Men will then be religious by visiting the fatherless and the widows in their afflictions, and by keeping themselves pure and blameless.

Man is a being who *acts*, *knows*, and *feels*. He is a simple being, but with a threefold power of manifestation. He manifests himself as activity, intelligence, sensibility. Hence there are three ways in which he can serve and be served. Every man has these three faculties; but in some men one of them predominates; in others another. Those, in whom activity predominates, are what are termed men of action, practical men; those, in whom intelligence predominates, are men of science, whose tendency is to know, to investigate, to be acquainted with the universe, its principles and phenomena; in fine, those, in whom sensibility predominates, are artists, men who are attached to the beautiful, who delight in the fine arts, and aspire to ornament and embellish life. Ultimately men will fall into the three classes according to this three-fold division.

The men of action have heretofore been too often engaged in war and conquest, or in taking advantage of their more simple brethren. They will hereafter turn, as they are now turning, their activity into an industrial and peaceful direction. These will be the industrial portion of mankind, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, mechanics, traders, active business men. The second will be engaged in scientific investigations, all of which will be turned to the advantage of industry and art. The third will be devoted to the cultivation of the fine arts, to adorning our habitations, purifying our affections, and exalting our sentiments.

In these three ways man may serve man, and thereby worship God. They, whose taste and capacity lead them to industrial pursuits, will worship God by tilling the earth,

by manufacturing the raw materials, or distributing or exchanging the fruits of labor. They, whose tastes and capacities lead them in a scientific direction, will worship God by penetrating the secrets of the universe, upturning the several strata of the earth and learning how nature improves upon her own types, or as they track the divine wisdom through forests, see it unfolding in the violet under the hedge, living in the animal frame, soaring with the eagle, and blazing forth in glory in the sun and stars. All nature will be seen to be full of God, and at each step the man of true science will pause in transcendent admiration. The artist will worship him by communing with the visions of beauty that come to his soul, attempting to seize and transfer them to his marble or canvas to embody them in column or dome, or give them voice in song or story.

Forms of worship there will be, and forms that have meaning, that speak to the heart, and waken great thoughts and generous and holy feeling, forms that inspire men's souls, and make them aspire with ever increasing energy to worship God in humanity. All that industry can do, science can teach, or art inspire, will be done to bring man into harmony with the will of his Maker, and to redeem and sanctify all men. In this work art will take the lead. Man, by the fact that he is endowed with a sensible nature, can be inspired, and it is by inspiration that his progress is mainly effected. God by his providence raises up, at distant intervals, providential men, a Moses, a David, an Isaiah, a Jesus, a Paul, who, admitted by their love into a closer communion with himself, speak to men in those living tones which make their hearts beat, and would make them beat under the very "ribs of death," and waken them to a higher life, inspire them to new and better sustained efforts to realize the ideal and make earth reflect the beauty of heaven. Every genuine artist is a being in whom love predominates; love carries him up to the very principle of things, and makes all things beautiful and lovely to his rapt soul; and speaking from the deep love up-welling from the bottom of his own heart, he can quicken love in the race and inspire humanity to a more zealous and acceptable worship.

The church of the future will place the worship of God solely in the redemption and sanctification of the race, especially the poorest and most numerous class, in loving all men as we now love Jesus, and doing all that is possible to

do to raise up every man to his proper estate; in a word, to realize that equality between man and man in his material relations that we now recognize in his spiritual relations. But she will not be merely utilitarian. She will not be cold and naked and barren. In accepting material interests she will not become less, but even more spiritual. In making the worship of God consist in the service of man she will recognize both the necessity and the utility of whatever tends to develop the soul, to awaken generous sentiment, to increase the love of man for man. She will still have her temple-service, which will be solemn, imposing, and inspiring; her instructors, who will disclose the laws of industry, science, and art, instruct men in the proper direction of their activities, intelligences, and sympathies; her preachers, who will make the heart thrill, and kindle a deep and burning enthusiasm in the soul to labor for the amelioration of the race. All the fine arts will be laid under contribution. Poetry, painting, sculpture, music, architecture, whatever speaks to sentiment, will be pressed into the temple-service, and made to minister to the worship of God and the amelioration of man.

Protestantism, in its excessive rationalism, in its rejection of sentiment, of inspiration, has deprived the temple-service of nearly all its power. In its churches there are a few dry forms and much barren logic; very little that speaks to the soul and kindles love. Puritanism knows nothing of the power of love. It has not learned that the road to men's convictions lies through their hearts, and that we are raised to God effectually only by the purification and exaltation of our sentiments. It places the affections under ban, and regards all emotion as the fruit of the flesh, and is even enthusiastic against enthusiasm, inspired against inspiration. The church of the future will follow the example of the church of the past, and adopt a form of service, that shall speak to the sensibility, to man as a being capable of inspiration, of love. But she will purify the form heretofore adopted, and the better adapt it to the awakening of a genuine love for universal man.

The priests of the new church will be those who approach the nearest to God, those who best understand the works of the Creator, are best qualified to direct the activities of the race, and who have the most enthusiastic love for their brethren. They will be directors of the people, of all consciences because they will prove themselves the most able and

the most worthy; because they will be those in whom the power to act, to know, or to love, manifests itself in the most striking degree. They will be listened to and obeyed, because their words will carry conviction and create love. This is the true conception of a Christian priesthood. Men will not enter the priesthood to gain a livlihood, but because they are burning to do a work for humanity which they cannot do without entering it. They will be more powerful than ever were the priests of the old church; but their power will be in their inherent superiority, not in the artificial sanctity ascribed to their persons; not in the laying on of the hands of the presbytery; nor in any formal consecration. They will be God-ordained, God-commissioned, and they will speak as God gives them utterance; and their words will be with power, because they will be words of truth and love.

Such will be the church of the future. She will not be a destruction of the old church, but her fulfilment. She will be the church of the past, enlarged, modified, converted into the church of the future. She will be an organization for the more full and perfect realization of the Christian ideal. Christ is to her all that he has ever been. Jesus is her founder, and her aim is still the realization in actual life of the principles of the Christian revelation; but these principles more generously interpreted and seen in a broader generality. The ideal will still be the Christian ideal, and she will be a true Christian church, as true for the future as the old church was for the past.

This church, recognizing the unity of all interests, of spirit and matter, will place no term to her progress. Covering man's whole activity, her ideal will ever hover before her. She will gradually absorb the state and abolish the double organization of mankind; she will supersede the necessity of a religious organization and a civil organization; and as the service of God and the service of man become identical, church and state will become one. There will then be no clashing of rival claims, no war of hostile powers. The government of God and the government of man will be identical.

By spreading over all interests, extending to all activities, the church will command the direction of them all; and as her ideal is the redemption and sanctification of the race, she will impose upon the consciences of individuals and of legislators and rulers the religious duty of directing them

all to the production of that love and reverence for all men which have heretofore been paid to one man. Always then will she have a work for civilization to propose, and therefore always a work which will enlist the sympathies of the human heart. Therefore she will always be the church of the ideal. She will always aspire and kindle the aspirations of the race. She will then be forever a kingdom which the saints shall possess, and of which there shall be no end. She shall become a really catholic church, a church truly universal, and finally gather the vast family of man into one universal association; when wars will cease; all tears be wiped away; hatred be no more; and man labor side by side with his brother, in peace and love, for the glory of God and the progress of humanity.

The time has come for the new church to be formed. The old church has done her work. She has no work for us; nothing to propose but a certain routine which has no power to excite our sympathies, or to command our respect. She has ceased to aspire. She has no words of authority. Men laugh at her puerile duties and her idle threats. She does not direct the action of society; nor does she presume to make it a religious duty for legislators and rulers to shape the laws and the administration of the government so as to effect, in the most rapid manner possible, the moral, physical, and intellectual amelioration of the race, especially the poorest and most numerous class. She declares all men equal before God, and yet tolerates, nay, upholds the grossest inequality before society; she declares poverty a virtue, and riches a sin, and yet gives the chief seats to the rich and baptizes their means of gain. She declares that the poor are blessed because theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and frowns upon all measures likely to be effectual in securing them the possession of that kingdom on earth. She has no ideal. She looks back and sighs merely for her lost dominion. She has no blessing to pronounce on the young prophets of God who start up to gain a more glorious future for the race. They are, in her estimation, seditious fellows, disturbers of the peace, profane revellers, disorganizers, abhorred of God, and rejected of man. For them no word, no look of encouragement. She excommunicates progress, and pronounces a curse on whatever is advanced, whatever belongs to the ideal. Humanity will not, cannot tolerate this, but will return neglect for cursing, and pass on, leaving the dead to bury the dead.

For three hundred years the church has been on the side of the past, and the future has been with statesmen and philosophers. During these three hundred years of insurrection, revolution, experiment, and philosophizing, philosophers and statesmen have brought forth two grand conceptions which are to serve as the basis of the whole future. These two conceptions are *Equality* and *Progress*, or the incarnation of the Word in all men, making all thereby the sons of God, and therefore equal to one another; and the indefinite perfectibility of the race; giving therefore an ideal to the church, and making it her duty to labor for the realization of this perfectibility for all men, and in all the aspects of their being. These two conceptions were already in the mind of Jesus, but were only partially embraced by the church. She admitted the divinity of human nature only in the case of one man, and progress, perfectibility, only in the spiritual order. Now all men are divine, and progress must be sought in the material order no less than in the spiritual. This progress is indefinite; no term can be placed to it. These are the grand conceptions which have come forth from past labors and past struggles. They have cost much, but they are worth all that they have cost. These are the foundations of future society, *Equality and Progress, Love to all men, as heretofore there has been Love to Jesus*, efforts to set the race forward to more and more advanced stages of civilization. Here is the ideal. Morality, piety, all that is praiseworthy and noble will consist in efforts to realize this ideal. This ideal is now affirmed, and not by one man only, but by millions of warm hearts that thrill at the very words *Equality* and *Progress*. They are affirmed in the very soul of the age in which we live, and the church must accept them and become an organism for their realization,—direct all activities, intelligences, and sympathies to their realization. The existing church may accept this ideal. She is already an organism for that purpose, did she but know it. Her clergymen may become prophets, and from the heights of every pulpit in Christendom proclaim that all men are sons of God and indefinitely progressive, and that the love and worship of God consist in the love of all men and in efforts to advance the race in civilization. But if she will not thus proclaim, if she will not make it matter of discipline, and regard the neglect to labor in the cause of equality and progress an offence deserving the censure of the church, then a new church will organize

herself, a new temple will arise at the magic words, as did the walls of Thebes as the prophet touched his lyre.

The time of denial has gone by. Protestantism is obsolete. The time has come to affirm, and to affirm with emphasis. The race is tired of mere analysis, criticism, dissecting, which gives not life, but takes it away. It demands a broad and generous synthesis, positive convictions, positive institutions, and a positive mission. It would act. Infidelity there may yet be; men no doubt are still disputing whether there be or be not a God, whether the scriptures were or were not given by divine inspiration, whether there be or be not a life beyond this life. Vain disputings all. He who would have faith must go forth and act. He who will do the will of God shall know there is a God. He who will cultivate a love to all men, by seeking to do good to all men, shall never doubt that there is a common Father of all; and he in whose heart eternally wells up a living love for all that live, who perpetually aspires, shall want no arguments to convince him that he cannot die. He lives immortality. Let the church once more aspire, let her face be turned to the future, and let her command the moral, physical, and intellectual advancement of the race, command it in the name of God, and bless him who is able and willing to live or die for it, and faith will be restored and men will live again. Christ will then reappear, and the kingdom shall in very deed be given to the saints who will possess it for ever and ever. Even now they who have eyes may see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven, in all the glory of his Father, surrounded by all pure and loving spirits, to gather his elect from the four corners of the earth, into a holy association, animated by a single spirit, and directed by a single will, for the brilliant conquest of the future. He comes. Lift up your heads, ye who have sighed under bondage; open your eyes, ye who have sat long in the region and shadow of death; exult, ye who have waited to see the salvation of God; for he cometh, and the day of redemption is at hand, and all the ends of the earth shall see the glory of God, and rejoice together.

REFORM AND CONSERVATISM.

[From the Boston Quarterly Review for January, 1842.]

We do not introduce this sermon to our readers in consequence of its intrinsic merit, for it is but a common-place performance, altogether beneath the talents and genius of its author,—a most estimable man, and a successful preacher;—but for the purpose of saying something on the very important and deeply interesting subject it broaches.

The man who helps us to detect our errors we always hold to be our friend, for he renders us an essential service, the most essential that one man can render another. We, therefore, feel that we are not a little indebted to the author of this sermon; for we had no conception of the impotence of the doctrine we had all along been insisting upon, till we found him reproducing it. We cannot reflect on our advocacy of the doctrine, here drawn out at length, without taking shame to ourselves, confessing our sins, and promising an endeavor at amendment.

The leading doctrine of this sermon is, that the well-instructed scribe is one who retains a firm hold on the past, while exerting himself to conquer the future; that reform is progress; and that the true reformer labors ever to fulfill the old, never to destroy it. This is a doctrine which our readers know that we have insisted on from the first; it is a doctrine which covers a great and vital truth; but as we have often brought it out and as it is brought out in this sermon, its effect must be worse than that of falsehood itself. By its light Mr. Clarke proceeds to read a lecture of conservatism to reformers, and of radicalism to conservatives. To the first he says, virtually though not consciously, "My dear friends, you are too hot;" to the second, "You are too cold. Let me beseech you, therefore, reformers, to cool off a little, and you conservatives, to warm up a little; and then we may all come peaceably together, in a state of most perfect and blessed lukewarmness."

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*The well-instructed Scribe; or Reform and Conservatism. A Sermon. By James Freeman Clarke. Boston: 1841.

This is not Mr. Clarke's language, nor does it express the effect he aims to produce; but the effect the doctrine in question, as set forth, must produce, so far as it produces any effect at all. But is it necessary to labor to produce lukewarmness? Is it not more acceptable to the great Head of the church to be either too cold or too hot, than it is to be neither cold nor hot? Nothing is, or can be more nauseating than to be lukewarm. Give us, we say, open, energetic, uncompromising enemies, or firm, staunch friends, who will take their stand for the truth, for weal or for woe, to live with it or die with it; and not your half and half men, blowing hot out of one side of the mouth, and cold out of the other; neutralizing always their own exertions, and producing only a state of absolute indifferency.

Mr. Clarke must pardon the strength of our expression. We are censuring ourselves more than we are him; for we are an older sinner, and with less excuse for our sins. We, like him, have been for years blowing hot and cold with the same breath, though unwittingly and unintentionally; and like him have mistaken an imbecile eclecticism, for a powerful and living synthesis. We are both wrong. Reformers unquestionably often mistake their means and fail in their ends; but they are never too hot, too much in earnest. The true man, he who feels the great heart of humanity beat under his breast, is always terribly in earnest. He speaks out from a soul full of love, as if life and death hung on the issue, burning words which fall like coals of fire on the naked heart of the sinner, and make him shriek out in the agonies of hell, "What shall I do to be saved?" He can make no compromise with sin and iniquity, whether in church or state, in the individual or in society; but, armed with the word of God and the terrors of God's law, pursues them through all their windings, fearless of the hosts of enemies he may rouse up, the blows he must give or receive; resolved to save the soul or die in the attempt. There is his work, right before him; and he can eat not, slumber not, pause not, till he has done it. Wo to the anointed preacher that calls out from the height of the Christian pulpit, "Stop, my good friend, you are running too fast, you are too hot; cool off a little, let me pray you." How the fiends must laugh to hear him!

Man was made for progress. The race, nay, the entire universe is in motion, flowing onward with all its waves of

worlds and beings, as the current of a mighty river, and will flow on forever; for it flows out from the inexhaustible Infinite,—is the unremitted effort of the infinite God to realize out of himself his own infinite ideal. But progress is effected by growth, by accretion, by assimilation, not by abstraction and waste. The race advances by assimilating to its own life and being the truths which God successively reveals to it, and those which its own generations, by constant striving, successively discern and promulgate. We, of to-day, are enlarged by all the past accumulations of the race. Into us flows all that has been, which swollen by our contributions, flows on through us, and will flow on, ever enlarging by new contributions, into the unknown ocean of eternity. Here is the significance of the doctrine we and others have been striving after. Here is wherefore the true reformer retains ever a hold on the past, while he labors for the future. He retains the past, because it has flowed into him, been assimilated to his actual life; because he is the past as well as the presentiment of the future, and can no more divest himself of it than he can divest himself of himself.

There is no question that it is idle to war against the past. No man can be a reformer who has no tradition. Divest us of all tradition, of all that we have derived from the past, or which the race has assimilated of past labors, as the body assimilates food, and we were mere naked savages, without industry, science, or art, wandering the earth forlorn, with no shelter but the caves or the inclement skies, and no means of subsistence but the scanty pittance doled out, with a grudging hand, by step-dame nature. They who would so divest us, so cut us loose from all tradition, must ever be as impotent as they are mistaken. They are mere false meteoric lights, that rise and deceive for a moment, it may be, the simple; but instantly melting into nothing, leaving the glorious vault brilliant as ever, studded, as of old, with all its "sapphire flames," which shine on in their mysterious beauty, all unconscious of the mimic stars that collect and dissolve at infinite depths below. There is no need to exhort the reformer to venerate the past. If he really be a reformer he carries all the past in his soul; and to tell him that he must retain it, is like telling the child that, if it do not retain from day to day the accessions it is constantly receiving, it will not grow.

The folly we are guilty of on this subject arises from our

not having fixed in our minds, *what past* it is we should retain. We have supposed that it must needs be the past that subsists in monuments, doctrines recorded in books, or engraved on tablets, moral precepts, lessons of experience, forms of faith or practice existing out of the soul, the essence of which has not as yet been assimilated to the life of the race. But these, so far as they are true and unassimilated, forming as yet no integral part of the life of humanity, belong to the ideal and not the actual, and therefore to the future and not to the past. The past is only that which has been realized, and become an integral part of the life which the race is now living. This is the only real past. This is what we term tradition, and this we cannot throw off, if we would; for it is a part of the very life with which we who are now living were born. It constitutes our past progress, the growth to which we have already attained; and is the point of departure for new progress, for further and nobler growth. So much is gained, and can never be lost. We need, then, give ourselves no concern about retaining it; but turn our whole attention, and exert all our zeal and energy in behalf of new acquisitions

The mistake of preachers, and even philosophers, is in overlooking the true principle of progress, and in supposing that it consists only in the accumulation of monuments. Moses and the prophets, it is thought, live for us only in the Old Testament; Jesus and the apostles only in the New; Grecian art and philosophy and Roman jurisprudence only in the few fragments which all-devouring time has spared. Poets, prophets, philosophers, who sung, inspired, taught, lived, toiled, suffered, and died, of whom there are no external monuments remaining, are to us as if they had never been. But this is false. As the warm life-blood that flowed in the veins of Adam in the garden, still circulates in ours, so lives in us the life of all that have gone before us. Not alone in the Old Testament, or New, not in the fathers nor in ecclesiastical historians, live Moses, and David, and Isaiah, and Jesus, and Paul, and James, and John, but in that new life they have given to the world, into which, through them, the race has been initiated; and which we should live, and could not but live, were all exterior monuments of them destroyed. In order to slay Jesus and the apostles, you must annihilate the race. Their moral life circulates in the soul of him who attempts to revile them, and gives force to his attacks on their pretended representatives. Lycur-

gus, Solon, Socrates, Plato, speak in your pettiest village politician, and debate through your least significant disputant in your least significant lyceum.

We must remember that there is a progress of *Man*, as well as of men, and that this progress consists not merely nor chiefly in external monuments, whether industrial, scientific, or artistical, but in the enlargement, the actual growth of human nature itself. We say *growth*, by which we do not mean the creation of new faculties, or new elements of our being, but an enlargement of those with which man was originally constituted. These original elements are perpetually growing, and in their growth consists the progress of the race. Man to-day is a larger being, has more being, if one may so speak, than he had three thousand years ago. He can do unaided, to-day, what formerly surpassed the combined powers of the race. In the age of Moses no man, without a special revelation from God himself, could rise to the conception of one pure and spiritual Divinity. And no community could then take in the idea, though God through Moses proclaimed it. Now we need no supernatural assistance to possess ourselves of the conception of one God. We read his being and unity in all nature, in our souls, in all the events of history. When Jesus came no man was equal to the great conception of the universal brotherhood of the race. It required a positive revelation from God to place the doctrine in the world; and though so placed, the apostles themselves very imperfectly comprehended it; none of our sectarians even now comprehend it; yet the more advanced portion of the race see it, as it were naturally, and embrace it as a truth self-evident. All that theologians to-day call natural religion, which they distinguish from revealed religion, and suppose man by nature may attain unto, surpassed the natural powers of the race in its infancy, and needed to be revealed specially from heaven. We find no such natural religion among the savages of antiquity, nor among the New Zealanders of to-day. Now it is natural religion with the more advanced Christian nations, because by the aid of Providence, always acting the part of an educator, their natural powers have become equal to it. Natural religion is always that amount of revealed religion, which the race has assimilated, and for which no positive divine authority is any longer needed.

The school-boy of to-day, it is often said, knows more

than the wisest of the Greeks. He is in advance of the wisest of the Greeks, not because he can in a few months learn all that Plato could teach, or the great and wise of the race have since been able to teach; but because there circulates within him a life far above the highest life of which Plato dreamed. The child born of civilized parents, carried at the most tender age and left in the cabin of the savage, other things being equal, will grow up with a nature superior to that of his savage associates. He will adopt, but refine, their manners. He will have thoughts surpassing their comprehension, dreams which visit not them. They will marvel at his words and deeds, and bow to him as their chief. Catch, on the other hand, young as you please, the savage infant, and bring him into the bosom of your civilized life, and surround him with all that is most advanced in your social state, he will, in spite of all your efforts grow up with an untamed soul; the wild Manitou will speak to his heart, and he will pine for his native forests and the wandering life of his forefathers. Our missionaries repeat to us ever the exceeding difficulty they find in making the children of the heathen comprehend the most familiar conceptions of Christian civilization; not dreaming that ages of growth are needed to bring the heathen races up to the level of the advanced life of Christendom.

Proofs of this doctrine may be found in families. Nature has her aristocracy, and the more advanced races are always the ruling races. Family pride, nobility founded on birth, is not altogether without reason in fact and experience. It is not absurd to ask of one, Who was his father? What was his mother? Find a man really distinguished, and you may be sure he comes of an improved stock; that he has, as we say, good blood running in his veins. A man who has no ancestors is nobody. Patricians and plebeians intermarry, before they become equal in the state.

This comes not from the fact that God did not make all men of one blood, but from the fact that your patrician stock, your real nobility, have had for ages, superior means of culture, and their children inherit the growth thus effected. It takes many generations to wash out the churl's blood. The *novus homo* betrays himself at a glance. The doctrine of hereditary descent plays a more important part in the affairs of the race than we democrats admit. Nay, we all feel it; we all are proud of our ancestry, if they were at all distinguished. We inherit the features, the diseases, the

moral and mental qualities of our parents. The child of truly noble parents brought up in the family of the churl will be no churl. How many tales and romances have been founded on this fact! They are not mere fictions; they must contain a vein of truth, or the race would not, could not, relish them as it does.

We repeat it, this comes not from the fact that God made originally men of different bloods; for he made all of one and the same blood. But some families and nations, being more favorably situated for improvement than others, have obtained the lead, and retained it unless corrupted and exhausted by vice and luxury. By continued superior moral, intellectual, and physical culture, they have improved, if we may say so, the blood. They have become really superior, and their children are born with more enlarged capacities than the children of those whose ancestors, for countless ages, have had no advantages of education. When, by a fixed regimen of the state, you separate these families from the community at large, the fact becomes striking, and productive of the greatest evils. But in a society like ours, where wealth makes up for the want of birth, there is a general intermixture, which produces comparative equality and the gradual elevation of all. There are, in consequence of the perpetual whirl of our society, of its ups and downs, few families with us that cannot boast as good blood, in some of its branches, as flows in the veins of the proudest aristocrats. Democracy, therefore, needs not shriek at our doctrine. Nay, it may accept it; for it shows strongly the necessity of laboring for the universal culture of the race, and keeps alive its hopes, by making it appear that the progress effected in one generation is so much capital in advance for the succeeding.

Unquestionably all men are born with the same nature, but with that nature in different stages of development or growth. A Leibnitz has nothing of which the New Zealander has not the germs; but between the New Zealander and Leibnitz there intervene a hundred centuries of growth. Leibnitz thinks without effort, and assumes as self-evident axioms, what surpasses the utmost conception of the New Zealander, and would, were the New Zealander educated from his earliest infancy in the bosom of our own social state. Yet the New Zealander may one day be to a Leibnitz, what a Leibnitz now is to him.

With this view of progress, that it consists not in the

accumulation of exterior monuments only, but in the moral assimilation of truth, in the continued growth of our being, and enlargement of our actual life, there is no danger that the past will be unduly depressed, that it will be forgotten, or that men will cut themselves loose from tradition. The thing, we repeat over and over again, is impossible, for we *are* the past as well as the presentiment of the future. We are the synthesis of what has been, and of what is to come; and while the humanity that was, the humanity that is, and the humanity that is to be, all beat in our hearts, circulate in our veins, think in our thoughts, and love in our love, we should give ourselves no further concern with the monuments of the past than is necessary to decipher its lessons, so far as they can instruct or warm us for new efforts to advance the race. What we want, then, is not, as we have heretofore carelessly contended,—though the doctrine we have now advanced has been for years our faith,—and as Mr. Clarke contends, a moulding of conservatism and reform into a sort of systematic eclecticism, compelling its disciples to keep perpetually turning from the past to the future, and from the future to the past, in endless gyration, and therefore making no progress; but a real *synthesis*. Mere eclecticism, taken strictly, is impotent. So far as it is at all influential, it is mischievous, by withdrawing our attention from the ideal, damping the ardor of hope, quenching philanthropic zeal, and rendering us indifferent and imbecile. Alas! we have felt this. We have labored long and hard; no man more zealously, and with scarcely a perceptible effect. The world has felt that we contradicted in one breath what we had asserted in another. We felt that this was unjust, for we knew that we were consistent. We knew we were right so far as concerned our own thought, and marvelled that, with tolerable powers of expression, we could never make the public perceive the precise position we chose to occupy. The amalgamation of conservatism and reform, as existing in our own mind, was well enough; but no form of expression we could devise would enable us, when we undertook to speak to others, to escape apparent contradiction. The moment that we had awakened them to efforts for progress, we struck them all aback by telling them they must not run away from the past. Our progress doctrines offended conservatives, and our conservative doctrines offended reformers; and we received little except, as we perhaps deserved, the execrations of both.

We trust we have shown the cause of this failure. The fault was not in the public, but in ourselves, in a certain confusion in our own mind. The public must judge whether that confusion is still there or not. We have felt that the past was venerable, and should be retained, and that there still should be efforts to conquer the future. But, in stating this, we so stated it that our readers, and especially those who listened to our public discourses, could not see how the past could be retained and venerated, while by our efforts to conquer the future, we were running away from it as fast as we could. This came from mistaking eclecticism for synthesis, a system composed of shreds for an entire new garment woven without seam from top to bottom. Eclecticism wants life, power to quicken men's souls, to make their hearts beat, pulses throb, and prompt bold and energetic and continued efforts for humanity; but a synthesis, which binds the past and the future into a living unity, obviates the difficulty, and gives us an effective system. By our doctrine we retain the past, because we live it, live what has been, as well as fore-feel what is to be. Here is a genuine synthesis. Not a speculative synthesis, existing only in a system, only in the abstract; but in actual life,—in the actual life of the race, and in that of the individual. Every man in his degree, is this living synthesis; and, therefore, every man in his degree, struggles for progress. There is, then, no real foundation for this distinction, harped upon so much, between conservatives and reformers. In our civilization the question at issue is never, Shall there, or shall there not be progress? but simply, What is, or what is not, progress? Every man has an ideal, and admits that it is his duty to labor for the perfectibility of man and men, and only asks you to show that what you propose will tend to realize that perfectibility. They in whom the past is most living, and the future most present, are they who can best tell what is or what is not most favorable to progress.

There is no foundation for the distinction between the movement party and the stationary party, when one looks a little below the surface. Men are not so radically different in their tendencies as this distinction supposes. All men aspire, some with more energy than others, but all in a degree. They differ, not in their tendencies, but in their judgment, and their faith. One believes in more progress than another; and one believes that that is progress, which another regards

as a retrogression. At bottom all men are the same, else what means the great doctrine of fraternity? These distinctions we make, convenient and true enough under a certain point of view, are after all mischievous, and sunder men instead of bringing them together, make men feel to each other as strangers, not as brothers. The less we insist on them the better. Are we not all of one family? Hath not one God made us? Are we not bound up together in one common lot?

Nor is there even a class of men who really deserve the name of destructives. The human race goes forward by a series of transformations. All things change their forms. Nothing is stable but truth itself, but God; and of truth, of God, our views undergo, whether we will or not, a ceaseless metamorphosis. Old forms must be modified to new conceptions; the garments of childhood must be thrown aside as we approach manhood, and others fitting our new size must be obtained. The modification of old forms of society, of faith and practice, is after all by no means a destruction, any more than the pruning of a fruit tree, to improve its beauty and advance its growth, is a destruction. Jesus and his apostles were not destructives; and yet they destroyed the old form of the Jewish and pagan religions. They were not destructives, for there came forth from their labors new dogmas, a new temple, a new worship, a new and a higher life for the world. In no country, in no age of the world, have the men called destructives deserved the name. These men, at all epochs, demand a reform, a progress of man, of men, or of institutions. They are men who have an ideal they would realize. They are believers in perfectibility, and, therefore, in some sense religious. The much decried French philosophers of the last century, belong to the great brotherhood of believers. They were not irreligious, nor merely destructive in their aims, nor in their tendencies. They were not sceptics, as we sometimes foolishly imagine, but men of strong faith, full of zeal and enthusiasm; and faith, however small the quantity, when once at work in a man's soul, redeems him from sin, and brings him into harmony with God. But these men, it is said, were atheists, they denied God and Christ, and reviled the Holy Scriptures. All a mistake. Just as if a man who has faith and love enough to do valiant battle for humanity, could possibly want faith in God, or be a denier of Christ, or a reviler of the Bible! Voltaire, Condorcet, Helvetius, and

Rousseau, are of the same fraternity with Luther, and Calvin, and Zuinglius, and Knox. And they labored in the same cause with them, and for all that appears, with motives as pure and as Christian. No doubt they said many foolish things, many absurd things, which no wise or good man will repeat; but from their labors and those of their age, the Christian ideal has come forth enlarged. A grand, a Christian idea, eminently so, has been brought out and placed in the common faith of mankind by these same philosophers, whom we and others have been foolish enough to call infidels, atheists, and destructives;—the grand and brilliant idea of the *Perfectibility of the Race.* This idea was in the mind of Christ, and may be found in the monuments we have remaining of him; but it was not embraced by the church. The church had embraced only the ideal of the perfectibility of individuals. The philosophers did not war against the church because she labored to perfect men, but because she refused to labor to perfect man and society. The church was right in what she asserted, but wrong in the point of view from which the philosophers attacked her. They were right in their attacks. They destroyed nothing. The idea embraced by the church is as firm as ever; but they have added to it another idea, even broader and more powerful, which the church may embrace, if she will; and if she will not, she will find it exceedingly difficult to retain her hold on the race. The two ideas are perfectly compatible; and now we can see that the adherents of the one have no occasion to make war on the defenders of the other. Tell us not, then, that these men who have enlarged our ideal, given a positive dogma to the faith, a second table to the law of the race, were mere destructives. They did their work, as most men do, imperfectly, with a due mixture of human passion and weakness, but they did it as time and circumstances permitted; and it were more fitting for us to make sure of our own faith than to be questioning theirs. They have labored to advance the religion of the race, and why shall we undertake to separate them from the great brotherhood of religious men? The professed believers in Christ must go and study yet longer the meaning of the Christian dogma of *Equality*, if they find it difficult to embrace them as brothers.

What these French philosophers say of Jesus, of Paul, of the Bible, and the fathers, is all very foolish, very absurd, and very saddening withal; and cannot fail to make us

regret that men cannot be found to advocate truth without a mischievous admixture of error. But we can see the error of these philosophers, their folly and absurdity, and therefore need not imitate them. We are under no necessity of denying what they denied, nor of reviling what they reviled. We can do, what they could not, separate their truth from their error. Both they and the church, in their respective denials, were pitiable enough; but both were grand, kindling, and Christian, in their positive faith, in what they asserted and really sought to establish. Mole-eyed sectarianism will, no doubt, shriek with horror at these remarks; but her shrieks have no great power to touch a wise man's heart, who will rarely think her end untimely should she even shriek herself to death. She would, no doubt, take it very unkindly in our heavenly Father, should he suffer Voltaire, Condorcet, and Diderot to escape being damned; but we have never been able to persuade ourselves that of all his numerous offspring, God loves none but a few Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists. What mighty thing have they done, or are they doing, for religion or morals, that they should rise up and arrogate a monopoly of Heaven's favors? They are, doubtless, passable people enough, as the world goes, and we shall be happy to renew our acquaintance with them in a fairer and better world than this; where, we trust, we shall find their views somewhat enlarged, their tempers sweetened, and their charity *not* diminished. Equally happy shall we be to meet in company with Calvin, and Edwards, and Gill, and Wesley, Voltaire, Turgot, d'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and d'Holbach. Sure Heaven is large enough to contain these as well as those; and God's love is broad enough to cover them, and rich enough to bless them. It is time to leave off this nonsense about infidels and destructives, and to remember that all men are brethren. No man is an infidel who believes a greater good can be obtained for the human race, and who exerts himself according to the measure of his strength and light to obtain it. We heartily repent us of the charge of infidelity, which we have so often thrown out against greater and better men than ourselves. God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him, whether he embrace our creed or not. Thank God! we are not the wielders of his judgments, nor the distributors of his bounty. If we were so, alas for our brethren!

Nevertheless, we are not among those who believe all opinions alike good; and that every man does all he can, or all he ought, for the progress of man and of men. We deny utterly all such radical difference among men in regard to religion and infidelity, or reform and conservatism, as is commonly contended for; but we recognize a wide difference among men in the justness or sagacity of their practical views, and in the energy and fidelity with which they labor for human perfectibility. Some mistake entirely the means of realizing a greater good for the race; and others neglect almost entirely to use the means they do not mistake. Men are fallible in their judgments, and they come short in their actions. They err and they sin; and hence the slow progress of individuals, and of the race. History records man's weakness not less than his grandeur; his crimes, sins, misdeeds, as well as his virtues. Over her scroll we must blush and weep, as well as tremble and hope. There is darkness no less than light in our past doings. And men now, in seeking to do what they believe to be right, often war against the best interests of the race. Ever does Satan delude them, by coming to them in the guise of an angel of light. And not this alone. Indolence, like an incubus, rests upon thousands to whom God has given intellect and means, and paralyzes their souls; selfishness and sensuality drive thousands and thousands of others in a direction their better feelings and soberer judgments assure them is false and wicked. We believe neither in the infallibility nor the sinlessness of the race. We believe only in its capacity for progress, in its *perfectibility*; not in its perfection, nor power to become perfect, but merely to approach perfection.

Errors are peculiar to no one class of men. They who are called reformers and they who are called conservatives err, not because they advocate or oppose progress, but in their adoption and application of means to obtain the end common to them all. They are all brethren, their faces are really all the same way; but they all, in no small degree, mistake the most effectual means for setting humanity forward. Our transcendental theologians, saving so far as they are animated by an intenser zeal than their opponents, are no more the party of the future, no more reformers than the others. They err by mistaking, in no small degree, both the end and the means. Their merit consists in their assertion of the inspiration of all men, and thereby declar-

ing all men to stand in intimate relation with their Maker. This is a great and glorious truth; but it is not the whole truth. Their opponents, in rejecting this truth, are wrong, and mischievous in their influence. But these opponents contend for another truth equally great and equally, if not more, essential, the *special inspiration of individual messengers*, as the providential agents of the progress of the race.

The tendency of the transcendental theologians is to overlook the agency of these special messengers, these providential men; and to assert the sufficiency of the inspiration common to all men. Hence Bibles and Messiahs to them are but natural occurrences, and entitled to no special reverence or authority. Through the aid of Bibles and Messiahs they have grown so large, that they fancy Bibles and Messiahs are no longer necessary; nay, that they were never necessary. We have no sympathy with this tendency. Undoubtedly all men stand in intimate relation with their Maker; undoubtedly all men are inspired, for all men love; undoubtedly many of the great essential elements of religious faith have been so far assimilated to the life of humanity, as to be now natural religion; and therefore no longer needing, with the more advanced nations of the earth, a positive supernatural revelation either to assert them, or to confirm their authority; but, after all, it is mainly through the agency of specially inspired and extraordinarily endowed individuals that the race is itself improved; and through Bibles, prophets, Messiahs, revelators that it has attained its present growth. God is nearer to us than transcendental theology teaches. He is near us, not merely in the fixed and uniform laws of nature, but with us in his providence, taking free and voluntary care of us, and tempering all events to our strength and condition. God is not a resistless fate, an iron necessity, inaccessible to human prayer, which no tears, no entreaties, no contrition can move; but a kind and merciful Father, who hears when his children cry, and is ready, able, and willing to supply all their wants. True, we see him not, know him not, save in his manifestations, in the effects he produces, and so far as he enters, by his power and love, into his creatures. But this we know, that we have never sought help of him in vain; and have never gone to him with a broken and contrite spirit without finding relief. We see a special as well as a general providence in the history of individuals and of the race. All is

not the result of natural tendencies. Moses, no doubt, embodies in himself all the tendencies of his people, but how much more! These tendencies did not produce him and his legislation; for ages on ages were requisite for his people to come up to his level, to reach the point where his legislation must cease to be an ideal for humanity. The absurdest of all theories is that which would make Moses the natural production of his age and people; and that people utterly incapable of comprehending him, so sunk in ignorance as, the moment his presence was withdrawn, to fall down and worship a calf of gold!

We have indeed no sympathy with Jewish exclusiveness, none with the doctrine that teaches God had disinherited all nations but the Jewish; and, we may add, just as little with the modern doctrine that,

> "Out of the heart of Nature roll'd
> The burdens of the Bible old;
> The Litanies of nations came,
> Like the volcano's tongue of flame,
> Up from the burning core below,—
> The canticles of love and woe."

This is to mistake the effect for the cause. These litanies came not from "the burning core below;" but they came from God, and they kindled that "burning core." They originated not in the human heart, sprung not from the effort of the soul to utter or to satisfy its own inherent wants; but they came from abroad, to create in the soul a deep want for God, and to make the heart and flesh cry out for the living God. Tell us not that nature has produced the Bible. Man has not degenerated; he lives in as close communion with nature as ever, has the same senses, the same soul, the same "burning core," and yet out from his heart no Bible rolls its "burdens."

Christianity is no natural production. It had, no doubt, its reason in the age in which it was born; it was, no doubt, that to which all preceding progress pointed, which all the previous tendencies of the race demanded as their fulfilment; but, if it was the mere natural and inevitable result of the natural development of the human race, why appeared it not first where that development was most manifest? Why was not its first appearance in Athens, Rome, or Alexandria, and in the Temples, the Mysteries, or the Schools, instead of a by-corner of the world, in an obscure hamlet, and in the person of an obscure peasant, followed

by humble fishermen and despised publicans? Had the tendencies of the age reached furthest, become most manifest, the development of the race most advanced with the fishermen and boatmen of the Lake of Genesareth? Undoubtedly Christianity was the last word of oriental and Grecian philosophies; a word for the utterance of which all previous providences had been preparing the way; but a word none but God could utter; and not till he had uttered it in thunder tones from his dwelling in the heavens, and his well-beloved Son had echoed it from the cross and the tomb, could the nations hear it and leap at the sound.

For ourselves, we confess our utter inability to explain the past history of the race on the theory of natural development, or even on that of the supernatural inspiration which we believe to be common to all men. That history is all bristling with prodigies which are inexplicable to us, save on the hypothesis of the constant intervention, in a *special* manner, of our ever-watchful Father. It is through the agency of prophets, and messengers, and Messiahs, specially and supernaturally endowed by God's spirit, coming when they should come, that the race is initiated into higher and higher degrees of moral and social life. It is our profound belief in this agency that sustains us in the darkest days and enables us to hope in the midst of despair. It is because there is a God, a great and good God, who never deserts his child, humanity, but is always near and able to succor, that we look forward to a higher moral and social state; and have the courage and the strength, though single-handed and alone, to demand progress, and to labor for it. We have thought differently in our day; but let this confession, written while tears of contrition and joy are falling fast, plead our pardon.

Nor let it be supposed that, in clinging to the Bible and Jesus, men are mere conservatives, that they have no aspirations. Some of the truths of the Bible have been assimilated; a portion, if we may so speak, of the divine life of Jesus has become the life of Christendom. Some portion of the Christian ideal has been realized. But not all. There are depths in that old Hebrew Book which no human plummet has sounded; heights in the life of Jesus which no human imagination has scaled. In contending for the Christianity of the Bible and of Jesus, we are not looking back, but forward; for we are contending for truths far, far in advance of our age. Here is the truth of those who war

against what is called transcendental theology. They see, as well they may, in the rich store-houses of the Gospel, of the Bible, of Christ, enough for the warmest heart, the profoundest intellect, the loftiest aspiration. Their error, if error they have, is in misinterpreting Christianity, in not being true to the law they acknowledge, in not laboring with sufficient faith and energy to realize the ideal of Christ. They are hearers and not doers of the word. They are as the man who seeth his face in a glass, and then goeth away and forgetteth what manner of man he was. Let them really bring out the Christian ideal, and labor with zeal and energy to form Christ, the hope of glory, in the individual and in the race, and they will be true and efficient reformers. Their works will live after them.

Nor, again, let it be supposed that they who cling to the authority of revelation, are necessarily inimical to the rights of the mind, or to progress in the knowledge of truth. The Christian ideal, so far as realized, needs no foreign authority. The human mind is equal to it. But what is the authority for that ideal, so far as yet unrealized? The individual reason? Alas! we have seen enough of mere individual reason. It is impotent when it has not, for its guide and support, the reason of God, speaking not only to the heart, but through revelation and the traditions of the race. The great doctrines we are laboring to establish, the reforms we would effect, we confess our inability to demonstrate by mere individual reason. We ask for them, both on our own account, and on account of others, a higher authority. That reason may be sufficient for here and there one. But how can it suffice for the ignorant, the bigoted, the superstitious, the incredulous, the sensual, the wicked; the men in whom conscience slumbers, love sleeps, and only the world with its impurities is awake! Alas! man's word is impotent to arouse them; man's authority too weak to command even their attention. They may speculate with us, or debate with us, but not act with us, not live with us, for God or for man. You must go to them with a higher authority than your own; speak to them in a Name above all names which they dare not resist, or your preaching and efforts will be fruitless. Deprive the preacher of the authority of God, let him go in his own name, not as the messenger of God, and men will laugh at his truth, and mock at his most earnest expostulations. No. They are sorry reformers who would reduce God to nature, and the authority of his word

to that of the individual reason varying with every individual and with every age.

Nor can we sympathize with the doctrine that makes "religion a matter wholly inward and spiritual." Does Mr. Clarke call this a new doctrine, or an old? It is as old as the oldest records of the race, excepting the Bible, and its legitimate results may be seen in the Indian Fakir, who sits all day with his eyes turned downward, contemplating the celestial light playing upon the end of his nose. It may be seen in the sublime indifferency and refined sensuality of the great Goethe, the modern transcendental saint, who cared not how the world went, providing he succeeded in cultivating all sides of his "many-sided" being. Whenever we make religion a matter wholly inward and spiritual, we either make sanctity consist in the calm, quiet contemplation of the beauty and excellence of truth, or we run into a vague, dreamy sentimentalism, which is never slow to lose itself in sensuality. In either case the result is to be deprecated.

Mr. Clarke tells us that, prior to the rise of transcendental theology, our community was divided into two classes,— "both of which sought to be justified by works rather than by faith; the one by religious works, the other by moral works. According to both systems the free soul of man was bound beneath the yoke of opinions and outward practices. Christianity was not enough regarded as lying in the state of the soul, and in its inward union with God." This account of our religious community does not state the precise evil that existed. Assuredly we shall not here advocate a round of rites and ceremonies, but we utterly deny that those who sought to be justified by "religious works" were wrong in principle. The doctrine which led our Orthodox Christians to seek the favor of heaven by works of piety and love, which led them to maintain what they believed to be the truth, to build churches and assemble for worship, to form Bible, missionary, and tract societies, and to contribute liberally of their wealth for evangelizing the world, was no false doctrine. It led them out of themselves, to seek heaven by doing good; and in this it was right. Their error was not one of principle, but merely mistaking the most direct method of doing the greatest amount of good for their brethren. Nor did our Unitarian community err in principle. We should like to know how a man is to be justified, if not by the performance of *moral* works. The "baptized

atheism," with which we sometime since charged Unitarianism, belonged to its neglect of tradition, to its excessive rationalism, and its want of a broad and comprehensive faith in the progress of man and society; in a word, to its coldness and want of power to inspire love and prompt its believers to bold, earnest, and successful efforts for human salvation, and to its contending for a philosophy, the logical results of which could not fail to end in speculative atheism. We never thought of charging Unitarians, as such, with being atheists, or of censuring them for making religion too outward and formal. Either the orthodox principle or the Unitarian is altogether preferable to the antinomianism of the transcendentalist. So far as the transcendentalists have recognized in man the power to perceive truths which transcend the outward senses, so far they have been of service and have aided progress; but so far as they have represented these transcendental truths to exist in the soul, and taught us it is in ourselves that we see them, and led us to suppose them to be mere developments of the soul itself, they have falsified the truth, and retarded progress instead of aiding it. No, these transcendental truths are no more in the soul, no more the patrimony, as somebody calls them, of the race, than are the objects of external nature. They are objects of the soul's intelligence, and therefore are out of it, exterior to it, and possessed by it only when it beholds them. It is always out of us we are to look for the truth; never in us; for it is only as we are reflected from what we are not, as in a glass, that we learn what we are, or even that we are.

It is making religion consist in the frame of the soul, not in the intensity and direction of its activity, that leads the author of this sermon, when speaking of the duty of the Christian minister, to say that he has "a work to do *on the hearts* of his hearers." This is the highest conception of the duty of the minister of Jesus that he can take with his mysticism and quietism. According to him the question is not what we do, but what we are; just as if what we are is not the result of what we do; as if our being is not in our doing. We exist not for ourselves any further than we act; and all consciousness of our very existence ceases the moment we cease acting. The great end of life is not to be, but to do; and in doing being is developed and enlarged. This cant of the followers of our transcendentalists about being, and cultivating one's being, is quite nauseating. Assuredly we do not regard the frame of the mind and

heart a matter of indifference; assuredly we do not object to self-culture, nor the cultivation of one's whole nature; but there is for us no sadder image than that of a man who sets out "with malice aforethought" to cultivate himself. Sad, sad is it to see a man engrossed wholly with himself, and thinking only of the effect this or that act may have in cultivating the barren soil of his own puny being. The great question the apostles made their hearers ask was, What shall we do? and Jesus bids us *do* the works he commands, if one would know whether he be of God or not. The preacher must not aim at doing a work on the hearts of his hearers,—although, if true and faithful to his mission, a great and glorious work he will do,—but he must aim to make his hearers do something, to point them to a work out of themselves, which they must do in order to be saved, and inspire them by bold words and warm love with zeal and energy to do it. In doing this work, in being drawn away from themselves, forgetting their own salvation even, and laboring to realize a good for humanity, they will cultivate their souls, improve their hearts, and advance in the internal life of Christ. We do not cultivate love to God by trying to look into ourselves, by calm contemplation of his commands, nor by internal, isolated strivings to love him; but by active efforts to do his will, which is to love and serve our brethren; that is by "moral works." Nor do we come to love mankind by efforts carried on by ourselves alone, but by going forth among them, into active life, and striving to do them good. No man loves his race till he has served it. If we waited for faith and love, before acting, we should never act. Faith and love are born in the effort to do. The love to God, or to man, that comes in any other way, is no true love, but a vague, dreamy sentimentalism, weak and effeminate, weeping and sighing at the recital of wrong and outrage, fainting at sight of human suffering, but unable to lift a finger to lighten the load of misery that weighs man down in the dust.

No; your Christian minister is not one who contents himself with, or thinks of, the work he may do on the hearts of his hearers. He comes from God to man, and points to a work the sinner must do. On that work he fixes the attention of his hearers. He speaks with authority, and infuses a new and higher life into the world by awakening it to the performance of nobler deeds. He carries every man's thoughts away from himself, and instead of concentrating

them on his own self-culture, he fixes them on God, on duty, on humanity, and warms and kindles, enlightens and directs, every one to bold and vigorous efforts for truth and progress. Self-culture, the redemption and sanctification of the individual heart, will follow as a natural and necessary result.

But we have extended our remarks beyond what we proposed, because the subject is one of vital importance, and on some points of which, we are fully satisfied that we have often spoken too hastily, without due deliberation, and on which we have been still more mistaken by others. We trust we have now expressed ourselves so clearly and distinctly that we shall not be again misapprehended on these points. It will be seen that for the foundation of our faith and our general tendencies, we take our stand with those who do not accept the transcendental theology. We go for progress; not in truth, for truth is immutable, but in the knowledge of the truth; and that truth is no innate property of our souls. We are not born in possession of it. We obtain a knowledge of it only by a sincere and earnest study of man and the universe, the Bible and the life of Jesus. We have no wish to separate ourselves from common humanity. We go with our brethren. Their traditions are ours; their God is our God; their faith is our faith; and all we ask of them is to permit us to labor in common with them for a more perfect understanding of the Gospel, and a more complete realization of the great truths, in both man and men, in the individual and society, in church and state, in industry, science, and art, in the whole sphere of man's life and activity.

LEROUX ON HUMANITY.*

[From the Boston Quarterly Review for July, 1842.]

M. Leroux, though but recently known in this country, has for some time held a very high rank among the literary and scientific men of France, and indeed of Europe. He first distinguished himself, we believe, by his contributions to the *Revue Encyclopédique*, which was in its day one of the ablest, if not the very ablest, of European periodicals. He is now one of the principal conductors of the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*, a philosophical, scientifical, literary, and industrial dictionary, intended to render an exact account of the present state of human knowledge; a work which owes much of its value and distinctive character to his contributions; and which, judging from the names of those engaged in it, must be a work of no ordinary literary and scientific merit, and proper to be consulted as an authentic record of the doctrines and aspirations of *la jeune France.*

We can claim no great familiarity with the writings of M. Leroux, having read but two or three of his productions; but from what we do know of him, we feel warranted in saying that he is one of the most remarkable men of our times. He possesses talents of a very high order, various and profound learning, a rare philosophical insight, and rich poetic fervor. Few men can read him without being warmed and instructed. He is a true lover of his race, a firm friend of liberty and equality, and a bold champion of social and religious progress. He is a democrat in the highest, as well as the lowest, sense of the word. He is no mere speculative philosopher. He is sincere, deeply, almost terribly in earnest; and sometimes he speaks to us in the thrilling tones of the prophet, and makes us tremble before the awfulness of the preacher. He evidently regards himself as a man of destiny, to whom God has given a work to do, and he aspires to be the founder of a school, if not even of a religion,—the school, if not the religion of Humanity.

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*De l' Humanité: de son Principe, et de son Avenir: où se trouve exposée la vraie définition de la Religion; et où l' on s'explique le sens, la suite, et l' enchaînement du Mosaïsme et du Christianisme. Par Pierre Leroux. Paris: 1840.

At bottom, however, M. Leroux belongs to, and continues the school of Saint-Simon, though in some senses modifying, and in others, rejecting its teachings. This in the minds of many of our countrymen will not tell to his advantage. Saint-Simonism is not in the best possible odor, perhaps because it is so little understood. The Saint-Simonian school was a great school, and may be justly regarded as one of the profoundest and richest schools to which the race has given birth. Saint-Simon is worthy to be mentioned with Pythagoras and Plato, St. Augustine, Descartes, and Leibnitz. He was one of those providential men whom God raises up at distant intervals in the world's history, specially endows, and sends among us to disclose a loftier ideal, and to initiate us into a higher order of life. Saint-Simon will be to the church of the future very nearly what St. Augustine has been to the church of the past. He has been in our day the truest interpreter of the thought of Jesus, the first since Jesus to comprehend the *social* character of the new Covenant, which God has made with man, to reinstate, if we may so speak, humanity in its rights, and give it in our systems of religion, its due place and influence. Christianity may now become what in the Augustine "City of God" it was but imperfectly, the *Religion of Humanity*, and without losing for that its character of the *Religion of God.*

Of course, we have no sympathy with the follies and extravagances of the Saint-Simonians; nor with their mistake of confounding Christianity with the Catholic Church; nor with their substitution of immortality in humanity for immortality as individual men and women; nor with certain pantheistic tendencies which they have not escaped, but which are in fact no necessary elements of the school. There was an original vice somewhere when they passed from a school to a sect. During the life and influence of Bazard, one of the most distinguished men they were ever able to claim, a man of large intelligence and much practical sagacity, they advanced with great rapidity, and threatened to become the dominant party in France. Bazard was a salutary restraint upon the bolder, profounder, more religious, but impracticable Enfantin, and prevented the school from breaking entirely with the existing social organization. But after, in a fit of disgust or discouragement, he had foolishly and impiously shot himself, all went wrong with the Saint-Simonians, and their meetings were soon suppressed

by the strong arm of civil power. As an outward, visible society, the school, or sect is we believe, no longer extant. Père Enfantin, at the last advices, was in the service of Mehemet-Ali; and the twelve apostles that went even to the gate of the harem of the Grand Turk, in search of a woman worthy to become the *mère suprême*, have returned, reported their ill success, and vanished in thin air; yet the school is not dead, nor will it speedily die. The more we penetrate its spirit, the more are we struck with its inherent vitality. Its doctrines, in a modified form, freed from the extravagances and technicalities of the sect, are the only doctrines really making any progress in Europe, or even in this country. Its pantheistic tendencies must be abandoned, its dreams of an hierarchical organization of the race must be indefinitely postponed; but its fundamental principles, as modified by time and inquiry, will rule the future, and justify the confidence expressed by their early expositors.

Saint-Simonism, regarded in its elements, its fundamental principles, is at present the true Weltgeist, the real spirit of the age. Men hit upon it without knowing it, and advocate its doctrines without knowing or suspecting their origin. In this fact we may read the evidence of its soundness, of its adaptation to the wants of our epoch, and of its future destiny.

Saint-Simonism is superior to all its rival schools in the fact that it has an ideal, and therefore is not merely speculative. The Hegelian school is erudite and profound; and, though we are far from pretending to an intimate acquaintance with it, we know enough of it to know that it contains a large share of truth; but it is merely speculative; it proposes no ideal, does not prophesy, does not legislate for the future. The French eclectic school, founded by Cousin, is an admirable school, a great school, rich in learning and original psychological researches, earnest, sincere, explaining with great truth and clearness the past and the present; but it is dumb before the future. To the questions, What has been? What is? it is prompt with an answer, and an answer which is by no means to be despised; but to the question, What *ought* to be? it has no answer. It has no ideal. It cannot tell what we must do in order to inherit eternal life. It is therefore sufficient only for those rare individuals, who are satisfied with themselves and with men and things as they are; who aspire to nothing better, holier, wiser, or more beautiful; who are contented merely to speculate as ama-

teurs on the past and the present. But these individuals, however estimable they may be, and however admirable and desirable may be their cool, philosophical indifferency, which converts them, to use the language of a popular preacher, "into statues of tranquility with forefinger pointing to heaven," toward which they move not, are far from constituting the bulk of mankind. Humanity is no mere amateur. It is terribly in earnest. It is with it always a matter of life or death. It cannot be satisfied with mere *dilettantism*. It does not, cannot feel itself here merely to speculate on its appearance in time and space, and on what passes on round about it and within it. It feels itself here to act, to live; and it demands a practical philosophy, a *Religion*, able and prompt to answer the ever-recurring and tormenting question, What shall I do to be saved?

Humanity lives only on condition that it aspires, and it aspires only on condition that it has an ideal. Prophets and Messiahs redeem and sanctify the race by giving it new and loftier ideals. The true ideal of humanity is no doubt intrinsically, eternally, and universally the same, though it enlarges ever as the race advances, and therefore seems to be always changing. In seeking, in laboring to realize this ideal humanity finds its life. *This is its life.* The Jews lived only so far as they succeeded in realizing the ideal which Moses gave them. Jesus enlarged and generalized the ideal of Moses, translated it out of Judaism into humanity, and therefore of Jews and gentiles made one; and this enlarged and generalized ideal the race, since his coming, have been laboring to realize. So far forth as we have realized it, we have lived a true life, and a life in some sense, nay, literally, derived from Jesus, who in giving us this ideal, which, by his intimate relation with God, he had himself realized, and making us aspire to its realization, has become the father of the new age, the life of the world, the redeemer and the sanctifier of humanity.

The ideal of Jesus has never, in its fulness and beauty, been the ideal of the race. The church has embraced his ideal as interpreted by St. Augustine, with which she was content till the times of Martin Luther and John Calvin. Since then she has been seeking an ideal rather than the realization of an ideal; and hence her apparent want of faith, and the critical and atheistical tendencies of modern society. None of the philosophers have given us any substitute for the Christian ideal as interpreted by St. Augus-

tine. The devout have continued as before to seek the city of God, as conceived by him, not as conceived by Jesus, and interpreted by St. Paul and St. John. Many of them have not even felt the necessity of an ideal; some, however, have sought it; Descartes, Bacon, Leibnitz, Price, Lessing, Herder, Condorcet, and a few others have caught glimpses of it; but Saint-Simon has been the first since St. Paul to give it an adequate formula. He, paraphrasing the answer of Jesus, has been able to reply to the question asked by young and eager humanity, "Good Master, what good thing shall I do to inherit eternal life?" "Love thyself in thy neighbor, and do thy utmost so to organize society, as to effect in the speediest manner possible the moral, intellectual, and physical amelioration of the poorest and most numerous class of thy brethren."

Saint-Simonism does not, then, content itself with mere speculation on the past and the present. It surveys them indeed, for it is erudite and observing, grateful, no less than hopeful; but it does it in a deep, earnest, *religious* spirit, for the purpose of throwing light on the future, and of determining the end toward which individuals and nations should direct their labors. It aspires to be a religion; that is, to legislate, to impose the law, not merely by telling what has been, and what is, with which most schools content themselves, but by telling *what ought* to be.

The Saint-Simonian City of God, no doubt, differs from the Augustine; but we have not been able to perceive any discrepancy between its ideal and that of Jesus, as interpreted by St. John and St. Paul. We do not find that Saint-Simon considered his ideal repugnant to the Christian. In his secret thought he was a disciple of Jesus, as must be every full-grown man brought up in the bosom of Christian civilization; and in calling his system *Nouveau Christianisme*, he did not mean to intimate that it was new in relation to the Christianity of Christ, but in relation to the Christianity enjoined and realized by the Augustine church. His followers have not always been careful to mark the distinction between the Christianity of Christ and the Christianity of the church, and hence the source of their most fatal errors; but the ideal of their master was implicitly at least, in the teachings of Jesus, and explicitly in the philosophic commentaries by St. Paul. The church, however, seeking the Augustine City of God, instead of the Pauline, has failed to perceive the important fact, that

though humanity is indeed actualized, lives only in individual men and women, it has, nevertheless, a being, development, and growth of its own, as a race; and individual men and women have no real existence but in their union with it. There is in the Augustine City of God no clear, distinct recognition of the unity of individuals in the race. There is no humanity, no unity of individuals in one human life, running through them, and identical with them all. Individuals are not members of one and the same indissoluble body; or if so, it is in a sense which tends to absorb man in God, virtually annihilating him, as may be seen in the pantheistic tendencies of that church as interpreted by Luther and Calvin. These last have a perpetual tendency to lose the individual in God. Man is nothing before God, has no power, no agency, no virtue of his own. If, on the other hand an effort is made to save man, the church runs into pure individualism, asserting the reality of individual men and women, but denying the existence of humanity, without which individuals would be as if they were not; nay, would not be at all. But breaking the unity of the race, the church has isolated individuals from humanity, and conceived them, in the sense they are human, to exist as individuals and as individuals only. She recognizes then men and women, but no *man*, no Adam, as in the beginning, male and female. Now the salvation the church can seek with this view, can be only the salvation of individuals, mere isolated individuals. Her efforts, therefore, are not to redeem humanity and save individuals in the race, by leading them back to unity, and making them one in the bosom of humanity, as Christ was one with the Father, but to save these isolated individuals, which as *isolated* individuals, have no existence at all; for individuals always have their being in the species, and through the species in God.

In consequence of this error on the part of the Augustine church, the ideal of Christianity has necessarily been interpreted to be the improvement of mere individual men and women. It has not been felt that Christ enjoined the improvement of man, and of men only in so far as they are man, and because they are man. Yet Saint-Simon is right, and the Christian ideal is rightly affirmed to be the indefinite progress of humanity, and of individual men and women in the bosom of humanity. This is what St. Paul asserts, when he asserts that "as

in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Indeed, notwithstanding what we have just alleged, the church herself asserts the same, or would assert the same, if she but comprehended the profound significance of her own symbols. She has taught us that in Adam all men sinned, so that all men have become corrupt and guilty. But we could not sin in Adam as individuals, for as individuals we had no actual existence, and nothing can be more absurd than to make men responsible for acts in which they do not and cannot participate. We sinned, and still continue to sin in Adam; but not as individual men and women. We sinned and sin in him as the race, as humanity. The corruption is therefore rightly termed a corruption of humanity, of human nature; and we partake of it only in so far as, and because we partake of human nature. It was the race, not individuals that died in Adam, or individuals only as existing potentially, virtually, but not actually, in the race. So it is the race that is redeemed by Christ the Lord, termed by St. Paul himself, the second Adam, come to repair the damage done by the first. As the fall was that of the race, otherwise it could not have implicated us, but have been merely the fall of two individuals, for which they alone would have been responsible; so the redemption must be that of the race. Adam and Eve eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, are humanity falling into sin, and dying a moral death; Christ is humanity, for so may the Hebraism, Son of Man, be interpreted, rising from their moral death, from their grave of sin, and reascending to unity in God. The true Christian redemption is, then, that of humanity, and of individuals only so far forth as they exist in humanity, and because it is in them only that humanity lives and is actualized. The church herself, then, virtually rejects the individualism she has countenanced. This individualism is repugnant not only to the deeper sense of the symbols of the church, but to the whole spirit of Christianity. The Christian ideal is not *sauve qui peut*, but "Love thy neighbor as thyself." It is not the regeneration and sanctification of individuals, as so many separate, independent forces, without mutual relation or solidarity, that it proposes, but the regeneration and sanctification of the species, of the race, by means of the new life which God, through his only begotten Son, Jesus, communicated to it. This new life was not actually communicated to all individuals, but it was communicated to the race, and

through the race to all individuals *virtually*, because all exist virtually in the race, and *actually* to all who commune with regenerate humanity.* Translate this doctrine of the redemption of the race, and of individuals only so far as they commune with redeemed humanity, into a doctrine of social and political life, and it becomes precisely the doctrine of social progress, for which Saint-Simon contends, and which he proposes as the true ideal of all who will live godly, inherit eternal life, in other words live a true life conformable to the will of the Creator.

We have no time to pause on this doctrine, and our readers must forgive the apparent digression already indulged in; for we have a sort of affection for Saint-Simon and his school, which it would be vain for us to attempt to disguise if we would, and which we would not if we could. Moreover, we have thought it not improper to say thus much of the school in which M. Leroux was formed, and to which in all that concerns the elements of his system, he still belongs. He retains, since he came out of the school, or since its dispersion, nearly all it had worth retaining. He retains its ideal, is true to its spirit, and obedient to its inspirations; while he avoids its extravagances, and shows, in the development and defense of its leading principles, a freedom of spirit, a warmth of feeling, a depth and originality of thought, not altogether unworthy of a man who aspires to found a school. But with all this, M. Leroux is no artist. His mind is a wild, weltering chaos, into which are thrown in the greatest confusion imaginable, materials various and rich, difficult to obtain, rare and of great

*Unsound as this reasoning must appear to the orthodox reader, it is really profound and as near the truth as it is possible for the rationalist to reach. Understand that the Incarnation is the basis a new and supernatural order, is a new creation in reality, and it becomes plain that humanity, the race was redeemed in the sense understood by the author, and that the new (supernatural) life was not actually communicated to all individuals, but it was communicated to the race (that is, the church, which in the supernatural order is what the race is in the natural) and through the church to all individuals *virtually*, because all may, and *actually* to all who, commune with regenerate humanity, through the new birth. All that the author wanted to correct his view was the doctrine of the supernatural order, so thoroughly and clearly discussed in the third volume of these works. Indeed all the false views contained in this fourth volume find their refutation in the arguments of the third.—Ed.

price, in ample abundance for a new intellectual world; but they will not coalesce, combine, assume unity, and clothe themselves with form and beauty, till a more creative spirit than his passes over them. His views are various, profound, often original, ingenious, and striking, but incomplete. Nevertheless he gives us some admirable criticisms, throws light on several dark problems in philosophy and theology, suggests numerous trains of rich and captivating thought, and kindles up many pure and noble aspirations. We honor him for his heartiness, honesty, deep earnestness, and lofty aims. There is nothing little, insignificant, or *dilettanteish* about him. He is a man; thinks, feels, and speaks as a man.

With these remarks on the general character of M. Leroux and the school to which he virtually belongs, we pass to the consideration of the work before us, which comes, as the author tells us, in the train of his *Essai sur l'Égalité*, which it continues. In that essay he had analyzed the present and explained his views of the past, detected the law of progress, found that the human race, having passed successively through all the phases of inequality, stands now on the borders of equality and a happier future. But before this future, so far as that work was concerned, the author stopped short, daring neither to prophesy nor to dogmatize. The questions came up, What is this future to *me?* What relation between me and humanity? between its destiny and mine? Shall I be on the earth when justice and equality reign among men? Shall I hope for the future, love it, and seek to usher it in? or shall I repel it, and withdraw myself as much as possible from it? The work before us was written professedly to answer these and similar questions.

The work is preceded by an Introduction on *Happiness*, of considerable length, originally an article in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*. It makes a complete work in itself of great value. We should be glad to give an analysis of it, but must pass it over; for the slightest notice of its contents would carry us quite away from our present purpose.

M. Leroux divides his work into six books, the sixth book occupying about one-third of the first volume, and the whole of the second. The first book is taken up with definitions of man, and their application. Psychologically, Leroux defines man, not the man of ancient theologies, but the abstract man of modern thinkers, to be *sensation-senti-*

ment-cognition indivisibly united. He does not demonstrate or attempt to demonstrate the truth of this definition. He collects it historically, taking one element from Descartes, another from Gassendi and Locke, another from Leibnitz. This is not a very scientific method, and is the more remarkable in Leroux, since he condemns it without mercy in his work against eclecticism, in which he unjustly charges this method upon Cousin. But this is a small matter. Leroux assumes it as embracing in itself all the psychological knowledge that we possess on what may be called the abstract, or isolated mind of man.

Critically considered, we have somewhat to object to this definition. Cognition abstracted, sensation and sentiment are virtually the same. They have a common basis, and depend on one and the same faculty of human nature, to wit, the *sensibility*, or power to feel. The two terms are thus reducible at bottom to one; and instead of "sensation-sentiment-cognition," we should define man to be feeling-cognition. But this loses the trinity of ancient and modern psychology, and moreover is not broad enough to cover the whole man. Man *acts*, as well as *feels* and *knows*. We ought, then, to define him to be *action*-sentiment-cognition, indivisibly united. Furthermore, we see no good reason why Leroux should define man phenomenally, rather than ontologically, since he, as well as we, admits man's ontological existence. Undoubtedly man recognizes his existence, the fact that he exists, only in the phenomenon; but he does recognize his existence, and never *as* phenomenon. The ontological is always revealed in the phenomenal, and our knowledge of being, as the subject of the phenomenon, is as direct and as positive as our knowledge of the phenomenon itself. This follows from what Leroux himself assumes in his *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme.* Man never confounds himself with his phenomena. He is never a pain, a joy, or a grief, is never sensation, sentiment, or cognition; but the subject who joys or grieves, is pained or pleased, feels, acts, or knows. He should be defined ontologically, then, from his powers, not from the effect of their exercise. Instead, then, of being defined action-sentiment-cognition indivisibly united, he should be defined activity-sensibility-intelligence indivisibly united; that is, man is a being who acts, knows, and feels, and all these at once in each and all of his phenomena. Thus corrected, it is the

definition adopted by the Saint-Simonians, by Cousin, and, as Leroux contends, virtually by all modern thinkers.

The main point in this definition to be observed in its applications to morals and politics, is that according to it man is a unity in triplicity, a trinity. He is not sensation *and* sentiment *and* cognition, any more than a neutral salt is an acid *and* an alkali; but he is a simple unity, inherently and essentially activity-intelligence-sensibility, and therefore each one of his phenomena is indissolubly action-feeling-cognition. The distinction of faculties implies no division of essence; the triplicity of elements does not break the unity of man's being. We cannot, then, as do our psychologers, separate the mental phenomena into actions, or volitions; sensations, or sentiments; and cognitions, or ideas; because in actual life there is no separation at all, but each phenomenon is the product of the three elements in their indissoluble unity.

This fact marks the true distinction between a *synthetic* and an *eclectic* philosophy, though it does not mark the distinction, as Leroux fancies, between himself and Cousin; for, save in name, Cousin is as synthetic as Leroux, and even more so; and he insists every whit as earnestly on the primitive and essential synthesis of our faculties in each of our phenomena. Man, according to Cousin, is a trinity fundamentally and indissolubly, and the fact of consciousness is always action-cognition-sentiment indivisibly united. Cousin's error consists principally in the infelicitous choice of a name, which misleads the greater part of the public, and sometimes even himself. His philosophy ought not to be called eclecticism, for by eclectic he really understands synthetic. Had Leroux been aware of this fact, he might have spared himself and philosophy several portions of his very able *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*.

This definition of man, Leroux thinks, was not unknown to the ancients; but the failure of philosophers in all ages has been caused by their exaggerating one of its three terms, sensation, sentiment, or cognition. Plato exaggerates the last, Machiavelli and Hobbes the first, and Rousseau the second. Plato, by exaggerating the cognitive element, subordinates to it the other two, which, when transferred to political and social life, will be the subjection of the men of industry and the artists or warriors to priests and men of science, as we see in his Republic. Machiavelli and Hobbes, exaggerating sensation, see in men only a troop of animals,

which must be reduced for their own advantage to submission, by the strong arm of power, or by artifice and cunning. Rousseau, in fine, exaggerating sentiment, the *me*, the individual will, arrives at a mere individualism, or mere aggregation of equal and mutually repellant individual forces, which can be bound together in society, harmonized only by means of a social compact, according to which each individual surrenders his own freedom to the community, to become free only as an integral part of the city or state, and consents to clothe the majority with sovereign power to do as it pleases, even to employ force to execute its decisions. In any of these cases we have despotism. According to Plato, we should have the despotism of a theocracy; Machiavelli and Hobbes would give us the despotism of the law incarnated in the king; Rousseau the despotism of the majority, the worst of the three.

Philosophers break the unity of the human being; divide man into separate faculties, nay, into separate beings, as it were; then seize specially upon one or another of the fragments into which they have broken him, and with that alone seek to reconstruct man and society. But the man and society thus reconstructed are at best fragmentary, incomplete, and must needs be ever at loggerheads with man and society as God and nature intended them. Our consolation in this case is that God and nature are stronger than the philosophers, and humanity, preserving in actual life her own unity in triplicity, makes her way through the ages, leaving behind the philosophers and their systems.

From a psychological definition of man, Leroux proceeds to give us what he terms a *philosophical* definition; that is, a definition of man not as an abstraction, but as a real being, living and developing himself in the bosom of the race; that is, again, man defined not from the individual, but the species. The ancients defined man to be a "social and political animal." This definition included all they knew of man. Have we moderns nothing to add to it? We add to it this, *Man is progressive, society is progressive, the human race itself is progressive.*

Leroux assumes this last definition as his point of departure, and takes as an axiom assented to, this thought of Leibnitz, *videtur homo ad perfectionem venire posse.* He does not attempt to prove that man is progressive, but merely that his capacity for progress is an admitted fact, an integral part of the present intellectual life of the race, no

more in need of proof than the fact of life itself. In order to prove this he quotes a large number of modern thinkers, among whom we may mention Saint-Simon, Pascal, Perrault, Fontenelle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz, Lessing, Turgot, and Condorcet.

Saint-Simon asserts that "the golden age, which blind superstition has hitherto placed in the past, is in the future; a paradise on earth is before us," not behind us. He fully sustains Leroux, for Leroux is one of his disciples; but we are not sure that the others quoted sustain his doctrine, save indistinctly, vaguely, and at best merely by implication. This doctrine, as Leroux, after Saint-Simon, maintains it, is that humanity is a collective being, living in the bosom of universal life, a life properly its own, and developing itself by a law of growth strictly analogous to that of the individual; that the race, taken as the ideal (in the Platonic sense) or virtuality of man, that is, as human nature, which may be termed the potentiality of the individual, has a growth by way of accretion, or assimilation, which is as truly a growth as that we witness in the individual in passing from infancy to manhood; not that humanity, as an aggregation of individuals, through successive generations, merely augments its accumulations of monuments, whether industrial, scientific, or artistic, and its skill and wisdom in the application and use of these monuments, but that humanity as the virtuality of the individual becomes really enlarged, that the possibilities or capabilities of human nature itself increase from generation to generation, so that children of later generations are born not only with greater external advantages, owing to the labors of preceding generations, but with greater internal capacities. This is the doctrine for which Leroux contends, and is set forth at some length in our paper on *Reform and Conservatism.*

This doctrine consists of two articles; first, the collective life of humanity; and second, that humanity, as well as individuals, is progressive. Pascal maintains that "not merely individual men advance in the sciences, but all men taken collectively advance in them, as the world grows older; for it is with successive generations of men, as with the different ages of the individual, so that the whole series of individuals, continued throughout the ages, should be considered *as one and the same man, persisting always and continually learning.*" Charles Perrault says, "the human race ought to be considered as *a single eternal man,* so that

the life of mankind, like that of the individual, has had its infancy, has now its manhood, but will have no decline." Fontenelle expresses himself to the same effect. Assuredly mankind taken collectively have in both ancient and modern times been likened to the individual, and said to have four ages, infancy, youth, manhood, and old age; but neither the ancient nor the modern thinkers referred to, seem to us to have had any conception of the doctrine as we have set it forth. The progress, of which Pascal, Perrault, and Fontenelle speak, is external, in the arts and sciences; and their "one and the same man" their "single eternal man," is merely a figure of speech, by which they express their faith in the continuance of the species, and that each successive generation shall enlarge the *accumulations*, not the *growth*, of the race. No doubt the language of these thinkers in the mouth of Leroux would imply the doctrine in question; but in the mouth of those thinkers themselves, it means something altogether more superficial and common-place.

Bacon was a great man, a man no doubt, as Leroux contends, who was an idealist in relation to progress in the material order; he unquestionably believed that man, by means of science, would be able to extend his empire over nature, and to improve his external condition; but we do not find in him any trace of the doctrine of the collective life of humanity, as we embrace it; no evidence of any faith in the progress of man's inherent capabilities, of humanity, human nature itself. We yield to no one in our admiration of Leibnitz, whom we dare maintain to be the greatest thinker of modern times; but we confess that we have not found our doctrine of progress in any of his works that have fallen under our notice. Leroux thinks that he finds it in Leibnitz's *Law of Continuity*. We think the doctrine we are maintaining is the only true explication of the facts which Leibnitz has under his eyes, but he himself meant, by the law of continuity, not progress, but that nature never proceeds by leaps, that she tolerates no void, no chasms, but is a universal pleroma, at least a just gradation of being from the highest to the lowest, as versified by Pope:—

> "Vast chain of Being! which from God began,
> Natures ethereal, human, angel, man,
> Beast, bird, fish, insect, which no eye can see,
> No glass can reach, from infinite to thee,
> From thee to nothing."

His *videtur homo ad perfectionem venire posse*, seems to us to express, not the doctrine, that man is indefinitely progressive, but the reverse, that he is perfectible, able to come to perfection, that is, to become perfect; or in other terms, to realize the utmost capacity of his nature; which is by no means the doctrine contended for. Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, indeed all modern thinkers a little distinguished, have no doubt had a sort of presentiment of the doctrine of progress; have felt that man must be in some way improvable, and that his future must be holier, happier than his present or his past; but none of them, prior at least to Condorcet, have, so far as we are able to ascertain, given it a distinct, scientific statement.

Leroux contends that the ancients had no sentiment, not even vague, of the collective life of humanity; we are not sure but he is virtually correct in this; yet we can find the doctrine in Seneca even more clearly and energetically expressed than in Pascal or Perrault, if we may be permitted to adopt the same principles in the interpretation of him that Leroux adopts in deducing it from the moderns. "Men indeed die," says the Roman philosopher, "but humanity itself, in whose image man was made, survives, and remains unaffected by the sufferings and decay of individuals."*

After all, the doctrine of progress, veiled indeed and not always recognizable by careless observers, runs through all the religions of antiquity; and so does also that of the collective life of humanity. The doctrine of progress is the real significance of the old universal faith in the periodical destruction,—sometimes by water and sometimes by fire,—and renovation of man and nature. The palingenesia of the ancients is the imperfect statement of the progress of the moderns. Christianity, which is Judaism translated from the tribe into the race, making of Jew and gentile one, reveals, at least to us, both the doctrine of the collective life of humanity, and of the progress of the race and its institutions. This is the doctrine which lies at the bottom of the faith in the millennium, so rife in the early ages of the church, so prevalent even yet, and the realization of which all Christians pray for in the petitions, "Thy Kingdom come.

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*Homines quidem pereunt; ipsa antem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet; et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus, illa nil patitur.—L. Annæi Senecæ, *Epist.* 65. Even the doctrine of progress, which we call a modern doctrine, was not altogether unknown to this philosopher. Nec ulli nato post mille sœcula præcluditur occasio aliquid adjiciendi.—*Ep.* 64.

Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven." It is the significance of the faith in a Messiah, who, all Christendom still, in common with the Jews, believes, is to come, it is what is implied in the hope of "a latter-day glory;" what Isaiah promises when, enraptured with his vision of the Messiah's reign, he breaks forth, "He shall not fail, nor be discouraged, till he have set judgment in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law." It was chanted in the chorus of angels over the manger-cradle of the infant Redeemer, and was preached by Paul as "the liberty of the sons of God," into which the whole creation groaned to be delivered. The doctrine is, as we have shown in commenting on the Saint-Simonian ideal, peculiarly a Christian doctrine, and to Christianity are we indebted for its principal developments; but it has required eighteen hundred years of training under the Christian dispensation, to enable us to give it a clear, distinct, and scientific statement. As a doctrine clearly, distinctly, and scientifically stated, it is probably not older than the close of the last century; but as a doctrine forefelt and foreshadowed, it is older than Bacon and Descartes, than Paul and Jesus, than Plato and Pythagoras, as old as Moses, and we know not but as old as the first aspiration of the race.

Leroux, in his second book,—not the least valuable part of his work,—considers man's nature, destiny, and right. He holds,—and in this we coincide with him,—that man, taken alone, is never competent to the task of his own manifestation. He remains in a virtual or latent state, a mere potentiality, till assisted to actualize himself by that which is not himself. He cannot exist in his own eyes, be conscious, without acting, and he cannot act without an object which he is not, and cannot of himself furnish. For instance, he is made with the capacity to love, but he does not from the first actually love. This capacity, when he does not actually love, is still love, but love in a virtual or latent state, love *in potentia*, not *in actu*. From this virtual or latent state love can be brought only by means of an object. Or, in simple terms, man is created with the power to love; but he cannot manifest this power to love without loving; and he cannot love without loving something, some object. An object which is loved is as essential to the production of actual love as is a subject that loves.

Love, so far forth as man loves, is his life. But as this love is, if we may so speak, the joint product of the subject loving, which is the man himself, and of the object

beloved, which is not himself, his life must be partly in and partly out of himself, and depend partly on himself and partly on that which is not himself. Now this which we say of the capacity to love, we say of all man's capacities. They are all latent, except so far as by means of appropriate objects he is enabled to develop, to manifest, or actualize them. His whole life, then, whether intellectual, sentient, or sentimental, is jointly in himself and in that which is not himself, in the *me* and in the *not-me*. His life unquestionably consists in the manifestation, or actualization, of his latent capacities. As this manifestation, or actualization, is but the echo of the intershock of the *me* and the *not-me*, or of his communion with that which is not himself, it follows that he can live only so far as he has an object. His life, then, is at once subjective and objective. Other men and the world furnish the objective portion of his life. They furnish it only by means of an uninterrupted communion between him and them. As he has need of living, so has he need of this communion; and his right to this communion must be commensurate with his right to live; for it is the necessary, the indispensable condition of his life.

There is a portion of man's nature, what we usually term the domestic affections, which finds its object only in the bosom of the family; another portion, the social, which finds its object only in having a country, a fatherland; and still another, only in acquiring and possessing property. In order, then, to be able to develop, to manifest himself, that is, to live, man needs a free, uninterrupted communication with other men and with the world, *under the three forms of family, country, and property.* This conclusion, though not remarkable for its novelty, save in the light in which it is placed by the metaphysics of the author, is of great practical importance. It is worth considering by all those zealous world-reformers, who are seeking to obtain the palingenesia by destroying family, country, or property. They, who contend for a community of goods, would annihilate property. Hence the dangerous tendency those must guard against who in our days are advocating "the community system." They who declaim against the marriage relation, or who would introduce the general liberty of divorce, and they who strike at separate households, as do the disciples of Charles Fourier, together with those who seek to transfer the responsibility of educating and rearing their children from themselves to the community, as was advocated by Frances Wright, in her

scheme of a national education, annihilate the family, and therefore the domestic part of man's life. They who maintain that all government is a sin and a usurpation, and acknowledge the legitimacy of no government, but each individual's moral convictions of right and duty,—which seems to be the doctrine of our New England non-resistants and no-government men,—by making the state impracticable, annihilate country. Each thus in turn takes away from man objects indispensable to the development of his latent powers, to the actualization of his virtuality, and therefore the necessary conditions of his life.

The *nature* of man is to live by means of an uninterrupted communion with other men and with nature, under the three precise and definite forms of family, country and property. His *destiny*, that is, the design of his Creator in his constitution, is not, then, to place himself physically, sentimentally, and intellectually in unlimited communion with all men, and with all the beings of the universe. This were to annihilate him by the vast solitude of Sahara, equally destructive with the solitude obtained between four walls in our modern penitentiaries. He would roam from man to man, from object to object, without resting his mind or his heart upon any; weary and desolate in the midst of endless variety and perpetual change, he would die for the want of something permanent and unchangeable. He must concentrate to increase his energy. His philanthropy is too gaseous to be of any practical utility, till condensed into love of family and fatherland. His intellectual powers are too feeble to attain to science, unless he confines himself to a limited range of studies. The finite seeks in vain to master the infinite. "Man, from the first moment of his life is placed in relation with certain of his like, and with certain beings of nature, which his true destiny requires him never to quit."

Nevertheless, by the normal methods God has established, man has the *right* to communicate with *all* men, and with *all* nature. No one has the right to forbid this unlimited communion. To forbid it, to restrict man in an absolute manner to a particular communion with certain other men, and certain beings of the universe, were to build a prison around him, which, though a palace, were none the less a prison, and in which he would be annihilated by solitude. The recognition of his *right* to unrestricted communion with other men, and with nature, is what makes his *liberty*.

Who in fact would restrict this right? The scientific? Science claims the right to know every thing, to send her searching glance into every thing that can be known; and this is what is cherished as the freedom of science, freedom of mind, freedom of thought. Artists? Art knows no limit; it claims the right to seek the beautiful anywhere and everywhere in God's universe; and this is what we denominate the freedom of art. Men of industry? Industry claims in turn the right to possess all, and by her labors to increase its fruitfulness; and in this consists the freedom of industry. While, then, man must, in point of fact, because he is finite, restrict himself to precise and definite relations with other men and with nature, yet he has the right to unlimited communion with all men and with all nature. This conclusion is not without significance, as we shall see in approaching the third book, which treats of *Evil and its Remedy.*

Family, country, and property are in themselves good, excellent, indispensable conditions of man's life; but their excess is mischievous; and they may, and often do, exist in excess. The family may absorb man; the nation may absorb him; property may absorb him. He may be the slave of his birth, the slave of his nation, the slave of his property. Hitherto he has been the slave of all three simultaneously, and of each successively.

The past has been evil, and only evil, because neither the family, nor the nation, nor property has been so organized as to admit, in the bosom of each respectively, man's free development and progress. Leroux labors this point at great length, and shows that the evils of society, all the wrongs and outrages man inflicts or receives, result never from the inherent depravity of man, nor from the original vice of the family, state, or property; but from the fact that through ignorance these three forms of man's communion have been organized with a special reference to themselves, so that each becomes, instead of a help, a let and a hindrance to the free communion of each man with all other men and with all nature. That there has hitherto been antagonism between the family and the nation, and between the nation and the race, between the individual and the family and the nation, and between man and the proprietor, there can be no doubt. That this is the cause, the veritable cause of our evils, would seem to be pretty satisfactorily demonstrated. The conclusion at

which Leroux arrives is not peculiar to him; but we confess that, though many have asserted it, he is the first writer we have known to demonstrate its philosophic truth. We have all said that by injuring others we injure ourselves; but no one to our knowledge before Leroux has shown us why it is so. We see now that it is so, because, according to him, *to live is to manifest one's self; and one cannot manifest one's self without an object, and this object is our brethren.* Our life exists jointly in us and in them, and to injure them is to injure the *objective* part of our life, every whit as essential as the *subjective* part. This is the richest discovery of modern philosophy, and contains in itself the seeds of a whole philosophical, moral, religious, and political revolution. Let it be pondered well.

We, as well as Leroux, have contended that the progress of the individual cannot be effected alone; that it can be effected only by the progress of the race, of social institutions, and surrounding nature. Churchmen, to some extent, have disputed us on this point, and assured us it is by individual culture and progress that the race is advanced. In their view mankind is an aggregate of individual forces or wills, coexisting, but without necessary union, without mutual dependence; and they have sought to reform the world by considerations addressed to these isolated, independent wills or forces, as if the individual man could attain to the highest perfection of a human being, without communion with other men, or with nature; or as if living in communion with them he could rise to a pitch of excellence altogether superior to them. This doctrine, in great vogue with American transcendentalists, appearing under various names, but more frequently under the names of individual improvement and self-culture, and when so named opposed to the doctrine of those who seek to reform the world by ameliorating the family, the state, and property, is founded on the hypothesis that *man can be his own object, and that his life is all in himself, and therefore wholly subjective.* Leroux has demonstrated this doctrine to be *false*, and the opposite doctrine to be *true*, by demonstrating that our life must needs have an objective portion, and that this portion is in other men and nature.

It is, then, to us a matter of the deepest concern what those other men are. They are a portion of our life, and the truth and reality of our life; its worth, its approach to the divine life God requires us to live, depend as much on

the character of these other men as on our own. We can obtain true normal life with a false object no more than with a false subject. The effort, then, to advance men, by isolating them from the race, and treating them as independent wills or forces, able in and of themselves to become better, other men and nature remaining as they are, will prove, as it always has proved, unavailing. The church must enlarge its ideal, and propose, not the progress of isolated individuals, the salvation of the isolated soul, but the progress of men in their union with humanity, and therefore necessarily propose the amelioration of the several forms under which man communes with other men. We must understand that our progress as individuals is inseparably connected with the progress of other men, with whom we stand in relation, that our lot is bound up with that of humanity, and that whatever be its degree of excellence or depravity, that degree must be ours.

But to return. Evil results from the violation of the law of unity and fraternity. This violation of the divine law is occasioned by the establishment of *castes*, under the three forms of family caste, the national caste, and property caste. The remedy for evil under its two forms, the evil of the oppressed, and that of the oppressor, must, then, be sought in a return to unity and fraternity, to the communion of the human race:—men must be brought to the communion, made to commune. To be conformed to our nature, and consequently to be happy and moral, we have need to be intentionally and virtually in communion with all men, with all nature, and through them with the infinite God, from whom they all proceed, and in whom they all breathe and live. The family must be so constituted that we can enlarge in all directions within its bosom, without restraint; the state must be so organized as to permit us to develop ourselves and advance in its bosom, without being oppressed; the same also must be affirmed with regard to property. In other words, these three forms, by which man communes with man and nature, must be so ameliorated as to aid our free and uninterrupted communion with all men and with all nature; not so as to confine us necessarily to our own estate, our own family, within the narrow enclosure of our own country. "Family, country, property must be so harmonized with man's right to free communion with all men and with all nature, without, however, on that account ceasing to be family, country, property."

This brings us to what Leroux contends is the fundamental principle of all genuine ethical and political science. The ancients founded ethics and politics on the maxim, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor,"—a profound maxim, which has not yet been comprehended in all its depth. Philosophy now, for the first time, demonstrates its wisdom and truth, and does so by showing that thy neighbor is thyself, because he is thy object. In other terms, thy life being indissolubly objective and subjective, and the objective part residing in thy neighbor being as much thine as the subjective part residing in thyself, there is a oneness, a true solidarity between him and thee, which makes it necessary for thee to love him as the indispensable condition of loving thyself, impossible for thee to love thyself without loving him. To love is to manifest thyself, whether thou lovest thyself or another. But thou canst not manifest thyself without an object, and this object must be other than thyself. Thou canst not love even thyself, then, save in loving an object which is not thyself. Here is the law of thy life. Withdraw thyself from it thou canst not. Violate it thou mayst, but never with impunity. Here, then, is self-love itself leading to charity, or love of neighbor. Leroux reproduces here the doctrine of Pope, who declares self-love and social the same, and virtually the doctrine of "Interest well understood," or enlightened self-interest, in which, under one of its principal aspects, resulted the philosophy of the last century; but under other conditions, with stronger and nobler sanctions. He unites, to speak truly, "in a pure and fundamental synthesis, both the teachings of Jesus and the conclusions of the philosophers."

We come now to the fourth book, on the *Mutual Solidarity of Men*. The preceding book has prepared the way for the leading doctrine of this; but we approach now more closely the author's peculiarities, and therefore must be even more than ever on our guard.

The mutual solidarity of men, or unity of all men in the one life of humanity, is explained by the law of life already stated; namely, that life resides jointly and inseparably in the subject and the object, and therefore that in life the subject and object are not only placed in juxtaposition, mutually acting and reacting one upon the other, but are in fact unified, if one may so speak, *soldered* together, or amalgamated as the acid and the alkali in the formation of the neutral salt, so that a separation in time or space is impos-

sible, without destroying life itself. The *actual* object of each man is his family and his country; his virtual or possible object toward which he aspires, and should be free to aspire, is all men. Then the life of each individual man resides, so to speak, jointly and indissolubly in himself and in all other men. Each man is an undivided and an indivisible part of the life of all men, and the life of all men and of each man is an undivided and an indivisible part of the life of each man. Thus is each in life *soldered* to the whole, and the whole to each. This, as clearly and precisely as we can state it, is what Leroux and the Saint-Simonians mean by the solidarity of the race.

The doctrine may be easily realized by recalling the old theological * doctrine of the federation of mankind in Adam and Christ. According to this old theological doctrine, God made a covenant with Adam, whereby Adam became the federal head of his race, so that in his fall all his posterity were to be implicated; God also made a covenant with Christ, the second Adam, whereby he became another federal head of the human race; so that through his righteousness the elect should be redeemed, and adjudged to be righteous. Understand now by Adam the father of humanity in its anormal condition, by Christ the father of humanity in its normal condition; and what theology has heretofore declared to exist virtually by way of covenant and imputation, but not actually, understand to exist actually and really, as the very principle and law of human life itself, and you have the doctrine in question. It is a great doctrine, and follows necessarily from the position assumed that to live is to manifest one's self; that man in no sense whatever can manifest himself without an object; and that his object is mankind. It is the clear, distinct, and philosophical statement of the doctrine which lies at the foundation of what we all say when we say, "Man is a social animal; he was fitted to live in society; he withers and dies in solitude." We confess, important and far-reaching as the doctrine is, we are forced to accept it, not only by Leroux's reasonings, but by certain considerations which had brought us independently of him to accept, as the foundation of all sound philosophy, the fact on which it all rests, namely, the absolute impossibility in which the human *me* is placed of manifesting itself, that is, of living, without an uninterrupted communion with the *not-me*.

* Calvinist.—Ed.

We have seen that this doctrine of the mutual solidarity of men lays the foundation of a genuine charity, universal as well as special, without for that destroying the *enlightened self-interest* of the philosophers. It effects the atonement, or rather a perfect synthesis of the love of self and the love of neighbor, and the love of *me* and of *not-me*, by showing that one is never without the other, and can never be but by and with the other.

Leroux, while acknowledging the superiority of Christianity over all other religions of the past, still thinks it has failed to show this synthesis and reconcile the love of self with the love of neighbor. If he will substitute church for Christianity, and if instead of saying that Christianity has fallen into this error, he will say that some Christians, in their interpretations of the precepts of Christianity, have fallen into it, we shall have no objections to offer. And it is proper here to observe that Leroux and others who for the most part agree with him in his general doctrines, mean by Christianity, Christianity as it has been defined, interpreted, and authoritatively enjoined by the church; in other words, Christianity, if we may so speak, according to St. Augustine, and not according to Jesus, the Son of Mary. Leroux himself, notwithstanding what he says, exonerates Christianity from the charge he brings; and while claiming his doctrine as a modern discovery, seems to convey the notion that Jesus borrowed it from the Essenes, a Jewish sect which had no doubt anticipated many of the elements of Christian theology and Christian ethics. That Christianity has not metaphysically demonstrated its doctrine of charity is no doubt true, for it demonstrates no doctrine; it teaches, it does not demonstrate; but that it teaches the true doctrine of charity Leroux admits, and we have ourselves proved it in our *New Views*, and in what we have just said in defence of the ideal of the Saint-Simonian school.

Nevertheless, we agree with Leroux that Christianity, as it has been widely, but not universally, nor exactly authoritatively, interpreted by both its learned and unlearned adherents, is liable to the objections he brings. Christians have rarely comprehended the Communion, or Eucharist. It has been disjoined from charity, and instead of being a feast of love has become a sacred *mystery;* in these our days too often a mere rite, or ceremony. We know no doctor of the church who has explained, nay, who has even suspected

its profound significance. The Catholic doctors are less untrue to it than the Protestant. Indeed, it may be questioned, if the Protestant doctors, in rejecting Transubstantiation, have not virtually rejected the doctrine itself. The doctrine of Transubstantiation, by which man is said to feed upon the human-divine Flesh of Jesus, teaches the profound truth of the solidarity of men in humanity, and of humanity, through Jesus, in God; and that it is only by a living communion of the individual with humanity, through humanity with Jesus, and through Jesus, with God, that he can be redeemed and sanctified; that his true life is indissolubly united to the life of humanity, and through the life of Jesus, to the life of God. Well, well has coming to the Communion, celebrating the Eucharist, been considered the most solemn expression of one's faith in Christ, and when sincere, the most glorious act of one's life!

Still, we own that the Communion has remained a *mystery* for the great mass of believers, uninterpreted, or misinterpreted; and Christian charity, therefore, which with St. Paul was "the bond of perfectness," "the fulfilling of the law," which was "the perfect law of liberty," according to St. James, has been misconceived, theoretically degraded, almost to a nullity. The doctors of the church have erred in condemning holy and necessary love of self, and by that rendering the love of neighbor and of God impossible. They have forbidden the Christian to love himself; they have made his Christianity, his sanctification consist in the annihilation of self; they have commanded him to love his neighbor only in appearance, only in view of God, which is to love him not at all; and have ended by making his duty consist in pure, direct, and absolute love of God, which in this case becomes an impossibility. By these three errors the Christian doctors have virtually obliterated charity from their ethical code, and would have obliterated it from the human heart, were it not that life is stronger and more persistent than theories, however high and sacred the authority that promulgates them. "The fervent Christian, turned only toward God, really loves neither himself nor others, and is deceived in supposing he loves God as God would be loved."

This pure and exclusive love of God, to which your pietists, your Fénelons, and your Guyons aspire, is altogether impracticable. Men may aspire to it, enthusiasts may struggle to obtain it, and sensitive dispositions may

believe themselves in possession of it; but it is never a real love of God. God, isolated from self, neighbor, and nature, is, so far as we human beings are concerned, as if he were not, is a mere illusion, an empty form, like the image of the beloved Creusa that appears to Æneas in his flight, and which, when he would clasp it to his aching bosom, melts and vanishes. God can be known and loved only as he manifests himself. And this doctrine, so strongly insisted on by Leroux, as he pretends, in opposition to Christianity, is the real Christian doctrine, and also that of the church; for the church pronounced Fénelon's pietism a heresy. What else means this doctrine, that we approach God never directly, but only through a mediator? It is always in the face of the Son that we behold the glory of the Father. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son that is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared, or manifested, him." "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." God was manifested in the flesh, that is, in humanity, and it is in and through humanity, and Jesus, the father of redeemed humanity, that we have access to the Father. Always is it God in his indissoluble union with human nature, always the God-Man Jesus, that redeems and sanctifies us. If God is known only as manifested in and through humanity, then is it only in humanity, in the love of neighbor, that we do or can love him. "No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us." "If any man say, I love God, and hate his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how shall he love God, whom he hath not seen?" Can any thing more explicit be required to prove that, according to Christianity, we love God only mediately, by, and in, loving our brother? Leroux is wrong, then, in pretending that the pure, direct, and absolute love of God is a Christian doctrine.

The ascetic view of the world is not the view taken in the gospels, nor by St. Paul. We will not pretend to deny that we may not now and then discover a trace of asceticism imprinted on the form of Christianity, as developed by St. Paul; but it nowhere penetrates to the foundation, nowhere affects the real substance of the true Christian's faith. Christianity founds its claims to our love and confidence on the ground that it is the religion of *reconciliation;* that it has power to harmonize all the antinomies of the moral,

intellectual, and physical world,—God and man, time and eternity, soul and body, heaven and earth, self and neighbor, family and nation, nation and humanity,—individually and collectively. The asceticism of the church is of foreign origin, and belongs not to Christianity. That theology has arrived where it has through the failure of the Gospel to give it a clear and firm basis is by no means certain. If the passage already quoted from John does not touch the heart of the question, we know not what can. "If a man say, I love God, and hate his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how shall he love God, whom he hath not seen?" Does not this plainly enjoin the love of man as well as the love of God? nay, the love of man as the indispensable condition of loving God? "No man hath seen God at any time; but if we love one another he dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us." What does this mean, but that we attain to our knowledge of God, and to the realization of his love in us, by loving one another; that it is through the love of one another that we commune with him? Is not this explicit? Jesus himself says, "A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another, as I have loved you." "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." This is the only new commandment Jesus ever gave, and of course, it marked the peculiarity of his religion, since men were to be known as his disciples by keeping it. Did Jesus, then, lay any foundation for the asceticism Leroux condemns as Christian theology? Nay, we will not rest here. St. Paul himself says, "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law; love worketh no ill to his neighbor; *therefore*, love is the fulfilling of the law." We say, therefore, once and again, that the Gospel, the New Testament, affords no countenance to the doctrine that has been drawn from it, and which Leroux does well to combat. The charge of leaving God out altogether, as an object of love, could be more easily sustained against the Gospel, than that of resolving the love of neighbor into the abstract love of God.

In consequence of the hostility which Christianity, as interpreted by the doctors, suffered to remain between the love of self and the love of neighbor, and the love of man and the love of God, the charity of the Gospel has never been organizable. It has never been possible to organize civil society according to its principles. Civil society has,

therefore, with the interests of time, been abandoned to Cæsar, that is, to ignorance, violence, and brute force. The church alone has been able, in some feeble degree, to be organized for the realization of the doctrine of love. But able now to melt the love of God, the love of neighbor, and the love of self into one and the same love, or rather into one and the same *life*, we may fuse church and state, and organize the whole society under its terrestrial and its celestial relations, according to one and the same principle, and for the realization of true Gospel charity. This will be done by ameliorating the family, the nation, and property, so that these three forms of man's communion with man and with nature, shall tend unceasingly to facilitate his free communion with all men, with all nature, and through them with God himself, in whom they all live and have their being, without being he or his being they. This is our work for the future. To the performance of this work we must bring all the energy and enterprise of industry, all the instructions and directions of science, and all the inspirations of art.

Thus far we have followed Leroux with considerable pleasure, and as to the substance of his doctrines, with general approbation. In what follows in the fifth and sixth books, our sympathy with him is altogether less. Having brought us to see what we are in and of ourselves, what relation subsists between us and the race, between our destiny and its, and to perceive the work to be done for the future, he has felt that some motives and sanctions were necessary to secure the performance of that work. Leroux is, as we have said, a sincere, earnest-minded man. He is no amateur philosopher. He thinks and writes for the purpose of bettering the condition of mankind. He works, and would induce others to work, and to work zealously and effectively. But he sees and feels,—and it is honorable to him that he does so see and feel,—that it is impossible to induce them so to work, without the allurements and sanctions of religion. He has seen and felt the utter hopelessness of all efforts for reform not prompted and sustained by religion. He has, then, sought not a mere speculative philosophy, but a religion; not merely to make a discursion on ethics and politics, but to give men a true, inward, abiding, and all-controlling faith; a faith which, like the early Christian faith, shall enable them to "overcome the world." To this he says he has attained by his own inductions; but after

having thus attained to it, he has seen its connection with ancient theologies, and he has therefore gone into elaborate historical researches to sustain his doctrines by the traditions, the religious and philosophical monuments of the race. Through these researches we have, as our readers must perceive, no space at present to follow him.

After having established his doctrine of the mutual solidarity of men, by which he has shown us that the life of the individual and that of the race are inseparably united—literally one and the same life; and therefore led each to seek the good of all, and all the good of each, by all the force of both our selfish and our social affections, he has wished to strengthen this force, by showing that this solidarity, this oneness of the life of the individual and of that of the race, is not only temporary, during what we call our present existence, but eternal; and therefore that we are as much and as directly concerned in whatever may be the future condition of the race, as we are or can be in its present condition. This established, then both the selfish and the social elements of man, the love of self and the love of neighbor, will be reinforced by all the superiority of an eternal good over a mere temporary one, and thus reinforced cannot be long in making evil disappear from the face of the earth.

But in order to establish this he has felt it—and we regret that he has—necessary to make war upon the old and all but universally received opinions concerning heaven and hell, time and eternity, this life and another. He rejects the dualism between heaven and earth, and heaven and hell, as commonly understood, and thinks that the immortality looked for by believers, out of this world and out of this life, is chimerical, is the veriest illusion. The only dualism he admits is the dualism of the absolute and the relative, the unmanifested and the manifestation. There are, he says, two heavens: "An absolute heaven, permanent, embracing the universe, and each creature in particular, and in the bosom of which lives the universe and each creature; and a relative heaven, not permanent, but progressive, the manifestation of the first in time and space." The second heaven accompanies always the first, and Leroux says, "his faith is that the first heaven, which is for him God, the eternal and invisible, manifests itself more and more in creatures which succeed one another, and that adding creation to creation, with the view of raising creatures nearer

and nearer to itself, it follows that creatures more and more perfect must issue from its womb in proportion as life succeeds to life." But who does not see that here is no creation at all? The two heavens are the *plenum* and *void* of Brahminism, and especially of Buddhism. The absolute heaven is the infinite *void* seeking to become *full*. This void is the *Seyn* of the Hegelians, which even they define to be the synonym of the *Nicht-seyn*, for its only quality is that it is. It is, according to Leroux himself, merely an infinite possibility seeking to become real, or an infinite virtuality seeking to actualize itself in time and space. God has, then, according to him, no real, no actual existence; that is to say, God is nothing but a possibility, or at least a virtuality, save in what we term creation. Abstract creation, and there would be no real, no actual God; there would remain only the possibility of a God, which will become a real God in proportion as there shall be an actual creation. The whole of which seems to us to amount to this,—there is no God but the universe, and the *possibility*, or, if you please, *power* of the universe to grow and expand itself indefinitely in time and space. Which in our view is, to say the least, nothing better than a mitigated form of pantheism. Leroux evidently admits creation only by way of emanation, by an efflux, to interpret his own figure, of the infinite into the finite. This determines the character of his theodicy, and proves him a pantheist. The distinction between theism and pantheism is, that the last contends that the actual universe *emanates* from God, while the former contends that God has actually *created* it; and that though he sustains it, and is its life and being, yet is he independent of it, and as truly God without it as within it. Emanation is the besetting sin of all oriental philosophy, except the Jewish; and we are sorry to find it revived and contended for by a man so distinguished as Leroux.

The immortality for which Leroux contends may now be easily conceived of. There are only two orders of existence, the possible and the real, the virtual and the actual. The possible, the virtual is infinite, eternal; the real, the actual is finite in regard both to time and space. It is what we call this world, this life, in one word, the present. There is, then, and can be, no actual life but the present life. The only life we have, or can have, is this life, and the infinite possibility of living this life. Leroux, therefore, permits us

to aspire to no paradise beyond this life, to no heaven beyond this world. Paradise and hell are to him mere illusions. All that he permits us to aspire to is *a renewed existence in this life.* In other words, the race is eternal, for it is the infinite virtuality of each individual, and being an infinite virtuality it will eternally tend to actualize itself in individuals; which amounts to this, *individuals die, but the race survives.* We as individuals, as actual men and women, are after all only for a day, our life extending only from the cradle to the grave. O, friend, is it with the allurement of such a hope as this, that you are to captivate our hearts, and make us give ourselves up, soul and body, to the work of ameliorating the condition of our fellow men on earth? Is this what you call our being on earth when justice and equality shall reign among men? Never have we feared that the race would become extinct; never has it been over the possible annihilation of humanity that we have stood with sorrowing heart and streaming eyes; but over our own possible annihilation, and that of those we have loved. We did not ask thee to prove that we may exist hereafter as we have existed heretofore, that we may be born into this world again as we have already been in the generations which have preceded us; but that we ourselves shall survive the tomb, and that the beloved of our heart, whose body the earth has covered from our sight, but who comes to us so oft in the sweet visions of our sleeping or our waking, is not dead to us, survives not merely in our own deeply cherished love, but really, actually lives, and shall be again met, again clasped to our bosom, which has been true to the last. The mother did not ask thee to prove that there would continue to be mothers and new-born babes, but that her own, her darling boy, so sweet, so gentle, so beautiful, too sweet, too beautiful for earth, so suddenly taken from her, yet lives, and that she shall press him again to her maternal breast, and know and feel that it is the same, her own long lost, never forgotten child. O mock us not! If you have no faith in such a future as this, in such another life as this, talk not to us of living again. Leave us what faith we already have; or if we have none, leave us to the stern reality, to live, and toil, and weep, and die, and rot, and be no more.

Leroux, after all, recognizes no immortality but that of the race; for he recognizes no life but this present life successively reproduced. We assuredly believe our present

life contains in germ our future life; and we believe that our future life, like the present, will be a life in and not out of nature, and like the present linked to the universal life of humanity; but in a far other sense than that of merely being reborn. The departed are not departed. The generations of the past live in us and out of us. They are all here, round and about us, and we might, if we would, and some of us even do, at times, commune with them. But this by the way.

Leroux not only takes the view which we have ascribed to him, but he takes up more than two-thirds of his whole work in endeavoring to prove that his view of future life is the one taken in all the traditions of the race. We cannot at this time, as we have already said, go into any examination of the question, whether these traditions do or do not sustain him; but this much we may safely assert, his immortality is not that in which the human race has always supposed itself to believe. Universal tradition sustains us in saying that the human race has always believed that it understood, by a future life, something else than a mere rebirth into this life; and if so, would not this belief, after all, be the real traditionary belief of the race? Suppose, then, that by ingenious interpretation we can make out that the monuments of antiquity do contain the doctrine in question, we by no means prove that these monuments contained it to their authors; and the fact that they have never been so understood by the world at large, is no mean proof that they did not. Then again, if the doctrine in question is absolutely that of Moses, Buddha, Pythagoras, Plato, Apollonius of Tyana, of all the oriental and western worlds, throughout all antiquity, higher and lower, as Leroux contends, wherein consists that progress of the race, for which he also contends? Where is Leroux's originality, if he merely reproduces what was the faith of mankind even before history began?

Leroux goes largely into the exposition of Judaism and Christianity. We may hereafter, perhaps, call attention again to some of his expositions, for some of them are ingenious, and not without value. He interprets the first ten chapters of Genesis, the *Bereshith* of the Jews, as a series of myths, intended to teach a system of psychology and political economy. Adam means humanity; Cain, Abel, and Seth reproduce the triad of the soul, sensation-sentiment-intelligence, according to Leroux's terminology, the

industry, science, and art of Saint-Simonism. Cain is the man of sensation, the physical man, the man of activity, who possesses himself of the earth, and kills his brother so as not to share it with him. Abel represents *void*, man of desire, of sentiment, who leads not, like Cain, an agricultural, but a nomadic life. The struggle between these two is the struggle between the rich and the poor, between the Haves and the Have-nots, a struggle in which the Haves kill the Have-nots;—which we know from history is the usual termination of such struggles. Seth is the man of intelligence, and represents the return toward good. His posterity form for a time a parallelism with the descendants of Cain; but ultimately drawn together by the attraction of voluptuousness the two races,—knowledge and wealth (without sentiment),—mingle and produce that moral corruption represented by the deluge. Then commences a return of the race toward a better state of things. Humanity is now called Noah, not Adam, and the triad of the soul is now Shem, Ham, and Japhet.

Now all this may be very good philosophy, and the ethical and political system Leroux deduces from it may be very excellent, as we cheerfully concede that it is; but was Moses acquainted with the highest metaphysical formula to which modern philosophy has attained? Was it embodied in a book which the world has possessed and studied for thousands of years, and yet never suspected by any one before M. Pierre Leroux? If Leroux had not had the formula in his own mind, we suspect he would never have discovered it in the *Bereshith*. That he can interpret Genesis in accordance with this formula, does not surprise us. All truth is homogeneous, and is reflected by the veriest monad God has created. Once have the truth, the true formula of truth, and you may find it in every fact of history, in every grain of sand on the seashore; because all is created by one and the same mind, after one and the same original idea, which idea each race of beings and each particular being reflects from its own point of view, in each and in all of its phenomena.

We do not complain that Leroux gives to Genesis a philosophical interpretation, or that he treats the *Bereshith* as a series of myths; but we do complain that he does not remember that the myth has been accredited as history before becoming a myth. Boötes was a man on earth before he was a constellation in the heavens. The sacredness gen-

erally attached to the myth, as history, is what leads to its adoption, as a myth. The mythical ideas are attached to well known and profoundly reverenced historical facts, by individual philosophers or reformers, who have new views they wish to embody and in some sort to publish. This borne in mind, we have no objection to treating the first ten chapters of Genesis as a series of myths, intended to teach certain great ethical, political, and psychological doctrines; nor indeed to treating, with Dr. Strauss, even a portion of the New Testament in the same way. Indeed we all do so treat it, when we make its narratives cover a great psychological, moral, or religious truth; when we accommodate, as it is called, a passage to a particular purpose which we have in view, to which it may apply, but to which it was not applied by the original writer. We use the narrative of the Resurrection as a myth, representing the immortality of truth, of a righteous cause, and the certainty of its ultimate triumph. This is allowable, if it be remembered that the narrative is not only a myth, but also the record of an historical fact. This rule, carried into history, will give the philosopher his freedom, without depriving the historian of his sobriety. We think Leroux might have been worth full as much as a philosopher, and more as a historian, had he observed it. History, when interpreted so as to retain no traces of what it has always been considered to be, ceases to be history. The belief of the race is always a running commentary, not less authoritative than the text. Leroux may find Saint-Simonism in the Jewish lawgiver, but it will not therefore follow that Moses was merely the precursor of Saint-Simon.

Moses was a real character; and though mythical notions may have gathered up around him, he was no creation of a poet's fancy. He was no Egyptian priest, nor Indian philosopher. He was eminently a Jew, oriental indeed by the boldness of his genius, the richness of his imagination, and the warmth of his temper; but oriental under the Hebrew type. The attempt to confound him with any other must always be a mark of historical folly. And what we say of him may be said of the *Bereshith*. The effort to resolve it into one of the cosmological books of the Egyptian priests, and to interpret it according to the Egyptian modes of thought, we should think could be made by no one capable of perceiving the connection between the philosophy of a people and their national character; or the difference between

the ignorant, superstitious Egyptian, worshipping leeks, onions, calves, and crocodiles, overrunning orchard and garden with gods, gods foul, stupid, uncouth, obscene, and the Jews in stern simplicity, disdaining to bend before aught finite, and standing in awe only before the living Shekinah of the invisible Jehovah. The Hebrew character has no prototypes, no analogies in any of the nations of the earth. It is distinct, peculiar, remarkable for its serene beauty, its chastity, simplicity, freedom from the extravagant, the grotesque, the superstitious, the marvellous. It is distinguished from that of all the other nations of antiquity by its good sense, its sobriety, its reserve, no less than by its force and energy. Yet was the Jew a poet. He struck the harp with freedom, boldness, and delicacy, and drew from it tones which had been caught only from the seraphim, and which were not heard without the heart's rising anew to its Father and its God. To the Jew, then, let us leave ungrudgingly the honor of having originated, through Providence, his own literature, and by that, of having become the chosen of God to instruct the nations in the deepest principles of philosophy, of jurisprudence, and theology; and at the same time to charm them by the divinest music, and kindle their aspirations for God by the sublimest poetry.

Moreover, there is no necessity of seeking to get rid of the ordinary views of the Bible, and of immortality. Leroux's motive is a good one. He wishes by establishing the solidarity of men in time, as well as in space, to enable the generations which now are, to feel a personal interest in the amelioration of man's condition on the earth, and also to vindicate the justice of Providence, by showing that all ameliorations may be retroactive; or in other words, that in the future progress of the race, the earliest generations are to participate in an equal degree with the latest. But this may be obtained without sacrificing our hopes of individual immortality. If we admit the existence of races at all, we must admit a one life common to all the individuals of each race. Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals; individuals do not precede the race, and constitute it; humanity precedes individuals, and is their origin and support. It is human nature, that is, the human species, that makes individual men and women. The unity of the life of the race of necessity unifies, or makes one, all the individuals through which the race is manifested. All

ameliorations of individuals, then, at whatever epoch they may be effected, must retroact, and affect the first-born man, as well as the one that will be the last-born.

The error of Leroux consists in supposing that, if the future life of individuals be any other than a reproduction of the present life, it must be a life disconnected with the life of humanity, and therefore no longer a *human* life; then individuals, in ceasing to live this life, would cease to be men; and ceasing to be men, would no longer concern us. But man is already a being who exists in the three worlds of time, space, and eternity. If, then, at what we call death the individual should cease to exist in time and space, he would still exist in eternity; and by means of the eternal in the individual in space and time could still maintain his hold on the race, and be affected by all the changes the race undergoes in its passage through the ages. In this way the communion between the present and the departed could still be preserved.

But we are not yet disposed to admit that those we call the dead do not still live in time and space, and in the condition, to say the least, of *possible* communion with those we call the living. Man is a being made to live in a body, and disembodied, he probably never lives; but bodies may exist of different degrees of density. Bodies capable of penetrating the most solid with which we are acquainted, to which the most impenetrable that we have analyzed offer no resistance, are by no means impossible. Death may be nothing more than casting off this outer integument of flesh, so that we may be clad only in this more refined, as the ancient fathers contended, more "ethereal" body,—a body material indeed like the present, and therefore not absolutely impassible, therefore defining, distinguishing the individual; but still comparatively impassible, and like the lightning, capable of penetrating and passing on its way through bodies, hard, solid to our senses, either unimpeded, or impeded but partially. These beings commune with one another, and to a certain extent even with us who still live in these grosser bodies. In our moments of great spiritual freedom, of exaltation and ecstacy, what may be called trance, by which one seems to live solely in the transcendental, we may, and unless we choose to reject universal tradition, we do, actually commune with them face to face, —though ordinarily, we must own, that it is only as through a glass darkly. The secrets of the country lying on the other

side of that dark river death, are not so well kept as is sometimes alleged. That river is continually passed and repassed. Those who have passed from us still commune with us, are objects to us, as we are objects to them. Here is the great truth the church has shadowed forth under her doctrine of purgatory, which short-sighted Protestants have vainly, not to say rashly, pronounced a popish error. Here too is the ground of that faith which all Christians have that the life and death of Christ are retroactive, and do mediate for those who died before the coming of Jesus, as well as for those who have been born since. Deny the reality of this communion between the living and the departed, and this retroaction is not real, but fictitious, imputative. Here, once more, is the basis of the doctrine of the Communion of Saints, by which the saints above and the saints below are said to make but one communion. This doctrine also authorizes us to offer prayers for the dead, to make efforts for their salvation and sanctification, as we would were they still with us. O, it is not a popish error to pray for the dead, but a blessed privilege, proceeding from a blessed hope, which has its foundation in the everlasting truth of things! On the other hand, if the departed may continue in some degree to be our object, we may also be theirs; and consequently it is as much to them what we are, as it would be were they still clothed with this grosser integument of flesh. While we are poor, and miserable, and wicked, and vile, and wretched, they cannot be happy, their beatitude cannot be complete. No, wicked man! man of vice, low and worthless, thou art not only poor and miserable thyself, thou not only makest all wretched around thee, but thou carriest grief and anguish to bosoms in the world beyond the grave. The solidarity of men is universal, and no human being can find complete beatification, so long as any portion of the race is removed from its normal condition, living a sinful life. Death will not free us either from our own sins or those of others, either from the sins of past generations or future generations. We are all bound up together, are all literally members of one body, and one member, be it ever so insignificant, cannot suffer, but the whole body will suffer with it. This is a weighty consideration, and should rebuke the selfishness of the sinner, and also the selfishness of the saint, who fancies that he can go to heaven alone, be happy though the larger portion of his race should be miserable both here and hereafter.

Leroux seems also to suppose that humanity can grow only by reabsorbing individuals into herself, and pushing them out anew in successive generations. But his doctrine of *reversibility*, of reversion, is easily enough explained without recourse to the doctrine of rebirth in the race. The new life developed, or successively developed in the race, whether naturally or providentially, may pass from one generation to another without supposing the succeeding generation must be the preceding in any sense which implies that the preceding cannot still exist as individuals in the world lying beyond the grave. The succeeding generation has undoubtedly a reversionary interest in the life of the preceding, that is, the life of the preceding reverts to the succeeding generation. This reversion may be by natural generation. This is the view we took in our paper on *Reform and Conservatism*. It is true to a certain extent. The body can be improved by cultivation, and through that the man. This improved body may be transmitted by natural generation, and the child of the cultivated may, therefore, other things being equal, be born with superior natural capacities to the child of the uncultivated. Nevertheless, there is always danger of pushing this view too far. It is the basis of hereditary nobility, hereditary monarchy, and of hereditary property. When we assert it, if not on our guard, we so exaggerate the family as to interrupt that free communion of man with man and with the universe, which his nature demands, to which it is suited, and which it may claim as its right.

But we are wrong, if we suppose that the life of humanity can descend only by natural generation, that is, in the line of the same family. It descends by spiritual generation altogether more than by natural generation. One generation does not pass off, nor does one generation come on all at once. The generation that now is, laps on to the generation that is to succeed us, and thus becomes the objective portion of the life of our successors, and in this way transmits to it, not according to the order of birth exclusively nor chiefly, but according to the order of *capacity* and of *works*, the higher life which has been developed naturally or providentially within us. This is the true law of progress. In this way, as Leroux must see, may be secured the growth of the life of humanity for which he contends, without reabsorbing individuals in the race; and *we* also see now that in this way we can obtain this same growth with-

out exaggerating the family. With this view of progress we may restrict still more the principle of descent according to the order of birth, within the bosom of the family, than we have heretofore considered to be possible, leaving the state and property to the order of capacity and of works, as is the virtual faith of all genuine democrats whether at home or abroad.

We do not in this change any opinion. The great doctrine, for which we have always contended, is that the improved life of the individuals of one generation, independent of its monuments, descends and becomes integrally the life of the succeeding generation. This is what Leroux, in 1833, very properly called the *Law of Continuity.* This descent, he now contends, is by virtue of the rebirth of individuals, by virtue of the fact that the new generation not only continues the preceding, but is it, the very identical generation itself; we have contended that it descended by virtue of natural generation,—taking the aristocratic ground. The truer explication than either is, that all life is at once indissolubly subjective and objective, and the objective portion of any given generation is furnished by the preceding, by virtue of the fact that it overlaps it, and becomes its object.

More we would say, but we have already lingered too long. We have, after all, given our readers but an inadequate notion of the contents of this remarkable book. Many, however, will read the book, and find nothing in it but absurdities and blasphemies; we have found it one of the most profitable books that we have ever read. We were, in some sense, however, prepared for it, by our familiarity with the Saint-Simonian school, but more especially by the fact that we had by our independent researches attained to the great metaphysical principle on which the author bases his doctrine of life. We had not ourselves applied that principle much beyond the sphere of metaphysics. Leroux has applied it to humanity, and made it the basis of a social doctrine, at once grand, beautiful, and inspiring; in pursuing his social application of the doctrine we have seen,—what he does not appear to have seen,—its application to the doctrine of communion with Jesus, and through him with God, by which must be effected a complete revolution, not in religious belief, but in theological science. These three applications complete the cycle of human relations and inquiries. We hold ourselves able now to produce a

perfect synthesis of philosophy, politics, including ethics, and theology, all harmonizing with the "Word of Life," borne witness to by the apostles, and which Jesus was. This metaphysical principle, which becomes, as it were, a universal solvent of whatever pertains to life, is simply that the *me* can never manifest itself, that is, live, save in communion with the *not-me*. This is the principle on which is based our new system of philosophy; but important as we had found this principle in the region of metaphysics, we had not suspected half its importance in the region of politics and theology, till reading this work by Leroux. We see now the literal truth of what has been asserted of Christ as the mediator between God and men; we see how he can be both literally and truly, and indissolubly God-Man, and therefore strictly a mediator between God and men; how his mediation does and can hold, in God's providential plan for the salvation of men, the place commonly assigned to it, and how he can communicate his life to the world, and by so doing become literally, really, not by way of example, representation, or imputation, the life and salvation of the world. These great doctrines, which have been asserted and held on to by the church, as if life and death depended on them, which have been great and painful mysteries, and which in these days have driven so many from the church and from Christianity, if we do not greatly deceive ourselves, we can clear up, make philosophically plain and certain, in the most simple and literal sense, and on as high a degree of evidence, as that which we have for our own existence. A glorious discovery, for which we thank God, and which restores us without any subtlety, without any refining on terms, to the great household of believers.

THE MEDIATORIAL LIFE OF JESUS.

A LETTER TO REV. WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D. D., JUNE, 1842.

Reverend and Dear Sir:—My apology, if an apology be needed, for addressing you on the Mediatorial Life of Jesus, is in the position which you occupy among the friends of liberal inquiry, the influence your writings have had in forming my own religious opinions and character, and the generous friendship which you have long shown me personally, in good report and in evil.

You, sir, have been my spiritual father. Your writings were the first to suggest to me those trains of thought, which have finally ended in raising me from the darkness of doubt to the warm sun-light of a living faith in God, in the Bible as God's Word, and in Jesus Christ as the mediator between God and men, and as the real Saviour of the world through his life, death and resurrection. I can never cease to be grateful for the important services you have rendered me, nor can I forget the respect and indulgence you have shown me notwithstanding all my short comings, and the steadiness with which you have cheered and sustained me, when the world grew dark around me, and hope was dying out of my soul.

You know, sir, somewhat of the long and painful struggles I have had in working my way up from unbelief to the high table-land of the Christian's faith and hopes; you have borne with me in my weakness, and have not been disposed to condemn me because I was not able, with a single bound, to place myself on that elevation. You have not been one to despise my lispings and stammerings; but while others have treated me rudely, denying me all love of truth, and all sense of goodness, you have continued to believe me at bottom honest and sincere. From my heart, sir, I thank you. I feel that you have been a true friend, and that I may open my mind and heart to you without reserve. You will receive with respect whatever comes forth from an ingenuous heart, whether it find a response in your own severer judgment or not.

You know that many years ago I was a confirmed unbeliever. I had lost, not my unbelief, but my hostility to religion, and had even to a certain extent recovered my

early religious feelings, when a friend, now no more, read me one day your sermon on *Likeness to God*, preached at the ordination of Frederic A. Farley, Providence, R. I., 1828. My friend was an excellent reader, and he entered fully into the spirit of the sermon. I listened as one enchanted. A thrill of indescribable delight ran through my whole soul. I could have leaped for joy. I seemed suddenly to have found a Father. To me this was much. I had never known an earthly father, and often had I wept when I had heard, in my boyhood, my playmates, one after another, say "my father." But now, lone and deserted as I had felt myself, I too had become a son, and could look up and say, "my father"—around and say, "my brothers."

The train of thought then suggested, pursued with fidelity, led me to believe myself a Christian, and to resume my profession as a Christian preacher. But when I first came into this community as a preacher, my Christianity was pretty much all comprised in two articles, the divinity of humanity, and the brotherhood of the race,—which I had learned from your sermon. These two articles suffered me as a preacher to dwell only on the dignity and worth of human nature, and the importance of making this dignity and worth acknowledged in all men, however high or however low. But this I thought enough. I was honest, I was sincere in avowing myself a Christian, all deficient as I now believe my faith was; and consequently, I could not admit the justice of the charge of infidelity which was brought on all sides against me. So far as sincerity of purpose and honesty of conviction were concerned, I knew myself a believer, and thought I had a right to be treated as a believer. You were one of the few to acknowledge that right.

In looking back, sir, on the ten years which have passed, or nearly passed away, since I had the honor and the pleasure of first meeting you personally, I am now satisfied that I came among my Unitarian brethren with a faith quite too contracted for the wants of a real Christian, and with my bosom torn by two contrary tendencies. I had a strong tendency to religion, and to religious faith; but at the same time, unconsciously, another tendency, of quite an opposite character. This last tendency, really the weaker of the two, was almost the only one noted by the public, and hence, the almost universal accusation of infidelity of which I became the subject. This last tendency has shown

itself in my efforts to find the grounds of religion in human nature, to discover in the pure reason the evidences of religious faith, and to resolve the providences of God, as manifested in extraordinary men, prophets, and messiahs, into the ordinary operations of nature. But, in my preaching and writings, I have given altogether more prominence to this tendency that it really had in my own mind, in the persuasion that by so doing, I could recommend the Gospel to unbelievers. I am now satisfied that in this I not only exposed myself to undeserved reproach, but committed a great mistake as a matter of mere policy. The best way to convert unbelievers to the Gospel, is to preach the Gospel, the whole Gospel, and nothing but the Gospel. Preach God's truth as he has revealed it, in simplicity, and with fidelity; it will not fail to do its work. Nevertheless, though injustice was done me, by a misconstruction of my motives, yet this tendency which had originally made me an unbeliever still subsisted to a considerable extent, and under its influence I sometimes uttered things irreconcilable with my present views of the Gospel.

The truth is, sir, that I have come but slowly and perhaps reluctantly into the Christian faith. I embraced at once the two articles I have named, but I have been slow to go far beyond. I have disputed the ground inch by inch, and have yielded only when I had no longer any ground on which to stand. The debate in my mind has been going on for the last ten years, which have been to me, taken as a whole, years of much severer internal conflict than they have been of external conflict, severe as this last, as you well know, has actually been.

You must permit me to say, that from the first, I have had some misgivings. In my happiest moments my thought has never been clear to myself, and I have felt that there was more in it than I had mastered. With more than tolerable powers of utterance, both as a speaker and as a writer, I have never been able to utter a thought that I was willing to accept when reflected back from another mind. Neither friend nor enemy has ever seemed to understand me; and I have never seen a criticism from a friendly or an unfriendly hand, with but one single exception, in which there was the remotest allusion to the thought I seemed to myself to have had in writing the piece criticised. Discovering that I was not understood, or rather, that I was misunderstood, I have from time to time changed my point of

view and my phraseology, with the hope of being able to communicate my real thought. All in vain. I have only gained a sneer for my versatility and frequent changes of opinions. I have at times wondered at this; but I am satisfied that it was owing to the contrary tendencies at work in my mind, and to the fact, that I had not fully mastered what I wished to say, and therefore had only lisped and stammered, instead of articulating clearly and distinctly.

You must pardon me, for saying so much of myself. I have wished to confess, explain, and then forget. The difficulties under which I labored, I think, through the blessing of God, I have finally been able to overcome. I think I see wherein my past faith was defective, and why I have heretofore been unable to speak so as to be understood. I think, moreover, that I am now able to solve several problems which have troubled other and greater minds than mine, to throw light on several questions connected with Jesus as Mediator, and to point out the ground on which both Unitarians and Trinitarians may unite as brothers, with "one Lord, one faith, one baptism."

I have sir, finally attained to a view of the plan of a world's salvation through a Mediator, which I think reconciles all conflicting theories, discloses new wisdom in that plan, and enables us to take, in its most obvious and literal sense, without any subtlety or refinement, what the scriptures say of Jesus, and of salvation through his life. The Gospel becomes to me now a reality, and the teachings of the New Testament throughout realities, having their corresponding facts in the positive world. The views to which I have attained appear to me to be new, grand, and of the greatest importance. If I am not deceived they enable us to demonstrate with as much certainty as we have for our own existence several great and leading doctrines of the church universal, which have heretofore been asserted as great and holy mysteries, but unproved and unexplained. I think I can show that no small portion of the Bible, which is generally taken figuratively, is susceptible of literal interpretation, and that certain views of the Mediator, and his Life, from which, our Unitarian friends have shrunk, are nevertheless true, and susceptible of a philosophical demonstration. I think sir, I am able to show that the doctrine that human nature became depraved through the sin of Adam, and that it is redeemed only through the obedience of Christ; that the doctrine which teaches us that the

Mediator is truly and indissolubly God-man, and saves the world by giving literally his life to the world, are the great "central truths" of Christianity, and philosophically demonstrable.

This, if it can be done, you will admit is important, and must involve a theological revolution. My purpose in writing you this letter, is to call your attention to the method by which it can be done, and to ask your judgment on that method. If I am right, I know you will rejoice with me, for the result will prove to be that *higher manifestation* of religious truth which you and so many others have been looking for, and asserting, must come.

Before I proceed to lay before you the important views themselves, I must be allowed to say a word as to the means by which I have attained to them; I do this that I may not arrogate to myself what does not belong to me. I have little other merit in attaining to these views, than that of following out to their legitimate conclusions, certain philosophical principles, which I have been assisted by others to obtain. The great principle which underlies the whole, I became master of about one year ago. I saw, at once its immense reach in the region of metaphysics; but did not see at the time very clearly its importance in the social world, or the religious world. Leroux, in his work on *L'Humanité*, discovered to me its social applications. In endeavoring to point out, in a sermon a few Sundays since, this social application, which seemed to me to give new significance to the Communion, I perceived suddenly the theological application, of the principle in question, and the flood of light it throws on long-controverted dogmas. This theological application, which I am about to point out, is all that I claim as original with myself, and all that I claim as novel in the views of which I speak. I really then have done nothing, and pretend to do nothing, but to make an original application of principles which have been discovered for me by others. I say this, because I am sometimes accused of plagiarism, and sometimes lauded for being original. I have never yet claimed to be an original thinker; I have no ambition to be thought an original thinker. I might perhaps have deserved the credit of originality some twelve or fourteen years ago. I lived then far away from books and from the society of intelligent men; but men have gained great credit in this city since I have been here, by doing little more than echo the doctrines

which I then put forth, or which may be found at least in germ in what I, an untutored backwoodsman, then wrote and published. But since I came into this community, I have read what I could, and have sought to obtain a knowledge of just views, and to present just views to the public, without caring whether they originated with me, or with others. But in fact many views which I have put forth, and which it is presumed that I must have borrowed from others, have really been original with me. This is the case with certain doctrines on property which I hold in common with the Saint-Simonians, also certain views as to the influence of property on politics and legislation, which are similar in some respects to those of Harrington, &c. But after all, the great inquiry of every man should be for the truth, and the truth he should be willing to accept, let it come from what source it may. Our own reputations for originality should never weigh one feather. The only truly original mind after all, is the mind that can readily assimilate and reproduce from itself the truth that comes to it. In the doctrines I am about to present, I claim no originality. I merely claim originality for the process by which I demonstrate their philosophical truth. The doctrines have been taught ever since the time of Jesus; they have never, before this attempt of mine, so far as my knowledge extends, been demonstrated. What I have to offer on the main subject of this Letter, I shall take the liberty to arrange under three general heads.

First.—Whence comes the Mediator? *Second.*—What is his work? *Third.*—What is the method by which he performs it?

These three inquiries will cover the whole ground that I wish at present to occupy, or that is necessary to enable me to bring out all the peculiar views I am anxious to set forth concerning Jesus as the Mediator and Saviour of the world.

First.—Whence comes the Mediator? I should not detain you a moment with this inquiry, were it not that there is a tendency in some minds among us, to rank Jesus in the category of ordinary men. I do not say that any among us question his vast superiority over all other men of whom history retains any record, but in this superiority they see nothing supernatural, no special interposition of Providence. Jesus was a man of greater natural endowments, and of more devout piety, truer and deeper philanthropy than other men. He has exerted a great and beneficial influence on

the world, will perhaps continue to exert a beneficial influence for some time to come; but he is divine, it is said, in no sense in which all men are not divine, in no sense in which nature is not divine. He had a larger nature, and was truer to it, than other men, and this is all wherein he was distinguished from other men, or had any special divinity.

Persons who entertain this view, speak of him in very respectful, I may almost say, in very flattering terms. Their praise is high, warm, and no doubt sincere. But they do not seem to regard him as having been, in the strict sense of the term, a "providential man." He is providential only in that vague and unsatisfactory sense in which all nature, all men, and all events are providential. They do not look upon him as having been, in the plain, ordinary sense of the terms, sent from God to be the Redeemer and Saviour of the world. They give a very loose explanation of the text, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son to die, that whosoever should believe on him might not perish, but have everlasting life." Jesus was the "Son of God" as all men are sons of God, and in no other sense, and "was given" as all men are given, and not otherwise. This is a conclusion, you are aware, to which some among us have come.

The same tendency which leads thus far, leads even further. It not only reduces Jesus to the category of ordinary men, but, as might be expected, it does the same by Moses and the prophets, by the apostles, and, indeed, by all who have generally been regarded as having been specially sent from God for the instruction and improvement of mankind. These men have not spoken to us from God, words given them by a higher power, and in the Name above all names, but out of their own hearts, from their own deep but natural experience. Their utterances are, no doubt, worthy of our respect. We may be refreshed by reading them, as by all genuine utterances, in which men are true to their great natures. The Bible, of course, ceases to be a book divinely inspired, a book authoritative, fit to be appealed to as decisive on matters lying beyond human experience; though it remains a very good book, containing many striking passages, much genuine poetry, some fine myths, some touching narratives, even some philosophy, and worthy to stand on the scholar's shelf with Homer, Shakspeare, Thomas Brown, and Emanuel Swedenborg.

This tendency might go further still. The state of mind and heart which leads us to wish to exclude all special providence or interposition of the Deity from the person of Jesus, and the Bible and its authors, would, if followed to its legitimate result, lead us to exclude God from the moral world altogether. When excluded from the moral world, he of course will not be retained in the natural world, and then is God wholly excluded from the universe. We are then without God, and God, if he be at all, is only an Epicurean God, who reposes at an infinite distance from the universe, disturbing himself with its concerns not at all.

It seem to me, sir, that this tendency, which neither you nor I have wholly escaped, is a tendency to resolve God into the laws of nature,—the laws of the moral world, and those of the natural world. Now what is this but a tendency to sink God in nature, to lose him entirely, that is, to become atheists? I do not mean to say that you or I have been affected by this tendency to any very great extent, but you know that it has manifested itself in our midst. We have found it in our friends; we have met with it in our parochial visits; we have seen it in the doctrines put forth by men who profess to have outgrown the past; and indeed it has been the decided tendency of the literature and science of Christendom for the last century and a half. Men have deified nature, boasted the perfection and harmony of her laws, forgetful that there are such things as volcanoes, earthquakes, noxious damps and poisonous effluvia, blight and mildew. They shrink from admitting the doctrine of Providence. In reading ancient history they seek to resolve all that is marvellous or prodigious into natural laws, and some entire religious sects are so afraid of the interposition of God, that they say men are rewarded and punished according to the "natural laws." They see no longer the hand of God, but great Nature.

But I need hardly say to you that this whole tendency is anti-religious, and productive, in every heart that indulges it, of decided irreligion. The scriptures everywhere represent the agents and ministries of our instruction and improvement as sent by a heavenly Father. Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, Isaiah, Peter, James, John, and Paul, are always called of God, and sent. They come to us not of their own accord; they speak to us not in their own name, but as ambassadors for God. God gives to each a special mission, and sends him on an errand of love and mercy to his tribe,

nation, or race. This is the only view compatible with religion.

When we resolve God into the laws of nature, whether as called the laws of the moral world or of the natural world, we have nothing remaining but nature. Nature, when there is no God seen behind it, to control it, to do with it as he will, in fact, that wills to overrule its seeming evil for real good, is a mere fate, an inexorable destiny, a dark, inscrutable, resistless necessity. It has no freedom, no justice. It sweeps on regardless of what it crushes or carries away before it; now with its lightnings striking down the old man in his sins, and now the infant in its innocence. Where is the ground for religious emotion—religious exercise? All is fixed, irrevocable. What shall we do? or wherefore attempt to do any thing? We may fear and tremble at the darkness before and behind us, but wherefore love, or be grateful? We may be anxious about the future, but wherefore pray? We may wish to be forgiven our sins, but who can forgive them? What is the ground of penitence and pardon?

Prayer, many amongst us have felt, is quite useless, if not improper, saving as a sort of æsthetic exercise, saving its spiritual effect on the one who prays. Forgiveness of sins men have seemed, to a very great extent, to consider as altogether out of the question. They either seek on the one hand a scape-goat, a substitute, some one to suffer for their sins, in their place, or they say God leaves us to the *natural* consequences of our deeds. There is no God, who of his own free grace, pardons the sinner, and receives and embraces the returning prodigal.

In fact, sir, not a few among us, though they admit, in words, that there is a God, do virtually deny his existence, by failing to believe in his freedom. You have contended for human freedom, and declared that man is annihilated just in proportion as his freedom is abridged. You may say as much of God. Freedom and sovereignty are one and the same. It has been felt that God has hedged himself in by natural laws, laws of his own establishing, so that he is no longer free to hear and answer prayer, or to comfort and forgive the penitent. God acts undoubtedly in accordance with invariable and eternal laws, but these laws are not the *natural* laws, not laws which he has enacted, but the laws of his own being; that is to say, he acts ever in conformity with himself, according to his own immutable will. The

laws which he is not free to violate are not laws out of himself, but which he himself is. That is to say again, God is not free to be other than himself, and in this fact he is proved to be absolutely free.

This tendency to resolve God into nature, is unscriptural and fatal to religion. Either we must give up all pretensions to religion or follow an opposite tendency. Either we must give up all ground for piety, or suffer Providence to intervene in the affairs of the world, and of the human race. We must also guard with great care against all disposition to revolt at this intervention. The true religious theory requires us to regard the authors of the Bible as supernaturally endowed, as sent specially by our Father on special missions, and the Bible therefore as a supernatural book, belonging to a different category from that of all other books.

According to this view, we must regard Jesus, not as *coming*, but as *sent*, not as raising himself up to be the Mediator, but as having been raised up by the Father in heaven. He is from God, who commends his love to us by him. It is God's grace, not human effort or human genius, that provides the Mediator. It is impossible then to press Jesus into the category of ordinary men. He stands out alone, distinct, peculiar. This much, I must be permitted to assume in regard to Jesus, if I am to concern myself with Christianity at all. In answer then to the question, Whence comes the Mediator? I reply, from God, "who so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son to die, that whosoever should believe on him might not perish, but have everlasting life."

Second.—But, assuming that God sent the Mediator, what did he send him to do? What was the work to be done for human redemption and sanctification? In other words, what is the condition in which the Gospel assumes the human race to be *without Christ*, and from which God, through the mediation of Christ, is represented as saving it? A great question this, and one on which I feel that I cannot so fully sympathize with your views as I once did. You say, in the sermon to which I have already alluded, that "In ourselves are the elements of the Divinity. God, then, does not sustain a figurative resemblance to man. It is the resemblance of a parent to a child, the likeness of a kindred nature." I am not sure that I catch your precise meaning in these sentences, but from these and from your writings

generally, I infer that you hold man to be created with a *nature* akin to that of the Divinity. In other words, man is created with a divine nature, and therefore the human and divine must be at bottom identical. This is the doctrine I have been accustomed to draw from your writings, and which is termed, amongst your admirers, the doctrine of the divinity of humanity.

This doctrine, which you have set forth on so many occasions, with all the power of your rich and fervid eloquence, I must needs believe is the real parent of that deification and worship of the human soul, which has within a few years past manifested itself among our transcendentalists. Men more ardent but less discriminating than yourself, have seized upon this expression, "in ourselves are the elements of the Divinity," and have inferred that God is nothing but the possibility of man. In your mind, I presume the expression only means that it is in ourselves that we find the germs, not of God, but of the idea of God. Others, however, have interpreted you differently, and have gone so far as to say that God is merely the complement of humanity; and some whom we have been loath to call insane, have not illogically though absurdly proceeded to say of themselves, "*I* am God;" "I and my Father are one,"—thus interpreting of the human soul, all that is said in the Bible of Jesus, of the Logos, and therefore by implication all that is said of the infinite God.

You will not understand me to intimate that you have had any sympathy with this extravagant, not to say blasphemous conclusion, which not a few of our friends have drawn from what they have supposed to be your premises. I know well that while you have wished to defend the freedom of those who have drawn it, and to do justice to the moral purity of their characters, you have shrunk from the conclusion itself. Yet, you must allow me to say that I feel that you have in some measure warranted this deification and worship of the human soul. Assuming the divinity of human nature as the starting point, as you do, I see not well how a logical mind, not restrained by an abundant stock of good sense, can avoid coming to this conclusion. I must confess that I cannot see how one can avoid it, save at the expense of his consistency.

I certainly shall not deny that there is something divine in man; but I do deny that what is divine in man is original in his nature, save as all nature is divine, inasmuch as it

is the work of God, and made at bottom,—if one may so speak, and mean any thing,—out of divine substance. But neither you nor I have ever intended to favor pantheism. We do not therefore confound nature with God, any more than we do God with nature. I see not, then, how it is possible for man in any intelligible or legitimate sense of the word, to be *naturally* divine. The two terms seem to me to involve a direct contradiction. There is something divine in the life of man, I am willing to own; but this divinity which you find there, I think has been communicated to man, superinduced upon his nature, if I may so speak, by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ. The error which I seem to myself to find in your view of man is, that you assume his *natural* likeness to God, that he contains, as essential elements of his nature, the elements of the Divinity. I am unable to reconcile with this fact of possessing a divine nature, my own experience, or the recorded experience of the race. Man, if so lofty, so divine, having in himself the elements of God, and therefore of infinity, should not be so foolish, so weak, and so wicked as we know him to have been in all past ages, and as we find him to be even in ourselves. It does well enough now and then for declamation to talk of man's likeness to God, but alas! few there are who have not been obliged, by painful experience, to exclaim with the Hebrew prophet, "it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps."

Allow me to say, that I think it is an error to assume that Christianity takes the divinity of humanity as its point of departure. Christianity seems to me to assume throughout as its point of departure, man's sinfulness, depravity, alienation from God and heaven. It treats man everywhere as a sinner, as morally diseased, morally dead, and its work is always to restore him to moral life and health; not to a consciousness of the greatness and divinity of his soul, but to righteousness, to a spiritual communion and union with God. And after all, is not this view the true one? Is not man a sinner? Who is there of us, however exalted or however low our estate, cultivated or uncultivated our minds, however pure and blameless may be our lives, that does not bear on his heart the damning stain of sin? Who has not exclaimed, nay, who does not perpetually exclaim, "I am a sinner; the good I would I do not, and the evil that I would not that I do. O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" The

universal conscience of the race bears witness to the fact that all men sin, and come short of the glory of God. All religions are so many additional witnesses to this fact, for they are all so many methods dictated to man, or devised by him, for getting rid of sin, and placing himself at one with God.

This much you, I know, will admit, however it may or may not be reconcilable with what you say of man's divinity. But I think Christianity goes further than this. It assumes not only that all men are actual sinners, but also that human nature itself has been corrupted, is depraved, so that men by nature are prone to do evil. This is the doctrine which I know you have opposed; but I think I can present it in a light in which you will not refuse to accept it; because I see how I can accept it, and find also a place for the doctrine which you yourself have so much at heart.

This doctrine of the depravity of human nature is, you will admit, a doctrine of universal tradition. With me tradition is always good evidence when its subject-matter is not intrinsically improbable. This is, I am aware, a broad principle, but I am able to demonstrate its soundness. The pure reason is always incompetent to decide on questions which go out of the department of mathematics. In what concerns the race, tradition is the criterion of certainty, only we must not forget that the individual man must be free to sit in judgment on the question, what is or is not tradition. The doctrine of human depravity is admitted on all hands to be a doctrine of universal tradition. If men were not universally conscious of its truth, of its conformity to what they know of themselves, how could they universally believe it? If it were false, it would be right in the face and eyes of what each one knows of himself, and we should naturally expect to find it universally rejected. Men cannot even by your rich and kindling eloquence, which is seldom surpassed, be made to believe, to any great extent, in your doctrine of the divinity of humanity. Even those of us the most anxious to embrace it, find ourselves unable to do so. We are too conscious of our own weakness and unworthiness. If the opposite doctrine were not more true to our experience, we should find equal difficulty in believing that.

Moreover, the Scriptures seem to me to teach very clearly, that the actual sins of mankind, are not all the difficulties in the way of our salvation, that are to be overcome. I will say nothing now of Genesis; I confine myself to the New

Testament. Paul teaches, beyond all question, that all men died in Adam, that through Adam sin entered into the world, and by sin a corruption of human nature. It was through the disobedience of one man that many, the many, that is, all men, were made sinners. Thus John, when he points to Jesus, says, "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the *sin* of the world." He does not say *sins*, but *sin*, that is, the original depravity of human nature.

Experience also, I think, indicates at least that there is in all men, even now, an under-current of depravity, by virtue of which men, if left to themselves, delight in sin rather than in holiness. Children are not always the sweet innocents we sometimes pretend. The little rogues not unfrequently show animation, spirit, intelligence, only when doing some mischief. Moreover, if human nature were not depraved, if it were what you represent it, and if there were no sin but actual sin, how could there be even actual sin? How comes it to pass that men, pure by nature, and possessing in themselves the very elements of God, do no sooner begin to develop their pure and godlike nature than they sin? What is it that works in us, and manifests itself in our acts? Is it not human nature? Since then the workings of this nature are unquestionably sinful, must not the nature itself be depraved?

I am willing to admit that the doctrine of human depravity, has assumed a form which is somewhat objectionable. Not indeed because it has been said to be total, that is, extending to and over all the faculties of the human soul. For the human soul is not many, but one, and acts ever as a unity. It would be grossly absurd then to assume that one phasis of it could remain undepraved while another was depraved. Sin also blunts the intellect as well as corrupts the heart. They who have pleasure in unrighteousness are easily deluded. They are the pure in heart who see God. But the error has been in assuming perfection as the point of departure for man and nature, and therefore in considering the imperfection we now see in man and nature to be the result of a fall from a perfect state. A fall from such a state is inconceivable. But man being originally created imperfect, as he must have been, naturally, if not inevitably, sinned, and this sin necessarily corrupted human nature.

I say *necessarily*. Grant me what you will not deny, that the first man, whether called Adam or not, sinned, and the doctrine of the inherent, hereditary depravity of human

nature follows inevitably, necessarily. This may seem to be a strong statement, but I can justify it.

The old doctrine on this subject, is that God made a covenant with Adam, by virtue of which Adam became the federal head of humanity, so that all his posterity should be implicated in his transgression. I do not like the term *covenant.* Say that God so created man, and subjected him to such a law of life, that the first man could not sin without involving all his posterity in his sin, and you will say what I believe to be the strict truth. But how can this be? Shall the innocent be involved in the fate of the guilty? They are so in nature, and in this life, to some extent, in providence. This world does not realize our conceptions of justice. Hence the promise and the hope of another. But this is not the point.

Philosophy has succeeded in demonstrating,—what everybody has always believed without perceiving its full significance,—that we are dependent beings, and are in no case and in no sense able to live by and in ourselves alone. Man can no more *live* by himself alone, than he can *exist* alone. Cut him off from all communion with nature, and could he live? Cut him off from all communication with other men, with his race, would he not die? Does not man die in solitude? In perfect solitude could he ever be said to live, that is to live a human life? Could any of his affections, moral, religious, social, or domestic, be ever developed? Certainly not. Here then is a fact of immense importance.

Let us begin by distinguishing *life* from *being.* To be is not necessarily to live. Inorganic matter *is*, but we can hardly say that it *lives.* To live is to manifest. But no being except God the self-existent, and the self-living being, is able to manifest itself by itself alone. There is no act, no function that man can perform in a state of perfect isolation. He cannot think without thinking himself as the subject of the thought, and thinking something not himself as its object. He has the capacity to love, but he cannot manifest it, that is live it, without loving; and he cannot love without loving something, some object. This which I say of love I may say of all of man's capacities, whether physical, intellectual, sentient, or sentimental. To deny this, and to assume that man can in any case be his own object, were to assume that man is capable of living in himself alone; which would imply that he, like the infinite God is self-existent and self-living.

If to live is to manifest ourselves, and if we cannot manifest ourselves without communion with an object which we are not, it follows that our life is at once subjective and objective. A man's life is not all in himself. It is in himself and in his object—the object by means of which he lives. This, if we say man is a dependent being, insufficient for himself, is what we necessarily affirm.

Now man's object, by communion with which he lives, is other men, God, and nature. With God and nature he communes only indirectly. His direct, immediate object is other men. His life, then, is in himself and in other men. All men are brought by this into the indissoluble unity of one and the same life. All become members of one and the same body, and members one of another. The object of each man is all other men. Thus do the race live *in solido*, if I may use a legal term, the objective portion of each man's life being indissolubly in all other men, and, therefore, that of all men in each man.

It follows necessarily from this oneness of the life of all men, that no one member can be affected for good or evil, but the whole body, all humanity in space, time, and eternity must actually or virtually be affected with it.

Assume now, that the first man sinned, and it is a fair presumption that he did sin, to say the least. This man must have been the object by virtue of communion with which his children were enabled to live. They could not live without an object, and he must be that object. Life is indissolubly subjective and objective. He must furnish the objective portion of their life. This portion of their life must partake of his moral character. He had polluted himself by sin. This pollution is necessarily transmitted by virtue of the fact that he is their object, to them, who corrupted in the objective portion of their life, must needs be corrupted in the subjective portion.

Adam's sin must necessarily have been transmitted to his children, not solely by natural generation, as some have contended, but by moral generation. Nor could it stop there. His children must have been the object of their children, and thus have transmitted it to them. These again must have transmitted it to a later generation; and thus, since the preceding generation furnishes always the objective portion of the life of the succeeding generation, it must necessarily be transmitted from generation to generation

forever, or till the race should cease to exist; unless the current were arrested and rolled back by a foreign power.

Bearing in mind this law of life, which philosophy has succeeded in demonstrating without once suspecting its application, and I think you will agree with me in accepting the doctrine in question, in believing that Paul meant what he said, that all die in Adam, and that through the disobedience of one man all were made sinners, and that, therefore, death hath passed upon all men. I think, also, that you will agree that the church generally, with which we have both warred on this point, has been right in asserting original sin, and the innate, hereditary depravity of human nature. The church seems to me to have erred only in considering this depravity, hereditary by virtue of a covenant or imputation, on the one hand, or by natural generation on the other. It is hereditary by virtue of the fact stated, that the preceding generation always furnishes the objective portion of the life of the succeeding generation, and without the objective portion the subjective portion would be as if it were not.

This principle of life which I have set forth is one of an immense reach. It shows at a glance the terrible nature of sin. In sin this principle is reversed, but is not destroyed. It operates for evil as, when in its normal condition, it does for good. By virtue of this principle, sin, whatever its degree, however great or however slight, by whomsoever committed, necessarily propagates itself, and must continue to propagate itself eternally, if not arrested by the sovereign grace of God. Humanity has originally in itself no more inherent power to overcome it than a body once set in motion has to arrest itself. How little then do they know of the true philosophy of life, who treat sin as if it were a light affair!

I am now prepared to answer the question, what is the work to be done? It is to redeem human nature from its inherent depravity, communicate to it a new and divine life, through which individuals may be saved from actual transgression, and raised to fellowship with the Father, by which they shall become really sons of God, and joint-heirs of a heavenly inheritance.

Third.—Having now determined the work there was for a Mediator to perform, I pass in the third and last place to consider the method by which he performs it; and I think I shall succeed in demonstrating the truth of the four following positions which are held by the church generally.

1. Man naturally does not and cannot commune directly with God, and therefore can come into fellowship with him only through a Mediator.

2. This Mediator must be at once and indissolubly, in the plain literal sense of the terms, very God of very God, and very man of very man; and so being very God of very God, and very man of very man, he can literally and truly mediate between God and men.

3. Jesus saves man, redeems him from sin, and enables him to have fellowship, as John says, with the Father, by giving his life literally not only for him but to him.

4. Men have eternal life, that is, live a true normal life, only so far forth as they live the identical life of Jesus. "He that hath the Son hath life;" "he that hath not the Son hath not life;" "except ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man ye have no life in you."

These are strong positions, and such as we Unitarians have not generally embraced in a very literal sense; but I think I can show them to be not only tenable, but positions that we may accept without giving up any thing we now have, that we really value. They may require us to enlarge our faith, but not to alter or abandon it. Nay, they are virtually implied in what we are every day preaching.

Jesus says, in answer to a question put to him by Thomas, "I am the way, the truth, and the life." These words have a profound significance, and a literal truth, which I confess I for one have been but slow to comprehend. I confess, sir, that I have honestly believed, that we might have a very sufficient Christianity without including the historical person we call Jesus; not indeed that I have ever failed, in my own view of Christianity, to include him. But I have taught from the pulpit, and from the press, that Christianity did not necessarily and could not be made to stand or fall with the fact whether there ever was or was not such a person as Jesus. This I now see was a grave error. Christ, the literal person we call Christ, *is* Christianity. All begins and ends with him. To reject him historically is to reject Christianity. This is the truth which they have had who have accused some of us of advocating the "latest form of infidelity," though under other aspects we who have been so accused, have been much further from infidelity than our accusers.

The fact is, sir, that the language, in which the catholic or universal church clothes the doctrines I have set forth in the

propositions enumerated, has prevented a large number of us from seeing the realities concerned. Many of us have even believed that there were no realities there, that the doctrines of the church do not concern realities at all, but mere covenants, bargains, imputations, legal fictions, &c. Finding no reality under the symbols of the church, we have concluded them to be empty forms, with which it were useless for us to attempt to satisfy the wants of either our minds or our hearts. We consequently rejected them, and sought to find what we needed in the everlasting truth and nature of things. All well enough up to a certain point; but we sought it unfortunately in the *abstract* truth and nature of things, not in *real life*. Consequently Jesus became to us a law, an abstract principle according to which man was made. This has been the case with myself in nearly all that I have written. In my *New Views*, Jesus has for me a high *representative* value. But having once attained to the principle represented, to the everlasting truth signified, I felt that the representative became as unnecessary as the scaffolding after the temple is erected.

On the other hand were our Unitarian friends of what has been called the old school. These with great truth hung on to the person and life of Jesus, and accused us who sought to resolve Jesus into an abstract law of the moral world, of rejecting Christianity altogether. But they did not help our difficulties. True they retained a personal Jesus, but they did not seem to us to retain any great matter for him to do; and when they talked of the importance of his life they failed to show us that importance. With the best intentions in the world, we could not see how, except in words, they made out that Jesus was any thing more than a very exemplary sort of a man, a very zealous and able reformer, whom we should do well to respect and to remember along with Plato, Alfred, Luther, and Swedenborg. We felt that there must be a deeper, a more permanent Christ than this, and we sought him, as I have intimated, in abstract philosophy.

You, sir, I know have said much of the life of Christ, and have spoken of its intimate relation to Christianity; but I confess that I do not find its importance according to your views, save as an example, and as well fitted to give force and efficacy to his instructions. You seem to me to make Jesus the way, and the truth, an example for man to imitate, and a teacher, through his life as well as through

his words, of the truth; although I find, in what you say of him, I admit, almost a presentiment of the fact that he is the Life. Now, I apprehend that Christendom feels very deeply that Jesus was something more to humanity than a picture hung up on the cross for the world to gaze at, and something more, too, than a teacher of truth; for as a mere teacher, I apprehend he has slight claims to originality. I have been unable to find a single doctrine, a single precept, absolutely peculiar to the New Testament. It will hardly do to stop with Jesus as an eminent teacher and true model man. We have all felt, nay, we all feel, that something more was necessary. As a model man, he serves us very little purpose, because we see him in but a very few of the relations of life, and because his perfections are above, altogether above the reach of us human beings. If none could be Christians but those who can be in all respects what he was, we should have no Christians. Taken as a mere teacher, the Gospel histories become to us almost a farce. The little that is brought forth in this way hardly justifies the prodigies recorded.

Allow me to say again, that I think there is a significance in what Jesus says, when he says, "I am the way, the truth and the life," which those of us who have asserted the abstract Christ, and those of us who have reduced Jesus to the capacity of an exemplar and teacher of truth and righteousness, have not attained unto,—a significance which once attained unto, will save the one class of us from our alleged coldness, and the other from our abstractions, and give to us all what we and the world need—LIFE.

I begin by assuming that the finite cannot commune directly with the infinite. Like does not and cannot commune with unlike. Moreover, the finite when regarded as depraved, all will agree, cannot commune, hold fellowship with infinite holiness. Man then could not commune directly with God; both because finite and because sinful. Then he must remain ever alienated from God, or a medium of communion, that is, a Mediator, must be provided. And this Mediator must of course be provided by the infinite, and not by the finite. It would be absurd to say that man, unable to commune with God, can nevertheless provide a medium of communion with him. God must provide it. That is, he must condescend, come down to the finite, down to man, and by so doing, take man up to himself.

The Mediator, or medium of communion must needs be

both human and divine. For if it do not touch man on the one hand, and God on the other, it cannot bring the two together, and make them one. Moreover, it must be really, literally, and indissolubly human and divine, God-man; not figuratively, symbolically, or mythically, for the Gospel deals only with realities. Types and shadows disappeared with the Mosaic dispensation.

Now, if you will recall what I have said of life, and the law of life, you will see at once how truly, and how literally Jesus was this Mediator between God and men. To live is to manifest one's self, and no being, except the self-living being, God, can manifest itself save by communion with some object. Life, then, in all beings, but the Unbegotten, is at once subjective and objective. This is the principle of life, which philosophy has demonstrated beyond the possibility of cavil.

Jesus, you admit, to say the least, was an extraordinary personage. I have already shown in this letter that he does not belong to the category of ordinary men. He is special, distinct, peculiar. Say now that God takes humanity, in the being we term Jesus, into immediate communion with himself, so that he is the direct object by means of which Jesus manifests himself. The result would be LIFE; that life, like all derivative life, at once subjective and objective, must necessarily be, in the strictest sense of the terms, human and divine, the life of God and the life of man, made indissolubly one. For God being the object, would be the objective portion, and man being the subject would be the subjective portion, which united is God-man. Here is the Mediator at once God-man, and that in no figurative sense, in no over-strained, refined sense, but all simply and literally, as the most simple-minded must understand the terms.

According to this view, it is the life that mediates; that is, the Mediator is the living Jesus, not Jesus the latent, the unmanifested, and, therefore, to all practical purposes the same as no Jesus at all. The living Jesus, the life, is the Christ, and the Christ is then, what Paul and the church have always asserted, *God manifest in the flesh.* How true, now, is what Jesus said, "I am the way, the truth, and the Life!" All those passages which speak of Jesus Christ as the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, become now literally true. Christ is literally the Son of God, begotten of the Father by spiritual generation, and being

born from the immediate communion of the human and divine, is in the strictest sense in which you can use the terms, very God of very God, and very man of very man; and as God, distinguishable, as the church has always contended, from God the Father only as the begotten must needs be distinguishable from the unbegotten.

If I am right in this, Jesus lived not as we do, merely by virtue of communion with other men and nature, but by virtue of immediate and unrestrained communion with God. The Scriptures nowhere represent Jesus as living an independent, and underived life. He is begotten of the Father; he is the Son; and he says expressly that he lives *by* the Father. I need on this point make no quotations. He never professes to live without the Father, but professes to live always by the Father and in the Father.

Now Jesus being at once God and man in his life, answers precisely the condition of a Mediator between God and men. God and man are nothing to us save so far as they are living. They exist for us only so far forth as they live. Jesus is all to us in his life. The Jesus men saw and communed with was the life of Jesus, the living Jesus, that is to say, the Christ. Being human he was within the reach of human beings, and being at the same time indissolubly God, by communing with him they necessarily communed with God. Whoso touched him, laid his hand on God. "Have I been so long with thee, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father."

It is the life that mediates. Jesus, I have said, so has said the church, saves the world by communicating to it his life, not as a life for them to look at, to contemplate as an example, and to seek to copy, to imitate, but for them literally to live, to be *their* life. This is now quite explicable. Jesus was placed in the world in the midst of men. Men communed with him while he was in the flesh. Then by the very principle of life already stated, he must have become the objective portion of their life. Then his life literally enters into and becomes an inseparable portion of the life of those human beings, say his disciples, who lived in and by communion with him. He was the object to his disciples; then, the objective portion of their life, by virtue of which their subjective life was developed.

But the human race lives, as we have seen, *in solido;* all are members of one and the same body, and members one

of another. There is a oneness of life which runs through them all, making them so strictly one, that the whole must feel whatever affects any one. The slightest vibrations in the heart of the least significant member are felt through the mighty heart of the whole. Consequently, the very moment that this new life of Jesus was communicated to the disciples, it was communicated virtually to the race. The disciples became objects with which others communed, and by means of their communion with others, necessarily imparted this life to others, by virtue of that very principle of life by which they had received it, and by virtue of which, when reversed, we have seen the sin of Adam necessarily extended to all his posterity. By the fact that one generation overlaps another, and thus becomes its objective life, the generation in which Christ appeared must necessarily transmit it to its successor, and that successor to its successor, and thus generation carry it on to generation, so long as the succession of generations should last.

This doctrine of the transmission of the Life from generation to generation, is denied by no sect, to my knowledge, except the Baptists, who seem to me to mistake more fundamentally the real character of Christianity, than any other sect to which the Protestant reformation has given birth. In all other churches it is borne witness to by the doctrine of infant baptism. Children are baptized because it is felt that there is a sense in which the children of elect or believing parents are born into the kingdom. Infant baptism, then, has an important meaning. It is the symbol of a vital doctrine of Christianity, which is, to my understanding, rejected by all those who admit only baptism of adults, on voluntary profession of faith. The same doctrine of the transmission of the life from man to man in time and space, by what I have termed spiritual generation, is borne witness to by what is termed apostolic succession. Without meaning to accept this last doctrine, in its episcopal sense, I must say that I see a great truth which it covers. This divine life was communicated to the world through the apostles, and mainly through those who succeeded them in the ministry. A virtue evidently, according to the principle of life, must have been communicated by the apostles to their successors. They who have not received this virtue cannot be true ministers of Jesus. For how can I communicate to others the divine life of Jesus, if I have not myself received that life? The doctrine of apostolic succes-

sion teaches us simply that the church has held that this divine life is communicable from man to man by spiritual generation. Hence with singular propriety has she called her clergy, *spiritual fathers.* Every true clergyman is the father of his flock, and verily begets in them a true life. The error of the church has been in supposing that this life could be communicated by laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Probably, however, at bottom, nothing more has ever been meant by this, than that the communion between us who are to minister at the altar and the apostles, and through them with Jesus, must be real and unbroken. And if the view I have taken be true, this communion depends on no arbitrary ceremony; it is real, and the very principle of life itself prevents it from being interrupted in any case whatever. Perhaps also, if we were really filled with this divine life, as we should be, we might impart somewhat of it, merely by the laying on of hands.

We see, now, how Jesus can be literally the Mediator between God and men, and how by the fact that he lived in communion with men, he must communicate his life to the world, to human nature, so that it must become henceforth the life of humanity, a new life, by virtue of which the human race comes under a new dispensation, and is able, so to speak, to commence a new series. Assume what we have assumed, that this life is at once human and divine, we can readily perceive that its introduction into the life of humanity would redeem humanity from the corruption which was by Adam, so that what Paul says must be literally true, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." And this discloses the necessity of regarding the life of Jesus as supernatural, superhuman. The life of any man would pass into the life of all men as I have shown must have passed the life of Jesus; but unless that life was a life above that of humanity, it could not redeem humanity, and raise it to a higher life. The merit of the life of Jesus, and the reality of the redemption by him, must be then in exact proportion to his divinity. To deny his divinity would be the denial of all in Christianity worth affirming.

Happily this divinity is easily demonstrated; at least, we can easily demonstrate the supernatural, the superhuman character of the life of Jesus. It is historically demonstrable that the life of Jesus was altogether superior to the age in which he lived. He must then have lived in com-

munion with an object which that age, and therefore nature, could not furnish; that is to say, in communion with an object above the world, above nature, superhuman. Here then is his supernatural character established at once. Then the introduction of his life into humanity, was a redemption of humanity. He becomes then our Redeemer, the Father of a new age.

Nor is this all. By virtue of the fact that the life of Jesus has passed into the life of humanity, humanity is able to commune with God. Through Jesus who is our life, we have access to the Father, may come into communion, as John says, into *fellowship*, with him. Then we may live in communion with God, and consequently be every moment deriving new life and strength from him. Thus the life of Jesus does not grow fainter and fainter as echoed by generation after generation, but stronger and stronger, as the path of the just grows brighter and brighter into the perfect day. Hence his life becomes more powerful unto life than the sin of Adam was unto death, and so through Jesus we shall be more than conquerors. This is what Paul means when he says, "not as the offense so is the free gift; for if by one man's offense death reigned by one, *much more* they which receive abundance of grace shall reign through one Jesus Christ." "But where sin abounded grace did *much more* abound." Life is stronger than death, and must be ultimately victorious, especially since by virtue of the indwelling Christ, which is our life, we have access to the Father and can renew our life at the Fountain of Life itself day by day.

I intended to adduce a large number of passages of Scripture in support of these views, but I have not room, nor is it necessary. These passages will readily occur to all who are familiar with the writings of John and Paul. They always speak of Christ and Christianity as the Life. "That," says John, in his first Epistle, "that which was from the beginning which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of Life; (for the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you, that eternal Life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us;) that which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, *that ye may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ.*" This is quite to my purpose. But here

is a passage more so still. Jesus says, "As the living Father hath sent me, and as I live by the Father, even so he that eateth me shall live by me." *As the living Father has sent me.* The Father hath life in himself, and needeth not others in order to be able to live. This self-living Life hath sent me. *As I live by the Father.* Here is the assertion of the fact that Jesus lives by communion with the Father, and therefore of the fact that his life is indissolubly God-man. *Even so he that eateth me shall live by me.* Eating is merely a figurative expression for partaking, receiving. It is not the literal flesh, for the flesh profiteth nothing, that we are to receive and assimilate, but the spirit, the very life of Jesus. To those who thus receive him, he is the object with whom they commune, and they live by him precisely as he lives by the Father; and as he by living by the Father lives the life of God immediately, so they by living by him do live the life of God mediately.

This view gives new meaning to the doctrine of brotherhood. You have done much to make us all feel that whatever our condition in life, or position in society, we are all brothers, members of one and the same great family. But the doctrine I am bringing out goes even further, and shows us that the relation subsisting between men is actually more intimate than that which we ordinarily express by the term brotherhood. All men are not only members of one family, but they are all members one of another. The life of each man is indissolubly in himself and in all other men. The injury done to the life of one man is an injury done to the life of all men: the least significant member, however incrusted with filth or polluted with sin, cannot suffer but the whole body must suffer with him. Regard for our own welfare and disinterested regard for others may combine then to ameliorate the moral, intellectual, and physical condition of mankind. Here is the doctrine that shall give power to the preacher, the philanthropist, the genuine reformer, whether moral or social.

This intimate relation of all men in the unity of one and the same life, explains the Eucharist or Communion. That rite of the church is not merely commemorative of the last supper of Jesus with his disciples. All Christianity clusters around it, centres in it; for all Christianity is in this one word *communion.* Jesus was the living bread which came down from heaven to give life to the world. This Life, the new Life, Eternal Life, the Life by living which we are

redeemed from sin and united to God, could be communicated to the world, only by virtue of a communion between Jesus and his disciples, and to the rest of mankind in time and space only by communion with them. The great fact here affirmed is that the life of Jesus is communicated to the world, and spread from man to man according to the very principle of human life itself. It becomes human life, and men become one with Jesus, and one with God, just in proportion as it is lived. Then in order to enable all men to live this life, we must seek to facilitate the means of communion for all men in both time and space. This translated into practical life will be the organization of all our domestic and social institutions in obedience to the strictest order and most unrestrained freedom compatible with order. Nay, our domestic and social order, instead of being a check on freedom, should be so organized as to be the support of freedom, or of man's uninterrupted communion with man, according to the normal wants of his nature and his life.

We may now understand and accept what is said of the dignity of human nature. Taken as we find it to-day, in the bosom of Christian civilization, it unquestionably has a recuperative energy, even, if you will, a divine worth. My objection to what you have alleged of human nature, is that you affirm it of human nature originally and universally. You and the church in some respects agree. Both speak of human nature to-day, without intimating that the mission of Christ has in the least affected it. If human nature were always what you say, I cannot conceive what need there was of a Redeemer; if it be now what the church generally affirms, that is, inherently and totally depraved, I am equally unable to conceive what the Redeemer has done. If there be any truth in the doctrine of life as I have set it forth; if there be any truth in the alleged fact that the Life of Jesus was a new life, a life *above the human life of the age in which he came;* then assuredly has the coming of Jesus redeemed human nature, and communicated to it higher and diviner elements. Human nature is not to-day what it was before the coming of Jesus. In speaking of human nature, meaning thereby the powers and capacities of man, we must have regard to chronology. It is false, what we say, that human nature is the same in all ages. The law of human life is the same in all ages; but that life is never the same for two successive generations, or else where were the idea of progress, without which the whole plan of Provi-

dence would be inexplicable? To assert that human nature is the same to-day that it was before the coming of Christ, is to "deny the Lord that bought us;" because it either denies that Jesus has come at all, or that he has come to any effect.

The coming of Jesus has communicated a new life to the race, which by means of *communion* of man with man shall extend to all individuals. This new life has not as yet, we all know, wholly overcome and effaced the death which was by Adam; but it is in the heart of humanity, an incorruptible seed, I had almost said, a seminal principle of divinity. The humanity of to-day has in its life, which is the indwelling Christ, the Christ that was to be with us unto the end of the world, a redeeming power, a recuperative energy, by virtue of which it is able to come into fellowship with the Father, and thus work out its own salvation. The possession of this principle, this energy, this life, literally, as I have endeavored to prove, the Christ, is that wherein human nature differs now from what it was before Jesus came. Then it had in its life no redeeming principle, now it has. This divinity is not *it*, but Christ formed within it, the hope of glory. Human nature in some sense then I own possesses to-day the divine worth you claim for it; not by virtue of its own inherent right, but by virtue of its union through the law of life to Christ, who is our head, and who is one with God. This union virtually complete, is actually incomplete. To complete it, and therefore to make all men one in Christ, and through him one with the Father, thus fulfilling his prayer, as recorded in the seventeenth chapter of John's Gospel, is the work to be done, towards which Christian civilization is tending, and to which all true Christians direct all their efforts, individual and social. We may be even far from this glorious result as yet, and we may even be in ourselves weak and inefficient; but the Life is in the world; Christ has entered into the life of humanity; the Word has become Flesh, and dwells among us; and as individuals and as a race we may do all things through Christ strengthening us. We can effect this, because God works in us both to will and to do. By communion with Jesus, we derive life, as I have said, from God himself; we are led by the Spirit of God, are sons of God; clothed upon with a life, majesty, and power, before which the empire of darkness and sin must be as chaff before the wind. We are placed at one with God. All things then are for us. The winds are our

messengers, and flames of fire our ministers. Even the spirits shall obey us. Who can set bounds to our power, since our strength is not ours, but God's; since our life is hid in God, in whom we dwell, and who through his Son dwells in us. O, sir, I believe it will prove to be literally true, what Jesus said, "he that believeth on me, greater works than these shall he do." We know little of the power, of the moral force with which to overcome the world, true fellowship of man with man in the life and spirit of Jesus will give us. God is for us, who can be against us? Here, sir, is my hope. The world lieth in wickedness; man preys upon man; discordant sounds of wrongs, outrages and grief and death strike my ear on every hand; but I despair not; Christ is our life, because he lives we shall live also; Christ is our life, a true life, and I fear not but life will finally swallow up death in victory, and the new heavens and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, become a glorious reality, an everlasting inheritance for the generations of men.

Longer I would detain you; I would endeavor to show that by virtue of the law of life which binds in one indissoluble whole all the individuals of the race in space, time, and eternity, the mission of Jesus must therefore necessarily be retroactive, extending back to the first born man as well as forward to the latest born; thus giving a meaning to what is said of his preaching to the spirits in prison, to the inhabitants of the world before the flood, and also a meaning to the practice of baptizing for the dead, of which Paul speaks. But this would carry me too far for my present purpose. I can only say, that this law of life appears to me to be a key to most of the mysteries connected with our faith. It throws a flood of light on many, very many points, which have hitherto been dark and perplexing. It gives to the whole Gospel an air of reality; nay, makes it a living reality. We get rid of all types and shadows, symbols and myths, representative, symbolical, or mythical interpretations. We are able now to take the Gospel as it is, with docile minds, and in simplicity of heart, in its plain obvious sense, without any mystical refinement or philological subtlety.

For myself, sir, I value the view I have presented, because it removes all doubts with regard to the origin of the Bible. Here is a doctrine of Life contained in the New Treatment, which has been asserted, preached, believed, denied, contro-

verted, for eighteen hundred years, unproved, unexplained, and pronounced by all the world to be inexplicable, and held to be a mystery by its most devout and enlightened believers. The latest discoveries of philosophy furnish us a key to this mystery, and instantly it is plain, simple, demonstrable. Now, am I to believe that man could have found out and written, what it has taken the race eighteen hundred years of close study to be able to begin to see the reasonableness of? Believe so who can; I cannot. In this simple fact alone, I see that in writing the New Testament there was employed a superhuman mind, and a mind which after eighteen hundred years of growth none of us can equal. For I see there depths which philosophy is yet in no condition to sound. But when every discovery in philosophy but tends to make more apparent and certain the truth of the Book, can I for a moment hesitate to believe that these depths, when sounded, will be found to contain the richest treasures of divine love and wisdom? The Bible is therefore removed at once out of the category of ordinary books, and I can clasp it to my heart as the Word of God, in which is recorded the truths I am to believe, and contained ample authority for asserting them. Though I have come slowly to this conclusion, do not believe that I have come so slowly as my writings would seem to indicate, as they who know me best can readily testify. I have seemed to the world to have altogether less faith in the Bible than I have really had, because, as you well know, I have for these last ten years been laboring to bring under religious influences, a class of minds to whom the Bible is an offense rather than an authority. All I say now is that the view I have presented, shows so much wisdom and beauty in the New Testament, so much and so profound truth, altogether beyond the age in which the book was written, that I feel more deeply than ever its supernatural character; and am more and more willing to yield to it as an authority. I can take it now all simply, and do not feel called upon to refine away any portion of it.

I have now, I feel, a doctrine to preach. I can preach now, not merely make discursions on ethics and metaphysics. The Gospel contains now to me not a cold abstract system of doctrine, a collection of moral apothegms, and striking examples of piety and virtue. It points me to Life itself. Metaphysical studies have indeed brought me, through the blessing of God, to the understanding of the doctrine, but having come to it, it suffices for itself. I now need to know

nothing but Jesus and him crucified. I can shut up all books but the Bible and the human heart, and go forth and preach Christ crucified, to the Jew a stumbling-block, and to the Greek foolishness no doubt, but to them that are called, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. I have something besides abstract speculations and dry moral precepts, or mysterious jargon to offer. I have the doctrine of Life, the Word of Life to proclaim. I have an end to gain; it is to bring men into communion with each other, so that the Word of Life may have free course among them, and be glorified in binding them together in that love wherewith God hath loved us.

I feel too, that I can now go and utter the very word this age demands. That word is COMMUNION. The age is waiting for it. It is sick of divisions, sick of mere forms, wearied and disgusted with mere cant; no better pleased with mere metaphysical speculations; impatient of dry disquisitions, and of cold, naked abstractions. It demands Life and Reality. Away with your formulas; away with your seeming and make-believe! Life and Reality; give us Life and Reality! Life and Reality we can give, for such the Gospel now proves itself to be. The doctrine that man lives by communion with man, and through the life derived from Jesus with God, will bring us together on one platform, in the unity of life itself, and the church will become one in Christ, "from whom the whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love;"—the church shall in very deed become one and universal, and be the living body of our Lord, and the race will speak with one tongue, have one faith, one Lord, one baptism. The great doctrine of Life may now be preached, and whoso preaches that will bring the world to the Life, and through the Life save it from death and raise it to God.

Nor is this all. With this doctrine of life, I feel that I may go forth in a higher name than my own. I was wrong some time since, as I was understood, in saying that man should not presume to speak to man authoritatively in the name of God, although I was right in my own thought. What I wished to protest against was, an artificial priesthood, the members of which by virtue of their membership, should deem themselves authorized to speak to us, nay, to command us in the name of God. My protest was against

man-made priests, priests after the order of Aaron, whose authority is in their gown and band. These were the priests I said we must destroy, and for saying which my wise countrymen abused me from one end of the Union to the other. But priests in this sense, I say now, away with. They are dumb dogs that will not bark. They are foolish builders that daub with untempered mortar; blind leaders of the blind; spoilers not feeders of the flock. Yes, away with them, if such there be. Let us have priests after the order of Melchisedec; priests anointed with an unction from the Holy One, whose tongues are touched with a live coal from off God's altar; whose authority is engraved by the great head of the church on their very hearts. These are the priests that we want, and the only ones we want, — priests of God's calling, not man's. Nevertheless no man should attempt to preach unless he may speak in a higher name than his own. Man is a poor, frail worm of the dust, and what is his authority worth? Let me speak in my own name, who will hear, nay, who ought to hear? I feel, and so does every man feel, when he rises to preach, that is, if he have any humility, that he is insufficient and altogether unworthy. How can I speak? These are older, wiser, more learned, nay, it may be, better than I. Have I the presumption to stand up to instruct, to warn, admonish, rebuke, exhort? Nay, I cannot. I cannot preach; I can only reason, discuss, or dispute; I must not speak from the height of the Christian pulpit, as one having authority, but from the level of the multitude I address. Every minister, worthy of the name, has felt this. For years I felt it, and never pretended to preach. I addressed the people who came to hear me. I discoursed to them as well as I could, but did not preach. I could not preach. I had no authority to preach; except the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, and that I felt was not sufficient. But now I feel that I have authority, because now I can say "the doctrine is not mine." I have God's truth to preach, and I go to preach it not in my own name, nor in the name of any man, nor any set of men, but on the authority of God's Word. So far as I am true to the doctrine, so far as I am faithful to the Life, I know God will speak through me, and give efficacy to the word.

More I would say, but enough. I have addressed you with freedom, but I trust not with disrespect. I have spoken freely of myself, for I have wished to make certain

explanations to the public concerning my faith. I have spoken earnestly, for the view which I have presented of the mediatorial Life of Jesus has deeply affected me. I have been verging toward it for years; some of my friends tell me they had obtained it some time ago from my public communications; but I myself have not seen it clearly until within a few weeks. Had I seen it earlier, the obscurities and seeming inconsistencies with which I have been charged, I think would never have occurred. I have found it a view which clears up for me my own past, and enables me to preserve the continuity between the past of humanity, its present, and its future. More than all this; it has touched my heart, and made me feel an interest in the Gospel, in my fellow men, and in the upbuilding of God's kingdom on the earth, deep as my interest has long been in these subjects, which I have never known before. What before was mere thought has now become love; what was abstraction has become life; what was merely speculation has become downright, living earnestness. God is to me my Father; Jesus my life; mankind my brethren. I see mankind practically divided, worrying and devouring each other, and my heart bleeds at the wrong they do each other; and I have no thought, no wish but to bring them back to unity and fraternity in Christ Jesus; so that we may all be one. My early profession I therefore resume, with a love for it I never felt before. I resume it because my heart is full, and would burst could it not overflow. I must preach the Gospel. Necessity is laid upon me, and woe is me if I do not.

Forgive the liberty I have taken, and believe me, as ever,

Yours, with sincere respect,

O. A. Brownson.

CHARLES ELWOOD, OR THE INFIDEL CONVERTED.

PREFACE.

I HAVE not much to say by way of preface to this little volume. It explains itself, and contains in itself the grounds of its own justification or condemnation.

I do not send it forth as a work of art, and I have not studied to conform to the established laws of the species of composition to which it may seem to belong. It has the air of being a work of fiction; but it has been written in an earnest spirit for a serious purpose.

The form in which I have chosen to send out the ideas and discussions embodied in this work, has been adopted to please myself, and because it was the most convenient form I could adopt for presenting my ideas clearly and in a moderate space. A regular treatise on the subject here discussed, I have not had the patience, if the ability, to prepare, and nobody would read it if I had.

It may be objected that I have introduced too much fiction for a serious work, and too little, if I intended a regular-built novel. All I have to say is the public must take the work as they find it. In order to have introduced a greater variety of characters and events, I wanted a fertility of imagination to which I lay no claim, and a different purpose in writing from the one I really had. I have introduced as much variety of character and action, as my imagination furnished, or my judgment approved. If novel-readers are not satisfied with this explanation, why, they must apply to somebody else, I can give them no satisfaction.

The characters introduced are of course fictitious, yet I may say that I have myself had an intellectual experience similar to that which Mr. Elwood records, and what he has said of himself would perhaps apply in some degree to me. I am willing the public should take the book as an account which I have thought proper to give of my own former unbelief and present belief. So far as it can be of any use, I am willing that what is here recorded should have the authority of my own experience.

Those who are acquainted with the philosophical writers of the modern eclectic school of philosophy in France, will perceive that Mr. Morton has anticipated many of their results, and perhaps given them an original application. He seems to be somewhat of a kindred spirit with M. Victor Cousin, though perhaps more of a theologian, and therefore more disposed to consider philosophy in its connexion with religion.

With these remarks I dismiss this little book to its fate. I have taken much pleasure in its composition; I have embodied in it the results of years of inquiry and reflection; and I have thought it not ill-adapted to the present state of the public mind in this community. It deals with the weightiest problems of philosophy and theology, and perhaps some minds may find it not altogether worthless.

BOSTON, Feb. 15, 1840.

INTRODUCTION.

You ask me, my dear K——, to give you the history of my life. I feel flattered by the request, but I can bring myself to comply with it only in part. The history of my life may not be altogether barren of interest, but I have resolved that it shall never be written. I have lived in the world from my childhood; I have acted even a conspicuous part with the men of my generation, in its busy scenes; my name has been known far and wide; and yet are there none living who can bring together the scattered fragments of my story, and furnish a tolerable account of my life. They who knew me in childhood are not they who have known me in the prime of manhood or in old age; and they who have known me at one period of my life, or under one relation, have had and can have no access to those who have known me at another period, or under another relation.

But why ask for the story of my outward life? It can tell you little of myself, and furnish you no sure index to my real character. The man lies beneath his deeds, and is but slightly revealed by the outward events of his life. Would you become acquainted with the man you must read the history of his soul—make yourself familiar with his spiritual experience, his inward struggles, defeats, victories, doubts, convictions, ends, and aims. These constitute the real man, and you become acquainted with him only in proportion as you become familiar with them. Moreover,

arrived as I am at the last stage in my earthly pilgrimage, and wasting away under a disease which, though gentle in its operations, must ere long lay me asleep with my fathers, my past deeds sink into insignificance, as does the world to which they belonged. I find now solace and support only in turning in upon myself, in retracing my inward experience, and ascertaining what I have garnered up in my soul that I may be able to carry with me whither I am going. But even this experience has little value except for myself. It can stand others in no stead, or if it can, they may find all that is essential in it, by recurring to what has passed in themselves.

And after all, my dear K——, what are individuals that their history should be written? Biography is too often the fruit of vanity, or of a false philosophy. What is purely individual, is of small value; it for the most part passes away with the individual, and leaves no trace; what there is in an individual, which belongs to the race, necessarily inscribes itself on his age, its institutions, laws, morals, or manners. The memory of the good man lives in the virtue which went forth from him, that of the great man in the results humanity obtains from the victories he has helped her achieve. The man's biography, if he have manifested aught of the manly nature, has become an integral part of the life of humanity, and therefore needs not to be written in a book and laid up in the scholar's library. The book preserves nothing; for nothing ever dies that ought to live; nothing is ever forgotten that should be remembered; and all is known of every man that is worth knowing.

You see then, my dear K——, why I cannot comply with your request. If I have done aught for my race, it will not be forgotten; if my fellow-men are the wiser or the better for my having lived, I am Immortal.

We should study to be men, heroes, and think not whether our names shall or shall not be remembered. Nevertheless, I understand the feeling which prompts us to inquire how it has been with those in this world whom we have loved, or whose memories we would cherish. I know the love which you feel for me, and which gives me an importance in your eyes which I have not in my own, makes you desirous of knowing what befell me in that long period of my life, which passed away before we met; I know every incident in my eventful life, every, the minutest fact in my experience would be precious to you for my sake, that you

would prize it and preserve it; and to gratify you, and to show how deeply I value the love which has come to shed a glory round the winter of my life, I would willingly recall and relate all that I have been, have done or have suffered. But I have not now the strength to do it. The time allotted me here is too limited; and my last moments should rather be employed in making what preparation I can for the new world into which I am so soon to enter. I have however, by me a short account of a period of my life, least known to the public, which I drew up, some years ago, at the solicitation of one, now, alas! no more. It will tell you not much of my exterior relations, nor of the scenes in which I have taken an active part; but it may tell you somewhat of my interior conflicts, and perhaps disclose to you some of the causes that have made me what I am. When I drew it up, I had the folly to think that it might serve as a guide to those who should find themselves, as I did myself, at an early age, lost in that wilderness of doubt, where a man cannot live, and from which there seems to be no issue; but I have lived long enough to learn tnat the experience that profits is one's own, not another's. I have looked it over and added a few notes which were needed to make some parts of it intelligible; I have revised some portions; but I have not been able to make it harmonize with the present temper of my mind. We are rarely in old age satisfied with the performances of our youth. The imperfections I see in it, however, render it but a more faithful picture of my mind and character at the period to which it relates. I place it in your hands and you may do with it as you please. As coming from me, and as concerning me, I doubt not that you will prize it. You will find nothing in it to make you love me less; and that is all I ask. Of the many whose hearts I have felt were my own, you alone remain. I will not say that any have been false, but all have left me, perhaps through my own fault. I have none who can talk with me over life's young trials, temptations, and struggles. With you I chanced to meet only long after I had persuaded myself that friendship and love were not for such as I. You have taught me what all who reach old age know but too well, however otherwise youth may fear, that the heart never grows old, that the affections are always young. I cannot consent that you should leave as others have left me. I would go down to the grave, feeling that one warm heart loved me still, and had no cause to regret the wealth of affection it had lavished upon me.

CHAPTER I.—A VISITOR.

I was surprised at my breakfast one morning by a visit from Mr. Smith, the young clergyman I had heard preach the preceding evening. This was not in the usual course of things. I was generally regarded in the village as an infidel; and he who is thought an infidel—that is, an open, avowed infidel—is for the most part excluded from the common courtesies of civilized life, and almost from the pale of humanity. Pious people beheld me with a most righteous horror, and not unfrequently, I have good reason to believe, made use of my name to restore quiet or preserve submission in the nursery. Of course I was generally avoided by the elect, perhaps through fear that I might cause them to become castaways.

The wisdom or the policy, to say nothing of the justice, of this manner of treating the infidel, is somewhat questionable, and in my own case was decidedly bad. I had a deep yearning for communion with my kind, and was ever ready to sympathize with them in their joy or their sorrow. I was unconscious of guilt; I had a strong desire to know the truth, and I felt that I had done my best to ascertain it, and that if I was in error I was not to blame. The conduct of religious people struck me, therefore, as unjust, and could not fail to prejudice me against them, and through them against religion itself. Had they treated me as a man, and shown me that respect for my honest convictions which I was willing to show them for theirs, I have no doubt that I should have been saved from dogmatic infidelity. But they were not wise enough—perhaps not Christian enough—for that.

I have since thought, however, that these religious people did respect me to a certain extent. We always, consciously or unconsciously, do homage to the man of true moral independence, who firmly adheres to what he believes to be the truth. No man who is true to his own convictions, who follows with fidelity his own conscience, and proclaims with a serene brow and a brave heart unpopular doctrines, regardless of the personal injury they may do himself, but does in the long run gain the respect of the community in which he lives, however great may be its repugnance to the views he sets forth. Everybody despises the time-server, the moral coward, who wants the manliness to speak out his honest convictions, and who says "Good Lord," and "Good Devil," doubtful into the hands of which he may ultimately

fall. But my religious friends had their religious character to maintain with one another, and no one among them had the moral courage to make the first advances. Every one felt that if he were intimate with me, all his brethren might suspect his orthodoxy, and perhaps accuse him of encouraging infidelity.

It is possible, also, that some did honestly fear that if they treated me as a man and a brother, they would be giving countenance to my heresies and encouraging me in errors which would prove not only dangerous to society, but fatal to my own soul. They felt it to be their duty to make me dissatisfied with my infidelity, and to do what they could to deprive me of all personal influence. This they supposed could be done most effectually by bringing the whole force of public opinion to bear against me. But in this, their zeal for religion outran their knowledge of human nature. Public opinion is the poorest argument in the world to convince a man of his errors. Every man, if there be any thing of the man about him, adheres but the firmer to his opinions the more unpopular they render him. We value those opinions the most for which we pay the dearest, and hold on as with a death-grasp to the faith, or the want of faith, for which we have been made outcasts from society. But this is a truth which people have been slow to learn, and learn it perfectly they cannot without just observation and profound reflection—two things to which I have not found the majority specially addicted.

It may be easily inferred, therefore, that I was left pretty much alone, and that my intercourse with my fellow men, was not a little restricted. My friends were few in number, and rarely such as I should have chosen. They who had reputation to gain, or to lose, had no ambition to be thought acquaintances of mine. And the friendship of those who called themselves my friends, grew cool in nearly the same proportion in which the warmth of the Revival increased. One young man, and only one, I had trusted might remain firm, but him I had left on the anxious seats, and could therefore hardly hope to meet him again unaltered. Under these circumstances, a visit early in the morning from a clergyman, and especially such a clergyman as I supposed Mr. Smith to be, was an event at first sight as unlooked for as it was inexplicable.

But Mr. Smith, to do him justice, was in the main an honest, well-meaning man. Early drawn to the contempla-

tion of religious subjects, and impressed with the importance of saving his soul, he had failed to enlarge his views of men and things, or to acquire much of that knowledge which expands the affections and liberalizes the mind. Educated too by charity, as a poor and pious youth, gratitude to the sect which had taken him up, and to which he had pledged his faith before he had begun his inquiries after truth, had tended not a little to quicken his zeal and narrow his sympathies. But he was sincere, and painfully desirous of saving souls. He was fresh from the theological school, full of the ardor of undamped youth, and burning with all the zeal to make proselytes naturally inspired by a creed which denies the possibility of salvation to all who doubt it. He had heard that I was an atheist, his attention had been directed to me at his evening meeting, and he had now just stepped in to convert me. Having never measured himself with an intelligent unbeliever, he counted on an easy and speedy victory.

CHAPTER II.—DIVINE REVELATION.

"I have called on you, Mr. Elwood," said Mr. Smith, after a few common-place remarks, "with a message from God."

"Indeed!" said I: "And when, sir, did you receive it?"

"Last night. When you left the meeting without taking your place on the anxious seats, God told me to come and deliver you a message."

"Are you certain it was God?"

"I am."

"And how will you make me certain?"

"Do you think I would tell you a falsehood?"

"Perhaps not, intentionally; but what evidence have I that you are not yourself deceived?"

"I feel certain, and do I not know what I feel?"

"Doubtless, what you feel; but how do you know that your feeling is worthy of trust?"

"Could not God give me, when he spoke to me, sufficient evidence that it was really he who spoke to me?"

"Of that you are probably the best judge. But admit that he could give it, and actually has given it; still you alone have it, not I. If then you come to me with the authority of God to vouch for the trustworthiness of your feeling, you must be aware that I have not that authority; I have only your word, the word of a man who, for aught I

know, is as fallible as myself. You come to me as an ambassador from God; produce your credentials, and I will listen to your dispatches."

"My credentials are the Bible."

"But, pray, sir, how can a book written many ages ago, by nobody knows whom, be a proof to me that God told you last night to come and deliver me a message this morning?"

"I bring you just such a message as the Bible dictates."

"And what then?"

"The Bible is the Word of God."

"That is easily said, but I fancy not quite so easily proved. The Bible is in the same category with your feeling of certainty, of which you have spoken. Certain men, it is said, in old times, had certain dreams, visions, inward impressions, which they called, or somebody in their name, the Word of God. That they had the dreams, visions, inward impressions, is possible, but how could they know that they came from God?"

"Their impressions bore the mark of God's seal. The men who received them were honest men, holy men, who could have no motive to deceive others, and who could not be deceived themselves."

"May I ask how you learn all that?"

"I am sure of it."

"I am glad of that. But I should hardly dare make so broad an assertion concerning individuals with whom I am intimately acquainted, much less of individuals of whom I know not even the time when they lived, the nation to which they belonged, the language in which they wrote, nor even the names which they bore. How know I that the Bible-writers were honest men? What do I, or can I know of their motives? Before you can have any right to expect me to rely on a man's testimony, you should make me acquainted with him; tell me his name, his place of residence, the nation to which he belongs; and in case of an ancient writer, you should tell me when he wrote, and in what language;—in a word, you should give me his whole character, and the entire history of his life. This, unless I am greatly mistaken, you are not able to do, in the case of a single one of your Bible-writers."

"You misstate the case. The historical evidence is complete; at least, there is much stronger evidence in proof of the genuineness and authenticity of the several books of the

Bible than can be adduced in the case of any other ancient writing whatever."

"I am speaking, sir, of the character and motives of the Bible-writers, of which, so far as I have been able to ascertain, we know next to nothing at all. But admit that we know as much of these writers as we do of any other ancient writers, does that help the matter? Because I know nothing of one class of writers, does it follow that I have no need of knowing any thing of another class? Besides, the cases are not parallel. The facts and doctrines of the Bible are to be taken on the *personal* authority of its writers. If I cannot prove these writers worthy of unreserved confidence, I can offer no good reason for believing the facts they relate, or the doctrines they teach. But it is not so with what are called profane writers. We have their books, and these speak for themselves. Their worth would be but slightly, if at all, impaired were their authors wholly unknown. The works ascribed to Homer, to Plato, Cicero, Virgil, and Horace, would be what they are, and have exactly the same authority in case they had been written by any other individuals than those to whom they are usually attributed; for the truth or falsity of their subject-matter does in nowise depend on the personal character of their authors. But with the Bible it is altogether different. You will not allow me to take the Bible as I do a work by Homer or Cicero, and judge for myself of its contents. You will not allow me the liberty to be my own judge of what is true or false in the Bible; but you require me to take the whole of it as true, and not only as true but as the measure and test of truth; and this, too, not because I have by the exercise of my own reason found it to be true, but on the bare word of its authors. This makes an essential difference, and requires you to furnish me with as much stronger proof in the case of the Bible-writers than is necessary in the case of profane writers, as the implicit faith you demand in the statements of the first surpasses the assent which I am expected to yield to the statements of the last. But waiving this, and much more to the same purpose, admitting that you can come to some tolerable conclusions concerning the characters and motives of the alleged authors of the Bible, how will you ascertain the purity and genuineness of the writings themselves, now in our possession, and which have their name?"

"That has been done over and over again, by some of the ablest, the most learned, and pious men that ever lived."

"So I have heard it said, but so have I not seen it proved. I have looked over most of your celebrated apologies for the Bible and Christianity, but with little other emotion than astonishment at the much which is asserted, and the little that is proved. All these celebrated apologies seem to me to proceed on the supposition that the Bible was written in an enlightened age, and published and extensively, I may almost say, universally circulated and read in a nation of critics, all of whom were interested in detecting its errors, and would most certainly have detected and exposed them had there been any. Now, sir, I need not tell you, a theologian, that such is not the fact. They were produced in a semi-barbarous age, or among a half-civilized people. They were never published, as we understand the term. They were never open to criticism, as books are now-a-days; partly because at first they were considered too insignificant to be refuted, but mainly because they were, by the people who submitted to them, regarded as sacred books. They were accounted sacred books, not because their superior worth was seen and felt, but because they were the productions of the sacerdocy, or such books as the Jewish or Christian priesthood approved, and authorized to be read. All books written or approved by the sacerdotal caste, were always accounted sacred, holy, in opposition to profane books, or books written or kept not in the *fane* or temple. Being sacred books it was never lawful to criticise them, and they never were criticised when the priesthood had power to prevent it. And you sir, are well aware, that whenever the priesthood has attained to power it has always taken good care to destroy the criticisms which it had not been able to prevent. Moreover, the books have always been in the keeping of the priesthood, and of a priesthood too which obtained its living, rank, and consideration from expounding them to a laity which had them not, and could not have read them, if it had had them. I own, sir, that I have a distrust of all books which have come to us through the hands of the priesthood, of whom it is no lack of charity to say, that in no age or country have they proved themselves too virtuous to interpolate, alter, or fabricate any work when required by the interests of their order."

"That is a statement you cannot sustain. The very fact that the sacred books have always been in the keeping of

the Jewish priesthood and the Christian clergy, is a sure guaranty of their genuineness and purity."

"Your assertion, it strikes me, betrays rather a superficial acquaintance with priesthoods in general, and the Jewish and Christian priesthoods in particular; or else that you have studied them with the partialities of a friend who deems it the greatest merit to be blind to a friend's faults. But I am not disposed to insist on this. I will merely add that once open the door to the admission of such testimony as you seem to judge unexceptionable, once lay it down as a principle of evidence that a man's word, if he have but a tolerable character for honesty and truth, is sufficient proof of any statement he may make, whatever be its subject-matter, and I see not what end you will have to impostors and impositions. Any one who can conceal a nefarious design beneath the cloak of external sanctity, may proclaim himself divinely inspired, command whatever he pleases, and denounce you in the name of God, if you refuse him obedience. You must own him as a prophet of the Lord, and accept his prophecies, be they what they may. The past and the present have a thousand voices to condemn in advance the principle of evidence you would establish. I would not treat you, sir, with disrespect, but knowing as I do from past history and from my own experience, how easy it is for a man to be deceived, I must believe that it is more likely that your zeal has betrayed you, than it is that God has given you a special message to me."

CHAPTER III.—MIRACLES.

"But you forget," replied Mr. Smith, after a short pause, "that the communications received by the sacred writers bore the impress of God's seal. God gave them all needed assurance that it was he himself who spoke to them. If then they were honest men, we ought to believe them. That they were honest men, worthy of all credit as speaking by divine authority, I infer from the fact that they could work miracles."

"All that is easily said. Whether God keeps a seal or not is more than I know; but supposing he does, are mortals well enough acquainted with it to recognise it the moment it is presented? How do they know its impress? Has God lodged with them a fac-simile of it?"

"God told them that it was his seal."

"But how did they know it was God who said so? Had

they had any previous acquaintance with him? Who introduced him to them, assured them it was verily the Almighty? But this leads us back to where we were a moment ago. I suppose you hold a supernatural revelation from God to be necessary?"

"Certainly."

"And without a supernatural revelation we can know nothing of God?"

"Nothing."

"Deprive us of the Bible and we should be in total ignorance of God?"

"Assuredly."

"It is necessary to prove that the revelation said to be from God is actually from him?"

"Undoubtedly."

"The revelation is proved to be from God by the miracles performed by the men who professed to speak by divine authority?"

"Yes."

"Miracles prove this, because they are performed by the power of God, and because God will not confer the power of working miracles on wicked men or men who will tell lies?"

"So I believe."

"It requires some knowledge of God to be able to say of any given act that it is performed by God. We say of what you term a miracle, that it is wrought by the Almighty, because we seem to ourselves to detect his presence in it. Now if we were totally unacquainted with his presence, should we be able to detect it? It therefore requires some knowledge of God to be able to assert that what is termed a miracle is actually effected by divine power. Also it requires some knowledge of God to be able to affirm that he will give the power of working miracles to good men only. You start at the idea that he would give this power to wicked men, because to do so would be inconsistent with the character you believe him to possess. In saying that he will not do it, you assume to be acquainted with his character; and from your assumed acquaintance with his character, you infer what he will or will not do. In both of these instances, no inconsiderable knowledge of God is presupposed. Whence do we obtain this knowledge?"

"Everybody knows enough of God to know when a miracle is performed that it is God who performs it, and to

know that God will not give the power of working miracles to bad man."

"Perhaps so. You at least may know enough to know this. But suppose you were deprived of all the light of revelation, would you know enough of God to know this? Did I not understand you to say that were it not for revelation we should be totally ignorant of God?"

"I said so, and say so still."

"I presume, sir, that there is a point here which has in part escaped your attention. I have observed that you religious people, in defending miracles, assume to be in possession of all the knowledge of God communicated by the supernatural revelation miracles are brought forward to authenticate. You assume the truth of the revelation, and by that verify your miracles; and then adduce your miracles to authenticate the revelation. But I need not say to you that before you have authenticated your revelation you have no right to use it; and before you can authenticate it, on your own showing, you must verify your miracles—a thing you cannot do without that knowledge of God which you say is to be obtained from the revelation only."

"I do no such thing."

"Not intentionally, consciously, I admit. You have not a doubt of the truth of revelation. Your whole intellectual being is penetrated in all directions with its teachings, and you never make in your own mind an abstraction of what you have received from the Bible, and thus ascertain what would be your precise condition were you left to the light of nature. You fall therefore unconsciously into the practice of reasoning in support of your faith from premises which that faith itself supplies, and which would be of no validity if that faith were proved to be false; and are of no validity when reasoning with one who questions it. But, sir, this whole matter of miracles may be cut short. What is a miracle? You must know as much of God and the universe to be able to define a miracle, as a miracle on any supposition can teach you. Therefore miracles are at best useless. Then the evidence of the extraordinary feats you term miracles is not altogether satisfactory. All ancient history, profane as well as sacred, is full of marvellous stories which no sound mind can for one moment entertain. They serve to discredit history. The ancient historian who should fill his history with marvels would by no means be held in so high respect even by yourself as one who con-

fined his faith to the simple, the ordinary, the natural. His faith in marvels, omens, oracles, prodigies, you would regard as an impeachment of his judgment. Why not do the same in regard to the Bible historians? You allege miracles as a proof of revelation, when in fact nothing about your revelation, or in it, is more in need of proof than your miracles themselves. Then again, miracles can prove nothing but our ignorance. No event that can be traced to a known cause is ever termed a miracle. A miracle is merely an event which can be traced to no known law of nature. To say an event is miraculous, is merely saying that it is an anomaly in our experience, and not provided for in our systems, of science. The miraculous events recorded in the Bible may have occurred, for aught I know, but they are of no value as evidences of Christianity."

"Why not?"

"I supposed I had already shown why not. You cannot know enough of God and the universe to know, in the first place, that what you term miracles are actually wrought by God. For aught you know to the contrary there may be thousands of beings superior to man capable of performing them. And in the second place, you can never infer from the fact that a man opens the eyes of the blind, or restores a dead body to life, that he cannot tell a lie. The fact that the miracle is performed does not necessarily involve the truth of the doctrine taught, nor the veracity of the miracle-worker. So far as you or I know a man may perform what is termed a miracle and yet be a teacher of false doctrines."

"But if you should see a man raise a dead body to life, in attestation of his divine commission, would you not believe him?"

"If your history be correct, there were men who actually saw Jesus raise Lazarus from the dead, and yet neither recognized his claims as the Son of God nor as a teacher of truth, but went away and took counsel how they might put him to death. Before the raising of a man from the dead could be a sufficient warrant for me to receive any doctrine, I must know positively that no being not commissioned by God, can raise a dead body to life, or that no being capable of raising a dead body to life, can possibly tell a falsehood. Now this knowledge I have not, and cannot have."

Mr. Smith made no reply. He remarked that he had overstaid his time, that an imperious engagement required

him to leave me; but he would call upon me again, and continue the discussion—a promise, by-the-by, which he forgot to keep, or which circumstances prevented him from fulfilling.

Many years have elapsed since this conversation took place. I have reviewed it often in various and diverse moods of mind, but I have not been able to detect any fallacy in my reasoning. It is true that reasoning, if admitted, goes to show that a revelation from God to man is impossible. If the premises from which both Mr. Smith and I started be correct, all supernatural revelation must be given up. *They who deny to man all inherent capacity to know God, all immediate perception of spiritual truth, place man out of the condition of ever knowing any thing of God.* Man can know only what he has a capacity to know. God may speak to him, and utter truths which he could not of himself have found out, but unless there be in him something which recognizes the voice of God, and bears witness for God, it is all in vain. If there be not this something in man, then can man receive no revelation from God. There must be a God within to recognize and vouch for the God who speaks to us from without.

Now this inherent capacity to recognize God, this power to detect his presence wherever he is, and of course everywhere, I did not admit, and not admitting this my conclusions followed legitimately from my premises.

Mr. Smith admitted it no more than I did, and therefore could not refute me. Denying this capacity, he admitted nothing by which a supernatural revelation could be authenticated, for it required this capacity to detect the presence of God in the miracles, not less than to detect it in the revelation itself. Not having this capacity, man could have no standard by which to try the revelation alleged to be from God. This was what I labored to make Mr. Smith comprehend; I demanded of him this standard, the criterion of spiritual truth, the fac-simile of God's seal with which to compare the impress on the despatches sent us in his name; but he could not answer my demand.

Many able apologists of Christianity fail to perceive the point they must establish in the very outset of this controversy with unbelievers. This point is, that man is endowed with an intelligence that knows God immediately, by intuition. They who deny this, may be religious, but only at the expense of their logic. We can rationally and scien-

tifically sustain religion only by recognising the mystic element of human nature, an element, which though in man, is yet in relation with God, and serves as the mediator between God and men. If we cannot establish the reality of this element, which is sometimes termed the divine in man, and which, though in nature, is supernatural, it is in vain to seek for any scientific basis for theology, and unbelief in God is the only conclusion to which we can legitimately come.

CHAPTER IV.—AN INTERVIEW.

After Mr. Smith had taken his leave, I called on my friend George Wyman, whom I had left the preceding evening on the anxious seats. He was not at home, but instead of him I found his sister Elizabeth. Of this sister, I must say something, and yet I would not; her name calls up much I would forget, as well as much I would remember; but little that I am willing to relate. The heart has secrets which it is sacrilege to reveal. Elizabeth and I had been acquainted for some time, and we had formed a strong mutual attachment; we had opened the state of our hearts to each other, and were now waiting for a few weeks to pass away, to be declared in due form "husband and wife."

"O, Charles, I am so glad to see you," exclaimed she, rising to meet me, as I entered the room. "O there *is* a God! He has spoken peace to my soul, and I wanted to see you that we might sing his praise together."

"O, there is a God," spoken by the sweet lips of eighteen, by her we love and hope in a few days to call our own by the most intimate and sacred of ties,—it goes well nigh to melt even the atheist. It comes to us as a voice from another world, and wins the heart though it fail to convince the understanding. It is no easy thing to be an atheist when one loves, is in presence of the one he loves, and hears her, in the simple, confiding tones of the child, exclaim, "O, there is a God." For a moment I gazed on the beautiful being before me, as upon one inspired. Could I see her, hear her, love her with all my heart, and not believe in the Divinity? She seemed sent to me from a fairer world, to bear witness to the reality of brighter beings than the dull inhabitants of earth.

I ought to explain the occasion of this exclamation on the part of Elizabeth, and I have done it, when I have said that she had been recently converted, and this was our first meet-

ing since. Her manner affected me not a little, and, strange as it may seem, went much further than all Mr. Smith's logic toward making me a Christian. But recovering myself, and making an effort to reply calmly, I replied, as is not uncommon in such cases, even coldly.

"I perceive, Elizabeth, that you have become a subject of the Revival," said I. "Women are easily affected in revival seasons. They are creatures of sentiment rather than of reason, and are therefore much addicted to piety. That may all be well enough. God, you say, has spoken peace to your soul. Very well. He has not spoken to me."

"Charles, Charles, have you no feeling? The whole creation is radiant with God's glory: all creatures, even beasts, birds, and insects, join in a hymn of praise to his mercy; and are you silent, you, whom I have heard so often and so eloquently plead for the oppressed, and so warmly vindicate the rights and dignity of man? Have you no word for God; the exhaustless source of all Goodness, Life, and Love? Is your heart cold and dead?"

"No, Elizabeth, no. My heart is not dead. I want not sensibility, but I want faith. I see all things with the eyes of the unbeliever. I hear not the hymn which so enraptures you. All nature is silent to me. I cannot sympathize with your present feelings. I am an unbeliever, but I do not ask you to be one. Indulge your piety, but think not unkindly of me if I cannot share it."

"Charles, you might be a believer if you would."

"No, I could not. I am not an unbeliever from choice, but necessity."

"I doubt it. You are too proud to be a Christian. You are ashamed of the humility of the cross. You would be a philosopher, and follow your own reason. You will not submit to God."

"Nay, Elizabeth, you wrong me, wrong me grievously. I am not ashamed of the humility of the cross. I have tried hard to be a Christian."

"You have?"

"Ay, by day and by night. I have sought God with my whole heart, with tears, entreaties, fastings, watchings, but it has availed me nothing; I am an atheist."

"O, say not so."

"Why should I deceive myself and others? If I know the state of my own mind, I do not believe in the existence of God. But do not fancy that I have become what I am

without a struggle. I am not ignorant of what men call religion. It has been the study of my life. My first lesson was the catechism, and my earliest delight was in reading religious books, conversing with religious people, and thinking of God and heaven. I was not yet thirteen when I was affected as you have been,—had deep and pungent conviction for sin,—heard, as I fancied, the Son of God declare my sins forgiven, and felt all the ecstatic joy you now feel."

"And yet have become an unbeliever!"

"'Tis true. But I have not labored to make others unbelievers. Unbelief has few attractions. It adds no glory to the universe, no warmth to the heart, no freshness to life. It is a sad creed; the wise endure it, but none love it."

"Why then cling to it? Why live without God in the world? Why not believe, and be filled with joy and peace unspeakable?"

"Because it depends not on us what we shall believe or disbelieve; because our belief or disbelief alters not the fact. Truth and falsehood depend not on us. We have not made the world. We must take it as we find it. No wise man values it very highly. It is full of cares and vexations, crosses and disappointments, trials and sorrows. The only course which wisdom leaves us is to make the most of the few fair days allotted us, to recline on the few sunny spots which may lie in life's pathway, endure without a murmur the evils we cannot cure, and welcome the end of our journey when we may lie down in the grave, 'where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest.'"

"So young, and yet so gloomy! So soon is the light of hope extinguished, your affections blighted, and your soul darkened! O, Charles, see the fruits of your boasted philosophy. Let me pray you to rekindle the light of hope at religion's torch, and your heart shall resume its early freshness. Your path shall be bright again, and you may walk through life praising God, and loving all his works; and when our journey is ended we shall not lie down in the cold grave, but uprise in a fairer and better world, where we shall re-youth ourselves, and enter into joys which 'eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, and which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive.'"

"It is a brave dream. It were pleasant to recline in the bowers of Elysium, to ramble over its green fields, and gather its wild flowers. It were pleasant, after having been

so long tost and torn on the stormy voyage of life, to find at last some secure haven in which our shattered bark may be refitted, and prepared to ride the ocean again in pride and safety. It may be that there is that haven. It may be that those green fields await us, and that we shall ramble over them together, and enjoy their beauty. It may be that we shall recline in those bowers and recount all that we thought, hoped, joyed, or sorrowed, amidst the trials and struggles, successes and defeats of our earthly pilgrimage. It is a blissful dream. I may sometimes wish to awake and find it a reality. Dream on then, dearest Elizabeth. I will not awake you. Who knows but your dreams may turn out to be truer than my waking wisdom? No: I will be no cloud over the sunlight of your soul. If there be a God, perhaps he may one day reveal himself to me also, and I may hope as well as you."

CHAPTER V.—THE INQUIRY MEETING.

Elizabeth took my last remarks for more than they were worth, and imagined me much nearer the kingdom of heaven than I really was. She was far from foreseeing the long and severe battle I had yet to fight with doubt and unbelief. She therefore requested me to accompany her to an inquiry meeting, and unwilling to grieve her by a refusal, I consented, and we departed.

Inquiry meetings were not, as the name would seem to indicate, meetings for the investigation of any points of doctrine or practice; but simply for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the souls of such as were seeking or had recently "obtained a hope." They were, at the time of which I speak, very frequent, and held among the most efficient means of pulling down the kingdom of Satan and building up that of God's dear Son. They are, if I am rightly informed, less frequent now, and held in altogether less repute. Whether this be owing to the fact, that other and more efficient means for converting the soul have been found out, or that men care less about the soul's salvation than they did, I am unable to say. I should, however, be sorry to believe that any part of the revival machinery formerly so much in use had been abandoned through indifference to religion, or to the welfare of man either for time or eternity.

There was unquestionably much in the revival measures which no enlightened friend of religion can approve, but I

have been prone of late to question the perfect wisdom of those who condemned them indiscriminately. The religious world had become all but dead, the church had lost nearly all sense of her mission, and men's indifference to their duties both as religious beings and as social, had become frightful. This world engrossed all minds and hearts, and the whole community seemed lost to all worship but that of Mammon. Something was necessary to awaken the slumbering conscience, to rescue men from the all-absorbing selfishness and worldly-mindedness which had become so universal, and to make them feel that they were created for a nobler end than that of amassing an estate, continuing the race, and rotting in the grave. Some few there were who felt this. They saw the gross wickedness and sensuality of the times; they roused themselves and set themselves at work to effect a reform. Their zeal was far from being always according to knowledge; their efforts from resulting in the production of unmixed good; but they succeeded in shaking the dry bones, in reviving a good work, in preparing,—unless I am greatly mistaken,—a more advanced state of the church and of society. Though once one of their most violent and indefatigable opponents, I have long since regarded them with a friendly eye. They undoubtedly engendered much fanaticism, much bigotry and sectarian animosity; but these, after all, disastrous as they may be, are less to be deprecated, than the selfishness and indifference they aimed to remove.

On our arrival at the place of meeting, we were separated, —Elizabeth, as having found religion, was conducted to the saints' apartment, and I, as being at best nothing more than a seeker, was ushered into the room occupied by the sinners. This was a large room in a private dwelling, much crowded —as sinners' apartments always are. It presented to my eye, on entering, a varied and even a touching aspect. In it, as in the tomb, were brought together the representatives of both sexes, all ages, and all conditions. Here was the old man of threescore and ten, with whitened head, palsied arm, and broken frame, bewailing a misspent life, and trembling with fearful apprehension of a judgment to come. By his side was the boy with chubby face and flaxen locks, his bright blue eyes swollen with weeping for sins he had not yet learned even by name. A little further on was a middle-aged man, his strong athletic frame writhing and contorting under a guilty conscience. I turned with horror from his countenance, which bore witness that the fires of

hell were doing their strange work within. My eyes rested a moment on a conspicuous seat, where sat the village trader, and the village lawyer, trying in vain to look sad and penitent. Not for their sins were they there. They were there, the one because he wanted more customers and better bargains, the other because he wanted more fees and more votes. I set them down as incorrigible, and turned towards a distant corner of the room to observe the subdued mien of a young maiden, I had known as the gayest among the gay, and the loveliest among the lovely. Yet she was pure and fit for heaven. She was there to find, not forgiveness for sins, but a soothing balm for a heart which a false wretch had betrayed and broken. But a truce with description.

I was allowed but a moment to look around and collect myself, after I had taken a seat to which some one had motioned me, before I was accosted by Mr. Wilson, the clergyman in whose parish the Revival had at first broken out. Mr. Wilson and myself were barely known to each other. He was one of those men from whom I have through life instinctively recoiled. He was about forty-five years of age, well made, a commanding figure, and of gentlemanly and to most people an engaging person and address. He had been originally a lawyer, but had some time since abandoned the bar for the pulpit. He had seen much of the world,—was familiar with men, acquainted with human nature,—on its dark side,—and had of course a sovereign contempt of man and his capabilities. His intellectual powers were respectable, his religious feelings strong and active, his moral sentiments weak and sluggish. He would never enter a church without taking off his hat, but he could pass a poor widow without thinking of her wants; he would do much for evangelizing the world and converting it to his creed, but very little for civilizing it, and making the earth the abode of love and peace. But whatever he was, he contrived to throw a veil of sanctity over the unseemly features of his character, and to pass himself off with the multitude as a saint of the first water.

"Mr. Elwood," said he, in a low and respectful tone, "I am glad to see you here. Religion is worthy of the homage of the mind in its dawn, and in its noonday glory. It is truly refreshing to the friends of Jesus, to see young men of talents and education coming forward to inquire the way to Zion. Have you long been concerned for the salvation of your soul?"

"No, sir," I replied. "But I have thought long and anxiously on the subject of religion."

"He who has done that, will not long remain indifferent to his soul's salvation."

"Perhaps not, in general; but for myself, I care little about my soul or any thing else that belongs to me. I am not worth caring for. But I would know if I ought to regard this miserable life as the term of man's existence,—if there be indeed a God who holds the destinies of the universe, and to whom vice and virtue are not indifferent."

"I fear, my dear sir, that you have indulged in some unprofitable, not to say presumptuous speculations. We must not strive to be wise above what is written. The world is full of mysteries and we cannot hope to unravel them all. We should seek to believe rather than to comprehend."

"I am not so vain as to hope to clear up all mysteries; but I must know what and wherefore I believe,—what and wherefore I worship. Even your master reproves those who worship they 'know not what,' and I must have a reason for the faith I avow."

"Take care that you do not rely too much on reason. Reason is a feeble and a false light, that dazzles but to blind. We should submit our reason to the word of God."

"Be my reason feeble and false as it may, it is my only light, and should I extinguish that I should be in total darkness. It is reason that distinguishes me from the brutes, and till I am willing to become a brute, I must insist on using it."

"Certainly, my dear sir. Use your reason, but bear in mind that it is reason's highest glory to listen to the voice of God. But I perceive that you are laboring under difficulties which this is neither the time nor the place to discuss. Do me the favor to call at my house to-morrow at ten o'clock, and I will try and relieve your mind of its embarrassments."

So saying, he turned away to address himself to his several subjects according to their several conditions. To one he whispered hope; in this ear he breathed consolation; in that he thundered rebuke and the startling terrors of the law. I remained till the meeting broke up, accompanied Elizabeth to her home almost in silence, and hurried to my own lodgings to meditate on the occurrences of the day, and the various topics which had come up. My mind was in

no enviable state. Love, doubt, desire to believe, and inability to believe, operating each by turns and all together, made me any thing but comfortable. I looked forward with some eagerness to the proposed interview with Mr. Wilson, but with little hope, it must be confessed, of any satisfactory result.

CHAPTER VI.—STRUGGLES.

We do not pass from belief to doubt, nor from doubt to disbelief without a long and severe struggle. Even after we have become confirmed unbelievers, there are many remembrances which rise up to make us weep that we are not what we were. In most cases, religion has been inwoven with all our earlier life. It has hallowed all the affections and associations which gather round the home of our childhood. Each spot, each object, each event dear to the memory, has its tale of religion. The sister who played with us, smiled when we were pleased, wept when we were grieved,—above all the mother who stood between us and danger, and knelt with us in prayer, speak to us of religion, and endear it to our hearts. Whenever we break away from it, we seem to ourselves to be breaking away from the whole past,—from all that we have loved, have hoped, feared, thought, enjoyed, or suffered, and to be rushing upon a new and untried existence. It is a fearful change which then comes over us. To be no longer what we have been, to lose sight of all that has been familiar to us, to enter upon we know not what, upon a state of being the issues of which we see not, and of which we can foretell nothing,—what is this different in reality from that event which men call death?

Over every one who once doubts the creed in which he has been reared, does this change come. The doubt once raised, the man has undergone a radical change. He can never be again what he was. The simple faith of his childhood never returns. He may attain to conviction, but the childlike confidence, the warm trustfulness is gone forever. From that time forth, he must battle his way in the dark, with doubts, perplexities, insolvable problems as best he may. And to all this, of which we have at first a forefeeling, think not that we bring ourselves to consent without a struggle.

Religion is life's poesy. It breathes a living soul into the universe, and gives us everywhere a bright and loving

spirit with which to hold sweet and mystic communings. On every object around us it sheds a mellow light, and throws a veil over all the stern and forbidding features of reality. Bitter is the day which raises that veil, and bids that mellowing light be withdrawn; when for the first time we look into the heavens, and see no spirit shining there, over the rich and flowering earth and see no spirit blooming there, abroad over a world of silent, senseless matter, and feel that we are—alone. I shall never forget that day; and I have no doubt that I shall see all the objects of sense, one after another, fade away and lose themselves in the darkness of death, with far less shrinking of soul, than I saw my childhood's faith depart, and felt the terrible conviction fastening itself upon me that all must go,—God, Christ, immortality, that which my fathers had believed, for which they had toiled, lived, suffered, died, which my mother had cherished and infused into my being with the milk from her breast,—all, all, even to the last and dearest article must vanish and be to me henceforth but as a dream which cannot be recalled.

The world may not give me credit for feeling so much, for the world may have misconceived my real character. It has allowed me the stronger, the harsher, but denied me the softer and more amiable qualities of our nature. It has supposed me incapable of generous sympathies and firm attachments. But the world has not known me: at least as I should have been, had it not been for the unfriendly circumstances of my earlier life which forced into notice much which in ordinary cases is concealed, and gave a disproportionate development to qualities, of which nature gave me indeed the germ, but which she never intended should form the prominent traits of my character. My youth was one of hardship, privation and suffering. My life has been a continual warfare with principles and doctrines which I have found in power, but which have appeared to me false and mischievous. I have almost always stood alone, battling single-handed for the unpopular cause, the unfashionable party, the heretical truth. My hand has been against every man, and every man's hand has been against me. Yet have I ever yearned toward my race, and separated from them only with the keenest regret. I have ever been found on the side of the future, the first to seek out and recognise the sheep-skin and goat-skin-clad prophets of God; and yet have I ever stood in awe before the weird past, and beheld with

reverence all that over which the stream of ages has rolled, over which has ebbed and flowed the tide of human life through many generations.

We know little of what passes in the hearts of our most intimate friends, what concealed wells of deep feeling, and holy sentiment, and gushing sympathy there are in those even who appear to us careless, cold, and superficial. We all wear masks to one another, and it is not in our power to unmask ourselves even if we would. We are all better than our best friends believe us. Could we but lay open our hearts to one another, and be seen by each other as we really are, hatred would cease, man's contempt of man would find no place, brother would bring no railing accusation against brother, unholy strife would end, discord die away, and love, joy, and peace would reign. O, we know not what treasures of rich and holy feeling our ignorance of each other's better nature leads us to throw away, or to trample under our feet. He had a deep insight into human nature who made it the law of his morality that we should love our neighbors as ourselves.

I know that in all this I shall but excite a smile in the men of the world, who fancy that to sneer at human nature, and to distrust the capacities of the human soul, is a mark of superior wisdom, and especially in those who deem abhorrence of the infidel the most grateful incense to God; but I can assure these men of the world that I too have lived in the world, and have studied men not less than I have man; and can speak from experience as well as they. They may laugh at what they may please to call my folly, but for myself, I can bear to be laughed at without losing my temper, and I am able in most cases to find something to commend, to love and reverence, even in those who deride me. They are better than they think themselves.

Religion I had loved from my infancy. In my loneliness, in my solitary wanderings, it had been my companion and my support. It had been my pleasure to feel that wherever I went the eye of my Father watched over me, and his infinite love embraced me. I was never in reality alone. A glorious presence went always with me. When I was thrown upon the world at a tender age without a friend, and left to buffet my way unaided, unencouraged, and felt myself cut off from all communication with my kind, I could hold sweet and mysterious communion with the Father of men; and when I smarted under a sense of wrong done me, I could

find relief in believing that God sympathized with me, and made my cause his own. God had been to me a reality, and though I had been nurtured in the tenets of the gloomiest and most chilling of Christian creeds, I had always seen him as a father, and as a father whose face ever beamed with paternal love. I could not then lose my faith, and see all my religious hopes and consolations escape in the darkness of unbelief, without feeling that I was giving up all that had hitherto sustained me, all that it was pleasant to remember, that could soothe in sorrow, strengthen under trial, inspire love, and give the wish or the courage to live.

CHAPTER VII.—AUTHORITY.

I called on Mr. Wilson at the hour appointed. I found him alone in his Library looking over the *Système de la Nature*. "I was trying to ascertain," he remarked, after the usual salutations, "what it is atheists find to allege against the existence of God. But here is merely the blind rage of an old man against an authority that should have sent him to the Bastille."

"But you would not," I interrupted, "rely on such arguments as are drawn from the Bastille, I presume?"

"No. Such arguments no longer comport with the spirit of the age. But I do wish men to feel that there is an authority to which they are accountable for their opinions not less than for their actions."

"Men are doubtless accountable to the truth for the opinions they entertain; but not, I take it, to one another."

"I allow no *man* to dictate to me what I shall believe or disbelieve; but I own that I feel myself bound to believe what God commands, and that I am guilty of rebellion if I do not."

"Not unless what he commands be true?"

"His commands are the highest conceivable evidence of truth."

"I do not perceive that."

"God is the God of truth, and what he commands to be believed must needs therefore be true."

"If he commands me to commit murder, am I to believe that murder is right?"

"Whatever he commands is right."

"Right because he commands it; or does he command it because it is right?"

"It is right because he commands it."

"Does the command make the right, or only evidence it?"

"Makes it."

"Whatever is commanded then must be right."

"Whatever is commanded by God."

"Why what is commanded by him rather than by some other being?"

"Because he is absolute sovereign, and an absolute sovereign has the right to command what he pleases, and what he has the right to command it cannot in the nature of things be wrong for us to do."

"But in what does God's sovereignty consist, in his power or in his justice?"

"It consists in the fact that he is God."

"But is not justice essential to sovereignty?"

"We say so, in regard to earthly sovereigns, because their sovereignty is not absolute, but derived. God is an absolute sovereign, and is therefore the supreme, the highest, the ultimate. You cannot therefore conceive him bound to conform to justice or right, or something above him, unless you can conceive of something higher than the highest, more ultimate than the ultimate itself."

"You hold yourself then always bound to do the will of God."

"Most certainly."

"The will of God, you hold, makes the right?"

"Yes."

"Then you deny that right is something eternal, and of course all necessary distinctions between right and wrong."

"Not at all. Perhaps in strictness I should say, God does not make the right in itself, for he is it. The highest conception we can form of right, for us human beings, is conformity to the will of God. And this is right for us, because God is absolute and eternal and immutable right, and what he wills is willed by right."

"But if your God had chanced to have possessed the character you Christians ascribe to the devil, then right would have been what is now wrong, and what is now termed devilish would have been termed godly."

"As to that I know nothing. God is what he is; and being what he is, right is what it is. If the highest could have been different from what it is, and have issued different commands from what it now does, no doubt right, good and evil, just and unjust would have been different from what they now are. But what of that? If there had been

nothing, nothing would have been. The divine being is what he is, not from an external necessity, but an eternal and invincible indwelling necessity."

"Well, be it so. But admitting his commands are obligatory upon us, that we are bound to believe what he has commanded, I suppose you allow me the free exercise of my reason in judging whether what is alleged to be his command, be in reality his command, and also in ascertaining its purport?"

"Hardly. Reason before the fall might have been competent to judge of these matters; but is not now unless regenerated by the Holy Ghost."

"Then you prohibit the exercise of reason?"

"Not at all. Reason is the power or faculty of deducing from certain data certain conclusions. When limited to the work of deduction, I approve it. But when it aspires to fix its premises, determine the data from which it should draw its inferences, it leaves its province, attempts what must ever exceed its powers, and should of course be rebuked."

"I thank you for your definition of reason. It is simply the power of drawing inferences. But aside from reason in this sense, you recognise in man, I presume, a power of perceiving, taking cognizance of the premises or data from which reason makes its deductions?"

"No power or faculty capable of recognising God, or divine things; at least not till after regeneration."

"But if we have no faculty by which we can take cognizance of the data, and even judge whether they are well grounded or not, what confidence can we place in the deductions of reason?"

"None, except when we have the authority of God for our data. It is only when we reason from the revealed word of God, that we can rely with any certainty on reason."

"But, suppose I chance to doubt that what you call the revealed word of God is his word, how am I to satisfy myself that it is his word? If reason cannot determine that question, it must always work with uncertain premises, and never give us any thing more than scepticism. But it is idle to discuss this question. If our reason is below it, it is above us, and therefore not for us. If the alleged word of God be above my reason, it can be of no use to me. That, which I cannot comprehend, which I cannot ascertain to be true, is for me as though it were not. A revelation is no

revelation at all, if I cannot comprehend its purport, and know that it is from God. But if I have no power or faculty by which I can attain to the cognition of divine things, no divine revelation can be made to me."

"You can attain to the cognition of divine things when you shall have been regenerated, not before."

"I will wait till then. For, if I cannot understand aught of God till then, I can have till then no evidence that I ought to be regenerated. But, sir, all this is wide of the mark. What is the use of talking to me of the authority of God, of the word of God, when I do not even believe that there is a God?"

"Not believe there is a God! Of that there is abundance of evidence."

"For you doubtless, who have been regenerated; but for me who have only my natural faculties, and who according to you have no faculty by which I can take cognizance of divine things, I should like to know what evidence there is?"

CHAPTER VIII.—ARGUMENT FROM NATURE.

"I forgive your sneer; but that there is a God, it appears to me, no man can really doubt, who has eyes to look abroad on nature. Every object I see from the spire of grass to the heavenly bodies proclaims to me the existence of God."

"Because you see them only with the eyes of the believer. You believe in God, and therefore do not want any proof. You transport God from your own mind into nature, and therefore find him there. But, if you had not a real or imaginary God within you, I much question whether you would discover one in nature. To me nature indicates merely its own existence, and says nothing of any existence beyond itself."

"Nature is an effect, and every effect implies a cause."

"When you call nature an effect, you assume the point in question. Is nature an *effect?*"

"Nature *is*. It did not make itself. It must then have been made. If made, it is an effect."

"This is a mere change of terms without any progress in the argument. I ask your proof that nature was made."

"Its simple existence is a proof that it was made, unless you are prepared to say that it came by chance."

"I know nothing of chance: no atheist believes in chance. But I am not driven to the alternative you suppose. Before

I shall be under the necessity of admitting the world came by chance, you must prove that it ever did come at all."

"But it is here, and of course must have come, either by chance or a maker."

"You say nature is *here;* I might ask you, *where?* but let that pass. The world *is*, that I grant; but I pray you to inform me how from simple existence you infer a maker? Can nothing exist without a maker?"

"Nothing, except him who makes all things."

"Your exception is fatal to your argument. If there can be one existence without a maker, then simple existence does not imply a maker. You have told me the world must have had a maker, simply because it is. This reasoning rests for its legitimacy on the assumption that nothing can exist without a cause. But you now tell me of an existence which is uncaused, that is, the existence of him who caused all things."

"I mean merely to assert that nothing can *begin* to exist without a cause."

"According to the principles of reasoning you have adopted, you cannot maintain even this position; but I will for the present accede to it. Nothing can *begin* to exist without a cause. You will now, I presume, give me your proofs, that the world had a beginning."

"That this world had a beginning, is not difficult to prove. Look around you. Does not every thing change under the eye of the spectator? Fix your eyes, if you can, on a single object which is the same that it was, or that does not bear the traces of having begun to exist."

"Apparently there are changes and transformations going on continually around us. You see that flower. A short time since it was a mere bud upon its stalk. You may have watched it grow and develop itself. But after all what have you seen? Simply certain facts of the plant itself. Had your eyes been stronger you might have seen all these facts when you first looked as well as now; for they all existed then. These facts which we learn one after another, we call changes, because they are presented to our inspection successively, in what we name time. But what is time? It is nothing. It but marks the order in which we become acquainted with the phenomena of the universe, whether it be the universe without or within us. We study the universe by parcels, and hence the idea of succession. But to an eye that could take in the whole at once, nature would

doubtless appear as one vast whole. You theologians tell us that with God there is no time. He inhabiteth eternity. With him all is an eternal NOW. To him there can be nothing new, nothing old, no succession of events, and consequently no change. What then we short-sighted mortals call changes, would, could we but see the whole at one glance, appear but contemporary parts of one immutable and indissoluble whole. The more we study nature the greater is the number, the variety of the phenomena which present themselves to our inspection; and though these phenomena present themselves, as we say, successively, still all we can say of them is that they are parts of the universe itself, from which nothing is to be inferred beyond the universe of which they are *contemporary* and constituent parts."

"Your remarks are quite too metaphysical for my understanding. But nobody can really doubt that this world began to exist. If any further evidence of this fact were wanted we could find it in the marks of design which we everywhere see around us. Now design necessarily establishes the existence of a designer. If the universe be proved to be the product of a designer, you will not question but it had a beginning."

"Of course not. But I am inclined to think you will hardly succeed in establishing design, till you have established the fact that the universe began to exist."

"Can you mark the order, the regularity, the adaptation of one thing to another, everywhere obvious in nature, and not regard it as the work of design?"

"There is, sir, in the whole of your argument, and in the arguments of all natural theologians I am acquainted with, an assumption of the very point I want proved. You assume everywhere that simple existence is the proof of a maker. The existence of nature, you tell me, is a proof that it was made. The existence of certain phenomena in nature, you tell me, is a proof that they are the effect of design. Now, in all this argumentation there is this grand defect; your inferences require that your premises should be universally true. If it were true that nothing could exist without a cause, your inferences would be just. But you deny the universality of the proposition, because, were it admitted, it would follow that nothing does or can exist. Your God, inasmuch as he is supposed to exist, would require a maker as well as the universe. Now I see nature as it is. When

I examine it, I find what from their analogy to the same things in art, I call order, regularity, adaptation of one thing to another; but these words, order, regularity, adaptation, only name certain facts which exist in nature. These facts prove nothing more than the simple character of nature as it appears to my observation. At least, unless you are prepared to say that they cannot exist without a creator."

"I am prepared to say that."

"And I, sir, am prepared to deny it. I assert that they can exist without a creator; and for proof I refer you to nature. You see in nature, order, regularity, adaptation. Now prove to me that nature was created, or else admit that these can exist without a creator."

"Your argument is defective. You assume the world was *not* made, a point you cannot prove."

"And you, sir, assume that it *was* made, a point you cannot prove. I have as good a right to assume the existence in nature of the facts to which you refer me as a proof that no creator was necessary, as you have to assume that existence as a proof of the contrary proposition."

"I point you to order, regularity, adaptation, as proofs of design, and from the fact of design I conclude very legitimately to a designer."

"You point to what you call order, regularity, adaptation; that is, to certain facts of nature, and *because* these facts exist there you infer that nature is the product of a designer. You assume here, as I have before told you, that these facts could not exist unless they were created. Are you prepared to lay it down as a universal proposition that the facts you choose to name order, regularity, adaptation, can never exist without being created?"

"I have hardly reflected on that point, but I think I am."

"Can there be any thing in the effect which is not in the cause?"

"Explain yourself."

"Some of your theologians have inferred the existence of an intelligent cause of nature, because intelligence, to wit, in man, is one of its phenomena. But, say they, if there were no intelligence in the cause there could be none in the effect. But there is intelligence in the effect. Therefore there is intelligence in the cause. Thus Paley, from the benevolent tendency of creation, concludes to the benevolence of its creator. If there be benevolence in the effect,

he infers there must be in the cause. So if there be order, regularity, adaptation in the effect, why not in the cause? Now if there were no order, no regularity, no fitness, (for this is what we mean by adaptation) in God, could there be any in his works?"

"Of course not."

"And in him these must exist uncaused. You will not contend now, I presume, that these cannot exist without being created, since you are forced to admit that they exist in God. The bare existence then of the facts termed order, regularity, fitness, is not a proof that they are created, or the product of a designer. If they exist in one instance, as you must admit they can, without a maker, I ask you how then simple existence proves that they cannot in another? In order to make out your case, it is necessary that you should point these out to me, in a world which you have proved to have had a beginning. If you could prove the world had a beginning in time, your argumentation would be conclusive. Design doubtless implies a designer, and a work of design doubtless has a beginning; but you must first prove that the universe had a beginning before you can establish the fact of design. This you have not done, and I see not how you can do it. The world is; this is all I know. Its existence is to me an enigma I cannot solve. If you undertake to solve it by referring to another existence beyond it as its cause, you merely place the difficulty a step further back, but do not obviate it. I should find the same enigma in the existence of its cause, for how could that existence be without a cause? No matter how far you extend the chain of sequences, the same problem ever recurs. I have sought in vain to solve it."

"Well, Mr. Elwood, we have hardly come to any result, and I am sorry to say that I am unable to continue the discussion longer at present. You have taken a somewhat different ground from what I anticipated, and some of your arguments are ingenious, and show a mind which I am sorry to see thrown away on the barren waste of atheism. You were made for better things, for a nobler destiny. Call on me again day after to-morrow, and I shall be at leisure, to continue the discussion; and I hope with a happier issue. Good day, my friend."

This conversation merely shows the insufficiency of the common argument from nature, an argument much insisted on

by those who seek arguments for others, not for themselves; but which is quite too easily set aside. Perhaps no man has stated this argument better than Paley in his *Natural Theology*, and yet it was that work which first raised my doubts of the existence of God. If Paley had really felt the need of convincing himself of the being of a God, he never could have written that book. No man is ever converted to theism by the argument from nature. And the reason why that argument is relied on is because it is the most easily adduced, and those who use it, feeling no need of any argument for themselves, think it ought to silence the atheist. I shall have occasion to show, before I get through, that no man does ever really deny the existence of God. Men may reject the term, but never the reality. The existence of God is never proved, and never needs to be proved. All the atheist wants is to analyze his own faith, and whenever he does that he will find God at the bottom. But to analyze one's own faith is a matter which requires some close thinking, and the natural theologians would fain get along without close thinking.

CHAPTER IX.—THE SACRIFICE.

While the conversation I have just detailed was going on, there was another conversation held between very different parties, and in which I also was interested. Mr. Smith, my morning visitor, of whom I have given some account, early sought out Elizabeth, apparently for the purpose of congratulating her on her recent conversion. He found her alone, with the Bible open before her, absorbed in deep meditation.

I have said Mr. Smith was in the main an honest, well-meaning man. Nobody could really doubt his sincerity or his ardent desire to save souls; but he had been so accustomed to dwell on another world, to see a material and burning hell before him, that this world and the social feelings and duties which belong to it, had lost nearly all their hold upon his conscience and his heart. His whole mind seemed contracted to one burning thought—hell, and his whole soul to one all-absorbing desire—escape from hell for himself and others. To this end he counted no sacrifice, valued no kind feeling, social harmony, domestic peace or love. So intent was he upon gaining this end, so eager was he after it, that he rudely dashed against the most sacred relations of private life, hurled husband against wife, wife against husband,

parent against child, and child against parent, brother against sister, and sister against brother. In his heart he would be and doubtless thought himself little less than an angel of God; but he passed through society, over the domestic hearth, a minister of wrath, scattering blight and death. He had now come to dash with poison the cup of life for Elizabeth, and to exert the influence he had accidentally acquired over her, to blast her brightest prospects and wither her purest and holiest affections.

"In deep meditation!" said he, approaching her, and speaking in as gentle and respectful a tone, as such a being could; "In deep meditation! Thinking, I presume, on your happy escape from the pit of burning. You have great reason to bless God for the work of grace he has done for your soul."

"I do bless God; but I was not thinking of what he had done for me."

"Is it possible that you can for one moment be thinking of any thing else?"

"I hope I shall never forget what God has done for me, but I had for one moment forgotten myself. And is there not danger that those who have been recently converted may think too much of what God has done for them, merely because it is for them rather than for others?"

"O, you were thinking of another!"

"I hope there is no harm in escaping sometimes from ourselves to think of our friends."

"Perhaps not. But of whom were you thinking?"

"O, sir, your profession is too grave to concern itself with the idle thoughts of a silly girl."

"If your thoughts are idle, you should not indulge them, for you must one day account for every idle thought to God. If they are serious thoughts you need not blush to disclose them to one of God's ministers."

"Sir, there may be subjects strictly our own, and with which no stranger, whatever his profession, has a right, or should be suffered to intermeddle. Some spot is there in every heart, which should be sacred from the stranger's foot."

"God knows those subjects; you cannot conceal them from him; and why seek to conceal them from his ministers?"

"The heart, sir, hath joys and sorrows to be shared only with those whom the heart selects."

"I understand you. I am not to have your confidence in a matter which intimately concerns your everlasting welfare. When I saw you sinking down to irretrievable woe, I warned you of your danger; and now when I see you about rushing into a connexion which can end only in your eternal ruin, I am not to be deterred from telling you of the awful peril you run."

"Mr. Smith, this is a subject on which you and I cannot converse; and I entreat you to say no more."

"I will speak, and you shall hear; I have come to you from God, commanded to talk to you on this very topic. It may pain you, but better that you suffer now, than hereafter."

"I beseech you, say no more."

"Stay; I must do my duty. I have a message from God and I must deliver it. God forbids this union which you contemplate. The Holy Ghost says 'be ye not unequally yoked with unbelievers, for what concord hath Christ with Belial, or he that believeth with an infidel? and what agreement hath God with idols?' You by your conversion have become a temple of the living God, and dare you suffer yourself to be desecrated by an atheist?"

"Surely, sir, you do not suppose that passage alludes to marriage, or that if it does it is to be taken literally?"

"I suppose the Holy Ghost means what he says. I am not wise enough to correct either his language or his meaning."

"But Paul says the unbelieving wife shall be sanctified by the believing husband, and the unbelieving husband by the believing wife."

"True: but he said that in reference to those who had been married before either became a believer, in order to satisfy any scruples of conscience they might feel about living together as man and wife, after one or the other had been converted to Christianity."

"That suits my case. Charles and I were contracted before I was converted. Before that event, we had pledged our faith, and were married in the eyes of Heaven, as much as we shall be after man has performed the customary legal ceremony."

"That is a dangerous doctrine, and one which I never expected to hear from a young lady, unless of avowed licentious principles. You are not married. You have only given your consent to be married on some future day.

But when you gave that consent you were in nature's darkness; you knew not what you did. Your eyes are now opened; you now see the wickedness of denying God. The Holy Ghost commands you to recall that consent, or yours must be the peril."

"I fear no other danger than that of doing wrong. But you do not know Charles. He would gladly be a Christian, and when he left me yesterday, I could not but hope that he was not far from the kingdom of heaven."

"Delusion all! No man can be further from the kingdom of heaven than he who denies both God and heaven. I tell you he is a hardened infidel." And then as if half suspecting that he had said too much, he added, "Still I do not know but you may be the chosen instrument of bringing him into the church. You need not reject him at once; but let him understand that he must give his heart to God before you can consent to be his." So saying, he left the trembling, nearly distracted girl, to go and do his master's work elsewhere.*

The agony which Elizabeth suffered during this whole conversation may be more easily imagined than described. She had lavished upon me all the wealth of her heart. She had loved me with a sincerity and depth of affection enhanced by the apparent unfriendliness of my condition. Like a true woman she had clung to me the closer for the reason that all else seemed to have abandoned me. It is not woman that leaves us when most we need her presence. I have had my share of adversity; I have suffered from the world more than I care to tell; but I have ever found in woman a kind and succoring spirit. Her love has ever shed a hallowed light along my pathway, cheered me in my darkest hours, and given me ever the

* This must seem to my readers a mere fancy sketch, for I presume such conversations do not take place in these days; but they were very common when I was a young man. One of the most common methods resorted to by revivalists was to make the love which a young man had for a young woman, and the love he hoped for in return, the means of his conversion to the church. My own case was not a singular one. The girl was instructed to throw her arms around her lover's neck, and entreat him, by all his affection for her, to join the church; but at the same time to assure him, that she could never consent to be his unless he gave evidences of conversion. There was some knowledge of human nature in this, and these fair apostles were not unfrequently successful as well as eloquent pleaders for God, especially when seconded by the burning passions of their youthful admirers.

courage and the strength to battle with my enemies, and regain the mastery of myself. There are those who speak lightly of woman; I have learned to reverence her as the brightest earthly manifestation of the Divinity.

Elizabeth had loved me, and in all her visions of the future I of course held a prominent place, and it were a foolish affectation to doubt that I constituted their principal charm. To banish me now, to strike my image from her heart, to break with me the faith she had plighted,—the thought of it was not to be endured. And yet what a mysterious nature is this of ours! The very intensity of her love for me alarmed her conscience. She had been but recently converted, and was still laboring under strong excitement. She had just dedicated herself to God. She must be his and his only. Did she not owe every thing to God? Should she not love him with her whole heart, and ought she not to sacrifice every thing to him? Was not religion, in its very nature, a sacrifice? Would she not be violating its most solemn injunctions, if she retained any thing which she loved more than God? Did she not in fact love me more than him? I was dearer to her than all the world beside; but then would not the sacrifice of me to God be so much the more meritorious? If she retained me would it not be a proof, that she counted one treasure too precious to be surrendered? Was she not commanded to forsake father, mother, sister, brother, for God, to give up every thing for God, which should come between her and him, though it should be like plucking out a right eye or cutting off a right hand? Must she not now choose between God and man, between religion and love? She must.

I mean not to say that this was sound reasoning; but I apprehend that it requires no deep insight into human nature, to be made aware that in many individuals, religion is a much stronger passion than love, and that in certain states of mind, and if the religious affection takes that turn, the more costly the sacrifice, the more resolute are we to make it. In her calm and rational moments, I do not believe Elizabeth would have come to the conclusion she did; but as she was wrought up to a state of pious exaltation, the idea of being able to achieve so great a victory over herself, as that of sacrificing her love on the altar of religion, operated as a powerful spell on her whole nature, and blinded her to every thing else. It almost instantly became as it were a fixed idea, to which every thing must henceforth be subor-

dinated. Religion therefore triumphed, and with a martyr-like spirit, she resolved to give me up. Blame her not. If she had not possessed a noble nature, such a sacrifice she had never resolved to make.

CHAPTER X.—THE DISMISSAL.

As the fates would have it, I called on Elizabeth at the very moment when she had finally taken her resolution to sacrifice her love for me to prove that her love for God was supreme. My visit was inopportune,—she was embarrassed, and as women do sometimes, burst into tears. I was not a little astonished, and perhaps not altogether pleased; for I confess I could never yet discover that beauty in tears was at all improved,—unless they were tears of welcome or of sympathy. "Elizabeth," said I, addressing her as gently as I could, "what is this? why do I see you in tears?"

"It is but a passing weakness," said she, making an effort to command herself, "my first, as I trust it will be my last."

"But why do I find you so agitated?"

"Charles," said she, rising and speaking with great solemnity, "you and I can henceforth be to each other only as friends."

"Elizabeth, I do not hear you; I have no ears for such words."

"You must hear me, and believe me. I have taken my resolution."

"Unsay what you have said, and be yourself again. Some strange infatuation has seized you for the moment, or you are merely trying my feelings. You need not doubt my love for you. I have given you already all the proofs you can ask, or man can give. I must also say, it is hardly in character for you to trifle with any one's affections, much less with mine."

"Charles, I am not trifling with your affections, nor has any strange infatuation seized me. I speak seriously and solemnly. I doubt not that you love me as well as man usually loves woman; and I have never disguised from myself nor from you, the strong affection I have for you. I have loved you as truly, as sincerely as you yourself could desire. I may to a certain extent subdue my love; but I shall never forget it. You have been too much to me, have played too conspicuous a part in all my dreams of the future, to be ever otherwise than a dear friend. Woman's heart never forgets. The flower of her love may be trampled

on, but retains ever its fragrance and freshness. It blooms immortal. But, Charles, I must be the bride of heaven: I have given myself to God, and I must be his alone."

"A formidable rival you have given me! Pray, has your ghostly adviser, whom I saw stealing away as I came in, been tutoring you on this subject? He has doubtless told you not to be unequally yoked together with an unbeliever."

"And if he has, has he not given me good advice, not for me, but for you? To you, do my best, I must, unless you should be converted to religion, soon appear a weak and silly woman. My religious zeal will be in your estimation mere fanaticism, and my love to God will seem so much abstracted from that which you will claim as due to yourself. Difference of belief will lead to difference of feeling, to a difference of tastes, and aims, and then to coldness, neglect, perhaps disgust and mutual wretchedness. With views on religion, so widely different as ours are, we can never enjoy that union of soul which we should both crave, and without which we could not be happy."

"I understand nothing of all this. Because you love God more, I see not why you need love me less. I see no reason why God and I should be rivals for your affections. Is the love which you have for God of the same kind with the love you have heretofore avowed for me? Can you not love God, do your duty to him, and also have a heart and a hand for the duties of a wife? According to your sacred books, God himself declared that it was not good for man to be alone, and therefore made woman to be his help-meet. Can she be wanting in her duty to her God, when she lives to the end for which he made her? Woman was made to be man's help-meet if your religion be true, and it is her glory to be a wife and a mother."

"No. I must live for God alone."

"Some of your divines pretend that we live for God, when we live for his children. You talk of consecrating yourself to God. Do you intend to become a nun? Does your God ask you to live in a cloister and waste your life in singing psalms and repeating *pater nosters?*"

"Charles, your questions do but confirm me in my resolution. You have no sympathy with that religious state of the affections, which I believe myself commanded to cultivate. You even now think me very foolish and are half angry at me."

"True. I regard your piety as a weakness; but I see

enough else in your character, which is not weakness, to enable me to overlook that. On the single subject of religion, I of course do not and cannot sympathize with you; but in all else, I am unconscious of any want of sympathy. When we come to live together, to have the same joys and sorrows, the same cares and perplexities, the same hopes and fears, in all other respects, I doubt not that we shall find that oneness of heart and soul, which will secure us as much happiness as mortals have any reason to expect."

"No. Religion must pervade my whole being; it must be inwoven with all my thoughts and feelings, words and actions. You must meet it everywhere and at all times, and wherever and whenever you meet it, I see from the present interview, it must offend you."

"I see no necessity of making your piety everywhere obtrusive."

"I must love God with all my heart, mind, soul, and strength."

"And your neighbor as yourself, which means, I take it, your husband. But why not follow the direction of your Saint Paul? 'Hast thou faith? have it to thyself?' If you have pious feelings indulge them. Surely, you must have room enough left for the proper affections of the wife. It must be a strange God in whom you believe, if he should be offended to see you studying to make the man happy to whom you confess yourself not indifferent, and to whom you have solemnly plighted your faith. Though on this last point I do not insist. I ask no one to keep faith with me longer than it is agreeable. I absolve you from all obligation to fulfil a promise you rashly, inconsiderately made. You can dismiss me if you please. I am not a man likely to complain. I was not born to go whining through life. I have already learned the lesson to bear. Still you have had much influence over me, and, until now, I have never conversed with you without wishing myself a Christian. The road to the understanding lies through the heart. Who can tell but through love you may lead me to God, be the means of my conversion?"

"I know not how that would be; but weak, imperfect as I am and always must be, I fear I shall be more likely to expose my faith to your contempt than to commend it to your love and reverence."

"I know of nothing in the past to warrant your fears; you have not changed half so much as you fancy. You have

always been religious since I have been acquainted with you. I have rarely witnessed your sensibility to religion, without regretting the loss of my early faith. I am not certain but it was the religious turn of your mind which first attracted my love, and I know that it has tended not a little to strengthen and purify it. Hopeless myself, a child without a father, I have not been displeased to see hope beaming from your eyes, and to hear from your lips the words, 'My Father.' I have never had an earthly father to whom I could apply those words, and it is long since I have had one in heaven. As much opposed as I am to the nonsense and mischief which pass with the multitude under the name of religion, yet ever have I felt that I would give worlds did I possess them, could I once more feel assured that there is another and a better world; could I look up with confidence and say, 'My Father.'"

"Charles, I cannot comprehend you. Can it be that you are in reality an infidel, in love as you are with all beautiful things and good? You seem to me at times all but devout. You are gentle and forgiving. I have often known you to risk your life for even your enemies. How is this? Is not Christ in you, though you know it not? Own him, I beseech you."

"And be a hypocrite? Never. I have lost my faith as a Christian, but as long as I live I will hold fast to my integrity. I have not the Christian's hopes nor his fears; but I should think meanly of myself, had I only the Christian's virtues."

"I do not understand this. I have always identified all moral excellence with belief in Christ, and been unable to conceive of any virtue separate from Christianity. I have believed that one must be born again, and then he would know the truth; and here you are professing to have experienced all that others do in the new birth, and at the same time denying the existence of God. Is it all a delusion? Can I be certain of nothing? O, Charles, do not drive me to scepticism, to madness!"

"Fear me not. To me I own religion appears all a delusion. I neither do nor can know any thing about it. But after all you *may* be right. I never set up my own opinions as the measure of truth."

"It is gone. It was but a passing cloud. Religion must be true. I have the witness within. I feel its truth, and even you own that you at times feel the need of it."

"It is hard to efface early impressions. Reminiscences of my childhood and youth sometimes come up, and I dream; but I awake as soon as reason dawns."

"Reason! Reason! that is the real soul-destroyer! I cannot reason on religion; I hold it too sacred, and I dare not so profane it. I must believe. I have always loved religion. It has ever shed a hallowed light over the world in which I have lived, and made all things around me beautiful and lovely. Within a few days I have felt as I never did before. God has manifested himself to me as he does not to the world. It must be so. I cannot mistake my feelings."

"But they may mislead you."

"And why more than your logic? May we not err by distrusting our feelings too much? These reminiscences of your early life, as you call them, what may they be after all but an outcry from the depth of your being for God,—the strivings of God's spirit with yours to lead you back to himself?"

"So I have sometimes fancied it might be. This is a mysterious nature of ours, and I pretend not to be able to unravel it. It is all dark and inscrutable to me. Thought, which now penetrates the solid marble, pierces through the earth, soars into the heavens, and sooner than I can utter the words, makes the circuit of the universe, is to me a mystery. Love, sympathy,—all the emotions are inexplicable; and not the least so that mystic communion of which we are at all times conscious, that something which often without external medium advertises us of the presence of the beloved object, and enables us to know before hand the emotions swelling in another's breast. Then this void I am conscious of within, which I am ever trying to fill, and which nothing but infinity seems capable of filling—this eternal craving of ours to break through the narrow bounds of the universe and breathe at our ease the free air beyond,—I know not what all this means. There are times when this world is too small for me, when I seem to have that within me which is greater than the universe, thoughts and desires which seem inhabitants of eternity. At times they startle me; but they are the freaks of a wanton imagination; they are fantasy all."

"I know not that. May they not be the soul's reminiscences of God, its native land? Are we not exiles from our home? and are not these thoughts and desires our sighs and yearnings for a return?"

"So perhaps old Plato would have said. But I dare not trust myself in a region so unsubstantial. I leave these matters to the mystics, and confine myself to my five senses and the operations of my understanding. These vague longings are to me only the feverish dreams of a perturbed sleep."

What would have been the result of our interview, I know not, had it not been suddenly and unexpectedly interrupted. I think I should have shaken Elizabeth's resolution, and she perhaps would have soothed my unbelief with visions of that mystic land, upon which, unknown to herself, she was entering. The natural cure for scepticism is mysticism, and had we been left to ourselves, I think it very possible I should have lost my atheism, and lived with Elizabeth a sort of theosophic life. But it was otherwise ordered. I have already mentioned Elizabeth's brother George. With him I had been longer acquainted, than with her. I had been able, on my first coming to reside in the neighborhood, to render him some essential service, which became the prelude to an intimacy with him, and, what I had valued more, with his sister. George would never have been selected by me as a friend, had I not served him. He had respectable talents, was well educated, but not precisely a man to my taste.

The last time I had seen him, he was on the anxious seats, where he succeeded in becoming converted. He was now a saint, and could address his former friends and associates as sinners. Conversion operates differently on different subjects. Some it makes better, manward as well as Godward, sweetening their dispositions, elevating their feelings and aims; others it makes decidedly worse. By persuading them that they are saints, it permits them to fancy that they can do no wrong because they are saints. Of this latter class was my friend George. Religion had in him combined with a harsh, haughty, and vindictive temper, and had given him the courage to display what he had previously studied to conceal.

In a social point of view, he was evidently my superior. His parents had been notable people in their day, and to him and his sister who resided with their widowed mother, had descended an ample fortune. But I was somewhat of an adventurer. Nobody knew whence I came, or what was my profession or occupation. I could not be absolutely poor, but I had evidently not been accustomed to refined society, and it was most likely that I was of obscure origin. On these points I kept my own counsel. I had perhaps a

tale to tell, had I chosen; but I had never learned that a man suffered by knowing more of himself than others knew of him. I shall not tell the tale now, for it would not be credited if I should. But evidently, although George had encouraged my suit to his sister, he did not now regard me as the most desirable suitor. Mr. Smith and a few other pious friends had conversed with him, and given him some advice.

Entering the room where we were conversing, and hastily approaching me, and addressing me in a rude and haughty manner, "Sir," said he, "you and I have been much together for some time past; I have permitted you to come and go as if this house were your home; I have borne with you in the hope that your pernicious principles might be corrected. It is in vain to indulge that hope any longer; and as I do not choose to associate with an atheist, you will have the goodness henceforth to spare my sister and myself the pleasure of your company. You will find neither of us at home to you hereafter."

"Say not so, brother," exclaimed Elizabeth; "you wrong your own heart; you wrong the charity of the blessed Gospel; you wrong Charles, who you know saved your life at the risk of his own."

"What I have said, I have said," replied he.

"Say no more, Elizabeth," I interposed. "He will, I fear, one day need my forgiveness; if so, he will find it. Farewell, Elizabeth. Otherwise I would have parted with you. I know not whether the resolution you mentioned when I came in is to be regarded as final or not. That is a matter which rests with yourself. I am not the man to entreat any one to break a resolution in my favor. If, however, you alter your mind, you will find me as I was. Farewell."

CHAPTER XI.—PRIESTCRAFT.

The incidents related in my last chapter, but ill prepared me for my second interview with Mr. Wilson. In my first interview I was calm, candid, willing, even anxious to become, if not a believer in all that passes for religion, at least in God and immortality. But now I was ruffled, I was exasperated against the clergy, those meddling priests as I regarded them; and I was resolved to combat Mr. Wilson's arguments with all the force of reason I could master. On this second day I found Mr. Wilson where I did before, but

not this time alone; some five or six of his brother clergymen were with him, all of whom, with faces as grave as a church-yard, showed a becoming horror at my approach. I was greeted with scarcely a single civil word. The clergymen looked up to heaven and sighed, hung down their heads and were silent.

"I have called," said I, addressing myself to Mr. Wilson, "to hear what further you have to offer on the subject of our former conversation."

"Ah, I had forgotten," replied he in a sanctimonious tone, "you are the young man with whom I had some conversation on the existence of God; was not what I said sufficient to remove your doubts?"

"No, sir."

"Then I fear all that I can say will be useless. He who denies the existence of God, is too far gone in blindness of mind and hardness of heart, to be affected by any thing short of the omnipotent workings of the Holy Ghost. He is past being reasoned with. In the language of the Holy Ghost, he is a fool."

"Be that as it may; if you have any reasons to offer, I can hear them; and if they have any weight I can feel them."

"I will pray for you."

"I want your reasons, not your prayers."

"The Scriptures forbid us to cast pearls before swine, or to give that which is holy unto dogs."

"An unnecessary prohibition in your case."

"Would you insult one of God's ministers?"

"I might answer you in the words of one of your saints, slightly varied, 'I wist not that thou wast a minister of God, thou whited wall;' but I insult no man, and shall always repel insult, let it come from whom it may."

"I perceive, young man, that you are in the gall of bitterness and the bonds of iniquity."

"I am not here, sir, to be informed of my condition, but at your special invitation, to be resolved of certain doubts, which you boasted your skill to solve. If you have lost confidence in your ability, or if you are otherwise engaged, I can retire."

"Go to God with your doubts. He only can solve them; you are quarrelling with God. Go and make your peace with God."

"Your directions are admirable. Pity they had not occurred to you a little sooner. But be so good now as to hear me a moment."

"I have no wish to hear you."

"I care not for that; but hear me you shall. You have given me your message, and I will give you mine. I, sir, was early taught to love God, and I early sought to serve him. I was early religious, and for some years found in religion all the enjoyment I had. Sectarian dissensions sprung up, grieved, and finally disgusted me. They compelled me to ask why I supported Christianity. I asked but could not answer; I went to my minister, and he told me if I doubted I should be damned."

"And told you the truth," said Mr. Wilson.

"I went to another, another, and still another, and received the same answer. I complained not. I resorted to the Bible, read, re-read it, read every thing I could lay my hands on that promised to throw light on the subject laboring in my mind; I spent years in study; I prayed, and prayed God, by night and by day, to help me. I sought for the truth with my whole heart."

"That is false," interposed one of the clergymen present; "no man ever prayed to God for the truth and remained an atheist."

"One article after another of my faith went, till I found myself at last without hope in immortality or belief in God. I wept at this result; but I said nothing,—sought to unsettle no one's faith, but pursued my way peaceably as a man, a citizen, and a friend. At the request of one, whose request to me is a command, I attended the other day one of your inquiry meetings; you know what passed there. At your request I called here, with what result, you know as well as I. I am here again at your request, and I have thus far, for reasons best known to yourselves, received only insult and abuse. One word therefore to you, and to all who call yourselves ministers of God; I have found you always loud in your professions, but always unable or unwilling to give a reason for the faith you enjoin. I have ever found you in relation to your opponents proud, haughty, overbearing, relentless; professed preachers of peace and love, I have ever found you sowing the seeds of discord, meddling with every one's private affairs, poisoning the cup of domestic bliss, and withering the purest and holiest affections of the human heart. You have brought wrath and hatred into this hitherto peaceful village; you have blasted my hopes of happiness, done me all the injury man can do to man; and what you have done to me you have done to thousands,

and will do, so long as the world endures your profession. You make earth a hell that your own services may be in request—make the people believe in a God of wrath that you may be employed as mediators between them and his vengeance. Did I believe in your imaginary place of punishment, I would say to you in the words of your master, 'Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?' Hitherto I have treated you with respect; there is war between us now, and earth shall be rid of you, or I will die in the attempt. Farewell. Before you dream of converting the infidel, learn humility, honesty, and good manners."

So saying, I left the house and returned to my lodgings. When I was gone the reverend gentlemen looked at one another and smiled; "that young man," said one of them, "would make a most capital preacher were he only on the right side." "Perhaps," said another, "he is nearer right than we should be willing the world should believe." "Never mind," said still another, "the people are superstitious; they will have some kind of worship, and we must let them have their way." These reverend gentlemen it seems understood one another.

CHAPTER XII.—IMMORTALITY.

I pass over several months in which nothing I can bring myself to relate of much importance occurred. Elizabeth and I met a few times after the interview I have mentioned. She was ever the same pure-minded, affectionate girl; but the view which she had taken of her duty to God, and the struggle which thence ensued between religion and love, surrounded as she was by pious friends whose zeal for the soul hereafter far outran their knowledge of what would constitute its real well-being here, preyed upon her health, and threatened the worst results. From those results I raise not the veil.

One tie alone was left me, one alone bound me to my race, and to virtue. My mother, bowed with years and afflictions, still lived, though in a distant part of the country. A letter from a distant relative with whom she resided, informed me that she was very ill, and demanded my presence, as she could not survive many days. I need not say this letter afflicted me. I had not seen my mother for several years; not because I wanted filial affection, but I had rarely been able to do as I would. Poverty is a stern master,

and when combined with talent and ambition, often compels us to seem wanting in most of the better and more amiable affections of our nature. I had always loved and reverenced my mother; but her image rose before me now as it never had before. It looked mournfully upon me, and in the eloquence of mute sorrow seemed to upbraid me with neglect, and to tell me that I had failed to prove myself a good son.

I lost no time in complying with my mother's request. I found her still living, but evidently near her last. She recognized me, brightened up a moment, thanked me for coming to see her, thanked her God that he had permitted her to look once more upon the face of her son, her only child, and to God, the God in whom she believed, who had protected her through life, and in whom she had found solace and support under all her trials and sorrows, she commended me for time and eternity, with all the fervor of undoubting piety, and the warmth of maternal love. The effort exhausted her; she sunk into a sort of lethargy, which in a few hours proved to be the sleep of death.

I watched by the lifeless body; I followed it to its resting place in the earth; went at twilight and stood by the grave which had closed over it. Do you ask what were my thoughts and feelings?

I was a disbeliever, but I was a man, and had a heart; and not the less a heart because few shared its affections. But the feelings with which professed believers and unbelievers meet death, either for themselves or for others, are very nearly similar. When death comes into the circle of our friends and sunders the cords of affection, it is backward we look, not forward, and we are with the departed as he lives in our memories, not as he may be in our hopes. The hopes nurtured by religion are very consoling when grief exists only in anticipation, or after time has hallowed it; but they have little power in the moment when it actually breaks in upon the soul, and pierces the heart. Besides, there are few people who know how to use their immortality. Death to the great mass of believers as well as of unbelievers comes as the king of terrors, in the shape of a total extinction of being. The immortality of the soul is assented to rather than believed,—believed rather than lived. And withal it is something so far in the distant future, that till long after the spirit has left the body, we think and speak of the loved ones as no more. Rarely does the

believer find that relief in the doctrine of immortality, which he insists on with so much eloquence in his controversy with unbelievers. He might find it, he ought to find it, and one day will; but not till he learns that man *is* immortal, and not merely is to be immortal.

I lingered several weeks around the grave of my mother, and in the neighborhood where she had lived. It was the place where I had passed my own childhood and youth. It was the scene of those early associations which become the dearer to us as we leave them the further behind. I stood where I had sported in the freedom of early childhood; but I stood alone, for no one was there with whom I could speak of its frolics. One feels singularly desolate when one sees only strange faces, and hears only strange voices in what was the home of one's early life.

I returned to the village where I resided when I first introduced myself to my readers. But what was that spot to me now? Nature had done much for it, but nature herself is very much what we make her. There must be beauty in our souls, or we shall see no loveliness in her face; and beauty had died out of my soul. She who might have recalled it to life, and thrown its hues over all the world was——but of that I will not speak.

It was now that I really needed the hope of immortality. The world was to me one vast desert, and life was without end or aim. The hope of immortality is not needed to enable us to bear grief, to meet great calamities. These can be, as they have been, met by the atheist with a serene brow and a tranquil pulse. We need not the hope of immortality in order to meet death with composure. The manner in which we meet death depends altogether more on the state of our nerves than the nature of our hopes. But we want it when earth has lost its gloss of novelty, when our hopes have been blasted, our affections withered, and the shortness of life and the vanity of all human pursuits have come home to us, and made us exclaim, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity;" we want then the hope of immortality to give to life an end, an aim.

We all of us at times feel this want. The infidel feels it early in life. He learns all too soon, what to him is a withering fact, that man does not complete his destiny on earth. Man never completes any thing here. What then shall he do if there be no hereafter? With what courage can I betake myself to my task? I may begin—but the grave

lies between me and the completion. Death will come to interrupt my work, and compel me to leave it unfinished. This is more terrible to me than the thought of ceasing to be. I could *almost*—at least, I think I could—consent to be no more, after I had finished my work, achieved my destiny; but to die before my work is completed, while that destiny is but begun,—this is the death which comes to me indeed as a "King of Terrors."

The hope of another life to be the complement of this, steps in to save us from this death, to give us the courage and the hope *to begin*. The rough sketch shall hereafter become the finished picture, the artist shall give it the last touch at his easel; the science we had just begun shall be completed, and the incipient destiny shall be achieved. Fear not to begin, thou hast eternity before thee in which to end.

I wanted, at the time of which I speak, this hope. I had no future. I was shut up in this narrow life as in a cage. All for whom I could have lived, labored, and died, were gone, or worse than gone. I had no end, no aim. My affections were driven back to stagnate and become putrid in my own breast. I had no one to care for. The world was to me as if it were not; and yet a strange restlessness came over me. I could be still nowhere. I roved listlessly from object to object, my body was carried from place to place, I knew not why, and asked not myself wherefore. And yet change of object, change of scene, wrought no change within me. I existed, but did not live. He who has no future, has no life.

CHAPTER XIII.—THE REFORMER.

It is no part of my plan to give a minute history of my life. My wanderings extended far and lasted a weary while; but time at length began to exert its healing influence, and I to return slowly toward life. I gradually began to make observations on what was passing around me, and was at length arrested by the imperfections of the social state. Wherever I went I beheld injustice, oppression, inequality in wealth, social position, moral and intellectual culture,—the many everywhere toiling for the few. Here is a man well made, with vigorous body and active limbs, an intellect capable of grappling with the weightiest problems of science, and a heart of loving all things which are beautiful and good; and yet is he compelled to toil and rack

his brains from morning to night, in order to gain the bare means of subsistence, which shall after all be infinitely inferior to the fare of the rich man's dog. Wealth is everywhere, in practice at least, counted the supreme good, and everywhere its producers are the poor and wretched. They who toil not, spin not, are they who are clad in soft raiment, and fare sumptuously every day. What monstrous injustice is here!

Here are priests, statesmen, lawyers, all boasting their services, and pretending to manage society as it ought to be managed. But what do they for the mass, the great, unprivileged, hard-handed Many? A rich man is murdered, and the whole community rises to ferret out the murderer; a poor man is murdered, leaving a wife and children to the tender mercies of a heartless world, and no questions are asked. Mothers, pale and emaciated, watch the livelong night over their starving little ones; young women are driven by poverty to prostitution; young men are becoming thieves, robbers, murderers, that they may not waste away in absolute want, unknown and unhonored. On every hand vice and crime, and wailing and woe; and the vice and crime of the poor alone exciting horror, and the wailing and woe of the rich alone calling forth commiseration. O, it is a bad world. Society is all wrong. These iniquitous distinctions of class, this injustice, this oppression of the toiling many to feed the luxury, and the vanity of the idle and worse than useless few, must be redressed. But who shall do it? Not the better sort, for they are the better sort only in consequence of their existence; not the poorer sort, for they are ignorant, and dependent. Yet it must be done; nay, shall be done. Justice shall be introduced and man's earthly well-being made possible. But who shall do it? I will do it. I will tell these lords of the earth, to their faces, that they are tyrants and oppressors, that a day of vengeance is at hand. I will tell these wronged, down-trodden masses, that they are men, not beasts of burden; that they have as rich a nature as their masters, and as pure blood coursing in their veins. I will speak to them in the name of justice, of freedom, and my voice shall be trumpet-toned. I will wake the dead, and make them feel the might that has for ages slumbered in the peasant's arm; I will bid them stand up men, freemen, and swear, in the depths of their being, that men they will be, living or dying, and that from this time henceforth wrong from man to man shall cease, that the

earth shall no longer echo to the groans of the slave, but resound with the songs of liberty, joy, and peace.

Now I had found a purpose, an end, an aim,—a future, and began to live again. No more whimpering, no more sickly sentimentalism; I was a man now, and had a man's work before me. I might stand alone against a hostile world, but what of that? I felt I had that within me, which was more than a match for all the forces it could muster against me; I carried a whole world within me, infinitely superior to the world without me, and which should ere long replace it. O, ye, who whimper and whine over your petty miseries, go forth into the world, behold the wrongs and outrages to which man subjects his brother, and seek to arrest them; so shall you forget your own puny sorrows, and find the happiness ye sigh for.

Into the great work of reforming society, or rather of reconstructing society, or more accurately still, of pulling down the society I found existing, I now entered with zeal and energy. I had now as I have said a future; nay, I had a religion,—a faith and a cultus, of which I was the apostle, and felt I could be the martyr. I went to the work in right good earnest. I wrote, lectured, published, talked, disputed, thought, dreamed, until sickness, poverty, and exhaustion of mind and energy, caused me to doubt of success, and to pause, and ask myself, if the means I used were adequate to the end I contemplated.

My system was the sensism of Locke's school. I relied solely on what I termed enlightened self-interest. I did not doubt but appeals to man's interest would be adequate to my wants. I knew what I proposed was for the interest of all men, and I fancied that all I had to do was to convince them of this fact. But some how or other this was not enough. The truth is, I professed one system, but in fact demanded the results of another. No reform can be effected without sacrifice, and sacrifice comes not from selfishness. I was astonished to find the multitude for whom I was wasting my life, choosing rather to return to the flesh-pots of their masters than submit to the few inevitable privations of the wilderness which lay between them and the promised land. I had not then learned that the reformer is powerless save as he appeals to men's sense of duty. Show the people that they are bound by the eternal sanctions of duty to effect your reforms, make them feel that the God within commands them, and you may count on them to the

last, to go with you to the battle-field, the dungeon, the scaffold, or the cross. But this I learned not till long afterwards.

And then I was a man, and by no means without my share of the weakness of human nature. I commenced with due spirit and confidence, but I gradually began to grow weary of standing ever alone; I grew sick of the combat, and yearned for peace and fellowship with my kind. I was never intended for a warrior, was never fitted to be a reformer. My natural inclinations and tastes were for a quiet and retired life passed in the midst of a family and a choice circle of friends. In laboring for mankind my love for them increased; and in proportion as I became really philanthropic the solitude to which I was doomed became insupportable. I could not bear to feel that in the vast multitude around me, not a single heart beat in unison with my own. I would love and be loved. Not the race only would I love. I wished for some one dearer than all to cheer me on to the combat, and welcome my return. It was doubtless a weakness, but it was a weakness I have never been able to get over. The affections have always had great power over me, and in fact have always done with me pretty much as they would. Could I have so generalized my affections as to have cared for mankind only in the abstract, and to have had no craving for sympathy with individuals, I should have been a stronger man, perhaps, and might not have failed in my undertaking. But this was not in my nature. I could never live on abstractions, love everybody in general and nobody in particular. I was alone. There was no God in heaven, to whom I could go for succor; there was no spot on earth to which I could retire for awhile, throw off my armor and feel myself secure; no sympathizing soul with whom I could talk over my plans, give free utterance to the feelings which I must ordinarily suppress, and find ample amends for the ungenerous scorn of the world. I felt that I was wronged, that I was misinterpreted, and that it was all in vain to seek to make myself understood. My philanthropy turned sour, and, I grieve to say, I ended by railing against mankind;—a no uncommon case, as I have since learned, with those who set out to be world-reformers. Few are the old men who have not turned their backs upon the dreams of their youth.

CHAPTER XIV.—THE CHRISTIAN.

While in the condition I have described,—poor, sick, despondent, brooding over abortive projects, affections soured, hopes disappointed, at war with myself and with mankind,—I was visited by a Mr. Howard, an elderly gentleman, who resided some dozen miles distant, of whom I had often heard, but whom I had not before seen. After introducing himself, and some general observations which interested me in his favor, he invited me to accompany him to his residence assuring me that it would afford him and his family great pleasure, if I would consent to make his home mine for a longer or shorter time, as might suit my convenience. This invitation, which seemed prompted by really generous sentiment, I was in no condition to think lightly of. I accepted it very gratefully; and as I had not many arrangements to make, I was soon ready, and, taking a seat with Mr. Howard in his carriage, we departed.

This Mr. Howard, at the time I speak of, was no every-day character. Endowed by nature with a warm heart, a clear and discriminating mind, he had spared no pains in cultivating his natural advantages. He was well acquainted with history, familiar with all the general literature of the day, and what was better than all, he had mingled in the world, had seen men in all conditions and under nearly all aspects, and that too, without losing his love for them, or his strong desire to serve them. He had been absent in Europe for some time, or it is possible that he had interested himself in my movements much earlier. On his return home, he had been informed by his family, that there was a man making some noise in the neighboring city, about a radical change in society, who was laboring to introduce a state of absolute social equality; but, they added, it is said he is an atheist, and a very dangerous man in the community. Mr. Howard also heard of me from other quarters, and heard too that I seemed to be sincere, that I had made some sacrifices for what I held to be the cause of humanity, and that I was now in ill-health, and most likely destitute of the common comforts of life, if not even its necessaries. This was enough. "That man of whom you speak," said he, "if what you tell me be correct, is no atheist. God is love, and no man who sincerely loves his brother can be a disbeliever in God. I will see him, and thank him in the name of religion, for his efforts at social reform; for if I do not mistake his character, he has much more of Christianity than have the

great mass of the professed followers of Jesus." He was as good as his word, and had now called on me as I have related, and invited me to his home.

"Mr. Elwood," said he, as the carriage drove off, "I have been much interested in what I have heard respecting your efforts in the cause of social melioration. I have just returned from the old world. I have seen its most favored countries, have spent considerable time in examining the rich monuments of its genius, arts and industry; but everywhere, amidst the much which I have heartily approved, and wished to see my countrymen studying to imitate, I have been pained to witness the depressed condition of the great mass of the people. The favored few may be enlightened, cultivated, refined; but the many are almost uniformly ignorant, half-brutish, and shut out from nearly all the advantages society was instituted by the Creator to secure to its members. The splendid palaces rise side by side with the wretched hovels of the poor. They may be filled with every luxury for every sense, wrung from the toil and sweat of the mass; but their occupants, notwithstanding their intelligence, refinement, and hospitality, seem never to have dreamed that the many were not made for the express purpose of ministering to their pleasure; and on their benighted minds dawns never the great doctrine of the common brotherhood of the race. I sometimes lost my patience. I told a judge one day that I would rather take my chance at the last day, with those he would hang than with himself. They were victims of an order of things they had not created, and could not control; of which he was one of the feed upholders. Instead of using the talents and means of influence God had entrusted to him, for the melioration of that order, he exerted them merely to crush whosoever should dare disclose its defects or seek to remedy them.

"I have now returned home, and here, I am sorry to say, I find the germs of the same order, the same principles and tendencies at work, and if resulting as yet in evils of less magnitude, it is owing to certain accidental causes, every day becoming less and less active. The lines of distinction between the great mass of the people and the favored few, are every day becoming broader and more indelible. Labor is held in less esteem than it was, and is not so well rewarded. Wages, perhaps, are nominally higher, the laboring man may consume more and richer articles of food and clothing; but if I am not greatly mistaken, he

finds it proportionally more difficult to maintain his former relative standing. Poverty keeps pace with wealth, and not unfrequently outruns it. Poor men may indeed become rich, and rich men poor; but the rich and the poor still remain; the perpetual shifting of individuals leaves the classes as they were, neither lessening their numbers nor diminishing their evil consequences. The evil does not consist in the fact that these individuals rather than those, constitute the rich or the poor, but in the fact that there are both rich and poor.

"I should pay little regard to this inequality in wealth, were its results confined to the mere physical well-being or suffering of the members of society. I am mainly affected by its moral results, and these are disastrous. On the one hand, the rich become vain, arrogant, forgetful of their responsibilities, and duties, and of course immoral. For he, in the strongest sense of the word, is immoral, who neglects his duties to society, or fails to vindicate to the full extent of his ability, the rights and the well-being of the many, however amiable he may be in his private relations, polished in his manners, or respectable in the eyes of the world. On the other hand, the poor become discontented, uneasy, and discouraged;—lose all self-respect, all self-confidence, moulder earthward, and live and die but a single step above the brutes. O! sir, the magnitude of the evil is immense, and from the bottom of my heart, I thank you for calling public attention to it, and for laboring to remove it."

"You are the first man, Mr. Howard," I replied, "who has ever addressed me in this style,—the first who has not either condemned me outright, or exhorted me to be prudent, and not to say aught to alarm the weak and timid. With a few such friends to the people as you appear to be, I had not failed in my undertaking, and in the bitterness of disappointment exclaimed with the Spanish Proverb, 'Mankind is an ass—kicks him who attempts to take off his panniers.' But, sir, while your language touches me, it also surprises me. I have always understood that you were rich and a Christian."

"And what is there in that to surprise you?"

"Every rich man I have hitherto met has cried out against me, called me an agrarian, a jacobin, a leveler, and sounded the alarm, 'property is in danger.' And Christians have been my most bitter and uncompromising enemies.

They have always met me with the assurance that these social inequalities and distinctions I deplore and would remove, are of divine appointment, the express will of God, and that it is therefore impious as well as foolish to war against them."

"There may be some truth in what you say, but I trust and believe you exaggerate. The rich men of whom you complain, are not so properly termed rich men as business men, men who are not rich but are seeking to be,—men who occupy a position they would not, and who know not how to attain to the rank, influence and consideration they crave, but by using their fellow beings. They would be richer than they are, but they can be only by availing themselves adroitly, not to say dishonestly, of the labors of others. Labor is profitable to the buyer in proportion to its cheapness, and, like every thing else, its cheapness depends on the supply in the market. It is therefore, as they view the matter, for their interest to keep the supply as large as possible. This supply can be large only on the condition that there be a large number of individuals who are solely dependent on the sale of their labor for their means of subsistence. Your efforts, had they succeeded, would have increased the number of independent proprietors, and diminished the number of mere laborers, and consequently the supply of labor which would be for sale, and would have enhanced its price, and therefore lessened the profits of its purchasers. Hence the opposition you have encountered from the business part of the community. But there are rich men who are truly enlightened, who feel that they hold their riches as a trust from Heaven to be employed not for their own private advantage, but in the sacred cause of humanity, in diffusing universally truth, justice, and love. These men are not your enemies, but your real friends, who take the deepest interest in your movements, and who are the first to espouse your cause and will be the last to desert it. The number of these individuals is every day increasing, and I could point you to not a few who would willingly impoverish themselves, if they could see that by so doing they would contribute to the moral and social elevation of the people."

"But how do you reconcile your democratic doctrines with your Christianity? It is difficult for me to conceive how it is possible that a true Christian, so far as he is Christian, should labor for the social regeneration of mankind."

"I owe my Christian friends no apology for my democratic sentiments. It is as a Christian that I take a deep and abiding interest in the well-being of my race, that I labor to elevate, morally, intellectually and physically, the poorest and most numerous class; and I were no Christian, if I did not. Christianity is the poor man's religion."

"So I have heard the clergy say; but why they say so, I know not, unless it be because Christianity keeps the multitude star-gazing, so that the rich and the great may enjoy the fruits of the earth unobserved. It may be that it is the poor man's religion, because it enjoins upon him submission to a state of things, of which he is the victim, and cries out 'Order, Order,' whenever the people take it into their heads to better their condition; and because it leagues with the despot and furnishes the warrant of the Almighty to sanction his despotism."

"I have," replied Mr. Howard, "a profound respect for the clergy, and am grateful to them for the much they have done, directly or indirectly, to advance the civilization of mankind; but I have yet to learn that they are infallible. They are in fact the creatures as well as the creators of their times. I do not, because I cannot honestly, join in the usual declamation against them. The charges generally preferred against them belong to the circumstances in which they are placed, rather than to themselves. It is given only to here and there a man among the clergy as well as the rest of mankind to stand out from his own age, the prophet and the representative of the future. The clergy may have had learning, but in general they have not been deeply versed in human nature. They are unfavorably situated, especially in our times. When they visit, they find the house swept and garnished; the child has on its best bib and tucker, and every one is clad in his Sunday suit. The best side is out. The real state of things is not seen. The clergy too have depended on books rather than on observation; and very different are the men and women of books from the men and women who actually live and breathe and move in the world round and about us. They have also inquired much oftener and altogether more earnestly, what is orthodox, than what is true; what will the church approve, than what she ought to approve, and consequently have had little time to bestow upon things as they really are.

"As a body the clergy have never comprehended, have never been capable of comprehending the real character of

Christianity. Nothing is more unlike the real conception of Jesus than what you and the majority of the Christian world call the Christian religion. What you call the religion of Jesus may contain some of the elements of Christianity, for it were not possible for the human race to overlook them all; but Christianity itself, as it existed in the mind of its author, is yet to be revealed.

"I am a Christian, but I am a Christian in my own way, and on my own hook. I learn of Jesus. I have as good a right to interpret him as any one else has; and if I interpret him aright, most others do not. The age in which he lived did not comprehend him, for some would have made him a king, and others crucified him between two thieves. His immediate disciples did not comprehend him, as may be collected from his reproofs, their confessions, disputes, and changes of opinion. Their disciples, further removed still, it is reasonable to suppose comprehended him still less.

"What now passes for Christianity is Catholicism. Protestantism, so far as it is Protestantism, is not a religion, and the religion we find connected with it in the minds and hearts of Protestants, is merely what has been retained of Catholicism. Religion affirms; it never does, never can protest. Catholicism succeeded to Judaism on the one hand, and paganism, as modified by the Alexandrians, on the other. It was a compound of both, immeasurably their superior, but immeasurably below the conception of Jesus. It borrowed indeed many terms from the Nazarene reformer; but in most cases it interpreted them by the ideas and associations of the old religions. I have a profound respect for the Catholic church, and very little sympathy with what Protestants say against it. If Protestantism did not mark a transition to something better, I should arrange myself with the Catholics rather than with the Protestants. The Catholic church had an important mission, that of civilizing the barbarian hordes which supplanted the Roman empire, of introducing a new order of civilization, and preparing the way for the second coming of our Lord; that is, for the introduction and establishment of a religious institution, Christian in reality as well as in name. Viewed in relation to this end, regarded merely as a provisional institution, which should in turn give way to a more perfect, as the Jewish had given way to it, I have no fault to find with Catholicism, but am willing to recognize it as a true church. But at the epoch of the reformation it had finished its work,

fulfilled its mission, and since then it has been a mere cumberer of the ground. The three hundred years which have passed away since Luther, have been merely ages of doubt, criticism, inquiry, destruction, efforts to get rid of a superannuated institution and to elaborate a new one. Of this no wise man complains, for it has been inevitable. But the new institution is not yet found, nor has any one of the numerous sects now extant, its nucleus even. But I am wandering from my point. Catholicism, excepting an impulse towards spirituality, which it received from Jesus, was in fact little else than a modification of the religions which preceded it. This is well known to some of your infidel writers, and is frequently urged as an objection to the truth of Christianity. It may be an objection to what has passed for Christianity, but it is no objection to that divine system of moral and religious truth which lay in the mind of Jesus.

"I mean not to say that what has passed for Christianity has had no truth, nor indeed that it has contained no Christian truth. What I mean is, that the church has not been constructed after the Christian model. The truths borrowed from Jesus have not served as its foundation, but as the decorations of its altar, or have merely entered as polished stones and been lost in its walls. The idea realized has not been the Christian idea; but in the main the Jewish idea. This has been the fundamental error of the church. The Christian world has not found its life and unity in the central idea of Christianity, although it may have recognized that idea, and insisted on it with much sincerity and force.

"Jesus said, 'My kingdom is not of this world,' and it has been thence inferred that he regarded this life only in its connection with another, and had no desire to promote its well-being save as a means of securing the happiness of the life to come. He therefore had no desire to favor social progress as such, and never sought man's earthly well-being as an end. In consequence of this misinterpretation of the words of Jesus, the social element of human nature, has never received the attention from the church it deserved. Understanding Jesus as concerning himself exclusively with the salvation of the soul in the world after death, and promulgating his religion on earth solely to secure that end, the church has contemned this world, pronounced it a vale of tears, a wretched land, and commanded us to look for happiness neither from it nor in it. The

great office of religion has not been to teach us to live, but to die,—not to create a heaven on earth, but to enable us to endure suffering. There is nothing true but heaven. All here is mere illusion, unworthy a wish or a thought. All human pursuits are vain; earth is cursed for man's sake; and thistles and brambles only shall it bring forth to his labor. Seek merely to gain admittance into heaven. Heaven is the home of the soul. There all our toils will be over. There no more pain, no more fatigue, no more sickness, no more sorrow; but all one clear, unclouded noon of unutterable bliss. No matter what are the sufferings of this short and transitory life, they are not worthy to be compared with the exceeding weight of glory which awaits us in the life to come.

"In all this there is a truth, a great truth, but not the whole truth. This life is not and cannot be exempt from suffering, and far be it from me to think lightly of the religion which makes us patient under suffering, and consoles us for present sorrows with the hope of joys to come. We all need consolations, a friendly hand to wipe the tears from our eyes, and to pour oil and wine into our wounded hearts. But then this world is God's world and is not to be contemned, and this life is God's gift and should therefore count for something,—cannot be mere illusion all. It is easy to account for the view which the church has taken of this world. The church grew up amid a dissolving world, when nothing seemed settled, when the earth seemed abandoned by its Maker to the devil and his angels. But the effects of this view have been none the less disastrous, because we are able to account for it. These effects have been to sink below its natural level the social element of Christianity, to make the devout think meanly of whatever pertains to this mode of being, and to produce the conviction that the melioration of society as such is unnecessary if not even sinful. In this view of the office of religion, you see why it is that the church through all the stages of her existence has never labored directly for man's earthly well-being. It has indeed given alms and founded hospitals and asylums, for it has been charitable; it has sent out its missionaries to evangelize the world, for it has been zealous, and filled with the spirit of propagandism; but it has sent out these missionaries expressly for the purpose of saving the soul hereafter, never for the purpose of diffusing the arts and blessings of civilization, albeit these have often followed.

"In all this I own the church has had a truth, a great truth,—perhaps the only truth past ages were able to appreciate,—but, as the church has interpreted it, by no means a peculiarly Christian truth, nor the truth demanded by the present. Christianity recognises the universal belief of mankind in a future life; it assumes always an hereafter; but it never makes it the principal object of man's life here to secure to his soul admission into heaven after death. It teaches us to prize the soul above the body; to seek the salvation of the soul; but not in the sense in which the church has alleged. Jesus would save the soul, not from future burnings, but from ignorance, low wants, grovelling propensities—in a word, from sinning. When he said his kingdom was not of this world, he spoke in reference to the world in which he appeared, and asserted that his kingdom, the order of things he came to introduce and everywhere build up, was to be based on other principles than were the kingdoms then existing. These kingdoms were established on the principle that might gives right; or at best on the idea of justice, as distinct from that of love. Their maxim was, 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, love to one's neighbor, but hatred to enemies,'—a maxim which at best could only create an eternal circle of injuries. But the kingdom of Jesus was to be based on the broad principle of absolute right, of universal philanthropy, a love for mankind, even for enemies, strong enough, if need be, to die for them on the scaffold or the cross. Those kingdoms were supported by the sword; his kingdom required the sword to remain in its scabbard, and commanded its subjects not to slay their enemies but to die for them. Jesus came to introduce a kingdom, a spiritual kingdom,—not an ecclesiastical kingdom,—a kingdom of righteousness, peace, and love; to establish the reign of a new and a higher morality; but it was on the earth he sought to establish it. It was this world, the affairs, the minds, and the hearts of men in this mode of being, he sought to subject to the law of God which is the law of right, which is again the law of love. Hence the angels sang not only 'Glory to God in the highest,' but 'on earth peace and good will to men.'

"This great fact has been overlooked or misinterpreted; and yet it was of this fact that the wise and good of old prophesied. They saw the vice, the crime, the poverty, the suffering, the bigotry, the idolatry, the superstition, with

which their own age was cursed, and they looked forth into the dim and distant future for a new order, a new age, a new world to spring into birth. They saw in the visions of their souls, in the inspirations of their hopes, an individual, a chosen messenger, a prophet, priest, king, or hero, the anointed of God, the Messiah, by whom, in due time, this new order should be introduced, and the latter-day glory, for which they yearned and hoped, and must die without witnessing, should be realized. The utterance of their hopes and their wishes and their presentiments, in the sublime strains of inspired poetry, is what the church reverences, and rightly reverences as prophecy, and the authority of which, with equal justice, it has always asserted. These prophecies of a long line of patriarchs and sages, all point to the new world Jesus came to create, to the establishment of the reign of justice and love throughout all the earth. And I, for one, believe that they were from God and shall be realized. These patriarchs and sages read in the stars, which ever and anon broke through the clouds which obscured their heavens, that the night should not last forever, that a glorious morning should dawn, a golden sun uprise, before whose beams the darkness should roll back, and the clouds disperse. To me Jesus is that sun. His light has been rising for ages on our world, struggling with the darkness, and I doubt not that he will, ere long, shine forth in all his glory, the whole earth be illumined, and man everywhere be able to stand up in his true dignity, the brother of man, and the child of God. This is the purport of all prophecy; and this realized, is the establishment of universal right, and the establishment of this, is the realization of the highest social perfection, as well as individual holiness.

"Man has suffered long; for ages been alienated from his brother man, the prey of false notions and anti-social habits. Long has he gone about bent to the earth, pale and haggard, bemoaning his existence, and at times, in the bitterness of his soul, cursing his Maker. Christianity comes to his relief. It brings a remedy; not merely by enjoining submission, patience, resignation; but by recognising his right to a better condition, and breathing into his soul, the courage to attempt its realization. Christianity, sir, deals with man's rights as well as with his duties. Nay, rightly interpreted, it concerns itself even more with our rights than with our duties, for even the duties it enjoins are but another name for the rights it recognises. It begins by

recognising all men as brethren,—'one is your Father in heaven and all ye are brethren,'—it proceeds by enjoining universal philanthropy, legitimated by the fact of the common brotherhood of the race; and ends by commanding us to labor especially for the poor, the friendless, the down-trodden. Jesus claimed to be the anointed of God, *because* he was anointed to preach glad tidings to the poor. His ministry began with the poor, the lower classes; they heard him gladly, while the rich scorned, and the great took counsel against him; from them were taken his chosen ministers, not learned scribes and rabbis, but poor unlettered fishermen, and humble tent-makers,—men who had nothing but their simple humanity, and therefore could be satisfied with nothing short of those broad and eternal principles of right, which extend alike to all the members of the race. The principles of the Gospel were broad enough to reach even them. Therefore 'blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,'—*is*, not merely shall be in another world, but is now, for it is for their especial benefit the Son of God has come to introduce the reign of righteousness and love.

"You see, now, Mr. Elwood, I hope, why it is I call Christianity the poor man's religion. It is not because it comes with the voice of God to make him submissive to his masters; not because it seeks to reconcile him to an order of things, the whole weight of which he must bear; but because it comes to reveal to him his rights, his own lofty and deathless nature; his equality with those who have for ages trampled him in the dust, fattened on his sweat and blood; and to assure him that he also is a man, and has a man's wants, a man's rights, and energies; because it says to his oppressor in the tone and authority of God: Hold, thou wrongest a brother, and blasphemest thy Maker by oppressing his child; because it says to the rich, the proud, the would-be nobility of earth: In the meanest, the lowest, the most filthy of the human race, behold an equal, a brother, a child of God, humanity in all its integrity, with all its imprescriptible rights, and its capacity of endless progress in truth, love, goodness. Here, sir, is what I see in Christianity, and seeing this, I could not be a Christian did I not recognise the rights of the poor, and feel my obligations to them; I could not for one moment find peace in my own bosom, did I not make the moral and social melioration of all the members of the community, the express object of all my thoughts, wishes, and labors. I hope, sir, you will no

longer feel surprised to find a professed Christian sympathizing with efforts designed to promote man's earthly weal."

"You have presented me the Gospel," I replied, "in a new light; and had I seen it in the same light some years ago, it would, perhaps, have saved me some trouble, and reconciled me to the Christian faith. But what signifies it? You call yourself a Christian, but the whole Christian world will call you an infidel, and were you not rich would condemn you as loudly as it does me."

"Well, what of that? The first Christians were called atheists, and Jesus himself was crucified as a blasphemer, and I trust that I shall not be frightened by a nickname. The truth never yet was extinguished by a nickname, and if I have the truth, the world may call me what it will. But there is no fear that my views will be termed infidelity. I have not stated *my* views only. Millions of hearts are there already to respond to them, and millions of voices ere long shall echo them. The Christian world is prepared for these views, and daily in the temple is it praying for them. Everywhere is there a Simeon to whose heart it has been revealed that he shall see the Lord's anointed, ready, on beholding the Gospel in the light I have presented it, to exclaim, 'Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation.'"

We had now reached Mr. Howard's residence and the conversation dropped.

CHAPTER XV.—CONVALESCENCE.

Of Mr. Howard's family I shall not say much. It consisted of a wife and two daughters; the eldest daughter was eighteen, the other some two years younger, both intelligent, beautiful, and religious, according to their father's reading of the Gospel. It was a quiet family, and in more respects than one, just the family in which the bruised spirit might be made whole, the chilled affections recover their warmth, and the troubled heart find its peace.

This family was cheerful, nay, lively; and the girls were now and then, as girls will be, a little frolicsome in a quiet way; but never, as I could discover, disposed to waste their time on trifles. Each had a regular employment, and each seemed to feel that life had serious aims which must not be lost sight of, and solemn duties which must not be neglected. Whether it was a fashionable or unfashionable

family I cannot say, not being a judge of such matters. It was a wealthy family; but I never saw any display of wealth. The house, furniture, and dress of the ladies, all seemed to me chaste, simple, and in good taste. Nothing was said about high and low; for the family did not belong to the class of *noveaux riches;* and the poor were never alluded to unless it were to have their rights explained and enforced, or their wants relieved. Mr. Howard, however, was no great advocate of almsgiving. In former times, he would say, when mere temporary relief was all that the most sanguine friends of mankind could hope to effect, almsgiving was a duty, and a virtue; but now we should aim at something higher, something which not merely palliates, but cures. Almsgiving is now often but a respectable way the rich have of displaying their wealth, or of excusing themselves from all serious efforts in behalf of the poor and needy. He wished not merely to relieve for a moment the wants of a few individuals, but to cure poverty itself, to abolish the distinction of rich and poor, believing with Agur, that neither riches nor poverty is best for man. But he did not seek to effect this object by giving to the poor, nor by seeking to do every thing for them. The poor, he contended, were not poor because the rich wanted generosity, but justice. Nothing was needed for the poor but a simple reverence for the rights and dignity of man, as man. The great inequality in wealth which obtains results from the want of strict honesty in its acquisition, from the undue advantages which individuals by their adroitness or suppleness, and want of conscientiousness have been able to secure to themselves, and from the want of high moral feelings and a manly independence of spirit on the part of the poor. If every man would take with him, on commencing the pursuit of wealth, not conventional, but true Christian morality, there would never be any inequality in wealth to be complained of; and consequently no poor to be commiserated, and no occasion for the display of generosity on the part of the rich. He did not ask the rich to give to the poor, but to respect their rights. For himself, he was rich; he had inherited the greater part of his wealth, and although he might question the strict morality of some of the means by which his estate had been originally acquired, he did not think it incumbent on him to throw it away; but to preserve it, and use it according to the best of his judgment

for the moral, intellectual, and physical improvement of the community in which his lot had been cast.

I soon found myself quite domesticated in this agreeable family. I was not overloaded with kindness. I was in very feeble health, but no one tried to make me believe my health was feebler than it was. I had been unfortunate, but I heard no allusion to the fact, and no one attempted to console me. I was an infidel, but my unbelief elicited no remark,—was I not also a man? Books, music, conversation, walks in the garden, short excursions to view some fine natural scenery in the neighborhood, afforded me ample means to recover my health and recruit my spirits.

Several weeks glided away uncounted, and I was evidently growing better. The world began to wear now and then a little sunshine, and to look less and less coldly upon me. Bright and laughing eyes were shining around me, but all the light did not come from them. I had somewhat to remember. I was an inmate for the first time in my life in a family where I could see religion without bigotry, zeal without fanaticism, warmth of piety without superstition. I was surrounded by holy influences. The temper of my mind was rapidly changing, and old half-forgotten feelings would come up, and at times I felt as I did in that distant past when all things were bright and lovely to my view. Somehow or other the world did not seem to me so desolate as it did, and I could hardly persuade myself that some good being had not made it. Whence this disposition to return to my early faith? this new disposition to believe and worship? I had been honest, philanthropic; I had aimed well, I had inquired diligently, but might I not, after all, have mistaken my way? A new doubt this, not a doubt that leads to incredulity, but which may perhaps lead to something else.

There is nothing, I suppose, singular or novel in this. There may be intellectual beings, who are moved by thought alone,—beings who never feel, but live always in mere abstractions. Such persons are dependent never on the state of the affections, and are influenced not at all by the circumstances around them. Of these beings I know not much. I am not one of them. I have believed myself to have a heart as well as a head, and that in me, what the authors of a new science I have just heard of, call the affective nature, is stronger, by several degrees, than the intellectual. The fact is my feelings have generally controlled

my belief, not my belief my feelings. This is no uncommon case. As a general rule would you gain the reason you must first win the heart. This is the secret of most conversions. There is no logic like love. And by-the-by, I believe that the heart is not only often stronger than the head but in general a safer guide to truth. At any rate, I have never found it difficult to assign plenty of good reasons for doing what my heart has prompted me to do. Mr. Howard understood all this perfectly, and uniformly practised on the principle here implied, not as a calculation, but because he was led to it by the benevolence of his own heart. He found me out of humor with myself and the world, suffering acute mental torture, and he saw at once that I must be reconciled to myself and the world, before I could look upon Christianity in the proper frame of mind to judge of its truth and beauty. Then again he was not extremely anxious to convert me. He did not regard me in my present condition as an alien from God, or as deserving to be an outcast from man. To him I was a man, a brother, a child of God. If I had been unable to come to the same belief he had, it might be my loss, but could not be my fault. He would gladly see me a believer, but he thought probably the influence of Christian example, and above all, communion with truly Christian dispositions, would go further than any arguments addressed merely to my understanding toward making me one.

CHAPTER XVI.—A PARADOX.

As I began to recover the tone of my mind, and to look with a less jaundiced eye upon the world, my infidelity became a frequent subject of conversation. One evening, while we were conversing, I remarked to Mr. Howard, that since I had been in his family, I had been almost persuaded to become a Christian.

"Perhaps," he replied, "you are, and always have been, much nearer being a Christian than you imagine."

"But I can hardly be a Christian without knowing it."

"I am not so sure of that. Christianity is not a creed, but a life. He who has the spirit of Jesus is a Christian, be his speculative belief what it may."

"I have not as yet advanced far enough to admit even the existence of a God. I see not then how I can have much of Christ in me."

"Christ is not a dogma to be believed, but a spirit to be cultivated and obeyed. Whoever loves truth and goodness, and is willing to die for their honor and the redemption of man, as Jesus did, I hold to be a Christian in the only worthy sense of the term. He may not indeed have the 'letter' which 'killeth,' but that is no great loss, so long as he has the 'spirit' which 'giveth life.'"

"You seem determined to make me out a Christian, and that too without changing my faith."

"The belief in Christ lies in the bottom of every honest man's heart. Christianity is nothing foreign to our soul. It is the ideal, the realization of which would constitute the perfection of our nature. Just so far as you advance in the work of perfecting your own nature, do you grow in Christ; and could you attain to the highest perfection admitted by your nature as a man, you would attain to the stature of a perfect man in Christ Jesus. In yielding obedience to the moral laws of your own being, you are yielding obedience to the Gospel. One of these laws, the one which I term the social element of human nature, you obeyed in your efforts to reform society and augment the sum of the common weal of your kind. Consequently in obeying this element, you were conforming to the Christian law. You fancied you were obeying a law of infidelity, but that was an error of judgment, easily accounted for. You saw that element generally overlooked or discarded by the Christian world; you therefore inferred that it could not be an element of Christianity; and you rejected Christianity because you supposed it rejected this element. But had you seen that Christianity recognized this element as its great, its central law, you would not have thought of rejecting it."

"But I was an unbeliever long before I ever dreamed of turning social reformer."

"Very possibly; but still for a Christian reason. All the infidelity I have ever met with springs from one of two causes acting separately, or from both combined. The first cause of infidelity I have already spoken of. Some men feel a strong desire to redress social or political grievances, and are repulsed by the church. They therefore imagine the church opposed to political freedom, and social progress; and identifying Christianity with the church, they disown it, and very properly. The second cause of infidelity is found in the development of the philosophical element of

our nature. This element is strong in some men. They must be free to inquire what and wherefore they believe. This inquiry the church has prohibited; they have therefore concluded it prohibited by Christianity itself; and therefore have rejected Christianity; and I add again, very properly. In both of these cases the supposed rejection of Christianity has been induced by Christian motives; and the infidel could not have been, with his lights, a Christian, had he done differently."

"You seem, sir, disposed to attribute infidelity to good causes and not to bad."

"Certainly. I have long since learned to hold myself ignorant of the real causes of a man's opinions, till I have been able to trace them to a good, even a sacred source. Infidelity indicates an inquiring mind, an honest mind, not a depraved heart. It originates in what is good in the individual, and is disgraceful only to the church which has given occasion for it. Instead then of censuring infidels, denouncing them in the name of God, and trying to set the community against them, I look into the church to ascertain, if I can, its errors or defects which justify infidelity. Christians, not infidels, are to be denounced, if any are."

"But, sir, will the church suffer you to make such assertions? Will it not denounce you as well as me?"

"I am not much in the habit of asking permission of the church to say this or that, and if it chooses to denounce me, all I have to say is, I will denounce it; and I am sure it will regard my denunciation of it, as much as I shall its denunciation of me.

"Every man who believes Christianity and knows why he believes it, has at some period of his life doubted it. Authority and tradition may answer the wants of the multitude, but there are those who must not only know what they believe, but wherefore they believe. In these men the philosophical element is active. They ask, why do we believe Christianity? What are the grounds for believing it? When they ask this question, they have no thought of doubting, far less of disbelieving. They are honest, but they have a craving to comprehend that faith they have hitherto taken on trust. But when they begin this questioning they are necessarily ignorant, and doubt is the inevitable result.

"Doubt, although in itself free from sin, is a critical matter. I am far from pretending that we may doubt without

danger. There is always danger in cutting loose from our old fastenings, and going forth upon an unknown sea, while as yet unskilled in navigation. There is always danger, that when we doubt the truth of the creed in which we have been reared, we shall make our doubt an excuse for disregarding all moral restraints, and for the indulgence of all our baser propensities; there is also danger that we shall be too hasty, and rush too precipitately from mere doubt to dogmatic infidelity; nevertheless, the hazard here implied we must run, unless we would be forever in leading-strings.

"Doubt itself has no necessary connexion with infidelity, or the rejection of Christianity. We can never attain to a rational faith in Christianity without passing through the wilderness of doubt; but the natural result of doubt would be conviction, not disbelief; that is, where it runs a free course. But unhappily it is not suffered to run this free course. It is almost always obstructed. Nearly the whole Christian world condemns it, pronounces it a sin, the effect of a depraved heart or a lawless will,—unchurches, anathematizes the trembling doubter, and assures him, that if he continues to doubt he shall be damned not only here but hereafter.

"From this fact results one of two consequences. If the want to account to one's self for one's faith, and to see clearly the grounds of its truth, be but moderate, the doubter stifles his doubts, sinks back under the dominion of authority and tradition, assents to whatever the church enjoins, and remains henceforth destitute of all real spiritual life, a dead weight on the cause of Christ, and a disgrace to humanity. Such, I fear, are at the present moment, a majority of the members of our churches. These are they who are loudest against the infidel, and the most ready to anathematize all freedom of mind. Poor creatures! having no reason themselves to give for the faith they avow, they fancy none can be given. On the other hand, if the want of which I speak be very urgent, that is, if the philosophical element of our nature be very strong and active, the obstacles which our doubts encounter, enrage us, make us mad at the church for its unreasonableness, and drive us into infidelity I think your own experience will bear me out in what I say.

"When you first asked yourself why you believed Christianity, nothing was further from your thoughts than its rejection. You were young, you had not, and you could not have had, at that age, the necessary acquaintance either with

human nature or the Gospel, to be able to assign rational grounds for believing Christianity. You doubted, because you wanted evidence to convince, and that evidence you were not then in a state to receive. If your Christian friends had encouraged you to doubt, told you that it was your duty to doubt till you should attain to rational conviction; if they had exhorted you to push your investigations into all subjects, sacred or profane, and bid you abide by the result of your investigations, be that result what it might, you would never have ranked yourself among unbelievers, but would have long ere this attained to a well-grounded faith in God, Christ, and immortality.

"But your friends I will venture to say were not wise enough for this. They told you these doubts were sinful, were from the devil, and you must stifle them. They undertook to frighten you. They talked to you of death and the judgment, told you long raw-head-and-bloody-bones stories about the death-bed, of noted unbelievers, and with cant and rigmarole, if not direct abuse and denunciation, sought to win you back to the church. Poor fools! They took the very course to make you disgusted with religion and ambitious to become an infidel. Firmly as I believe in God, Christ, and immortality, I confess, I rarely meet with a work written in defence of Christianity, that does not stir the devil in me, and make me ready to renew the old war of the Titans upon the gods. If the gods cannot employ more respectable advocates than they have hitherto done, I think it were no mean honor to be sent to hell for giving judgment against them. Happily, however, we are not dependent on their hired advocates, nor the witnesses they summon. Let God alone, and he will plead his own cause, and for witnesses,—we have a witness within worth all others.

"But this by the way. The philosophical element in you was strong and active. You must have a reason for the faith you avowed. That element the church disowned and would not suffer you to obey. But the infidel owned it and bid you obey it. You sided then with the infidel against the church, that you might be free to philosophize; in other words, that you might be at liberty to exercise your mind freely upon all subjects you should judge worthy of your examination. You became an infidel for the same reason that Luther became a Protestant. Luther became a Protestant not because he objected to the creed of the Catholic church, but because he would not submit to the authority

of the pope. So you rejected Christianity not because you had found its doctrines untrue, but because the church in its name asserted an authority over your faith which you deemed unwarrantable and mischievous."

"But I think my inquiries proved that the supernatural pretensions of Christianity were unfounded."

"I care nothing for your inquiries,—asking your pardon, sir; for they came afterwards. The reasons you may have alleged for disbelieving Christianity were not the reasons which induced you to disbelieve it; but, reasons which you raked together afterwards to justify your disbelief."

"But this philosophical element of which you speak, do you mean to assert that it is a Christian element?"

"Of course I do."

CHAPTER XVII.—RATIONALISM.

"Philosophy has a place in the history of mankind, and must therefore result from a want inherent in our nature. Men do not philosophize through mere caprice, but in obedience to an indestructible law of human nature. All men feel more or less strongly the want of comprehending, accounting for, and verifying their beliefs. This want is what I term the philosophical element of human nature.

"Christianity is the name I give to the law of man's perfection. The design of Jesus was to make us perfect men. He did not propose to perfect us by changing our natures, converting us into a different sort of being; but by developing our nature, by calling forth in their legitimate order and stimulating to their highest activity all the faculties with which we were originally endowed by our Creator. If the religious and ethical system he has proposed to this end, be narrower than human nature, if it leave out of its account any one element of that nature, it cannot secure the perfection contemplated. Could it then be proved that Christianity neglects or prohibits the exercise of the philosophical element, I would discard it as quick as if it neglected the religious element, properly so called.

"Christianity addresses itself to me as a being endowed with reason. It presupposes me capable of knowing and comprehending. It makes its appeal not to my senses, but to my reason. If then it should begin by denying my right to exercise my reason, which is virtually denying reason itself, it would leave no reason to respond to its appeal. It is reason that must pronounce upon its truth or falsity;

but if we deny both the right and the competency of reason to do this, we can never have any grounds for believing Christianity true or false, consequently no reason whatever for feeling ourselves obliged to obey it. Religion can dispense with reason, no better than philosophy can, for reason is its only interpreter and voucher."

"The Bible, I have supposed, commands us not to reason, but to believe, and assures us that we shall be damned if we do not."

"The Bible never threatens damnation as the punishment of disbelief, as such. But in relation to the language of the Bible on this and many other topics, there is, I apprehend, some slight mistake. Before you can rightly interpret the Bible you must take its author's point of sight. You, as well as many Christians, give to nature a causative power, an independent activity. If you believed in God, you would never think of ascribing to his agency what you could trace to the operation of what you term natural laws. In fact the Christian world is at present prone to restrict the sphere of the divine activity, and to introduce the *Deus ex machina* only when the powers of nature prove to be inadequate.

"But this is all wrong. Nature has no independent activity, no causality of its own. God is the only independent existence, and he is the cause of all causes. The laws of nature are his will. Truth is not one thing and God another; right is not one thing and God another. You admit that you ought to believe the truth, and to do what is right. Then you admit, if you understand yourself, that you are bound to believe what God commands, and to do what he ordains. To say a thing is commanded by God, is precisely the same thing it is to say that it is true, it is right. God commands it; the right enjoins it; it is right; are merely three different modes of expressing one and the same thing.

"Now the authors of the Bible always take this view, and regard God as the absolute sovereign of the universe, whose will is law,—consequently they promulgate all particular truths in the form of commands. God commands us to do this, not to do that; ordains, that do this and ye shall live, do that and ye shall die. Now this form of speaking is strictly just, and implies no more restriction on mental freedom than does the more common form of saying, this is true, and therefore ought to be believed; this is right, and therefore

ought to be done. God is everlasting and immutable right, eternal and unalterable truth. His words then are in the highest and strictest sense commands. He who utters a truth promulgates a command of God; he who points out a right or a duty declares a law of God, and has a right to say, thus God wills, thus saith the Lord. Be sure that what you utter is true, is right, and you are authorized to proclaim it as the command of God, and to demand in the name of God obedience. The Bible-writers then, make no war upon the rights of the mind, when they utter the truths they behold in the form of commands. All truth is authoritative,—a divine command, and whoso rebels against it, rebels against his legitimate sovereign."

"But does the Bible do what you seem to imply? Does it never proclaim any thing but the truth?"

"That is, are its words, the words of God; are its commands always the commands of truth? That is a subject for the human mind to determine. So far as it speaks truth, I contend it has the right to say, 'thus saith the Lord,' 'so God commands.' Our business is to ascertain what it really promulgates as the commands of God, and then if what it promulgates be really the commands of God, that is, true."

"But are you at liberty to make both of these inquiries? Will Christianity suffer you to do it?"

"If it would not, I would not suffer myself to be one of its advocates. I have no confidence in any system of faith or of morals that shrinks from investigation. Not truth, but falsehood shuns the light."

"But we are told that the Bible is the word of God, and therefore we must receive it blindly, implicitly."

"I rarely ask what I am told; I ask what is true. Be it that I am told that the Bible is the word of God, just so far as I find it true, I will admit it to be the word of God, but no further."

"Do you discriminate? The Bible is a whole, and as a whole is to be taken or rejected. They say we must believe what is in the Bible, because it is in the Bible, not because independently of the Bible, we have ascertained it to be true."

"*They say!* No more of that. I believe a proposition because I discover, or fancy I discover it to be true, not because I find it in one book or another; and I obey a com-

mand because I believe it just, not because it emanates from one source or another."

"But how do you determine whether a given proposition be true or false,—a given command be just or unjust?"

"By the reason with which I am endowed, freely developed and conscientiously directed."

"We are back where we were. Does Christianity allow you to do this?"

"No, it does not *allow* me to do it; but commands me, makes it my duty to do it. 'Why,' says Jesus to the Jews and through them to all men, 'why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?' 'If I do not the works of my Father believe me not.' Here is a distinct recognition of a power in man to judge what is and what is not right, and what are and what are not the works of God, together with a call upon us to exercise this power. If we have the power to determine what are the works of God, we of course have the power to determine what is true or false. And this power it is our duty to exercise."

"The church will dissent from your interpretation."

"And I, sir, will in that case dissent from the church. I am no believer in the infallibility of the church. The church has always misinterpreted the authority of truth. She has ever had a profound sentiment of the authoritativeness of truth, that every man is bound to believe and obey the truth; that no man can knowingly disregard the truth and be guiltless. So far she has been right. But on this she has built up a system of ecclesiastical tyranny which it behooves every wise man to protest against. She has first assumed that she has the truth, identified her teachings with the teachings of God, and then claimed for herself the authority which belongs only to truth—to God. Now between the church and absolute truth there may be a distance, and her practice of claiming for herself what belongs of right to truth, is founded on a species of logic I am by no means disposed to admit.

"I admit the absolute authority of God, and of course of truth, since I hold truth to be one with God. Show me the truth, and I own my obligation to submit to it. But I deny that the church has any more authority to interpret truth, and declare the will of God than I have. I make no war upon the church because it has asserted the principle of authority, for I contend as strongly as she does for that principle. Her error consists in placing that principle

where it does not belong, in claiming it for an individual or a corporation that has no right to it. I deny the legitimacy of all merely human government. God alone is sovereign. No power is legitimate that is not ordained of God. But when the church commands me to believe this or that, she speaks in her own name, and substitutes a human authority for that of God. Here is her grand error. It was this assumption on the part of the Catholic church that provoked the protest of the reformers in the sixteenth century; it is this assumption on the part of all Protestant churches now that leads to the protest of modern infidelity against all religion. And so long as the church continues to make this assumption, I will hold her accountable for all the infidelity which obtains.

"Of all tyrannies ecclesiastical tyranny is the worst, because it penetrates to the soul, and binds the conscience as well as the body. It makes man a slave within as well as without, and therefore utterly a slave. You may bind my body, you may task the motions of my limbs, but I am still a man if my soul be free, if my thoughts be not curbed, and my conscience itself fettered. In all ages the priesthood have established this tyranny, and they everywhere struggle with all their might to retain it. Even those of our clergy who fancy themselves the advocates of religious freedom still cling in principle and in fact to this same tyranny. They indeed protest against the authority of Rome, but they set up a written word for which they claim equal authority. They war against the hierarchy, but they claim infallibility for the congregation. The greatest extent to which their love of liberty will carry them, is freedom from all civil restraints in matters of religious worship. But this is no more than Rome always contended for. This was the principle involved in the long struggle between the popes and the emperors. The church claimed for religious freedom, entire freedom from the restraints of the civil power. But she by no means allowed the individual freedom from the restrictions of the ecclesiastical power. Nor do the modern clerical advocates of religious liberty in our own country. With us each church has its creed, expressed or implied, conformity to which constitutes the Christian character. The Calvinistic clergyman is no more free in the full and enlarged sense of the term than is the Romish priest. In our own country I presume few can be found who would impose civil restrictions on religious

belief; yet there are still fewer, claiming to be religious, who would leave the individual free to form his own creed, and to abide by his own honest convictions of the truth."

"Do you then claim for the individual reason the right to interpret the word of God?"

"I do, and more than is commonly implied in the remark. I not only claim for the individual reason the right to interpret the Bible, which is commonly meant, but the whole word of God, whether written or unwritten; that is, the right to decide in all cases whatever, what I am to embrace as truth. But of course I hold that I am to use my reason reasonably. In determining what is truth, I am to survey the whole proposition, and to avail myself of all the aid I can. I am not to confine myself to my own consciousness, to my own experience; but must interrogate the consciousness, the experience of the race, so as to come as near as possible, by means of my individual reason, to the decisions of the universal reason, of which my reason is a fragment. In this inquiry, the Bible, as being the most authentic record of the experience of the race, or of the teachings of the universal reason, or what is the same thing,—the revelations of God, becomes to me of the greatest possible value, and my surest guide."

"I can only say that, though I object nothing to your doctrine, I apprehend the Christian world will no more own you than it would me."

"As to that I shall not trouble myself. I believe I see very clearly the signs of the times. Men are not precisely what they were. Knowledge is no longer the exclusive property of the clergy. The laity have been to school, and are going to school; and it is shrewdly suspected by some that there is no especial virtue in the imposition of hands, or in gown and band, to enable one to see and know the truth. It is beginning to be believed that humanity in all its integrity, is in every member of the race, that each member therefore has the right and the power to form his own creed. The church may war against this new state of things, but she will by so doing only hasten the day of her dissolution. The human race is already escaping from her dominion. It demands a reason, and she must give it, or be discarded. She must recognize the authority of pure reason in matters of religion as well as natural science, or she will go the way of all the earth. I say this in no Titanic spirit, but with a deep respect for the church, and an earnest wish for her future glory."

CHAPTER XVIII.—THE PREACHER.

The day following the conversation I have just related, was Sunday, and Mr. Howard for the first time invited me to acompany him to his meeting. He remarked that his minister, though pretty orthodox in the main, was a little peculiar, and perhaps I should find myself interested, if not edified. Years had elapsed since I had entered a place of religious worship, and though I felt no great desire on my part to hear a sermon, yet as I thought I might please Mr. Howard by going, I accepted his invitation.

The place of the meeting was a public hall capable of holding some eight or nine hundred persons, and I found it well filled with a plain, sensible-looking congregation, whose earnest countenances indicated that they were there not because it was a place of fashionable resort, but because they were serious worshippers and honest inquirers after truth. A single glance told you that they were bold, earnest minds, who could look truth steadily in the face, let her assume what shape she might.

The preacher, a Mr. Morton, was a tall, well-proportioned man, with something a little rustic in his appearance, indicating that his life had not been spent in the circles of the gay and the fashionable. Though far from being handsome, his features were striking and impressed themselves indelibly upon the memory. His dark complexion, and small, restless black eye bespoke an active and also an irritable disposition, and assured you that he might say some bitter things. His head was large, and his brow elevated and expanded. His face bore the marks of past struggle, whether with passion, the world, or sorrow, it was not easy to say. He was apparently under forty years of age, but you felt that he was a man who could speak from experience, that he was in fact no ordinary man, but one who had a biography, if you could only get at it. There was something almost repulsive about him, and yet you were drawn insensibly towards him.

On commencing his discourse he seemed not exactly at his ease, and his address was hurried, and ungraceful. His voice, too, though deep-toned, grated harshly on the ear, and produced a most unfavorable impression. But there was an air of earnestness about him, an evidence of intellectual vigor, and of moral honesty, which arrested your attention; while the novelty of his views and the boldness of his language served to enchain it till he closed. His dis-

course was to me a most singular production. I had never heard such a sermon before; and I confess I listened to it with the deepest interest. As a copy of it subsequently came into my hands, I will here give it word for word as he delivered it, although I am aware that it can hardly make the same impression upon my readers that it did upon me. But to the sermon.

But I certify you, brethren, that the Gospel which was preached of me is not after man. For I neither received it of man, nor was I taught it but by the revelation of Jesus Christ.—GAL. i. 11, 12.

The declaration of Paul in these words is worthy of grave consideration. There is more in it than at first sight meets the eye.

Paul, you are aware, had much trouble with his brother believers. Many, a large portion of the Jewish, or as we should say to-day, orthodox believers in Christianity, looked upon him as unsound in the faith, and as one who might do mischief. They no doubt held him to be honest, probably admired his zeal, and did homage to the earnestness and singleness of purpose with which he gave himself up to the great work of diffusing Christianity as he understood it; but then they feared that his boldness, his rashness, the freedom of his speculations, might compromit the Gospel, and secure its enemies a triumph. Hence wherever he went, they followed him, scattering doubts as to his orthodoxy, warning the people not to listen to him, and laboring to secure the adoption of certain notions, or the observance of certain rites or ceremonies which he declared to be unessential or inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

It was to defend himself from the charges preferred by these orthodox opponents of his, to rebuke them for their folly or ignorance, and to recall his Galatian brethren to the simplicity, truth, and freedom of the Gospel that he wrote this epistle, from which I have taken my text; and he alleges as his defence the fact that the Gospel he was preaching, he did not receive from men, nor was he taught it by men, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ.

Paul had come to Christianity through the free action of his own mind, and had embraced it because convinced of its truth. He had opposed it, but not on account of that for which others embraced it, but on account of something which they probably did not see.

The early believers in Christianity were Jews. But in believing Christianity they did not consider themselves as

rejecting Judaism. They held on to the law of Moses after believing in Christ as firmly as they did before. They saw nothing in Christianity which required them to abandon their previous religious notions or observances. They saw no inconsistency in swearing by both Moses and Christ.

Paul, however, was too keen-sighted, and possessed too logical a mind, to fall into this mistake. He saw from the first that if Christ should increase Moses must decrease. The prevalence of the new religion was incompatible with the existence of the old. This was doubtless the secret of his hostility to Christianity. Bred a Jew, brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, according to the strictest sect of the Jewish religion, he very naturally believed the Jewish religion, even to its letter, was of divine authority. How could he then regard with indifference the prevalence of a heresy which struck at the very existence of the whole Jewish economy, and which, if not checked, must change the whole religious faith and practice of his countrymen? He opposed Christianity then, because it was directly opposed to the religion he believed to be from God.

When he became converted to Christianity, he did not hesitate to avow it, and to engage with the whole ardor of his soul in the defence of his new faith. But in becoming converted to Christianity, he did not become convinced that it and Judaism were one and the same thing. He recognised the same opposition between them now that he did before. He believed now, as he did before, that Judaism and Christianity were in the main two distinct religions, and could never be made to harmonize together. He therefore rejected Judaism now as he had Christianity before. Consequently he saw that those Christians who still clung to the Jewish law, and the traditions of the fathers, had but a partial view of the Gospel, and were in fact, deceiving themselves and seeking justification by conforming to a law by the deeds of which no flesh could be justified. He wished them to be Christians, not Jews; to rely on Christ, not on Moses; on the spirit, not on the flesh; on grace, not on works; for to attempt to seek justification by the Jewish law was mere folly. Hence the cause and the nature of the controversy with them in which he was engaged. They rejoiced no doubt to find him converted from a bitter opponent to a zealous defender of the new faith; they were no doubt highly delighted that he gave his powerful aid to the Christian cause; but then why need he oppose Judaism?

Why need he be so belligerent, and oppose so strenuously the traditions and usages they held sacred?

The case of Paul is by no means a singular one. Let a man in these days, and in this community come to a belief in Christianity through infidelity, and after having long opposed it, and he will find that his case is very much the same. He will inevitably embrace Christianity in a shape somewhat different from that most approved by the doctors of the church. Christianity, according to their reading, had failed to satisfy him. He had seen, what perhaps none of them had seen, that Christianity, according to their interpretations, was inconsistent with itself, that it opposed or neglected some essential element of truth, and therefore deserved to be rejected. But in his lone inquiries, in his silent meditations, in his secret interviews with the Egeria of his soul, the spirit of truth, he has become convinced that Christianity, rightly interpreted, is true, is from God. The scales fall from his eyes, and he is exalted in his soul to the third heaven, where he converses with Jesus and holds fellowship with the Father. His views are clear and definite; his soul is fired with a holy zeal, and he goes forth with a kindling enthusiasm to proclaim the glad tidings of his new faith. He is indefatigable in his labors, doing more in a week than the sleek doctors of the church in years. All rejoice in the new convert; all hail the energy with which he goes to his work, the fervor with which he prays, and the unction with which he preaches.

But this man, though converted to Christianity, has not been converted to the traditions of the fathers, nor does he defend them. He has been converted to a Christianity freed from the defects and inconsistencies which he had found in the Christianity of the doctors, and which had driven him to infidelity. He is converted to Christ, not to Moses,—preaches Christianity, not Judaism. Forthwith a clamor is raised against him. He may be honest, it is said, may speak with power, may labor abundantly, may wish to do good, and even fancy that he is doing good; but he is too rash, too bold; he does not see to what some of his assertions lead; he does not pay respect enough to the usage of the churches; and we are afraid he will unsettle the faith of many, breed disorder and do great harm to the holy cause of religion.

Let this man go where he will, let him labor with all zeal, diligence, and fidelity, let him wear out his body in the

intense activity of his mind, stand alone, forego most of the kindly charities and sympathies of civilized life, suffer poverty and want, and he shall find his Christian brethren everywhere and always the first to oppose him, diligent to throw suspicion on the worth of his labors, and to warn the people neither to believe him nor to listen to his words. And all the while they shall profess to have a generous concern for his welfare, to wish him well, and to be very sorry that he will ruin himself by his rashness, and his wild speculations. It is a great pity that he cannot be a little more prudent, and not be ever saying things which cannot but alienate from him his best friends.

Here comes in Paul's defence. Brethren, I profess and preach to you the Gospel of Jesus Christ; but I certify you that I did not receive it of men, neither was I taught it but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. The Gospel is no human device. Man has not made it, man does not own it; man has no right to authorize it nor to impose it; nor to say how it shall or shall not be preached. It is from God, and it is the duty of every one to whom Jesus Christ reveals it, to preach it as he has received it, and that too without conferring with flesh and blood.

If we recur more particularly to this defence, we shall find that it contains several propositions of which we shall do well not to lose sight.

"I certify you, brethren, that the Gospel which was preached of me,—or by me,—is not after man."

The meaning of this, I apprehend, is that he did not preach to them a Gospel which men had authorized him to preach. Grant, he would say, that the Gospel I preached unto you was in some, yea in all respects different from that which others preach unto you, what then? I came not to you as the envoy of men, nor of any particular class or set of men. I never entered into any engagement to preach other men's Gospels, or to preach to you what others, who regard themselves as the followers of Jesus, may preach to you, or contend ought to be preached. Men have no authority over my Gospel, to dictate to me what I shall preach; and I preach not because believers have authorized or ordained and sent me forth to preach. I stand on my own feet, speak for myself, and hold myself accountable to no human tribunal for the doctrines I teach. If then I teach not what others profess to believe, or contend ought to be believed; if I entertain not the traditions of the elders and

support not all the usages of the fathers, the congregations of believers have no right to call me to an account. I am not their agent; I speak nor in their name, and whether I agree with them or not, is a matter of no moment.

In this Paul evidently sets aside the doctrine of ordination. It has been supposed that every preacher must by a solemn act of ordination receive authority to teach. When the church has ordained him, he goes out in the name of the church, which is responsible for his doctrines, and to which he must hold himself responsible in return. Hence the jurisdiction the church has claimed over its preachers, and the right to which it has pretended, of trying them for heresy, and of suspending them from their ministry. But all this is wrong. No man, no body of men can give me or any one else, authority to teach. Every true preacher of the Gospel goes forth on his own responsibility, and speaks as God gives him utterance, without being amenable therefor to any earthly tribunal, whether termed civil or ecclesiastical. Men have no business to call him to an account for what he utters, the church has no right to try him for heresy, or to suspend him from his ministry, however obnoxious to its displeasure may be the doctrines he sets forth. Grant that he departs from the traditions of the elders, from the usages of the fathers, and does not adopt the reading of learned and reverend doctors, they have nothing to do with him, but to convince him by arguments addressed to his reason and conscience, that he is wrong.

Paul also asserts that he did not receive the Gospel he preached, from men, nor was he taught it by men. He had not learned the Gospel he was preaching from the brethren who were accusing him. They had not been his masters, and he therefore was under no obligation to them. He had not studied with the apostles, he had not taken from them even the formula of his faith; but had retired into Arabia, and not until after three years of solitary study, of communion with himself and with God, had he undertaken to preach. It was not then as a pupil of the apostles, but as a brother apostle, standing on equal ground with the immediate disciples of Jesus themselves, that he came forward as the preacher of the Gospel. He stood up a free and independent man, to utter the words God gave him to utter, and without referring to the words uttered by others or asking whether his harmonized with theirs or not. He felt that he had as much right to call the immediate disciples of Jesus

to an account as they him. In a word, he was preaching on his own hook, what he had learned of God to believe.

He was taught by Jesus Christ, who was acknowledged by all as an authoritative teacher. Jesus Christ was ultimate, the highest possible authority, in the estimation of all believers; Paul then in claiming to have been taught by Jesus Christ, claimed to have received the Gospel he preached from the highest possible authority. In claiming this he claimed to have drawn his doctrines from the primal source of truth. Grant, then, that he differed from his brethren; the error was as likely to be on their side as on his. Grant that he condemned Judaism as insufficient to wash out guilt and raise the soul to union with God; he might, nevertheless, be even a more consistent Christian than they who upheld it, and suffered no departure from the traditions of the elders.

I have called your attention to this profession of Paul, of having been taught but by the revelation of Jesus Christ, for another purpose than that of showing you how he defended himself from the charges brought against him. I think I see in it something which was not merely local and temporary, but which belongs to all times and to all individuals. I think I see here the recognition of the fact that the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot be learned of men. The immediate disciples of Jesus could have taught it if anybody could; but Paul would not go and study even with them. He would not take the Gospel at second hand. He would go to the primal source and receive it on as high authority as that possessed by the personal followers of Jesus,—would go to the Master and not to the disciple. Every one should do the same to-day. Every one should draw from the original fountain, take Jesus Christ and none other for his instructor.

Thus far I suppose all will agree to what I say. But I pray you observe that when they send us to Christ, to the original fountain, it is to the Bible they send us. I speak with all becoming reverence of the Bible; but you must own to me that the Bible, the written Word, as we possess it now, is not an authority so high as that possessed by the oral teachings of the immediate followers of Jesus. You would esteem the instructions which Peter, James, and John, were they here to-day, could furnish you, of higher authority than the mere record of their past instructions you read in the Bible. If they were here, and you should discover a

discrepancy between their teachings and the New Testament, you would rely on the former rather than on the latter. Then the instructions which Paul might have received from the immediate disciples of Jesus, were more ultimate than those which we can gather from the New Testament. But even the instructions of these immediate disciples were not ultimate enough for him. He would not learn even of them. He would go to Jesus Christ himself, and learn of the Master. Now the Bible is the work, not of the Master, but of the disciple; how then can sending us to the Bible be sending us to Jesus Christ, to the Master?

The New Testament is a record which has come down to us of the teachings of the disciples; or if you please, a record which the disciples have left us of the teachings of their Master; but we can conceive something more ultimate still; to wit, the original instructions themselves. Those instructions could you obtain them, you would value more than any record it would be possible to make of them. There is then, or there once was, a higher source of truth than the Bible. Paul held the disciples themselves not high enough. He would go above them, and learn from their Master, and is there any more reason why I should regard the Bible as high enough, than there was that he should count their instructions high enough? Why should not I as well as Paul go above the Bible, to the very source from which the Bible-makers themselves drew? Do I learn of Christ when I merely learn of the Bible, any more than Paul would have learned of him, had he taken only the lessons of the disciples?

But I may be told that Jesus Christ instructed Paul, as well as the other disciples, so that he might have another apostle to send forth into the field; and that since Paul evidently drew his instructions from the highest source, we should be content to learn of him. I am not satisfied with this. I know I am a sinner; but I do not know what I have done that I should not have as good evidence for my faith as Paul had for his: nor why I should not have as able instructors as he had. I know not wherefore Paul should have had Jesus for his instructor, and I only have certain letters Paul is said to have written for mine. Why such partiality? Am not I also a man? Am not I born as he was? Is not my nature as good as his was? Do I not stand in as much need of instruction as he did? Why then send him to the Master, and turn me off with the disciple?

Shall I be told that there was once indeed, a source of divine knowledge more original than the Bible, that then Jesus Christ was on earth, and his immediate instructions might be obtained; but that now all is changed, and we must receive our instructions from the written word only? I do not understand this. Is there not a Jesus Christ now as much as there was in the time of Paul? Was Jesus Christ any more accessible to Paul than he is to me? Beware how you answer these questions, lest you be found denying the resurrection. To say there was a Jesus Christ, but is not now, is only another form of denying the Lord that bought us. You might in that case believe, indeed, in a Saviour for Paul, but in none for me. But Paul himself teaches you better than this. He tells you not to say within yourselves, "Who shall ascend into heaven? that is, to bring Christ down from above: or who shall descend into the deep? that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead. The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart." Christ is not dead, but ever living,—not off in some distant world, but ever present, ever abiding with us, and ever saying unto us, "Learn of me," for "lo I am with you unto the end of the world."

Most people, I apprehend, fancy that all supernatural revelations from God have ceased, and that Christ teaches now only through the medium of the written word. But are they aware, that to believe so is as good as to deny both God and Christ? To say that God has discontinued his revelations to man, is only saying in other words, that all intercourse between him and us, is broken off; which is virtually saying that we are without God; at least that there is for us no living God, but only a God that was, but is not. A God that was but is not, is no God at all. To say that there was a Christ who taught men, but is not now, is to assert merely a dead Christ not a living,—is in fact to deny the resurrection.

There is an error quite prevalent, even among religious people, that of believing only in a Divinity which was, but is not. All admit that God made the world, very few that he makes it. After having spent a whole eternity in the contemplation of himself, it is supposed that some six thousand years ago, he spoke the universe into existence with all its furniture of worlds and beings, impressed upon it its laws, wound it up as the clockmaker does his clock, gave the pendulum a jog, set it a-going, and then left it to go of

itself. Just as though the universe could subsist a moment if the Deity, as its cause, did not remain in it, its life and substance, and motion! So though they admit that God has once in a while concerned himself with the piece of mechanism he had constructed, and condescended to give a few directions for its management, yet it was all in the past, long ages ago. No interference now, no God to reveal himself to us, who stand so much in need of his instructions. So also they admit that a Saviour once appeared in Judea, was crucified under Pontius Pilate for the redemption of the world, but there is no Jesus Christ now. The Saviour did not rise from the dead, and there is only a traditional Christ in which we may trust. How has the age lapsed into infidelity!

Brethren, I believe in a living God, in a God who not only made the world, but who makes it; who is not only above and independent of his works, but who is ever present in them; who not only revealed himself to men in past ages, but who also reveals himself to men even now, and who is always seen by the pure in heart, and everywhere. I contend also for a living Saviour, not for a Saviour who lived and died in Judea, a temporary and local Saviour; but for one who fills all space, and is the same "yesterday, to-day, and forever." I have no sympathy with the Arian heresy of ancient times, nor with the Socinian heresy of modern times, which the church seems almost universally to embrace, save in name. The Christ in whom I believe is one with the Father, and he lives now, and is as much within the reach of the humble seeker after truth to-day as he was when Jesus walked about in Jerusalem and Galilee. Beware how you seek for your Saviour in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea. Seek not the living among the dead. Christ has risen, and ever liveth to make intercession for us. O, deny not the glorious doctrine of the resurrection. Deny that doctrine and you are without hope in the world, and there is left you no redemption from sin.

The Christ from whom we are to learn the Gospel is not an old Christ, a Jewish Christ, a dead Christ, but the RISEN Christ, who comes to us not as the Son of Mary, clothed in flesh and subject to its infirmities, but as the *Paraclete*, the Comforter, the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, who was to lead us into all truth. The Holy Ghost, though distinguished in name, is one with the Son, the Christ, who is also one with the Father. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are

not three Gods, but one God. What is predicated of the one, under the relation I am now considering the subject, may be predicated of the other. The teachings of the Holy Spirit, are the teachings of Christ. This Holy Spirit, the Comforter, was to be ever with us, and Jesus said, "He shall take of mine and show them unto you." The manifestations of this Spirit are given unto all men to profit withal. The teachings of the Spirit are the Gospel of Christ, and to learn the Gospel from the Spirit, is to learn it from the Master.

The teachings of the risen Christ, the ever-abiding Christ, the universal Christ, the true Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, I hold to be superior to all other teachings. They are more ultimate than the written word, and to them we may appeal even from the Bible, if there be occasion. It is this, sometimes termed the inward Christ, because a spiritual Christ, and not a corporeal, that judges the Bible, interprets the Bible and vouches for its truth. This is the Master, the Bible is merely the disciple. This Christ is near unto every one of us, knocking ever at the door of our hearts and praying for admission, and we may all let him in and receive his instructions. Whomsoever he instructs is the equal of the Bible, the peer of Peter, James, or John; for Peter, James, and John had no means of knowing divine truth, which you and I, my brethren, have not also within our reach.

I come now to the conclusion I have all along been aiming at; to wit, the entire independence of every individual mind, as it concerns every other individual mind, in the acquisition of truth and the formation of its creed. God is impartial. He dispenses light alike to all men, of all ages and nations. All may know the truth, may know the Gospel, one as well as another. Every one has the great teacher within. No one therefore need go to another to be taught. The witness is within, and may bear witness that he is born of God.

Now in learning the Gospel you must do more than go back and explore the archives of Judea, more than pore over the records of the past. The past is silent, and darkness broods over it. The light by which you shall behold it, the spirit by which you shall revivify it, and give it a voice and a meaning, must be borrowed from the great teacher within. You must seek the revelations of the Spirit, you must com-

mune with the Divinity within you ; and the word which you shall hear uttered within you shall be superior to any written word whatever; it shall prove to be the living word of God, which proceedeth forth from the Father, which was in the beginning with God, and which is God.

If every one have this great teacher, this primal source of truth in himself, there is no one dependent on another. No child of God is disinherited, and obliged to depend on an elder brother for support. No one then has the right to call another to an account for his belief. All are equals, and where all are equals no one has the supremacy.

If this be true, then whoso learns of Christ, of the inward Christ, has authority to teach. He may utter his words, whatever they may be, for they are not his words, but the Spirit's. If the Spirit bid him bear his testimony against the traditions of the elders, the usages of the churches, the lessons of the doctors, so be it ; let him do it and fear nothing. He must needs speak as the Spirit giveth him utterance. Let those whom he offends look to it, that it turn not out that they are offended, not at him, but at the Spirit of God. He may indeed mistake the teachings of the Spirit, he may misinterpret his instructions ; let him therefore be modest, humble, prayerful, that he may not hear amiss. And let all who are wedded to old usages, who are ever pointing to our pious ancestors as if truth must needs have died with them, know of a surety, that truth is an immortality, and over it time and change have no power. Its bloom is as fresh and fragrant to-day as it was on creation's morn. The grave hath no power over it. Though crucified, buried in a new tomb hewn from the rock and guarded with armed soldiery, it rises and ascends to its Father, leading captivity itself captive. Forbear, then, to war against it. What you have that is true will survive; what you have that is false, must pass away, weep and howl as ye will.

CHAPTER XIX.—SOME PROGRESS.

Mr. Morton, after the meeting was out, at Mr. Howard's invitation, accompanied us home and spent the remainder of the day and evening with us. I found him, as his sermon had led me to expect, free from the usual cant of his profession, but serious and even enthusiastic. He appeared to be a man conscious that Heaven had raised him up for some important work, and he could not rest till he had

accomplished it. He had himself been an unbeliever, but contrary to the usual practice of converted infidels, he was as liberal towards unbelievers, and as unrestrained in his intercourse with them, as though his own orthodoxy had never been questioned. I learned subsequently that his conduct in this respect, had induced some persons more remarkable for their zeal than their insight into the motives of human conduct, to suspect that he had never been really converted, but was at heart an unbeliever still ; but he was not a man to be disturbed by such ungenerous suspicions, by whomsoever they might be entertained. He kept on the even tenor of his way, acting always according to the promptings of his own heart, or his convictions of right, leaving the world to make its own comments.

We conversed for some time on the various efforts which had been made at different periods by professed free thinkers and philosophers, to overthrow Christianity, and their general ill success. This ill success I attempted to account for by the want of character in the free thinkers themselves, and by the general ignorance and stupidity of the multitude, who always had shown more alacrity in receiving the impositions of crafty priests and wily statesmen, than in listening to the instructions of philosophy and good sense. This I said somewhat against my conscience, chiefly for the purpose of drawing out Mr. Morton, and inducing him to give the opinions he himself might entertain. For, I had myself begun to suspect that religion had a deeper hold upon the human heart than unbelievers commonly imagine.

"I think," said Mr. Morton, "the real cause of failure on the part of unbelievers in uprooting religion, lies much deeper than your remarks would imply. Religion is a fact in the natural history of man, since we find it wherever we find man. It must then proceed from a law of his nature, or a fundamental want of his soul. If this be so, its destruction would imply not merely a change of his views, but a radical change of his nature, his conversion into a different sort of being."

"Man, then, you hold to be naturally religious?"

"I hold that the ideas or conceptions, which he attempts to embody and realize, in his forms of religious faith and worship, are intuitions of reason ; and without reason I suppose you would hardly contend man would be man."

"Surely not. But I am not certain that these conceptions are intuitions of reasons. One of these conceptions

is that of the existence of God. "But I have no conception of such an existence; I cannot even conceive the possibility of such an existence."

"All in good time. We are concerning ourselves for the present with man, not with God. For the present at least, let us follow the poet,

> 'Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
> The proper study of mankind is man.'

Man, I take it, in his forms of religious faith and worship, seeks successfully or unsuccessfully, to realize his conceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good. These conceptions are the fundamental elements of religion; and they are also under one aspect the fundamental elements of reason, without which reason would not be reason."

"Develop your meaning, if you please, at greater length."

"Without confidence, trust, hope, we could not live a moment, for we could perform no duty tending to our own preservation or that of society. But at the bottom of all confidence, trust, hope, there is always a conception of the true, and even an assumption that it is true that matters will or will not turn out thus and so. It is an unquestionable fact that we are compelled by the very constitution of our intelligence to regard things, among other relations, always under the relation of true or false. All our reasonings imply it, and all our actions proceed on the assumption of it. Now we could not conceive of things as true or false, had we not a general conception of truth, of truth in itself. Why do I call this particular proposition true, and that one false? Because this answers to my conception of truth, and that one does not. Ask the same question in relation to any number of propositions you please, and the same answer must be returned. This proves that my conception is broader than any particular truth, nay, that it embraces universal truth. Without this conception I could not perceive any difference between truth and falsehood; I should have no standard,—true or false,—by which to measure one or the other. This conception, conformity to which is to me the test of truth in all particular things, or propositions, is what I term the conception of the true in itself.

"But we not only regard things under the relation of true or false, but we also regard them under the relation of beauty or its opposite. There must then be in the intelligence the conception of the beautiful. If we have not this

conception, I cannot understand whence come our emotions on beholding distant mountains with harmonious outlines, the tranquil lake sleeping sweetly beneath the moonbeams, the masculine form of man, the graceful form and delicate features of woman, an act of heroism, or of disinterested affection; or those emotions we are conscious of when we ramble over the wild and sequestered scenes of nature; survey piles of moss-covered ruins; linger on spots where man has contended manfully for his rights; enter the solemn temple where generations of our forefathers have worshipped, or stand among the dead and think of the nations which were, but are not. Strike out from the soul the conception of the beautiful, poetry, painting, sculpture, all the fine arts, with the miracles of which man has doubled his existence and embellished nature, would fall; most of the generous and touching sentiments of our nature would languish, and the universe would wear to our eyes one uniform, silent, drab-colored hue.

"Suppose us deprived of the idea of the good, we could conceive no ground of preference. All events, all actions, all things, would be alike indifferent. We could never say This is better than That. Useful and injurious, just and unjust, right and wrong, would be unmeaning terms. Life could have no purpose, exertion no aim. Existence would be to us as non-existence. But this is not the case. We unquestionably do regard persons, events, actions, and things under the relation of good or evil. We are ever asking, 'Who will show us any good?' But in conceiving of things as good, we necessarily conceive of something by virtue of which they are good, and the absence of which would leave them evil. We consequently have the conception of the good in itself.

"We have, then, these three ideas, of the true, the beautiful, and the good. These ideas, since they have manifested themselves in the whole history of mankind, belong to the race; and as without them we could not be reasonable beings, we may term them constituent elements of reason. But these ideas are not inactive. They are always struggling to realize themselves. We are ever asking ourselves, what is the true? What is the beautiful? What is the good? and exerting ourselves to possess them. We have a deep craving for them. And this craving, perhaps, in the last analysis, resolves itself into a craving for the infinite.

We crave the infinite, and this craving of the infinite, is under one of its aspects, the religious sentiment."

"But do you think it true that all men have this craving for the infinite?"

"Are they ever satisfied with the finite? The lamb crops its flowery food, lies down to rest, and ruminates in peace. Is it so with man? Gratify all his senses, lodge him in the marble palace, feast him on the rarest dainties of every clime, let music as voices from the invisible soothe him, flatter his ambition, let senates thrill with his eloquence, states and empires hang on his nod;—power, wealth, fame, pleasure, fail to fill up the measure of his wants, and they leave him poor and needy, ever seeking what he has not, sighing for what lies still beyond him. Man is never satisfied. The chant of the poet is but one long monotonous wail of the soul weary of what it has, and looking to what it has not, and cannot reach. The artist can never transfer to his marble or his canvass the visions of beauty which haunt his soul, and make him burn with fruitless passion. The philosopher, poring over the volume open round and about or within him, till reason approaches the verge of insanity, is ever finding new riddles to rede, new hieroglyphics to decipher; ever rages within him the 'eternal thirst to know,' to pierce the darkness, leap through the unknown, and grasp the infinite. This universal dissatisfaction of the soul with what it has, this perpetual craving for what lies beyond and above it, this eternal upshooting toward the boundless and the perfect, is what I call, under one of its aspects the religious sentiment, and this sentiment is universal, eternal and indestructible."

"But admitting the existence of this sentiment, may we not regard it as the result of education? May we not ascribe its origin to the fact, that in childhood and youth our heads are filled with words about the infinite, so that in all after-life we are unable to satisfy ourselves with what is finite and earthly?"

"I should think not. Education has no creative power; it can merely unfold and direct the powers which nature confers. It cannot make a poet of a horse, nor a mathematician of an ape. Education may undoubtedly do much toward determining the forms this sentiment shall wear, the positive institutions in which it may be embodied; but it cannot originate the tendency itself, unless we ascribe to it a power of completely altering, not merely the manifesta-

tions of a being, but also its permanent and indestructible nature. But even if education could produce the result in question, how comes it that man is the only race of beings known that so educates itself? Must it not result from something peculiar in the human race? If so, it virtually amounts to the same thing.

"Besides, if you form a conception of the finite, you must also of the infinite, for the two are correlative, and contemporary in reason. Educated or uneducated, we all have the idea of the infinite, and, what is more, we cannot get rid of it even if we would."

"Why not?"

"Do you not conceive of yourself as finite?"

"Certainly."

"And what is that you say, when you say you are finite?"

"That I am limited, bounded."

"Not infinite. You see, sir, that you presuppose the idea of the infinite, the moment you undertake to describe yourself as finite."

"But if all men have the conception of the infinite, and a craving for it, if all men have the conceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good, which you say are the fundamental elements of religion, how happens it, that all men have not a religion, and in fact one and the same religion?"

"Your question will be answered if you distinguish between the religious sentiment and the forms of faith and worship by which men seek to realize it. The sentiment is natural, invariable, and indestructible; but the form is artificial, variable, and transitory. We are religious beings by virtue of the fact that we have the conceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good; we have a religion only when we have embodied these conceptions in an institution, such as was Judaism, Greek and Roman polytheism, or, during the middle ages, Catholicism. When the prevailing religion, that is, the dominant religious institution of the epoch, fails to represent all that we can conceive of the true, the beautiful, and the good, we break away from it, and are for the time being without religion.

"Take your own case. You had all the conceptions which are the elements of religion, but as you did not find at the moment you began your inquiries, a religious institution which embodied them all to the satisfaction of your understanding, you doubted of all religion, and became an

unbeliever. You are not yet able to combine these elements in a manner to satisfy yourself, and therefore, though I hold you to be religious, you have as yet no religion.

"The reason why the prevailing institution does not satisfy you, is either in the fact that you do not fully comprehend it, or that your ideal is above it. You may have seen the religion of your country from a low and unfavorable point of sight, and may have therefore inferred that it embodies less of truth, beauty and goodness than it actually does. In this case it is not that religion you have rejected, but something else to which you have given its name.

"Admit, however, that you fully comprehend it, perceive it precisely as it is, and are really able to take in more of truth, beauty, and goodness than it represents, still you have one or two inquiries to make before you can be justified in rejecting Christianity. Does what passes for Christianity fully represent the ideal of Jesus? Is it equal to what Jesus designed to institute? Is it a perfect realization of the conception of Jesus? If not,—and I am sure that it is not,—then you should seek to ascertain the conception of Jesus, the amount of truth, beauty and goodness he contemplated."

"And if that be below my ideal?"

"Then you must turn prophet, and preach a new religion. You have no other alternative. If you will do this, and show me that you really comprehend more of truth, beauty and goodness, than Jesus did, I will become one of your disciples, and, if need be, follow you to the cross."

CHAPTER XX.—GOD.

"But all this, though very well. fails to reach my case. Grant I have the conceptions of which you speak, still I have no conception of God, and without God, I can hardly be religious. I not only have no conception of God, but I cannot even form one."

"If you mean to say that you have no *definite* conception of God, that you cannot define the idea of God, you doubtless are correct. But if you mean that you can have *no* conception of God, I must beg leave to differ from you."

"But what conception can I form of God? What is God?"

"He is spirit."

"But what is spirit?"

"Spirit is something to be described chiefly by negatives;

we can easily tell what it is not, but not so easily what it is. Nevertheless, I apprehend that you may attain to a proximate idea of what it is, if you attend to the manner in which we commonly use the word spirit.

"The use of this word spirit, is various. We say the spirit of the remark, and a spirited remark, spirit of nature, spirit of the universe, spirit of truth, spirit of man, a man of spirit, spirit of the affair, spirit of wine, &c. Now in all these and the like cases, I apprehend that we use the word to designate the *reality* and *force* of the thing or subject of which we speak. 'The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.' The mere form or verbal enactment of the legislative authority, is not the law; the intent, the reality, the *spirit* of the enactment, that which is actually intended by the legislative authority, is the law, obedience to which gives life.

"We say 'the spirit of his assertion.' In this case we make more or less clearly in our minds, a distinction between the form of the assertion, the literal words used, technically interpreted, and the general scope and meaning, the real intention. Here the force and reality of the assertion, the real thing asserted, is what we would designate by the phrase, 'spirit of his assertion.'

"By a chemical process we extract a substance from corn, which, when diluted with water, we call *ardent spirits.* Here again is the same radical meaning of the word. We have extracted the force, the strength, the essence of the corn, and we term it spirit. Etymological research into the word, would confirm this result, but I waive it as unnecessary.

"Now the human mind is, to say the least, so constituted, that it must believe that what is, is; that a thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time. That which exists it must believe is something. In all objects which we see we recognise an existence. We do not believe that the universe is a mere apparition, a mere sense-shadow. Something is at the bottom of it. Something lies back of all appearances and shines out in all appearances. The phenomena around us may change their colors or their forms, they may now be putting forth the buds and blossoms of spring, or wearing the thick foliage of summer, or the rich and varied and golden hues of autumn, or stand in the chilling nakedness of winter; yet amid all these changes, we seem to ourselves to recognise something which changes

not,—a permanent, indestructible essence, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. This something is what we mean by reality. Amid all these appearances, these sense-shadows, these flitting apparitions, these perpetual changes, we believe there is something real, permanent, unchangeable.

"Now this real, permanent, unchangeable something, we believe to be in every thing which exists, and to be that which exists, and only that. It is always *the* thing. That which is not real, permanent, unchangeable, is to us no existence, no being, but a mere shadow, an unsubstantial form, a nothing. The reality, the permanent substance, the living force of that of which we speak, that which constitutes its essence, and makes it what it is, is then, if I mistake not, what we mean by its *spirit.* The spirit of a man, is the real, the permanent, the substantial man, as distinguished from the form, the shadow, or changing apparition which environs him. Take what is real, substantial, unchangeable in man, that which constitutes him man wherever he is, and keeps him man in spite of all the modifications of disposition or character to which he may be subjected, in time or space, and you have the spirit of man; that is, you have the reality, the ground, the substance of the being called man, so far as he contains them in himself.

"Extend your thoughts now from man to the universe. Penetrate beyond and beneath all forms and shadows, all that is changeable and transitory, that is not, but appears; seize what is real, substantial, what constitutes the ground and reality of all existences, that which remains unchanged amidst all changes, which

> 'Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
> Glows in the stars and blossoms in the trees;
> Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
> Spreads undivided, operates unspent;'

and you have what may be termed the spirit of the universe, the life, the essence, the ground, the living force of all that is.

"It follows from this that the spiritual is always the real, the substantial, in opposition to those who regard it as chimerical, as merely imaginary. Hence also that which we regard as the real, the substantial, is always the invisible. That which is seen, which we examine with our senses, is never to us, did we but know it, the thing itself. It is mere appearance, shadow, pointing to a reality back of it, a sub-

stance which sends it forth, but which it is not. We always call that which is permanent, immutable, in the thing,—not its apparition,—the thing itself, and this always transcends the senses,—is transcendental. Spirit, is in fact, the only reality of which we ever do or ever can form any conception. Men are materialists only because they misinterpret or misname their own beliefs.

"Now, God is spirit. He is then the life, the being, the force, the substance of whatever is. In light he is the light, in life he is the life; in soul he is the soul, in reason he is the reason, in truth he is the truth, in cause he is causality, in beauty he is the beautiful; in goodness he is the good—God.* Wherever we attain to that which is real, which absolutely exists, which possesses a real, living force, we attain to God. In all these forms, in all these changing objects, whether in the natural world or the moral, which are forever passing or repassing before our eyes, is there not always one thing which we seek? Amidst all these mutations which oppress and sadden our hearts, and make us at times exclaim, 'This world is all a fleeting show,' do we not seek the permanent, and that which changes not? In these forms of faith which distract us, these creeds, dogmas, theories of the moral and intellectual world, so full of vanity, ever varying and imparting life never, seek we not something which is not vain, varying, distracting, which is not dead, nor subject to death, but living and life-giving? Wearied and worn with the endless windings of our pilgrimage, finding our journey ever beginning and never ending, that toil, toil, eternal task-work is our lot, sigh we not for deliverance, to be freed from our labours, and to find repose? Weary and heavy laden we would throw off our burdens and be at rest. The soul cries out for an ineffable repose. Now, what we seek in all this, is God. He is always the one thing we are seeking after. Amidst the variable and the transitory he is the immutable and the permanent. Amidst clashing and distracting forms of faith, he is the truth; to the soul aspiring to be wise and good, he is wisdom and goodness; to the weary and heavy laden he is rest, repose. In all things we seek a reality, and all reality in the last analysis is God.

* I am not sure but I am indebted to an extract which I have somewhere met with from a Hindoo writing for the thought here expressed, as well as in part for the language, but I have no leisure at present to make the necessary reference.

"God is to us the invisible substance, the invisible reality of all that arrests our senses, excites our minds, or touches our hearts; the invisible universe of which this outward, visible universe is the shadow, the apparition, or manifestation. Its life, being, cause, substance, reality are in him, in whom we, as a part of it, 'live and move and have our being.'

"To the question, then, what is God? the best answer I can give, is, that he is the unseen, unchangeable, and permanent reality of this mighty apparition which men call nature, or the universe. You may say that this answer is vague and unsatisfactory, that it defines nothing. Be it so. I began by saying God cannot be defined. He is indefinable because he is infinite, and infinite is that which cannot be defined. Nevertheless this answer I think, with the remarks I have made, will help you, not to comprehend the incomprehensible, but to apprehend it."

CHAPTER XXI.—THE DEMONSTRATION.

"I think I catch some glimmering of what you mean; but allowing that your answer to the question, what is God, is satisfactory, still I wish it demonstrated that there is a God."

"I can hardly be expected to give you a complete demonstration in the course of a single conversation. What I have already said, would be satisfactory to my own mind; but if it is not to yours, we will look at the problem a little closer. I suppose, if I make it as certain that there is a God, as you are that you exist, it will answer your purpose?"

"Yes. I shall be satisfied with that degree of certainty."

"I have already, I believe, established the fact that we have the conceptions of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and that we should cease to be men if we had them not; or in other words, that divested of these conceptions, reason would not be reason."

"That point I consider settled."

"If we are compelled by the very constitution of our being to entertain the idea of the true, for instance, we must believe that something is true. If I believe something is true, I must believe in the true in itself, for it is only by means of the conception of the true in itself, that I am able to conceive of any particular truth. Besides, I have shown that

the conception of the true, as a conception of reason, is a conception of the true in itself. Now the true in itself, is necessarily, universally, and eternally true. For, if we could conceive any condition under which it would not be true, then its truth would depend on conditions, and the true in itself, would be proved to be not the true in itself.

"Now, when we say a thing is true, we say that it is, and is just what it purports to be. That which has no existence, can have no truth. The truth of a matter cannot exceed its existence. To say a thing exists is to say that it is something, a reality, a substance. When therefore we say something is true, we say something exists, that there is a substance."

"But I do not see that you are making much progress."

"Be patient. We have now found that inasmuch as we have the conception of the true, we have also the conception of substance. But we have the conception of the true in itself, that is, of the universally and eternally and unconditionally true. Then, if I am right in identifying the true with substance, in saying that the true must, so far as it is true, exist, be a reality, then we must admit the existence of substance in itself; that is, a substance which requires no conditions out of itself in order to be a substance, and which therefore is always and everywhere a substance, that is, absolute substance."

"Do you mean by substance matter?"

"I might ask you what you mean by matter, but let that pass. I mean by substance that which really exists, which is a reality. Whether it be matter or spirit, is not now the point of inquiry. Some have supposed that what we term matter and spirit, are neither of them substances, but two modes by which absolute substance manifests itself. But this by the way. We have now found by analyzing the conception of reason, conception of absolute substance. That is, a substance which is substance in itself, containing in itself the grounds of its own existence. It is therefore uncreated and independent. If it were created it would be a substance only under certain relations, and the idea of absolute substance would have to be carried further back and predicated of the creator. The very conception of absolute substance precludes all necessity of any conditions of its existence,—all idea of its depending on aught beside itself to be, or to be what it is.

"This absolute substance must also be one, and can be but

one. Two absolutes were as much an absurdity, as two infinites, or two almighties. It is not a mere aggregate or totality, made up of parts. If we suppose it made up of parts, we must suppose each of the parts an absolute substance, and then a part would be equal to the whole; or we must suppose none of the parts are absolute, and then it would be as impossible to obtain the absolute from their union, or aggregation, as it would be the infinite from the union of an indefinite number of units. The absolute then can exist only in unity, and as the substance is absolute substance, it of course must be one and one only.

"This substance is also a cause. There can be no cause without a substance, unless nothing be capable of producing something. That every cause is a substance, that it to say, a real existence, nobody denies; that every substance, or real existence, of which we conceive, is also a cause, may not perhaps at first sight be quite so evident; but I think I can make it out.

"We have in our minds unquestionably the idea of cause. By cause we do not understand merely invariable antecedence, as a certain philosopher pretends, but an active, productive force. We conceive of various causes, but of all causes as either relative or absolute, that is, as causes within certain limits and under certain conditions, or as a cause without limits, without conditions, always and everywhere a cause. The relative implies the absolute. The absolute can be found only in the absolute. The absolute cause then must be identified with absolute substance. The absolute substance is then absolute cause.

"Moreover, I know substance only under the relation of cause. My real conception of all existences is of them as so many causes. I know myself only as a cause. I become acquainted with myself, I may say attain to the conception of my personal existence, only by surprising myself in the act of doing or causing something. I will to raise my arm; I attend to what is said to me, to the impressions made on my organs of sense. Now in every act of volition, of willing, of attention, there is an actor, a cause, and this cause is precisely what I mean when I say I, myself. *I* will, *I* attend. I know myself then as a power capable of producing effects, that is, as a cause.

"I know the external world only as something which produces effects on me, or on itself. Its various objects produce impressions on my organs of sense, and I see them

producing certain effects on one another, and I can ascertain their existence no further than I can find them producing effects; consequently I know them only as causes. But they are not absolute causes. I see them limit one another, and they are also limited, up to a certain extent, by my causality. Nor am I an absolute cause. I cannot do whatever I will. My power is bounded on every side, and I am not more certain of my causality itself, than I am of my weakness.

"But if both nature and myself are mere limited causes, causes only within certain limits, and under certain conditions, the absolute cause, which our reason demands, must be back of both nature and us, a substance more ultimate than either. It can be found only in the absolute substance, which is not only absolute substance, but absolute cause. I thus obtain the conclusion, not only that absolute substance is absolute cause, but that it is something above and independent of nature and of myself; therefore that neither nature nor myself is the absolute cause.

"I have now established the existence of one, absolute, original, independent substance, which is also absolute cause. Now our radical idea of God, is that of a cause, creator. Take away from God the idea of cause, and he would not be God. In establishing then the existence of a universal and absolute cause, one, and independent, have I not established the existence of God?"

"Not to my satisfaction. Before you have finished your work, you must establish the fact that this absolute cause, is not only a cause, but also intelligent, and personal. For as yet I do not see that you have advanced beyond pantheism."

"There is nothing pantheistic in the views I have thus far advanced. Pantheism is of two sorts: one, a low sort of pantheism, identifies God with nature; this is properly atheism: the other sinks nature in God, and recognises no existence but that of God; this was the pantheism of the famous Spinoza, which some people have been foolish enough to call atheism. Spinoza was so absorbed in the idea of God, that he could see nothing else. But let this pass. The personality of this absolute cause, by which I suppose is meant the fact that it is not a mere fatal cause, but a free intentional cause, I think, follows as a necessary induction from its independence. It is an absolute cause; nothing lies back of it compelling it to act. Its motive to

activity must be drawn from itself, and I cannot conceive a cause acting freely, from its own suggestions, unless it wills to act. Its independence and unity, would therefore to my mind imply its personality in the only sense in which personality can be predicated of God. But I do not insist on this.

"The intelligence of God, for I shall henceforth speak of the absolute cause, under this title, is sometimes deduced from the fact that intelligence appears in the effect; but on this argument I do not rely. I get at his intelligence by another process.

"The nature, the characteristic of reason is intelligence. Reason not only has the power to know, but actually knows. It is for us the principle of intelligence. All that we know at all we know by virtue of reason. It is by its light, that I perceive my own existence, that I am conscious of what passes within me, that I take cognizance of my thoughts, my sensations, passions, emotions, affections. On its authority I affirm that I exist, that you exist, that the external world exists. All the light I have comes from it; and its authority always suffices me.

"This is not all. You and I both believe reason to be authoritative. You try to make me believe that reason determines so and so, and you feel that if you succeed in making me see the point as you do I must admit it. You would think me a madman if I denied the relations of numbers, or refused to admit plain, legitimate, logical deductions from acknowledged premises. All mankind do the same. What each believes to be reasonable, he believes all ought to accept.

"Nobody ever asks for any higher authority than reason. What we call demonstration is only stripping a subject of its envelopes, and showing it to reason as it is. If when seen in its nakedness reason approves it, we say it is demonstrated to be true; if reason disapproves it, we say it is demonstrated to be false."

"It is hardly necessary to be thus particular in establishing the authority of reason with me, for I have never questioned it. Religious people are those who deny the authority of reason."

"Nevertheless, sir, I am about to make an application of reason from which, if you are not previously prepared, you will recoil. But assuming, for the present, the authority of reason, I shall insist on your yielding to every

legitimate application of it. Now, we speak of reason as individual, as though it were yours or mine; but nevertheless, I believe it declares that it is not individual. Were it individual it were personal, and we could control its conceptions. But all its conceptions have in fact a character of necessity. We cannot control them. We cannot make it affirm what we will. It declares two and two are four, and we have no power of will to make it declare otherwise.

"Nay, more, we always look upon the conceptions of reason as possessing authority beyond the sphere of individual consciousness. They all bear the character of universality and absoluteness. They transcend time and space. We regard justice, for instance, as something eternal and immutable. What is just now we believe was always just and always will be just. Its character of justice is independent of time and place, and of the individuals who entertain the idea of justice. So of truth, as I have already shown. The conceptions of reason therefore are not relative, dependent, and temporary, but independent, eternal, and absolute. If reason reveals its conceptions as absolute, it then reveals itself as absolute. On the same authority then that I affirm my existence, I affirm the absoluteness of reason.

"Now, reason is something or it is nothing. If it were nothing, a non-entity, could it reveal itself, impose its laws upon my understanding, and speak to me a clear and independent voice in spite of my will? I have only reason by which to determine the fact that I entertain the ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and I have its authority equally express, that it is a reality, and the highest reality I am acquainted with. If then it be an absolute reality, as it declares itself to be, it must be identical with the absolute substance, for I have shown that there cannot be two absolutes. Then the absolute substance, is not only absolute cause, but absolute reason. The essence of reason is intelligence; absolute reason must be absolute intelligence, intelligence in itself. God then is not a mere blind cause, but an intelligent cause, intelligence in itself."

"But do you mean to assert that my intelligence is absolute, that my reason is God?"

"No, sir. I mean to assert no such thing. I mean merely to assert that the reason which makes its appearance in us, and whose scattered rays constitute our intelligence, is itself above us, and independent of us. When it appears in us it is of course subjected to human conditions, which

are frailty and error. But at the same time, it reveals itself as stretching beyond us, and assures us that in that world into which it permits us to look as through a glass darkly, it possesses a character of absolute intelligence. Who is there to whom reason does not reveal itself as containing more light than he has beheld, more truth than he has comprehended? It is not reason subjected to the infirmities of the flesh, but reason taken absolutely, reason in its fulness, in its Godhead, of which I speak. I speak of it in its absoluteness, because it assures me that it is absolute, and if I may not trust it when it gives me this assurance, I know not what right I have to rely on it when it assures me of my own existence.

"Reason once established in its absoluteness, the intelligence of God is demonstrated. From his intelligence and independence, I think the induction of his personality follows as a matter of course. His freedom is asserted in his independence. He is independent and absolute. No power out of himself then can force him to act. He cannot be subjected to any external necessity. All the necessity he can be under of acting must be in himself. He is then perfectly free. He need not act unless he please; and he may act as he pleases. Conceive a being thus free, and at the same time absolute intelligence, and tell me if it be possible for him to act without self-consciousness, without knowing that he acts and wherefore he acts? Must he not from the very nature of the case act from volition, because he wills to act? Now, a being that is self-conscious, who knows what he does, and acts from volition, it strikes me, must possess personality in the highest degree. I am a person no further than I am a free intentional causality. But God is an infinitely free intentional causality. Therefore he must be infinitely more of a person than I am."

"But you have as yet clothed your God with no moral attributes."

"All in good time. But beware how you undertake to cut the Divinity up into attributes. He is ONE. He is, as we have thus found him, absolute substance, an infinite, free, intelligent, intentional causality. Would you determine whether he is just or not, you must descend into reason, and inquire whether you have the absolute idea of justice. You will find this idea, as we have already found the absolute idea of goodness. The absolute can reside only in the absolute. God then is not only absolute substance, an inde-

pendent, free, intelligent causality, but he is also just and good. You must go through with all the absolute ideas of reason, and when you have exhausted these you have determined the number and character of the attributes of the Deity."

"I am not certain that I have followed you through all the steps of your analysis and induction, but if I have, and rightly comprehended you, you have indicated a process by which the existence of God may be as satisfactorily demonstrated as any article of human belief. But you must not expect me to acquiesce at once. I must have time to reflect, and to go over the subject in my own mind. I can hardly persuade myself as yet, that you have not committed some mistake, for your conclusion seems too evident not to be doubtful."

"Take all the time you please. You say rightly I have *indicated* a process. I have only indicated it. To give a complete demonstration would require more time than I have at my command, and more patience than I fear you have to bestow upon so dry, though so important a subject."

"But Mr. Morton, though you have obtained a God, I do not see that he has done any thing. How do you demonstrate the fact that he creates?"

CHAPTER XXII.—CREATION.

"You will bear in mind, that we have found God as a cause, not a potential cause, occasionally a cause, accidentally a cause, but absolute cause, cause in itself, always a cause, and everywhere a cause. Now a cause that causes nothing is no cause at all. If then God be a cause, he must cause something, that is, create. Creation then is necessary."

"Do you mean to say that God lies under a necessity of creating?"

"God lies under nothing, for he is over all, and independent of all. The necessity of which I speak is not a foreign necessity, but a necessity of his own nature. What I mean is, he cannot be what he is without creating. It would be a contradiction in terms to call him a cause, and to say that he causes nothing."

"But out of what does God create the world? Out of nothing, as our catechisms have it?"

"Not out of nothing certainly, but out of himself, out of his own fulness. You may form an idea of creation by noting what passes in the bosom of your own conscious-

ness. I will to raise my arm. My arm may be palsied, or a stronger than mine may hold it down, so that I cannot raise it. Nevertheless I have created something; to wit, the will or intention to raise it. In like manner as I by an effort of my will or an act of my causality, create a will or intention, does God create the world. The world is God's will or intention, existing in the bosom of his consciousness, as my will or intention exists in the bosom of mine.

"Now, independent of me, my will or intention has no existence. It exists, is a reality no further than I enter into it; and it ceases to exist, vanishes into nothing the moment I relax the causative effort which gave it birth. So of the world. Independent of God it has no existence. All the life and reality it has are of God. It exists no further than he enters into it, and it ceases to exist, becomes a nonentity the moment he withdraws or relaxes the creative effort which calls it into being.

"This, if I mistake not, strikingly illustrates the dependence of the universe, of all worlds and beings on God. They exist but by his will. He willed, and they were; commanded, and they stood fast. He has but to will and they are not; to command, and the heavens roll together as a scroll, or disappear as the morning mist before the rising sun. This is easily seen to be true because he is their life, their being;—in him, says an apostle, 'we live and move and have our being.'

"The question is sometimes asked, where is the universe? Where is your resolution, intention? In the bosom of your consciousness. So the universe, being God's will or intention, exists in the consciousness of the Deity. The bosom of the infinite consciousness is its place, its residence, its home. God then is all round and within it, as you are all round, and within your intention. Here is the omnipresence of the Deity. You cannot go where God is not, unless you cease to exist. Not because God fills all space, as we sometimes say, thus giving him as it were extension, but because he embosoms all space, as we embosom our thoughts in our own consciousness.

"This view of creation, also, shows us the value of the universe, and teaches us to respect it. It is God's will, God's intention, and is divine, so far as it really exists, and therefore is holy, and should be reverenced. Get at a man's intentions, and you get at his real character. A man's intentions are the revelations of himself; they show you

what the man is. The universe is the revelation of the Deity. So far as we read and understand it, do we read and understand God. When I am penetrating into the heavens and tracing the revolutions of the stars, I am learning the will of God; when I penetrate the earth and explore its strata, study the minuter particles of matter and their various combinations, I am mastering the science of theology; when I listen to the music of the morning songsters, I am listening to the voice of God; and it is his beauty I see when my eye runs over the varied landscape or 'the flower-enamelled mead.'

"You see here the sacred character which attaches to all science, shadowed forth through all antiquity, by the right to cultivate it being claimed for the priests alone. But every man should be a priest; and the man of science, who does not perceive that he is also a priest, but half understands his calling. In ascertaining these laws of nature, as you call them, you are learning the ways of God. Put off your shoes then when you enter the temple of science, for you enter the sanctuary of the Most High.

"But man is a still fuller manifestation of the Deity. He is superior to all outward nature. Sun and stars pale before a human soul. The powers of nature, whirlwinds, tornadoes, cataracts, lightnings, earthquakes, are weak before the power of thought, and lose all their terrific grandeur in presence of the struggles of passion. Man with a silken thread turns aside the lightning and chains up the harmless bolt. Into man enters more of the fulness of the Divinity, for after his own likeness God made man. The study of man then is still more the study of the Divinity, and the science of man becomes a still nearer approach to the science of God.

"This is not all. Viewed in this light what new worth and sacredness attach to this creature man, on whom kings, priests, and nobles have for so many ages trampled with sacrilegious feet! Whoso wrongs a man defaces the image of God, desecrates a temple of the living God, and is guilty not merely of a crime, but of a sin. Indeed, all crimes become sins, all offences against man, offences against God. Hear this, ye wrong-doers, and know that it is not from your feeble brother only, that ye have to look for vengeance. Hear this, ye wronged and down-trodden; and know that God is wronged in that ye are wronged, and his omnipotent arm shall redress you, and punish your oppres-

sors. Man is precious in the sight of God, and God will vindicate him.'

"All this is very fine, but it strikes me that you identify the Deity with his works. You indeed call him a cause, but he causes or creates, if I understand you, only by putting himself forth. Independent of him, his works have no reality. He is their life, being, substance. Is not this pantheism?"

"Not at all. God is indeed the life, being, substance of all his works, yet is he independent of his works. I am in my intention, and my intention is nothing any further than I enter into it; but nevertheless my intention is not *me;* I have the complete control over it. It does not exhaust me. It leaves me with all my creative energy, free to create anew as I please. So of God. Creation does not exhaust him. His works are not necessary to his being, they make up no part of his life. He retains all his creative energy, and may put it forth anew as seems to him good. Grant he stands in the closest relation to his works; he stands to them in the relation of a cause to an effect, not in the relation of identity, as pantheism supposes."

"But waiving the charge of pantheism, it would seem from what you have said that creation must be as old as the Creator. What then will you do with the Mosaic cosmogony, which supposes creation took place about six thousand years ago?"

"I leave the Mosaic cosmogony where I find it. As to the inference that creation must be as old as the Creator, I would remark, that a being cannot be a creator till he creates, and as God was always a creator, always then must there have been a creation; but it does not follow from this that creation must have always assumed its present form, much less that this globe in its present state must have existed from all eternity. It may have been, for aught we know, subjected to a thousand revolutions and transformations, and the date of its habitation by man may indeed have been no longer ago than Hebrew chronology asserts.

"But much of this difficulty about the date of creation arises from supposing that creation must have taken place in time. But the creations of God are not in time but in eternity. Time begins with creation, and belongs to created nature. With God there is no time, as there is no space. He transcends time and space. He inhabiteth eternity, and is both time and space. When we speak of beginning in

relation to the origin of the universe, we should refer to the source whence it comes, not to the time when it came. Its beginning is not in time but in God, and is now as much as it ever was.

"You should think of the universe as something which is, not as something which was. God did not, strictly speaking, make the world, finish it, and then leave it. He makes it, he constitutes it now. Regard him therefore not, if I may borrow the language of Spinoza, as its 'temporary and transient cause, but as its permanent and indwelling cause;' that is, not as a cause which effects, and then passes off from his works, to remain henceforth in idleness, or to create new worlds; but as a cause which remains in his works, ever producing them, and constituting them by being present in them, their life, being, and substance. Take this view, and you will never trouble yourself with the question whether the world was created six thousand, or six million of years ago."

CHAPTER XXIII.—RESULTS.

This conversation with Mr. Morton threw some light on the great problems with which I had labored, and convinced me that the philosophy I had hitherto cherished was superficial and far from giving a complete and satisfactory account of the actual facts of human nature. I had done great injustice to man in reducing him to five senses and the operations of the understanding. There was more in him than I had seen. There were facts of his nature which could be traced to no empirical origin, transcendental facts, inherent in reason itself, and which it would by no means answer to leave out of the account.

Mr. Morton had assumed man to be naturally religious. Was he not right in this? How else could I account for the existence of religion as a fact of human history? Religion I find everywhere in history. No nation, tribe, or horde, however enlightened, ignorant, or savage, has as yet been discovered without some form of religious worship. Go where you will, you find the priest and the altar, man seeking to keep open some kind of communication with superior powers.

Nor is this all. Religion is not a mere unproductive fact in our his ory. Of all sentiments, the religious sentiment appears to be the strongest, and to exert the widest and most absolute dominion over the human race. At its bidding

hostile armies lay down their arms, and meet and embrace as brothers; at its voice kings and tyrants tremble on their thrones; the mother offers up her son in sacrifice, and the virgin vows chastity. Singular that a mere accidental fact, having no root in human nature, should be thus powerful, and so sway the passions, interests and affections of mankind!

No man is entirely free from the workings of this sentiment. Even I myself, in my doubts and unbelief, felt the need of holding intercourse with powers above me; and there were times when I could almost kneel down and pray. A poor mother saw her child fall into the river: she rushed in after it, and did all she could to rescue it, but in vain. She saw she could do no more, and that the child must drown. In an agony of despair, she stretched out her hands and exclaimed, "O thou great Unknown, save my child!" Did she not utter the voice of nature? In fact does there not always go with us the sense of the presence of an invisible being to whom we stand in certain undefined relations? When we fancy that we are alone, when solemn silence reigns around us, and all is still, do we not fear and tremble, and start we know not at what? Does it not seem to us that we are not alone, but standing as it were before a dread presence?

Then also there is the sense of insufficiency. I am oppressed with a sense of my insufficiency for myself. I start in life with high hopes and generous aims. I resolve to lead a life of strict virtue; but some how or other I am perpetually failing. I have yielded to temptation, and am expelled from the garden of innocence. For a time I weep, but soon I recover myself, resolve to try again; and again I fail. I see an excellence I cannot reach, approve a good, from which, though I struggle to gain it, I am ever departing. What shall I do? I feel the need of some succoring being to extend me an arm, that though I stumble I may not fall utterly. All of our race, who have attained to any experience, I apprehend, have felt this painful sense of insufficiency, that "it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps." Hence the universal demand for spiritual aid, for a communication with the powers above, that we may obtain assistance to wash out our sins, and to enable us to maintain our integrity for the future.

This feeling, I apprehend, lies at the bottom of all worship, and has given rise to all the rites and ceremonies of

religion. From the consciousness of sin, the need of atoning for it, and the need of divine aid in maintaining a holy life, have arisen the various sacrifices of man, animals, fruits, and flowers, which make up so great a part of all the religions of antiquity. Men did not submit to them because priests enjoined them; but because there was a deep want of the soul which demanded them. The form which they assumed, was, perhaps, not always the best, but all defects of this kind belonged to the general defective culture of the epoch in question.

Have not unbelievers ascribed too much to the craft of priests and statesmen? Priests have no doubt made of religion a trade, but they have been able to do this only because religion has had a strong hold on the consciences, or the affections of the people. Nor could they have originated religion. A priest is an officer of religion, and therefore must have been posterior to religion. Religion must have existed before it could have had ministers. Statesmen have no doubt found at times in religion a support for despotism, but only by availing themselves of its power over the people. Had not religion already swayed the people, it could have furnished no aid to the despot.

We consider art as natural to man, or springing from a natural want, because we find that man is everywhere an artist. The rude Indian polishes his bow, and paints the prow of his birchen canoe; the Indian maiden decorates her hair with feathers and shells, and the Indian mother binds the wampum around the neck of her child, bearing witness to the same indestructible instinct which shall immortalize a Phidias or a Praxiteles, a Michael Angelo or a Raphael. From the fact that man wars with man, constructs weapons and delights in battle, we infer that the fighting propensity is natural to him. Why not, then, from the fact that he everywhere venerates and adores, erects the altar and inducts the priest, infer that the religious sentiment is natural to him, that he is naturally religious?

But if religion be natural to man, it is useless to war against it. He is religious because he is man. So long then as he remains man he will have some kind of religious worship. Can the infidel change his nature? Can man be converted into a different order of being? If not, then let the infidel cease his warfare. He professes to respect nature, let him then respect it in man, and not less when it prompts him to adore, than when it prompts him to build himself a

cabin, clothe his body, or seek truth and goodness. Religion must be as indestructible as man's nature, and let us therefore cease to waste our time in trying to get rid of it.

But man not only seeks to adore; he also seeks to ascertain the true object of adoration. He inquires if there be really any object worthy of adoration, and if so, what and where? This question, Mr. Morton seemed to me to have answered. Reason demands an absolute cause, and this cause we are not, and the external world is not. Then it must be above both us and nature, the cause of its causality and ours. I look into reason and find that it contains the ideas of the finite and infinite. This idea of the infinite is not a secondary idea. I cannot derive it from any other idea. My ordinary experience makes me acquainted only with finite things. But from no imaginable number of finites can I deduce the infinite. I can draw from a thing only what is in it; and as the idea of the finite does not contain the infinite, I cannot deduce the infinite from it. Logically also the idea of the infinite must precede that of the finite. I cannot perceive a thing, as finite, unless I have at the same time the conception of the infinite from which to distinguish it. As my first experience is of finite things, the conception of the infinite must precede experience, and must therefore be a transcendental idea. That is, a conception of the pure reason, of the reason prior to all experience. If then I may trust reason, there must be somewhere the infinite. But I can predicate infinity neither of myself nor of nature. Then back of and above both nature and myself, there must be an infinite reality,—God. The conception of unity, of perfection, would lead me to the same result.

But may I trust reason? If not, I am in a sad condition. I have nothing but reason with which to show even that reason ought not to be trusted. Why shall I trust it when it declares it is not worthy of trust, rather than when it reveals to me my own existence, nature, and God? If it be not worthy of trust, then I have no ground for believing it when it declares it to be untrustworthy; but if it be worthy of trust at all, as it is one in all its degrees, why may I not trust it in its highest revelations, as well as in its lowest? But all this is unnecessary. I am not free in this matter. Reason addresses me always in an imperative voice, and its conceptions command my assent. I cannot discredit them if I would. Moreover, what have I always contended for? I have always extolled reason and condemned religious

people for depressing it. I have condemned them because I have supposed reason to be against them. I have then always admitted the authority of reason. I will do it now. If I do I see not how I can escape from Mr. Morton's conclusions. But, do I wish to escape from these conclusions? Not at all.

CHAPTER XXIV.—SUPERNATURALISM.

"I have been thinking over," said I to Mr. Morton, on meeting him a few days after the conversation I have recorded, "your reasoning in proof of the existence of a God; I have weighed it as carefully as I could, and I confess I am unable for the present to get away from it. But I do not see that you have made any use of inspiration. Your system seems to me only a system of rationalism, perhaps I should say, deism."

"We will not dispute about words," he replied. Nevertheless, I hold myself to be a supernaturalist as well as a rationalist, and I seem to myself to have a place for inspiration."

"What do you understand by inspiration, and what do you consider to be its office?"

"Your question is a short one, but it will require a long answer. Let me begin by saying, that men are prejudiced against inspiration, chiefly because they look upon it as an isolated fact, a sort of anomaly in our experience, without any analogy with the general and ordinary operations of the human mind. But this I hold to be incorrect. Inspiration is an unquestionable fact of human experience, and, if I am not much mistaken, is as explicable as any other fact.

"A favorite author with unbelievers, Thomas Paine, somewhere says in his *Age of Reason*, Whoever is in the habit of looking into himself, must observe that he has two classes of thoughts. We have one class of thoughts which spring up in our minds whenever we will to think of any particular subject; another class, which are involuntary, and come of their own accord. I am accustomed, he says, to treat these uninvited visitors with great respect; for I have learned that from them we obtain the most valuable part of our knowledge. I quote from memory and doubtless do not give his exact words, but I give his thought. Now, if I mistake not, here is a recognition of certain facts which will aid us to a right conception of inspiration.

"You will please to call to mind what I have heretofore said of reason. It is our only source of light. But reason

I have demonstrated to be absolute, divine. It is then superhuman, supernatural. Now, reason has, as Paine implies in the passage quoted, not only a voluntary activity, but a spontaneous activity. It not only acts when we by our wills call it into action, as when we will to think upon any particular subject; but it enters into activity of its own accord. That we all have thoughts and ideas which spring up in our minds without any effort of volition on our part, is what I think we must all have at times more or less distinctly noted.

"When you first doubted, first began to inquire, you had already, in your mind, the ideas you questioned. You had the belief in your own existence, in the existence of nature, and in that of God. You cannot even remember when you had not this belief. This belief was not of your own procuring. You had no agency in placing the ideas it implies in your mind. You may observe also that you began your intellectual life, not by denying, but by affirming. By what power did you affirm your own existence, that of nature, and that of God? Surely not by reflection. For when you began to reflect, this primitive affirmation was the subject-matter of your reflection.

"What I have affirmed of you I may affirm of the race. The race does not begin by reflecting, denying, and reasoning itself into conviction. It must believe something before it can deny, have ideas before it can reflect on them. Go back to the infancy of the race, and what do you discover? Doubt, reflection, philosophy? Not at all. The language of the primitive ages is affirmative: 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth:' 'God said let there be light, and there was light.' You are struck with the strength of faith you find, the undoubting confidence with which the mass affirm, what you and I should hesitate long before assenting to.

"From these and other facts with which I will not trouble you now, I infer that the human mind begins by affirmation, by faith, not by doubt. Now, the reflective reason or reason put into activity by our volitions, always begins by doubt, and proceeds by reflection, by reasoning. Its instruments are observation and logic. But in the infancy of the race, in the early chronicles of mankind, we find no employment of these instruments. Men see but they do not observe, believe but do not reason. Logic is not properly constituted till we have an Aristotle.

"Now this primitive affirmation by the race, and even by the individual, as it could not have been the result of reflection, must have been by virtue of the spontaneous activity of intelligence, reason acting by its own energy. Now the truths we affirm on the authority of the spontaneous activity of reason, we do not and cannot ascribe to ourselves. We are conscious that in the revelation of these truths we have taken no part. We have done nothing. We do not seem to ourselves to have any agency in the matter. We do not affirm what we affirm on our own authority. We therefore ascribe it to God, and call it inspiration, revelation.

"This primitive affirmation, prior to reflection, to all observation and reasoning, of the great principles of human faith, principles which lie at the bottom of all spiritual life, and form the subject-matter of all after mental action, is what the human race has always understood by inspiration. And in this you and I now see that they have been right. Reason we have identified with God. In reflection it is indeed subjected to the infirmities of the flesh; but in its spontaneous action, it acts independently of us, and is of course free from our imperfections. It acts then by virtue of its divine energy, and its revelations are real revelations from God.

"Those in whom this spontaneous activity is more remarkable than in the majority, seem to the multitude to be admitted more immediately into the secrets of the Almighty. They are therefore called the inspired, by way of eminence, and are looked upon as the confidants and interpreters of God. They are the priests, the prophets of mankind. Their chants become oracles, and are treasured up as the sacred word of God. Their laws and institutions are received as divine, and reverenced as religion.

"Observe, also, that this spontaneous activity of reason is always accompanied with a movement of the sensibility, with a great degree of enthusiasm. The prophet, therefore, always speaks in the language of enthusiasm. His prophecy is a chant, his revelation is a hymn, his language is poetry. In confirmation of my view, you may remark, that poetry in all languages is older than prose. The sacred books of all nations—which are their earliest literature—are written in poetry. The Hebrews, who were remarkable for their religious character, have given us in their literature scarcely a single example of prose. The Homeric poems date beyond authentic history; we know not when their

author flourished ; but Grecian prose is comparatively recent. The early literature of all modern nations consists in national songs and ballads.

"I understand, then, by inspiration the spontaneous revelations of reason ; and I call these revelations divine, because I hold reason to be divine. Its voice, is the voice of God, and what it reveals without any aid from human agency, is really and truly a divine revelation. They in whom this spontaneous reason is active in a high degree, raising them above their fellows into closer communion with God, are really and truly prophets of God. They know more of God and can tell us more of God than the rest of us. Rightly then are they reverenced as inspired messengers. Rightly too are their words received by the human race as authoritative, and respected as records of divine revelations.

"This word inspiration is applied to more subjects than one, though always with the same radical idea. The poet is said to be inspired, and every genuine poet is inspired. The lyric poet is inspired with a love of the lofty, the daring, the heroic, or the elegiac. A fire burns within him, kindles and exalts him, and he pours himself out in words which burn, exalt, or melt the souls of his listeners. The descriptive poet is inspired with a more gentle and peaceful kind of inspiration. He is inspired by a sense of beauty in nature or in art, which he seeks to reproduce in his verse.

"There is no radical difference between this inspiration proper to the poet, and that of the prophet. The poet is inspired by God under the aspect of love, beauty, joy, sorrow, liberty, heroism ; the prophet is inspired by God under the aspect of Sovereign, Father, Preserver, or Redeemer, and is moved by a sense of obedience, piety, sanctity, goodness. But in both it is one and the same God that inspires. The true poet utters as infallible truth in relation to the subject-matter of his song, as the prophet. The poems of the one are as authoritative, as far as they go, as the other's prophecies. Poetry, I am aware, enjoys no very high reputation for truth, but so far as it is genuine, it is the outspeaking of the Divinity, and embraces elements of universal truth. This explains why it is that the poet always commends himself to the universal mind, and his fame as his song is immortal.

"The prophet is the poet chanting the divine. His soul is full of God, and he pours himself out in a stream of

harmony on which float along the unsearchable things of God. God moves in him and speaks through him. He does not speak from himself, from reflection, human foresight and calculation, but as he is moved by the Holy Ghost; and he utters merely the words given him to utter.

"The character the inspiration assumes is determined by the genius and temper of the individual inspired. This man is inspired by the idea of the beautiful, and his whole aim is to realize it. But his individual genius and temper determine whether he shall attempt to do it by chanting a poem, composing a melody, pronouncing an oration, writing a book, or constructing a temple. Another man is filled with the idea of the Holy. He sees God everywhere and in all things. His soul is absorbed in God, and he becomes a David, an Isaiah, a Paul, a Fénelon, a Penn, a Swedenborg, an Oberlin.

"You may observe also that it is rare that one individual alone is inspired. The notion that God himself kindles up one man's torch, and that we all must go and light our tapers at that, is not to be received without some hesitation. Here I suppose I differ somewhat from the common view of inspiration. I cannot bring myself to believe that in any age or country the human race are wholly dependent for light and warmth on any one man. God places the fate of humanity in the hands of no one of her sons.

"This doctrine that only one or a few are inspired, and that the rest of them must go to them for light and warmth, is too near akin to the political doctrine which teaches that the mass must entrust themselves and their interests to the guidance of the enlightened few, to be wholly satisfactory to me. I always view with suspicion all doctrines which disinherit the masses and place them at the mercy of a few leaders. I believe God is impartial, that all his children share his love, and that he dispenses his favors alike to all. The opposite doctrine appears to me to be mischievous. It opens the door to the grossest abuses, and paves the way for the most intolerable tyranny.

"Nothing is more common, you know, than to find those who have no confidence in the people. Even the great and good Washington, though he loved the people, doubted whether they could be safely entrusted with so large a share of liberty as they are entrusted with by our political institutions. Alexander Hamilton, a no ordinary man, distrusts the people, and thinks we shall have to resort to monarchy at last; and

almost any day you please you shall meet men who have the greatest regard for the good of mankind, a profound reverence for the dignity of human nature, and who seldom let pass an opportunity of speaking of the infinite worth of the human soul, as it exists even in the humblest of our race, who nevertheless have no confidence in the people. They are afraid of crowds and look with a sort of contempt on the movements of multitudes. They have great confidence in the capacity of the people to be instructed, in their capacity of progress; but none in their spontaneous power of perceiving truth and obeying its impulses. The people must be instructed. The enlightened few must teach them; the favored few must go among them and by showing them examples of superior excellence stimulate them to virtue. Now all this, though it proceed from kind feeling, enlarged sympathies, and generous hopes, is yet based on the notion that the few have means of knowledge, which the many have not, and that but for the light these favored few emit, the many would be in total darkness. The people have no light in themselves. Here and there you shall find a man who may be called a sun shining with his own light, but all the rest are mere planets and satellites, shining only as they are shined upon.

"Now I protest against this doctrine. The true light enlighteneth every man who cometh into the world. Every man has the true light in himself, and is a sun, and not a planet. If the masses are not aware of this, the reason perhaps may be found in the fact that they are in the habit of looking outward, not inward. Each man, instead of looking into himself for light, looks abroad, and up to some great man, learned man, or, what is worse still, to some rich man.

"The impression has been very general, perhaps at times universal, that the people need rulers, guides, nursing fathers, and nursing mothers. Out of this have grown up aristocracies, monarchies, despotisms, tyrannies. From the earliest ages of history the few have struggled to save the people from themselves. The people, it is said, are ignorant, rash, and if entrusted with their own concerns, will assuredly ruin themselves. Hence it is always for the people's good that the few govern them; and when governing them in the worst possible manner, overwhelming them with taxes and reducing them to complete slavery, it has still been for their good. Although perverting their con-

sciences, and corrupting their manners by the false maxims and licentious examples of courts, it has all been for the people's good. Now, this could never have been but for the prevalence of the notion that the many have merely the capacity of receiving light, and none of originating it; that the many are therefore incapable of taking care of themselves, but must entreat the noble few to take care of them.

"The same notion introduced into our religious faith has been attended by consequences still more revolting to a true lover of his race. The notion that only a few are religiously inspired, that God reveals his purposes only to a few chosen witnesses, and appoints these to reveal them to the people, has built up priesthoods, given a basis to priestcraft, and brought the human race into bondage to sacerdotal corporations. If the masses who bowed with all reverence to the priest, had not believed that he possessed means of communicating with the gods which they did not, would they have submitted to his exactions? Every priesthood is built up on the idea that God reveals himself only to a few, and that these few are to be the teachers of the world. The priest having once made the notion prevail that he was more in God's secrets than the mass, and that they had no means of knowing God but through him, was able to impose upon them almost at will.

"The vast amount of wretched cant and fulsome panegyric, which disgusts the enlightened mind and correct taste, in regard to the Bible, comes from the same source. Why do men cry out so vehemently against every one who advances a doctrine not found in the Bible, or not taken directly from it? Simply because they suppose the authors of the Bible were specially illuminated in order to be in their turn the special illuminators of the world. The Jewish nation was instructed that it might instruct other nations. Peter, James, John, and Paul were taught the truth by God himself, that they might teach it to others. This and all coming ages are therefore entirely dependent on a single book for all true knowledge of God. Alas for man, then, if by any wickedness the book should be corrupted, or by any accident destroyed! Alas, too, for the nations who receive not this book, have never heard of it, and had no means of hearing of it! They are all in darkness, wandering in the wilderness with not a single star even to break through the thick clouds and guide them by its feeble light to their home.

"Now, people may say what they will, priests anathematize as they may, and statesmen utter as many old saws as they please, but I for one protest with the whole energy of my being, by all my reverence for God, and by all my love for mankind against a doctrine pregnant with such disastrous consequences. I shall not be a convert to it, till I become able to go all lengths in upholding priestcraft and kingcraft.

"I value books, and of all books I value the Bible the most; I value the services of great and good men; and I yield to no man in my readiness to receive instructions from those above me; but I will not own that any man has any means of knowing God, man, and man's destiny, which I have not also. If there be that in any man by virtue of which he has the right to call himself priest or king, there is also that in every man by virtue of which he has the same right. The Gospel aims to make all men kings and priests. Every man is a man if he chooses to be, and has in himself all that he needs in order to be a man in the full significance of the term; and therefore no one has any occasion to borrow a part of his manship from his brother.

"But do not infer from this that I hold all to be inspired in an equal degree. Reason is in all men, and it acts spontaneously in all men. All men, then, are inspired to a certain extent, and hence the power of all to apprehend the inspiration of each. But reason is not active to the same degree in all men. No doubt some feel it more vividly than others, and have a clearer view of God and duty. They are therefore undoubtedly capacitated to take the lead, to go before the multitude. But all have a kindred inspiration, and are merely younger brothers. They are members of the same family, and equal heirs, though not the elder members, nor the first to come into possession of their inheritance.

"Neither will you understand me to deny that one man may aid another. In whatever requires observation, in science and philosophy, one may undoubtedly be of great service to another, and even to the world. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Bacon, Locke, have not lived in vain, nor spent their strength for naught. The human race is greatly their debtor. But in all that concerns first principles, each mind has the light in itself. The great office of the teacher, the principal mission of books, is to turn the mind in upon itself, and induce it to look with clear vision and reverent feeling upon the light ever shining there.

"Inspiration rarely manifests itself in single minds alone. It may sometimes do it; but in general it manifests itself in the masses, and is called the spirit of the age. Christianity was an inspiration in this sense. The age in which it broke out was inspired. It was in fact a spontaneous outbreak of the common mind, the outspeaking of God moving in the midst of the people. It found in Jesus its first clear and distinct utterance, in Paul its first philosophic interpreter, who gave it a fixed formula, and founded the church. Yet not in the mind of Jesus only was there this inspiration. Other minds and hearts as well as his were travailling with the divine idea of immortality; and when his ministers went forth to preach it, they did but reveal the multitude to themselves. They merely gave voice and form to what was already in the minds and hearts of their hearers. Hence their power, the success of their preaching, and the conversion of the world.

"Ordinarily when the time has come for a new doctrine to be brought out and incorporated into the common belief of mankind, you find everywhere persons springing up, independent of each other, with a strong faith in it, and an invincible zeal in its defence. A new virtue is to be realized and practised by the race; all the world seem carried away in its direction. The staid and sober few who may remain unaffected, may oppose themselves to the general current, but all in vain. Conservatives may sneer, reason, declaim, nickname, call the defenders of the new virtue disorganizers, enemies of God and man, but all to no purpose. On they sweep by a power not their own, which they comprehend not, and which they do not even seek to comprehend. In all other respects than this one they may be wrong, and even destructive. No matter. There is no resisting them. Old institutions, old manners, old customs, old modes of thought, men and women counted wise and prudent, all are before them as the chaff of the summer threshing-floor before the wind,—are swept away or trampled under foot as on the multitude presses to the realization of the idea with which it is inspired. To the mere spectator this multitude may appear as the apostles did to some on the day of Pentecost, when 'others mocking said, These men are filled with new wine.' In this way the Christian idea of immortality became predominant; in this same way the doctrine of salvation by a crucified Redeemer was established, and the church founded; in this same way was instituted the commonwealth

in England, and the republic in France; and this same way all important revolutions or reforms in the faith or practice of mankind will be effected."

CHAPTER XXV.—THE BIBLE.

"I find nothing in particular to object to your views of inspiration. I see very clearly that you have a right to call yourself a supernaturalist as well as a rationalist. But I confess that I do not see how, on the ground you have assumed, you can maintain the special inspiration of the authors of the Bible. Why were not Homer, Socrates, Plato, Milton, Rousseau, inspired as well as David, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Paul?"

"If, instead of the word *special*, you used the word *exclusive*, I would admit your objection. I do not contend for the exclusive inspiration of the Bible-writers, but I do contend for their special inspiration."

"But you do not admit them to be inspired in the same sense the Christian world does."

"Of that I am not so certain. There is a looseness, a vagueness in most men's notions which renders it extremely difficult to tell precisely what they are. Give precision to the prevailing ideas of inspiration entertained by the Christian world, express them in clear and definite terms, and I think they will be found to be the same with mine. It has never been a doctrine of the church that none but the writers of the Bible were illuminated by the spirit of God. Some of the early Greek fathers contended for the reality of the inspiration of the gentile sages. They say that it is by the inspirations of one and the same *logos*, or reason, that an Isaiah prophesies, a Homer sings, and a Euclid solves mathematical problems. Paul assures us that 'the manifestation of the Spirit is given unto every man to profit withal.' Job declares that 'there is a spirit in man and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding.' John bears witness to a 'true light which enlighteneth *every* man that cometh into the world.' Jesus promises the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, who was to abide with us forever, and who should lead us into all truth. Moreover, the church has always, in some form or other, held to the reality of the inner light. Always has it held to the doctrine of experimental religion, and in experimental religion it contends for an illumination of the understanding, by the Spirit of God,

as well as for a purification of the affections. So the exclusive inspiration of the Bible-writers has never been a doctrine of the church. I do not then, in reality, depart from what has ever been accounted orthodoxy, when I assert that God reveals himself to all men. What else in fact has the church meant by its doctrine of 'common grace?' What else has it meant by the assertion that the Spirit of God strives with all men?

"But while I contend, that in a certain sense God reveals himself to all men, and that all therefore are really and truly inspired, I also admit that individuals may be specially inspired; that is, inspired in a more eminent degree than the many. These individuals are admitted into a closer intimacy, if I may so speak, with the All-wise and All-holy, and therefore are able to tell us more of God, and to be better interpreters of his will. Now ordinarily we call none inspired, save those who are inspired in an eminent degree. These alone are called *the* inspired; these alone are the prophets of God. This is what produces the seeming discrepancy between my views and those of the church. But the discrepancy is only seeming, not real. I too call these individuals *the* inspired; I too call them prophets of God, in a sense in which I do not others.

"Now, bear in mind, that we have determined the spontaneous reason,—that is, reason acting independently of our wills,—to be supernatural, divine. This reason is in all men. Hence, the universal beliefs of mankind, the universality of the belief in God and religion. Hence, too, the power of all men to judge of supernatural revelations. All are able to detect the supernatural, because all have the supernatural in themselves. Were it not so, we could detect God in no miracle, we could recognise him in none of his works, and could receive no revelation of him. Inasmuch as reason taken in its independence is absolute, is supernatural, its spontaneous revelations are supernatural, superhuman.

"Bear in mind, also, that some individuals experience more of the workings of the supernatural reason than do the many. God is revealed to them more fully than he is to the world. These, according to the common mode of speaking, are the inspired, the prophets of God. Their words are words of God, as we have seen, and are for that reason authoritative. Now the Bible I hold to be written by individuals of this description. It is a record which the inspired prophets of the Hebrew nation, have left us of

the revelations of God which they had received. This, if I mistake not, is the doctrine of the church, and if I understand myself it harmonizes with the doctrine I have contended for on inspiration.

"I know of but two methods of arriving at truth; one by reflection, the other by the inspiration of God. That is, we attain to truth by its spontaneous revelations, or by the slow and painful process of analysis and induction. In the last case we ourselves work, and often to no effect. In the first, as I have shown over and over again, it is God that works. Now, I see in the Bible-writers very few marks of analysis and induction. These writers do not attain to the truths they utter by reasoning, by philosophizing. The truths they utter, they receive as flashes of lightning, and hence it is that they utter them as it were with 'tongues of fire.' Being truths of universal reason, truths transcending time and space, they commend themselves to all and seem to address themselves to every man, and 'in his own tongue wherein he was born.' But when you read Plato and Cicero, you see the marks of reflection. These men you see are able philosophers, and have attained to much truth; but they are not prophets; they do not speak with authority. Their words are not the original words of God, but an attempted interpretation and verification of the original words of God. They make no revelation to you of new or hidden truths; but merely account to you for certain beliefs you already entertain. Here is the difference between the two classes of writers to which you have referred me.

"Then again the writers of the Bible are specially inspired in another sense. Rousseau was not without inspiration, but his was not a peculiarly religious inspiration. His inspiration was of another kind. He was inspired with the idea of nature, as distinguished from artificiality, or conventionalism. His mission was to break down the old social fabric and to lay the foundations of a new social order, more in accordance with the nature of man and of things. But the Bible-writers are inspired by God under the aspect religion more especially contemplates him. They are inspired with God as the Holy, as the object of veneration and worship, and as this is the highest view we can take of God, they are more especially prophets of God. There is a passage in Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, which throws some light on the doctrine I would set forth.

'Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administration, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations; but it is the same God, which worketh all and in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given unto every man to profit withal. For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge; to another faith; to another the gifts of healing; to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues. But all these worketh—or are affected by—that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing unto every man severally as he will.'

"Nations and individuals are inspired in relation to special purposes, for the performance of some special work in the general progress of humanity.

"The Jews were chosen by the Spirit to bring out and perfect the religious element of man's nature; the Greeks had the mission of developing the philosophical element, and of realizing the idea of the beautiful; Rome, that of bringing out the patriotic element, and of founding law or jurisprudence. In like manner each of these general divisions of the great work of human progress is subdivided among individuals. In relation to the religious element, to Moses is assigned one work, to David another, and to Isaiah still another. In relation to the philosophical element, one task is alloted to a Socrates, another to a Plato, and still another to an Aristotle. So I might say in regard to all the other elements of human nature. The Spirit requires not one man to do the whole, but subdivides and distributes the work among nations and individuals according to his own pleasure. Every man then who is called to a particular work, is specially inspired. And as religion is the highest of all, as the religious element in fact embraces all the other elements of our nature, they who are specially inspired to bring out the religious element, are inspired with a mission so much higher than all others, that they alone seem worthy to be called the inspired. The writers of the Bible having this kind of inspiration, being inspired for the accomplishment of this mission, are therefore specially inspired; and stand not only in the first rank of the inspired, but in a rank by themselves above all others."

"But do you believe every thing written in the Bible is true?"

"Your question is a broad one, and is not easily answered; because no one man can tell precisely all that is actually written in the Bible. The mere words of the Bible are nothing. We must look at what is actually meant. Now, I know no man who is able in all cases to say what is actually meant by the Bible-writers, whose experience is wide and various enough to interpret all they have said. Therefore I hold it the part of the wise man to be silent in some cases, and neither profess to believe nor to disbelieve. It will be time enough for him to accept or reject, when he is sure that he understands."

"From all of which I am to understand that there are some things in the Bible which you do not believe."

"Rather that there are some matters in it which I do not profess to be able to understand. I certainly would not, in all cases even where I do understand, abide by the mere letter. I certainly would not take it upon myself to defend all the laws ascribed to Moses, as so many divine institutions in the absolute sense of the term; but I would contend strenuously for the divine inspiration of Moses, and for the truth of the great principles he sought to embody in his legislation."

"What say you of the marvellous stories called miracles with which the Bible is filled?"

"The first question with regard to these miracles is, did they actually take place? I can assign no reasons *a priori* why they should not have taken place. Nature is but God's will, and he is not bound by what we term its laws; for its laws are himself. Therefore there was nothing to hinder him from performing them, if he chose. Also the general canons of historical criticism, which I adopt in all other cases, seem to require me to admit them. I cannot persuade myself that the universal belief in miracles is wholly an error. I could not so believe without depriving myself of all ground of certainty. Then the miracles of the New Testament are so interwoven with the texture of the narrative, and make up so essential a part of it, that I cannot deny them, without casting suspicion on the whole narrative itself. And I cannot reject the narrative itself, without departing from the principles of historical evidence which I find myself compelled to admit everywhere else.

"The second question in regard to the miracles is, are they genuine miracles? That is, were they actually performed by the power of God, or were they mere tricks of

jugglery? This question is not to be answered in the gross, but in detail. Each individual miracle is to be taken on its own bottom, and to be judged by itself. This we are able to do, because, as I have shown, we have in us an element of the supernatural. Therefore, there is in us a power of detecting God intuitively. If we detect the presence of God in the miracle, we are to term it an actual miracle. This I think I can do, at least, in some of the alleged miracles. I therefore contend for the genuineness of at least a portion of the miracles recorded in the Bible."

"Do you use the miracles as proofs of the revelation?"

"No. Because the evidence I have of the truth of the revelation, is stronger than that which I have of the fact that the miracles actually took place. The miracles rest on historical testimony, the weakest kind of testimony; the truth of the revelation rests on the testimony of a witness I have within. I do not use them as proofs, because I have as much ability to detect the presence of God in a moral doctrine as I have in the display of physical power. If I know nothing of God, I cannot detect him in the extraordinary display of physical power; if I know enough of him to detect him in the miracle, I must needs know enough of him to detect him in the doctrine, and therefore I do not need the miracle."

"What then is the use of miracles?"

"I do not know what was the actual purpose for which they were wrought; nor do I know what purpose they actually served. I can conceive, however, of a purpose they might have answered, and there is a use I can make of them now. As to the purpose they might have served: Mankind, especially when but partially enlightened, are much more attracted by extraordinary displays of physical power, than by the exhibition of moral grandeur. Had Jesus, for instance, appeared in the simple dress of a Jewish peasant from the obscure village of Nazareth, out of which it was proverbially said no good thing could come, whatever had been the purity of his life, the truth and excellence of his doctrines, he would hardly have secured a single listener. The miracles he performed, therefore, were necessary to draw attention to him, and induce people to listen to him. To the simple peasant-teacher nobody would have paid any attention. But from the man who could cast out devils, open the eyes of the blind, unstop the ears of the deaf, enable the lame to walk, and cause the dumb to sing, who

could still the raging tempest, and compel the grave to yield up the dead to life, they could not so easily turn away. Here was something extraordinary; here was a wonderful man, what had he got to say?

"Again, you cannot have failed to observe how prone men are to regard nature as possessed of causative power. Nature moves on so harmoniously, with so much regularity and uniformity, that we are exceedingly liable to regard all her phenomena as the effects of her own independent causality; thus stopping at second causes and virtually banishing God from the universe. Now it seems necessary that this order, this uniformity should at times be broken through, so that we may see that an omnipotent will rules in the affairs of the world; that there is a God who holds nature in his hand and does with it as he pleases. Miracles, which are interruptions of the natural course of events, occurring at distant intervals, seem to me admirably calculated to produce this effect, to raise men's minds from second causes to the first cause, and to show them that nature is but what he wills.

"There is another use of miracles, or rather of the events termed miracles, which I can make. I may regard them as so many symbols, each covering a great truth, or an important moral lesson. This use of them, is, perhaps, the principal one to be made of them now, and it is affected by no theory we may adopt as to their having actually occurred. Take as an illustration of what I mean, the miracle of the resurrection. I of course admit the miracle in its literal sense. But suppose I could not make it out that the body of Jesus actually rose, yet the great lesson taught us by the story of the resurrection remains unimpaired. Jesus was engaged in a great work, that of the complete and final redemption of man from every species of thraldom. In this work he encountered opposition, he was taken and crucified, buried in a new tomb, closed up and guarded with armed soldiery; but on the third day he rose from the dead, and after a few days ascended in triumph to God. So runs the narrative.

"Now for the moral. The defenders of the truth may be poor and few in number, they may be despised, persecuted, and put to death. Their cause may seem crushed to the earth, and destroyed forever. But it is not dead. It shall rise again. It shall burst the cerements of the grave, strike to the earth the armed bands of its enemies, and rise on high and shine forth in divine glory and majesty. And

is it not so? The earth has been strewn with the dead bodies of the defenders of liberty, and yet not one drop of blood has been spilt in vain. The cause has always risen from the grave, and been always marching onwards to victory. An obscure individual utters a great idea; the kings of the earth conspire against him, his feeble band of followers are dispersed, but the idea is immortal, is unconquerable, and rises from the dust of the battle-field, where it was supposed to be left with the slain, prepared for new battles and ultimate victory. Here is a truth precious to all the friends of humanity. It breathes the breath of life into the reformer, enables him to stand up undaunted against a world. What though I am alone, and of the people there is none with me? what though ye scoff and sneer at me? what though ye rage and vent your spite at me? Rage on, do your worst. Ye may silence my tongue, palsy my arm, crush my body, and seal me up in a new tomb hewn from the rock. What then? Ye cannot touch the holy cause in which I am engaged. I speak for God, for man, and my words shall echo through eternity; before the truths I utter ye shall yet grow pale and tremble; nay, bow down and worship. Here is the moral of the resurrection. Cherish it all ye who love your race, and know that in the sacredness of your cause ye are immortal and invincible."

CHAPTER XXVI.—THE CHURCH.

"Passing over the Bible, what is your view of the church?"

"The object of Jesus was to found a spiritual kingdom on earth; that is, to bring all mankind under the dominion of the great ethical and religious principles he set forth, all of which an apostle sums up in the terms, 'righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.' A kingdom of this kind must needs have its throne in the conscience and the affections, and is therefore by its very nature internal and invisible. The true church of Christ, the true catholic church, I hold therefore to be not an outward, visible church, but an inward and invisible church.

"Nevertheless the internal must needs have an outward, visible symbol. It must manifest itself in the outward organization of mankind. In the past it has been able to do this only by means of an organization separate from the civil or political organization; that is, by a separation of

church and state. But I do not find that Jesus contemplated this double organization of mankind. In strictness he allows but a single organization. The state should be a church. That is, the state should be organized in perfect accordance with the great principles of truth and righteousness which constitute the internal church, and then no other organization of mankind would be needed, or in fact admissible. The time before this can be done will be long. Mankind are yet suffering from the evils, which have resulted from the union of church and state; that is, by the alliance of the two organizations, and they must very generally regard what I am contending for as a renewal of the same. They cannot as yet understand the difference between a union of church and state, and the unity, or identity, of church and state. So we must wait patiently. All will come right in due time."

"But I am more particularly interested in the doctrines of the church. In order to be a Christian must I embrace all these mysterious, absurd, or conflicting dogmas, the church has contended for?"

"My friend, Mr. Howard, who never troubles himself with the dogmas of the church, will tell you that in order to be a Christian, all you need is to live the life of Jesus."

"Certainly," remarked Mr. Howard, who that instant came in. "I see little good which comes from mere doctrinal discussions. I find men very much the same under all creeds and under none. Tell me a man's creed, and I must still inquire what are his morals. I care little about modes of faith. Give me a good life, patterned after the life of Jesus, and I am satisfied."

"So am I," replied Mr. Morton. "Nevertheless, ideas are not to be thought lightly of. There are great problems relating to God, to man, and his relations to God, to man's duty and destiny, which it is very important should be solved; and I must believe one's character is essentially affected by the solutions he adopts. I am far from condemning zeal for the faith, and I confess that I prefer bigotry, and even the most violent persecution for opinion's sake, to mere indifference to all opinions. True liberality is at an infinite remove from indifference. Liberality does not prohibit one from valuing his own faith, from regarding it as superior to all others, and of infinite importance to the welfare of the soul; but it consists in allowing to all

men the same right to form their own opinions, and to propagate and defend them, which we claim for ourselves.

"For my own part, my philosophy teaches me to be very slow in dissenting from opinions which have been embraced by any considerable portions of my fellow men. The fact that a given doctrine has been widely believed, and earnestly contended for, is to me a presumption that it covers some truth, or an aspect of some truth, essential to the complete intellectual life of man. I then do not attempt to reject and disprove, but to comprehend and verify; and I count not myself to have rightly comprehended a doctrine till I have seen it in a light in which my reason approves it.

"It is undoubtedly no easy matter to get at the precise truth or aspect of truth covered by a particular doctrine. My method is to interrogate my own consciousness. All doctrines cover a fact of consciousness, or are designed to meet some want of the soul or understanding. I attempt then by a scrupulous analysis of human nature, to find what is the fact which the doctrine in question is designed to cover, or the want it is intended to meet. When I have discovered this fact, or this want, I take it for granted that I have discovered all that is essential in the doctrine. Undoubtedly in this analysis I may err; I may overlook some fact; I may not reduce a given fact to its lowest denomination; and I may misinterpret the facts I do discover. But I must be as honest and faithful as I can, and do all in my power to guard against error. To this end I must proceed slowly, and not be hasty in rushing to conclusions. I must go over the ground often, and review, and re-review my work till I have attained to all the exactness in my power.

"In a work of this kind I have been engaged for some years. When I have completed it to my own satisfaction, I hope to be able to give the world the results. But as yet I am a learner. Every day enlarges my experience and develops new wants within me, which essentially modify my former conclusions. Where I shall end, I know not now. But the more I inquire, the more deep and varied becomes my experience, the more confidence do I acquire in the experiences recorded in the Bible, and the more willing do I become to trust them where my own is imperfect or doubtful.

"On the great leading points of Christian faith I have attained to what I deem well-grounded convictions, and

these convictions, so far as I can myself judge, are substantially the same with those which the church has always contended for. How far the church will receive my expositions, I know not, and care not. I agree with it in the main as to what it actually believes, but I differ from it often as to the account it gives of its faith. I accept its faith, but not always its philosophy, what it really means, though I sometimes reject its interpretations.

"The great error of different sects is not in the fact that they embrace false doctrines, but defective doctrines. What they have is true, as far as it goes, but is not the whole truth. Each sect has a truth, and is so intent on maintaining that truth, that it overlooks others equally essential. The Calvinist has a great truth,—the sovereignty of God. He would introduce this truth everywhere. God is to him an absolute sovereign, who disposes of all things as he pleases, makes one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor; has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. This is all true. But there is another truth which the Calvinist overlooks,—the free agency of man. He is so intent on exalting God, and extending the sphere of the divine action, that he leaves man out of the account.

"The Arminian on the other hand, struck with the fact that man after all must count for something, plants himself on man's free agency. In his efforts to exalt man, and give him his proper sphere of activity, he overlooks the divine agency, and virtually annihilates God. Now both build on real facts; for God is absolute sovereign, and man is free. Both facts must be accepted. Man's freedom must be so interpreted as to leave God's sovereignty complete, and God's sovereignty must be so interpreted as to leave man's ability unimpaired.

"The believer in endless punishment is struck with the fact of God's justice. He recognises the fact which our reason discloses, that no man should be suffered to sin with impunity. God is just. He is of purer eyes than to look on sin with the least allowance or approbation. He will therefore by no means clear the guilty. So intent is the believer in endless punishment on this fact, that he does not sufficiently consider that God is also a God of love and mercy. The Universalist seizes upon this latter fact which he exaggerates and so interprets as virtually to exclude the idea of justice. Both are right, and both are wrong. But the two ideas are easily enough reconciled. The Universalist

does not object to man's receiving the consequences which, in the order of Providence, necessarily follow transgression; nor will the believer in endless misery deem it unjust that a man, when he has ceased to sin and become holy, should receive the rewards of holiness. Then assume that God will never place a man in any condition in which he cannot repent, and become holy if he will, and all controversy must cease. If the man sins eternally, let him be damned eternally; if he repent and become holy, whenever the event may occur, let him, as he must from the very state of his soul, enjoy God and heaven.

"The Trinitarian contends for the Deity of the Son and Spirit, and in doing this he overlooks to some extent the fact of God's unity, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are but one God. The Unitarian takes up the idea of unity which the Trinitarian neglects, and looks so steadily on this, that he fails to see that this one God exists as a Trinity. We ought to be careful that our explanations of the Trinity do not impair the idea of unity, and we should so understand the unity of God as to leave room for the admission of his threefold existence."

"And how is this to be done?"

"I can give you now only one way of doing it. I might remark that if you supposed God to be a mere unity, an absolute unity, you could never get at multiplicity; consequently you could never arrive at creation. God is not a mere barren unity, dwelling in eternal solitude, but he manifests himself in variety. Now in order to do this he must be both one and many, finite and infinite. He must then be one and many, and their relation. Here is a Trinity which you will find in reason, implied in every assertion, and in every thought. But on this I cannot now dwell. I look at God as the ground of all existence, the source whence all life and being proceed, and I call him the Father. I look again at this same God, as manifested, or uttered, that is, put forth, and I call it the Word, or Son. I look once more at this same God as a vivifying and sanctifying Spirit, preserving nature and giving it its life, enlightening the soul and sanctifying it, and I call it the Holy Ghost. Here are to my mind three obvious distinctions, each of which is God, and all three of which are one and the same God.

"The doctrine of the Atonement has excited not a little controversy. Still I think the doctrine is founded in truth. Christianity addresses man as a sinner, and it seeks his recovery, his reconciliation and union with God.

"Now I apprehend that man everywhere has the consciousness of sin.' The tradition of a primitive fall is nearly if not quite universal. No man feels that he stands in his proper relation to God. Every one feels that he has sinned against God, and has fallen from his primitive innocence, and lost the divine favor. Now this is not a state in which a man is willing to live; for say what we will, man has a conscience, and one that makes itself heard, too; at least, sometimes. Nothing is so painful to man, so insupportable, as the consciousness that he is a sinner. Let me but feel that I have held fast to my integrity, that I have walked ever by the law of God, and have nothing wherewith to reproach myself, and I can smile even at the stake. But when once I am obliged to confess to myself that I am a sinner, and can no longer look upon myself but with a sort of loathing, I am miserable indeed. I already feel the tortures of the damned; the flames of hell are already burning within me, and I have not one drop of water with which to cool my parched tongue. I cannot live in this state.

"But this is only half of the evil. Sin makes me a coward. Adam, after his transgression, comes not forth to meet his God, but seeks to conceal himself among the trees. When I have the consciousness of sin, I am afraid to meet God. I think he must be angry with me. I have a fearful looking for of wrath and indignation. God is my enemy and he can crush me. My own heart condemns me, and God is greater than my heart.

"As a sinner I need two things; first, that which shall wash out my sins, save me from the tortures of a guilty conscience, and make me holy; and second, that which shall restore me to the favor of God which I feel I must have lost, save me from his wrath, and make him again my friend. Now here are two deep wants of the human soul to be met. They are universal wants as I learn from the fact that men in all ages and countries of the world, in all times and places, have sought to provide for them. Sometimes by sacrifices and offerings, and sometimes by self-inflicted penance, lacerations of the body, the sacrifice of the objects dearest to the affections, or by voluntary submission to poverty and want. The rites and ceremonies and disciplines of all religions have this end in view. The Jewish economy was, to a great extent, proposed as a means of saving the soul from sin and reconciling it to God. To this end were its fasts, its ablutions, oblations, and sacrifices.

"But the blood of bulls, of rams and he-goats, cannot wash away guilt and atone for sin. The injunctions of the Jewish law were inadequate. By the deeds which that law enjoined no flesh could be justified. Those deeds could not purge the conscience and make the comers thereunto perfect.

"Christianity proposes itself as the sovereign remedy. It offers us the atonement. But what according to Christianity is the atonement? Through all religions you find runs the idea of sacrifice. Man has never felt it possible to atone for sin and gain the favor of God without a sacrifice. But the sacrifices enjoined by all religions previous to Christianity were insufficient, and could not secure the justification, much less the sanctification of the sinner. The sacrifice Christianity enjoins is therefore different in kind from that enjoined by any other religion. What it is may be inferred from a passage in the prophet Micah: 'Wherewith shall I come before the Lord and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come with burnt offerings, with calves a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath showed thee, O man, what is good. And what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' A just God can accept only the just, and to be reconciled to God we must come into harmony with him, possess in ourselves a godly spirit or disposition. The real sacrifice then enjoined by Christianity is a self-sacrifice. We are to present ourselves to God a living sacrifice. The literal death of Jesus, viewed as detached from its connexions and moral influence, does not either save us from our own guilt, or bring us into union with God. This the church has always asserted, in asserting that in order to effect our salvation there must be a practical application of the atonement. The individual must become really and personally holy, and then, and not till then, will God accept him, and blot out the remembrance of his transgression. This is the real Christian doctrine of atonement stated in its philosophical nakedness.

"But if you go back to the age in which the Gospel was first promulgated, you will readily perceive that the doctrine in this naked form could not have met its wants, nor in fact can it meet the want of the great majority of our own generation. The mass could not so refine upon the matter, nor appreciate a doctrine apparently so dry and abstract. Here

they were, tortured with guilt and trembling before a stern and inexorable Judge. What should they do? Assure us, say they, that God will pardon us. Mercy, mercy, we want mercy. Do you doubt? Behold then the cross. See there, nailed to the accursed tree, the Son of God. If God has not refused to give you up his only begotten and well-beloved Son to die for you, shall he refuse to pardon you? Behold his infinite compassion for sinners, and dare trust his mercy.

"Go again with the doctrine of the atonement in its philosophic formula to the northern barbarians who overran the Roman empire, and talk to them of the necessity of personal holiness, and of being godlike in their dispositions; of the importance of self-sacrifice, and walking according to the rules of right reason, and what impression will you make? The spiritual nature in them is unawakened; they live in the senses and not in the spirit. Would you humanize them and purify and exalt their sentiments, you must have something to strike their imaginations, and touch their sensibility. Point your ruthless barbarian, on whose heart mercy has never gleamed, to the cross: let him see there a bleeding and agonizing God, a God dying that man might live, and his rough soul is touched, and tears stream down his weather-beaten cheeks. What a sinner am I, that I have caused God to come down and die on the cross that I might live!

"That the Christian doctrine of atonement might meet the wants of the human race, and be efficient in reconciling them to God, it was necessary that it should be presented in its symbolic form. It has been so presented, and well is it that it has been. Nevertheless, the church must suffer those of us who wish, to interpret the symbol. The death of Jesus is symbolic of the great fact, that sin is washed out and the atonement realized only by giving up ourselves to God, and by being ready, able, and willing to live and die for man as Jesus did. This great fact is what the church has always been striving after, and it has done it in the only way in which it has been able to do it. You must speak to men in their own language. You do not tell men the truth, when you undertake to tell it to them in a language of which they are ignorant.

"About the doctrine of regeneration, also, the Christian world has disputed. I conceive, however, that the matter may be easily settled. Pelagius recognised in man a certain

degree of ability to effect his own salvation. Saint Augustine denied human ability, and represented salvation as wholly of God.

"Now, on the one hand, man is unquestionably fallen, and has not the ability to recover himself. I am conscious that I am not sufficient to effect my own redemption. I feel the need of assistance. On the other hand, I am equally conscious that I possess some ability. I have two sources of recuperative energy,—my reason and my will. My affections and tastes are corrupted, but I am still able to see the right and to will it. But this is not enough. Though I see the good, and resolve to pursue it, I am drawn by my lusts into sin. These are the facts of consciousness.

"Now what I want is, that my body should be brought into subjection to the law of my mind, that my affections and tastes should be so changed as to give me a relish for the food which endureth unto everlasting life. I may, as an unregenerate man, see the right, will it, and even do it, so far as its outward performance is concerned. But this is not enough. I must do it because I love it. God says, 'My son, give me thy heart.' I must delight in the law of the Lord, and find my meat and drink in doing his will. Now the change by which this effect is produced in me, is what I understand by regeneration. But this change I do not effect. It is effected by the Spirit of God. Yet not without my concurrence and coöperation. I am a complex being. On one side of my nature I am passive, and on the other I am active. In the fact of regeneration I both act and am acted upon. There is a concurrence of both powers,—the divine and the human. You may not be able to tell precisely where grace ends and human ability begins, but you must beware that you do not so interpret the one as to exclude the other.

"Other doctrines I would remark upon, but I have talked till I am tired. You will gather, from what I have said, my general views of Christian doctrines, and my method of investigating them. Beware of exclusiveness. Beware of denying. Seek always to comprehend. Know that the human mind never embraces unmixed falsehood, and cannot believe a pure absurdity. Range freely over all doctrines, analyze them all, and what you find in them which accords with human nature, as you find it in your own experience, or in the records of the race, hold fast and cherish, for it is the truth of God and profitable to man."

CHAPTER XXVII.—CONCLUSION.

I have now gone through with what I had to say respecting my intellectual struggles, in passing from infidelity to an unwavering belief in God and the supernatural origin of Christianity. I have detailed with some minuteness and with as much accuracy as I could, the various arguments and views by which my recovery was effected.

I have always felt myself greatly indebted to my friends, Mr. Howard and Mr. Morton, for the aid they afforded me. The one gave me an exemplification of Christianity in practical life, and won my love for it; the other showed me its foundation in my nature, and demonstrated its truth to my understanding. The more I pursued the course of reasoning Mr. Morton pointed out, the more clear and certain did the truth of Christianity appear to my mind; and I am now fully satisfied that every man who becomes acquainted with the laws of his own reason, and the wants of his own soul, must be convinced that the religion of Jesus is true and from God.

The effect of this change in my belief on the temper of my mind and my general disposition, I am satisfied has been salutary. I have had much to contend with since as well as before; the current of my life has never run smooth; I have ever been in a false position, and I have had trials the world has little suspected; but I have generally maintained a calm and equable frame of mind, and been able to bear my burdens without being overwhelmed. I have seen a Providence in all things, and have felt that all the events of this world, whether great or small, were under the control of a wise Governor, who would cause all things to work together for good. I have often had to stand alone, and to contend single-handed against my Christian brethren; but I have been sustained because I felt I was right, and that God would never abandon those who were faithful to conscience and duty. The heavens have often been obscured by thick clouds, and the light of day has been shut out; but I have never doubted that there were a bright sun and clear blue sky beyond.

As to the particular views which I have adopted, their general character may be gathered from the conversations of my friend and teacher Mr. Morton. I have not, however, adhered blindly to his opinions. In some respects I have modified them, and often I have chosen, where I adopted them, to express them in different terms. His great object

was to present Christianity in a light which should enable the unbeliever to see its truth. He found me an unbeliever, and he could not therefore talk to me as if I was already a believer. There can be no doubt, that had he been conversing with individuals whose faith was fixed, he would have used much more Scriptural language, and been less careful to point out the rational element of religion. But he had to adapt his language to my wants, to use a language I could understand, and which should enable me to see the coincidence between my own experience and that which I found recorded in the Bible. In this he did right, and so far as I was concerned he was signally successful; and must have been equally successful with any others who should have been in a like condition with myself.

In looking back upon the long struggle I have had, I must thank God for it. I have been reproached by my Christian brethren; they have tried to make me believe that I was very wicked in being an unbeliever; but I have never reproached myself for having been one, nor have I ever regretted it. I would consent to go through the whole again, rather than not have the spiritual experience I have thus acquired. I have sinned, but never in having doubted; I have much to answer for, but not for having been an unbeliever. I have no apologies to make to the Christian world. I have no forgiveness to ask of it. I have done it no disservice, and it will one day see that I have not been an unprofitable servant. It has never fairly owned me, but I care not for that. Even to this day it calls me an infidel, but that is nothing. It will one day be astonished at its own blindness; and when freed from the flesh, in that world where I shall not be disturbed by the darkness of this, I shall see it doing even more than justice to my memory. I have not lived in vain, nor in vain have I doubted, inquired, and finally been convinced. When the scales fell from my eyes and I beheld the true light I followed it; and I have done what was in my power to direct others to it. My task is now well nigh done, and I am ready to give in my last account. I say not this in a spirit of vain boasting, but in humble confidence. I say it to express my strong faith in God, and in his care for all who attempt to do his will.

I doubt not that many good Christians may be shocked at first sight at what I have here recorded. They will see no coincidence between the views here set forth and their own cherished convictions; but I will assure them, that as they

read on, and fairly comprehend them, they will find the coincidence all but perfect. The Christianity here set forth is the Christianity of the universal church, though presented perhaps in an uncommon light. I cannot persuade myself that a new Christianity is here presented, but the old Christianity which all the world has believed, under a new aspect, perhaps, and an aspect more peculiarly adapted to the wants of the present age. It cannot have escaped general observation, that religion, for some time, has failed to exert that influence over the mind and heart that it should. There is not much open scepticism, not much avowed infidelity, but there is a vast amount of concealed doubt, and untold difficulty. Few, very few among us but ask for more certain evidence of the Christian faith than they possess. Many, many are the confessions to this effect, which I have received from men and women whose religious character stands fair in the eyes of the church. I have been told by men of unquestionable piety, that the only means they have to maintain their belief even in God, is never to suffer themselves to inquire into the grounds of that belief. The moment they ask for proofs, they say, they begin to doubt.

Our churches are but partially filled, and the majority of those who attend them complain that they are not fed. Our clergy are industrious, and in most cases do all that men can do, and yet not many mighty works do they, because of the people's unbelief. Everywhere we hear complaint. Even amongst the clergy themselves doubt finds its way. Learned professors proclaim publicly and emphatically, even while denouncing infidelity, that we can have no certainty, that our evidence of Christianity is at best but a high degree of probability. Surely, then, it is time to turn Christianity over and see if it have not a side which we have not hitherto observed. Perhaps when we come to see it on another side, in a new light, it will appear unto us more beautiful and have greater power to attract our love and reverence.

The views here presented have won the love and reverence of one man who was once as obstinate an unbeliever as can be found. I know not why they should not have the same effect on others.

More I would say, but I have lingered too long already. If any have been interested in the several personages I have introduced, as having been in some way or other connected with my spiritual conflicts, and who would wish to know their ultimate fate, I must reply by asking where, in the case

of any one of us, are those who started with us in life, and whose young hearts responded warmly to our own? Where are the friends and acquaintances we formed, and whose course for a while run parallel with our own? There were many of them, but where are they now? One by one they have dropped away, and we have plodded on, in our turn to drop aside, and be passed by the new throngs pressing onward to an unknown goal.

"And Elizabeth, will you tell us nothing of her?" Pardon me. I have planted wild flowers on her grave, and watered them with my tears.

CHARLES ELWOOD REVIEWED.*

[From the Boston Quarterly Review for April, 1842.]

This small volume, written for the most part in 1834, though not published till a couple of years since, was by no means designed to offer an elaborate defense of the Christian religion, far less a complete system of theological doctrines. Its purpose was to state with a little more than ordinary clearness and philosophic precision, the leading questions between believers and unbelievers; to show the unsatisfactory character of the answers usually given to those questions; and to indicate with some distinctness a better method of treating them. It is properly a discourse on the method of handling the matters in issue between believers and unbelievers, with only such applications of it as were necessary to make it intelligible, and to establish its justness and sufficiency.

It is but justice to the author to say that he never for one moment considered that the book of itself would be sufficient to convert an unbeliever to the Christian faith; nor that viewed either as a simple argument, or as an exposition of a system of doctrines, it left nothing to be desired. His own painful experience had taught him that the unbeliever is never converted by mere argument, however forcible or conclusive. He is never reasoned into faith. His conver-

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* *Charles Elwood: or the Infidel Converted.* By O. A. Brownson, Boston: 1840.

sion, under the blessing of God, must be the result of the operations of his own mind. Far less can be done for him than is commonly supposed. The most we can do for him, is to present him the proper topics of consideration in a light, which aids him, from his position, to see them for what they really are. This is what, and nearly all that, is attempted by the author of *Charles Elwood*. For the desired effect, he relies on the trains of thought which he believes will be naturally suggested to the unbeliever's mind, and the feelings that will be kindled up in his heart. These trains of thought and these feelings will convey the intelligent unbeliever further than the book itself goes, if he pursues them.

The book is written in the form of an autobiography, and this has led some to infer that the author is the hero of his story. This, except so far as the purely spiritual experience detailed is concerned, is not true. The author has merely transferred to Charles Elwood his own experience as an unbeliever, the struggles which actually passed in his own mind, the efforts he made to get the better of his doubts, his repeated failures, and ultimate success. Beyond this he has nothing in common with him. The characters introduced are fancy sketches, though perhaps not unlike some frequently met in actual life. We mention this, because there have not been wanting individuals to demand of us, whether in sketching the character of Mr. Smith, the fanatical preacher, we did or did not mean them?

As a literary production, the work has been objected to, that its story is meagre, and its plot without interest. The aim of the author was not to write a story that should possess an independent interest, nor to show his skill in weaving and unravelling an intricate plot. The narratives and incidents introduced are integral parts of the work, essential elements of its discussions, and necessary to its main argument, to which they are designedly subordinated, but to which they contribute, perhaps, more than our readers in general suspect. Abstract the personal interest taken in Charles himself, the æsthetic effect of his conversation with his betrothed, and of the moral beauty of Mr. Howard's life and generous friendship for him, and the life and force of the argument would be greatly impaired, and nearly all the efficacy of the work would be lost. The author relied more on the subtle influence these would exert on the heart of the unbeliever, than on his metaphysics. Knowing this, we

were not a little amused by the following passage from a friendly critic :—

"But we do not think him [Mr. Brownson] qualified, nor do we think *he has attempted*, in the book before us, to present Christianity and its grounds so as to satisfy the wants and the tastes of all persons. We think that all must feel—the author and all—that the views to which his logic leads do not entirely satisfy. Logic has to do with the intellect and thought—the philosophic element in man. To this element Mr. Brownson has addressed himself satisfactorily. But the heart, and its affections and sentiments, the fancy and the love of the beautiful, have wants which logic cannot satisfy; they require what the logical understanding cannot prove to exist; nay, they often require a faith in what it pronounces to be impossible and *absurd*."—(Christian Examiner, May 1840, p. 198).

Doctors disagree. Without offering any comment on the metaphysics of this extract, we will say that it is precisely what this writer supposes the author did not attempt, that he has aimed to do; and it is precisely in the logical part of his work that he is least satisfactory. This critic took up a somewhat prevalent opinion, that the author of *Charles Elwood* is a sort of logic-grinder, without heart or soul, or at best with nothing but a gizzard; and therefore inferred that he could dream of attempting nothing but the construction of a mere logical argument. Yet from a tolerably intimate acquaintance with the author, of almost forty years standing, we must say that we have formed a somewhat different estimate of his character. We are far from regarding him as the pure, intellectual being, the mere dry logic-machine supposed. Nay, we doubt whether he has one-half the logical power ascribed to him. Abstract the deep, earnest feeling, the passion even, that he mingles up with his arguments, to an extent perhaps little suspected, and we apprehend his logic would be by no means remarkable. But be this as it may, we think the tone of the book indicates, and we know that its whole design was to show, the utter insufficiency of mere logic to satisfy the wants of the soul, or to effect any real change in one's faith. In his conversations with Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson, where only logic is brought into play, Charles is represented as falling deeper and deeper into unbelief, and we apprehend the reader sympathizes with him; but the moment he comes into the presence of his betrothed, whom he loves, and whose gentle

tones go to his heart, all is changed; he manifests a stronger and a stronger desire to believe; all his feelings, all the force of his sentiments, the emotions of the soul are on the side of faith; and we feel that he is not far from the kingdom of heaven. A subtler influence than logic is at work now,—that of love; and Charles himself says, that if untoward circumstances had not separated him from Elizabeth, she would have reconciled him to the Christian faith; and we are greatly mistaken, if the reader does not feel as much. Could he, who believed only the efficacy of what this critic calls logic, and who addressed himself only to the "logical understanding," have written the following?—

"'O, there is a God,' spoken by the sweet lips of eighteen, by her we love and hope in a few days to call our own by the most intimate and sacred of ties,—it goes well nigh to melt even the atheist. It comes to us as a voice from another world, and wins the heart though it fail to convince the understanding. It is no easy thing to be an atheist when one loves, is in presence of the one he loves, and hears her, in the simple, confiding tones of the child, exclaim, 'O, there is a God.' For a moment I gazed on the beautiful being before me, as upon one inspired. Could I see her, hear her, love her with all my heart, and not believe in the Divinity? She seemed sent to me from a fairer world, to bear witness to the reality of brighter beings than the dull inhabitants of earth."

Or this:—

"There may be intellectual beings, who are moved by thought alone,—beings who never feel, but live always in mere abstractions. Such persons are dependent never on the state of the affections, and are influenced not at all by the circumstances around them. Of these beings I know not much. I am not one of them. I have believed myself to have a heart as well as a head, and that in me, what the authors of a new science I have heard of, call the affective nature, is stronger, by several degrees, than the intellectual. The fact is my feelings have generally controlled my belief, not my belief my feelings. This is no uncommon case. As a general rule would you gain the reason you must first win the heart. This is the secret of most conversions. There is no logic like love. And by-the-by, I believe that the heart is not only often stronger than the head, but in general a safer guide to truth. At any rate, I have never found it difficult to assign plenty of good reasons for doing what my heart has prompted me to do. Mr. Howard understood all this perfectly, and uniformly practised on the principle here implied, not as a calculation, but because he was led to it by the benevolence of his own heart. He found me out of humor with myself and the world, suffering acute mental torture, and he saw at once that I must be reconciled to myself and the world, before I could look upon Chris-

tianity in the proper frame of mind to judge of its truth and beauty. Then again he was not extremely anxious to convert me. He did not regard me in my present condition as an alien from God, or as deserving to be an outcast from man. To him I was a man, a brother, a child of God. If I had been unable to come to the same belief he had, it might be my loss, but could not be my fault. He would gladly see me a believer, but he thought probably the influence of Christian example, and above all, communion with truly Christian dispositions, would go further than any arguments addressed merely to my understanding towards making me one."

It must be owned that critics do sometimes commit mistakes. If we could be persuaded that we fall into as gross errors with regard to the spirit and design of the works we criticise, as others do in regard to the spirit and design of our own productions, we would throw up the trade of critic at once in disgust.

Moreover, we are not willing to admit that the plot of this work is quite so insignificant as some represent it. The philosophical discussions unquestionably in part overlay it, and it is by no means worked up as far as it might be, but it is far from being without dramatic capabilities. It turns on the struggle between love and religion, the two strongest sentiments human beings ever experience. Ordinarily these two sentiments flow into each other, religion purifying and exalting love, and love softening, condensing, and individualizing religion; but now and then their harmony is interrupted, their alliance broken off, and they assume to each other hostile relations. The conflict which then ensues is terrible. As when Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war. Few bosoms can survive the struggle unharmed,—a struggle which almost always results in death, or in complete or partial insanity. We have ourselves witnessed, during seasons of great religious excitement, several instances of this conflict between love and religion which we shall not speedily forget. In writing the portions of the work in relation to Charles and Elizabeth, the author had in mind a real fact related to him by the young gentleman concerned, who at the time was one of his parishioners. The poor girl, a most lovely creature, full of life and soul, of captivating manners, and severe principles, was a lunatic, the last time we heard of her. We must, therefore, feel that the story of the book is rich enough in materials, and materials of high dramatic interest. It would have been comparatively easy to have amplified it, and multiplied the incidents; and had

it comported with the didactic design we had in view, and had it not been for our horror of writing a big book, which we hold to be a great evil, we should have so done, or at least tried our hand at so doing, whether qualified to succeed or not.

We have heard it alleged that throughout the book, the infidel has the better of the argument. He unquestionably does have the better of the argument for the first nine chapters; but not in the rest of the book, at least so far as we can judge. In these chapters it was unavoidable. The design of the writer was to show the real strength of the infidel argument, and the insufficiency of the replies usually given by standard authors on the evidences of our faith. Charles, therefore, must be more than a match for Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson. But we cannot admit that Smith and Wilson are mere men of straw. They reason as well as men can from their point of view, and better than one clergyman out of a hundred does reason in his actual controversies with unbelievers. They had the wrong side of the question on the particular points at issue, and their failure was inevitable, and not the fault of the writer.

The fact is, and there is no use in pretending to the contrary, that the works in defense of religion, most in vogue among our orthodox people, excellent as they are in some respects, are utterly inadequate to meet the wants of the unbeliever. They do not reach his case; they do not touch the actual difficulties with which he labors, and they are never able to effect his conversion. Reduced to their elements, they are, as arguments, logically defective; and this is what Charles but too easily demonstrates. They, who rely on these works, are themselves believers, and therefore feel no need of their aid to convince themselves. They have never reduced them to their simple elements, and consequently have never discovered their intrinsic weakness. Hence, when the author of *Charles Elwood* so reduces them, and shows that weakness, they think he has done them injustice. But we will thank those who complain that the infidel has the better of the argument, to tell us what argument for the truth of revelation is to be found in any popular treatise on the evidences of Christianity, that Mr. Smith does not recognise and urge; and what consideration of any value connected with the argument from nature for the existence of God, that Mr. Wilson does not suggest, or that Charles does not meet. These arguments and considera-

tions, it is true, are stated in the briefest possible manner, but as arguments they are stated in all their strength. They are not developed, nor was it necessary. Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson could have talked more, they might have been made to multiply words, and to bewilder their opponent in the mazes of sophistry, or to overwhelm him with declamation; but they could not have been made to reason better, unless they could have been made to change their point of view; because from their point of view religion is wholly indefensible,—a fact they would perceive at once, did they rely on their own arguments as the grounds of their faith. Men are for the most part sounder in their actual faith than in the reasons they give for it. It is rarely the case, that they are able to assign the reasons which have actually induced them to believe as they do.

Throughout the rest of the book the charge cannot be sustained. We do not now insist on Mr. Morton's metaphysical arguments, for Charles is represented to be virtually a convert before he makes Mr. Morton's acquaintance. Mr. Morton is in reality instructing the neophyte, not converting the unbeliever. His arguments would have no weight with one who was still in fact disposed to question the truth of religion. Mr. Howard is the one that converts Charles to religion, and Mr. Morton labors merely to give a rational and philosophic form to his faith. In judging of the merits of the book this fact is important, and yet it seems to have been altogether overlooked. We do not recollect having seen any notice taken of the ground assumed by Mr. Howard, the only original ground assumed in the whole work, and the only additions, if any, that it makes to the usual arguments adduced in defense of Christianity. The following extract will show what this ground is:

"One evening, while we were conversing, I remarked to Mr. Howard, that since I had been in his family, I had been almost persuaded to become a Christian.

"'Perhaps,' he replied, 'you are, and always have been, much nearer being a Christian than you imagine.'

"'But I can hardly be a Christian without knowing it.'

"'I am not so sure of that. Christianity is not a creed, but a life. He who has the spirit of Jesus is a Christian, be his speculative belief what it may.'

"'I have not as yet advanced far enough to admit even the existence of a God. I see not then how I can have much of Christ in me.'

"'Christ is not a dogma to be believed, but a spirit to be cultivated and obeyed. Whoever loves truth and goodness, and is willing to die

for their honor and the redemption of man, as Jesus did, I hold to be a Christian in the only worthy sense of the term. He may not indeed have the "letter" which "killeth," but that is no great loss, so long as he has the "spirit" which "giveth life."'

"'You seem determined to make me out a Christian, and that too without changing my faith.'

"'The belief in Christ lies in the bottom of every honest man's heart. Christianity is nothing foreign to our soul. It is the ideal, the realization of which would constitute the perfection of our nature. Just so far as you advance in the work of perfecting your own nature, do you grow in Christ; and could you attain to the highest perfection admitted by your nature as a man, you would attain to the stature of a perfect man in Christ Jesus. In yielding obedience to the moral laws of your own being, you are yielding obedience to the Gospel. One of these laws, the one which I term the social element of human nature, you obeyed in your efforts to reform society and augment the sum of the common weal of your kind. Consequently in obeying this element, you were conforming to the Christian law. You fancied you were obeying a law of infidelity, but that was an error of judgment, easily accounted for. You saw that element generally overlooked or discarded by the Christian world; you therefore inferred that it could not be an element of Christianity; and you rejected Christianity because you supposed it rejected this element. But had you seen that Christianity recognised this element as its great, its central law, you would not have thought of rejecting it.'

"'But I was an unbeliever long before I ever dreamed of turning social reformer.'

"'Very possibly; but still for a Christian reason. All the infidelity I have ever met with springs from one of two causes acting separately, or from both combined. The first cause of infidelity I have already spoken of. Some men feel a strong desire to redress social or political grievances, and are repulsed by the church. They therefore imagine the church opposed to political freedom, and social progress; and identifying Christianity with the church, they disown it, and very properly. The second cause of infidelity is found in the development of the philosophical element of our nature. This element is strong in some men. They must be free to inquire what and wherefore they believe. This inquiry the church has prohibited; they have therefore concluded it prohibited by Christianity itself; and therefore have rejected Christianity; and I add again, very properly. In both of these cases the supposed rejection of Christianity has been induced by Christian motives; and the infidel could not have been, with his lights, a Christian, had he done differently.'"

Mr. Howard assumes that there is no radical difference between the inward life of an honest, intelligent unbeliever, and that of an honest, intelligent believer. His argument, therefore, properly consists in establishing the identity of

the inward life of the one with that of the other. He proceeds on the ground, that the work to be done is not so much to give the unbeliever a new and a different faith, as to enable him to find and comprehend the faith he already has; for, paradoxical as it may seem, the unbeliever has a faith. Every man who is really a *live* man, has a faith; but not always the faith he thinks he has, nor that which he writes out in articles, or to which he formally subscribes. His faith is the intimate conviction of his soul, that which constitutes his spiritual life and controls him in his general relations with the unseen world of truth, and in his relations with the world of mankind. This faith, Mr. Howard assumes to be in the case of the unbeliever, in point of fact, as well as with the believer, essentially the true Christian faith. He therefore takes up the inward life of Charles, and shows it made up of Christian elements, that Charles had never really rejected Christianity, and that in supposing he had, he had done great injustice to himself.

In confirmation of Mr. Howard's view, we may appeal to the experience, not of every one who has been a scoffer and has subsequently become a professor of religion, but of every honest man who has at one period of his life doubted, or supposed that he doubted, the truth of Christianity, but has come finally to embrace it, and to find his happiness in living for it. Every such man feels that he is the same man after his conversion that he was before, and that in fact the elements of his faith are the same. He tells us he was an unbeliever only because he misinterpreted his own faith, and because he misconceived the true character of the Christian religion. We know, at least, that such was our experience, and it was our own experience that led us to place the argument adduced in the mouth of Mr. Howard.

We may also come to the same conclusion, or to the conclusion that there cannot be this radical difference, commonly supposed, between the believer and the unbeliever, by the higher consideration of the fraternity of the race, and the unity of the human mind. If there is any one thing incontestable, it is that the brotherhood of the race is a doctrine of Christian revelation. This doctrine of brotherhood must mean something, and more than that all have sprung from the same original stock. It implies that all men have not only a family relation, but a family likeness, and therefore the same general manner of feeling and of thinking. The human mind too is essentially one; modified

in different ages and individuals it may indeed be, but it operates everywhere, and always, by the same general laws; and we see by the records of the remotest past, that the human mind, then at work, is the self-same human mind that is at work now. All thinkers, then, must be of the same family, the same brotherhood; and instead of supposing themselves to be enemies, they should feel and know themselves to be brothers.

Mr. Howard, therefore, we insist is right in contending that Charles was already a Christian in fact. The only thing he should have guarded against, which he has neglected to do, is the universal application, which he does not make, but which some may suppose he makes, of his doctrine. Charles Elwood, though an unbeliever, belongs to Christian civilization, and therefore lives necessarily the life of Christ, so far as that civilization has realized it, whether fancying himself a believer or an unbeliever. Mr. Howard is right, then, in telling him that Christ is at the bottom of his heart. But would the remark hold true of a savage, or a man born and brought up in an order of civilization less advanced than the Christian, say the Mahometan, or the Brahminical? Not to the fullest extent. Christian civilization embraces the elements of all inferior civilizations but adds to them what is peculiarly its own. The man brought up in these inferior civilizations could then be a Christian only in a general and feeble sense; only so far as those civilizations constitute elements of the Christian civilization. The question would be, not of a difference of kind, but of degree. But in the bosom of Christian civilization itself, no man can be born and brought up without being, in his practical or actual faith, a Christian so far as that civilization itself is Christian. There is, then, no room for this bitter controversy which rages between believers and unbelievers, when one comes to understand the matter. With this qualification, we are willing to be responsible for Mr. Howard's argument.

To avoid all occasion for misapprehension, we say, what we suppose is sufficiently obvious without being said, that in Mr. Howard's statement, or in our own present statement, it is not a question either of the account men render of their faith, nor of their actual conduct; but simply of what may be called their spiritual or interior life, so far as spiritual life they have. Hume was a speculative sceptic, but an actual believer. In his philosophy he doubted of every

thing, but in reality he was as firm a believer as Reid himself. Men differ widely in the accounts they render of their faith, when virtually their faith is the same. In their actual conduct men also differ, and differ widely; but the conduct of the professed unbeliever not unfrequently conforms more nearly to the Christian law, than that of the large mass of professed Christians. The church is very far from embosoming all the virtue in the community. The profession of religion is a cloak which sometimes covers a multitude of sins.

Taking this view of the argument, with these explanations and qualifications, we must needs believe that the charge, that the infidel gets the better of the argument, is unfounded. The infidel is not convicted of being wrong where he was right, it is true; but he is convicted of having misconceived Christianity, and of having rejected it through ignorance of its real character; and he is brought to believe it by being made to understand it. What more could have been required we know not.

A writer in the *Christian Review*, Dr. Wayland, we believe, President of Brown University, objects to Charles Elwood that he remains the same man after conversion, that he was before; and says that the book ought to have been entitled *Charles Elwood; or, Christianity Converted.* This is very clever; but the reviewer does not seem to have even suspected, what he charges upon the author as a fault, was done with "malice aforethought." In the first place, the very design of the book was to show, not the radical difference, but the radical identity, between the true believer and the honest, intelligent unbeliever. It would have been, then, a great blunder on the part of the author, to have made his hero a different man after his conversion from what he was before. Moreover, Charles had, prior to his conversion, we will not say all the Christian graces and virtues of this learned and philosophic reviewer, but at least all that fall to the lot of ordinary Christians; and it would have been difficult to improve his character by radically changing it.

The reviewer also overlooks a very important fact, at least in the estimation of Christians of his persuasion, that Charles Elwood is represented to have experienced religion in his early youth, to have been regenerated even, before he became an unbeliever. To have regenerated him again would have been rank heresy, for which no one would have

been more ready to censure the author, than this reviewer, who, we presume, holds to the doctrine, "once in grace, always in grace." Here is the account Charles gives of himself :—

"'Do not fancy that I have become what I am without a struggle. I am not ignorant of what men call religion. It has been the study of my life. My first lesson was the catechism, and my earliest delight was in reading religious books, conversing with religious people, and thinking of God and heaven. I was not yet thirteen when I was affected as you have been,—had deep and pungent conviction for sin,—heard, as I fancied, the Son of God declare my sins forgiven, and felt all the ecstatic joy you now feel.'"

Now, the author meant to represent Charles as having been really regenerated, or he did not; for in a subsequent part of the book he shows that he holds to the doctrine of regeneration, and therefore could not have intended to represent a religious experience to be of no value. If he did not mean to represent Charles as having had a genuine religious experience, how could he have put this confession into his mouth? If he did mean to represent him as having been really born again in early life, he could not with any consistency have made his subsequent conversion a regeneration.

Moreover, the author designedly represented Charles as an amiable, intelligent, and worthy man, even while an unbeliever; not only because there are unbelievers who really deserve to be so represented, but because he had never been able to persuade himself, that the best way to make an unbeliever in love with our religion, is to begin by declaring him a bad man, a great rascal, deserving the utter reprobation of every friend to religion and virtue. When he was himself an unbeliever, he frequently met with good, pious clergymen, who sought to convert him by a similar method; but he never observed that their success equalled their efforts. He had also observed that in books written against unbelievers, and designed for popular reading, the infidel was always represented to be a profane wretch, a drunkard, a gambler, or a debauched villain. Such representations have a very bad effect. They mislead believers; they irritate unbelievers; and in no way advance the cause of religion and morality. They have the very opposite effect from the one intended. They create the impression with unbelievers, that believers have no solid arguments to offer for their faith; for they not unnaturally infer, that a

man rarely resorts to misrepresentation and abuse, so long as he has any thing better to offer. The author aimed, therefore, to avoid this error, as he regarded it, and to be just to the unbeliever, for the unbeliever's sake, his own, and that of the cause he advocated.

But it is said, that Charles is proud, and does not repent and humble himself before God. As to repenting, we do not know, so far as his character is drawn, what Charles had to repent of. No sin or misdemeanor is laid to his charge. That he had doubted is true; that he had dared to be faithful to the light he had, and to follow his convictions, though they exposed him to much popular prejudice, and cost many and heavy sacrifices, cannot be denied; but this, so far from being matter to be repented of, was on all sound moral principles, his merit, and his glory. To have made him repent of his honesty, his devotion to truth, and his willingness to sacrifice himself for the good of mankind, would have been to teach a morality we should be sorry to find approved by any professed follower of Jesus. And yet the author must have done this, had he made him repent, and talk like a sinner just converted.

Touching his pride and want of humility, we see not wherein the charge can be sustained. Charles Elwood is a man who respects himself; who claims to be a man amongst men; yielding them their dues, but conceding them nothing on the score of the unpopularity of his own faith, or want of faith. He does not make an apology for daring to think for himself; nor does he beg others to grant him the privilege of thinking for himself. He thinks as he can, as he must; and if he thinks differently from others, it may be his misfortune, but it is not his crime, *nor their virtue.* He meets them as an equal, and demands to be met as an equal. In all this we see only a proper self-respect, which whoso will not cherish merits only contempt. Toward God he manifests no pride, and no mock humility. He reverences truth, owns his obligation to seek for it, and to obey it; and he is willing to obey it at whatever personal hazard, when once assured that he has found it. Nor has he an overweening confidence in his own judgment. When he utters his own views, he does it in strong terms, simply and directly, in the tones of an earnest mind, believing the truth and importance of what he utters. But he is willing to be taught, listens with the docility of a child to whosoever professes to be able to teach him,—unless they begin

by abusing him, or assuming to be his masters, who have the right to command him—and yields up his previously expressed opinions without a blush, and whenever he sees a reason for so doing. Now this does not look to us like an excess of pride, or a sinful want of humility.

It is true, Charles Elwood does not adopt the usual phraseology of religious people, especially of what is called the evangelical school. Herein we acknowledge his heresy. He is a man whom the garment of Cant can never be made to fit. He cannot go about, and with infinite pains, try to make people believe in his piety. He speaks in his own natural tones, and wears his face as God made it. He makes his confessions, if he makes them at all, to his God, and not to his brother. He never tells people what a great sinner he has been, and how hot a place in the nethermost hell he deserves, in hopes that they will flatter his pride by telling him, "the greater the sinner, the greater the saint." When he prays, it is not standing in the synagogue, nor in the corners of the streets, nor in the market-place; nor does he in revenge go to religious conference meetings, and tell his brethren how often he prays in secret. In a word, he takes none of the usual methods to make men believe in his piety or virtue. He aims to be, and to do right, to *be* always what he *seems*. It would have been easy to have corrected all this, to have filled his mouth with pious phrases, to have drawn down his face, turned up his eyes, and made him speak in a tame, timorous tone; but really we are sinner enough to doubt, whether this would have essentially improved his character in the sight of God, or in the estimation of truly Christian people. We have no disposition to deny, that we have a large number among us, who take unnecessary pains to make us believe them pious worshippers. They quite overshoot the mark. Less ostentation of godly conversation, and more deeds of justice and love, would serve their turn altogether better. There was something worth remembering in the remark of one of our old divines, who when asked by one of the pious striplings of the day, if he had any religion, replied, "none to *speak* of." Religion should be like the light, the medium through which we see all that we do see, but remaining ever itself unseen. It should be an all-pervading spirit, but showing itself only in greater sweetness of temper, kindness of heart, fidelity to the great trusts of life, and untiring zeal and perseverance in the cause of well-doing. It should be

worn for use, to cover our nakedness and to keep us warm, not for mere show, to attract the gaze or the remark of the throng.

According to our method of judging, Charles Elwood, so far as his character appears in the book before us, is not obnoxious to the charges preferred against him, and we would rather take our chance with him, even in the days of his grossest darkness and blindest unbelief, than with the loudest of his impugners. They who think otherwise would do well to "go and learn what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice."

We say at once, however, that we by no means pretend that Charles Elwood is a true representative of all unbelievers. He represents only the serious, honest, intelligent portion of them, the only portion it behooves us to consider in our controversy with those who reject our faith. For the others, the miserable scoffers one meets in grog-shops, on board steamboats, and in stage coaches, all we have to say is, that we can address them only in the terrors of God's law, from the height of the Christian pulpit. We cannot honor them so much as to enter into a serious controversy with them; for the doubts they express hang as loosely about them, as do their moral principles. Such are the infidels converted in revival seasons, and who keep up a plentiful supply of fanatics and fanaticism. We turn them over willingly to the Nettletons, the Beechers, the Finneys, the Knapps and the Maffits.

Thus much we have judged proper to say in defence of Charles Elwood. We recognize the justice of none of the charges which, to our knowledge, have been alleged against him; and the authors of those charges, by bringing them, seem to us to impeach their own piety and Christian understanding. There are, we must be permitted to say, many things for them to learn, and some graces for them to acquire. Perhaps they would not do amiss to follow the example of Paul, after his conversion, and retire for a season into Arabia, before entering on the discharge of their functions as Christian teachers.

Nevertheless, the book is not altogether free from faults. So far as concerns its spirit and design, its main argument, and the special moral and theological doctrines it inculcates, we do not apprehend that any serious objections can be sustained against it; and if it be interpreted throughout in reference to the special purpose for which it was written,

we are willing to expose it to the rudest criticism. But it bears traces of a system of philosophy, which we are not willing to be responsible for, without some important reservations, and which, if accepted and applied universally, cannot fail to induce some grave errors of reasoning, if not of doctrine. It is not so accepted, nor so applied in *Charles Elwood* as to affect at all the substance of the work, or in the least to impair confidence in the important results at which the author arrives. It merely in a few instances affects the form of the reasoning by which he obtains those results.

The faults, which we should charge upon the book, belong to it as the reader will understand it, rather than as it was understood by the author himself. The author of *Charles Elwood* has the habit of viewing most subjects he treats under a special aspect, and of treating them with reference to a special purpose. If the reader seizes that special purpose, and interprets all that is said in reference to it, he will rarely find the author in the wrong, and still more rarely find any difficulty in understanding him. But this habit necessarily involves that of using terms in a more special and definite sense, than the one in which they are used by the generality of people. Hence a perpetual misunderstanding between him and his readers. They are always accusing him of advocating doctrines which he by no means entertains; and whenever he succeeds by a change of phraseology, or of the point of view from which he treats his subjects, in conveying to them some glimmering of his real doctrines, they forthwith charge him with having changed his opinions, and sneeringly allege that he has obtained "a new stock of ideas." Part of this grows out of the nature of the subjects which he discusses, and the loose notions generally prevalent on those subjects; part out of the haste with which he is obliged, by circumstances not under his control, to throw off his compositions; but more perhaps from the peculiarities, defects, it may be, of his mental constitution. His mind operates usually with great intensity, concentrating for the time being all its forces upon the precise point under consideration. It is also deficient in that power, so essential to the artist, of properly grouping his subjects, and of duly distributing the light and shadow. The main figure is always kept distinctly in view; it is brought out boldly in the fore-ground, as it should be; but the other figures, essential to the picture, are thrown too far

into the back-ground, and some of them so far as not to be detected by ordinary eyes. They are so deeply shaded that few discover them; and hence it is inferred that they escaped the observation of the artist. This is a defect which he has tried in vain to overcome, and it is this which occasions nearly all the misunderstanding between him and his readers. Yet, whoso takes the author's position, will, we apprehend, if he have a tolerable pair of eyes, and look long and steadily, discover that the figures are all there.

Without meaning this as an apology for the author, we suggest it for the guidance of his readers. The book must be considered from the point of view of the author, and interpreted by the precise purpose he had in writing it. This is necessary when it is taken as a whole; it is also necessary in considering any particular part of it. The purpose for which any special statement is made must shed the light by which to interpret it; nothing in the book stands alone, and very little that is said has, in itself, an independent value. Its value consists in its bearing on some ulterior purpose. This is not perhaps the best way of writing, but it is our way, and we can write in no other.

The faults, which we are about to point out in the metaphysical part of this work, nearly all grow out of the fact that the author uses terms which may seem to have a general application, in a special sense; and therefore appears to be affirming universal truths, when he is in reality only affirming special truths, or presenting merely such special aspects of truth as serve to enlighten the particular purpose he has in view. The error involved, then, it may easily be seen, consists rather in the application others may make of what he says, than in the application he himself makes of it. It may also, then, be seen how the book, as existing in the author's mind, can be sound, and yet, as it actually appears, not be free from some grave errors.

The book we hold free from the errors to which we refer, till in the progress of the story, Mr. Morton is introduced to give what he termed the metaphysics of religion. Till then the author speaks, from his own internal experience, the views which have been elaborated in his own mind. Thus far we would offer no criticism on the book, with the single exception, that Mr. Howard, who is the representative of the peculiar views of the author, in the chapter on Rationalism, restricts a little too much the sphere of the philosophical part of human nature, makes philosophy too

exclusively retrospective, and separates it too widely from religion. He, however, expressly identifies philosophy with Christianity, which is well. Had he asserted its absolute identity with religion, he would have done better, presented a juster view both of Christianity and of philosophy. His error lies in making Christianity more abstract than it is, and in recognising in philosophy nothing but the results of cool, unimpassioned reflection. However, Mr. Howard is in the main clear and just in his statements.

The serious deficiencies of the work commence with Mr. Morton, who attempts to interpret religion by the light of Cousin's philosophy, slightly reinforced by some scattered rays from Benjamin Constant. In general he borrows from these two writers only what is worthy of confidence. For the most part, he escapes their errors; but we find on a careful revision that he has not done it altogether, and that owing to the adoption of their phraseology, he has the appearance of not having done it to so great an extent as he really has. The points, on which he has fallen into error, or has not been sufficiently explicit in his statements, or guarded in his language, are these: 1. The origin of religion in human nature; 2, the impersonality of reason; and 3, the division of reason into spontaneous reason and reflective reason. The first shows the influence of Benjamin Constant; the other two of Victor Cousin. The first concerns the foundations of religion in the human soul; the second affects the form of the argument offered for the existence of God; and the third the explanation presented of the fact of inspiration.

I. Benjamin Constant in his valuable work on *Religion considered in its origin, its forms, and its developments*, defines religion to be a sentiment of the heart, an indestructible law of man's nature, seeking ever to embody itself in outward institutions. He attempts to bring all the phenomena of man's religious history within the range of sentiment. But this he cannot do. Unquestionably religion is a sentiment, but it is also more than sentiment. It is idea as well as sentiment. Religion, in addition to the inward sentiment, is man's theory of the universe, his solution of the problem of his own existence and destiny, prescribing to him a life-plan he must endeavor to realize, imposing a duty he must labor to perform. It is always legislative; it imposes the law; hence the Jews, with singular propriety, call their religion *the Law*, and never by any other name.

It always involves the idea of that which binds, which lays man under obligation. It implies, therefore, always moral considerations. Morality may not include religion; though without it, it has no adequate foundation; but religion always includes morality. They, who in our times attempt to separate religion and morality, whether in favor of the one or of the other, fall into serious error. The common sense of mankind pronounces the expression, an immoral religious man, a contradiction in terms.

Mr. Morton enlarges the definition of Benjamin Constant. He defines religion to be a craving for the infinite, and certain ideas or conceptions, which he calls *intuitions of reason.* This definition, though loosely given, is substantially correct. It was intended to supply the defects of Constant's definition, and is perhaps broad enough to embrace all that has ever been considered essential to religion. We should prefer to say religion, regarded as sentiment, is the *aspiration* to the infinite, to saying that it is a *craving* for the infinite; nevertheless, the main point is recognized, namely, that religion is both *sentiment* and *idea.*

Thus far Mr. Morton makes an evident advance on Constant, and is worthy of reliance. But there is another point involved in his statement, about which we are not quite so clear, or rather two points. He says, religion is a fact of man's natural history, proceeding from a law of his nature, a fundamental want of his soul; and that the ideas or conceptions man seeks to embody in his religious institutions are intuitions of reason; by which last, he apparently means, as may be gathered from his argument, that they are fundamental elements of human intelligence, without which man would not and could not be an intelligent being. This language is susceptible of a meaning to which we by no means object; but it may be interpreted so as to teach a doctrine, to which we are very far from assenting. What was the precise meaning attached to it we will not take it upon us to decide; though we apprehend that the author, at the time of using it, beyond a certain point, had only a vague and confused meaning. If it mean no more than that man has the natural aptitude to be religious, the natural capacity to aspire to the infinite, and to recognize intuitively the ideas or conceptions of reason concerned, that is, of knowing them when presented, which most likely was his meaning, we have no fault to find; but if it be so interpreted as to teach that the sentiment itself is innate, a law of man's

soul; and that the ideas or conceptions are elements of the faculty of intelligence; that is to say, innate ideas, we hold that it is altogether objectionable.

No sentiment is or can be innate. Sentiment is the soul in exercise, exercising its power to feel. It requires a power in the soul, and an exercise of that power to feel, as much as it does to know or to do. They are out in their psychology, who consider the soul as purely passive in its sentiments. In point of fact, the soul is never more active than in what are called the passions. Love is called a passion, but it is its highest possible activity, the fullest possible expression of its interior life and energy. Man, then, acts when he feels. Sentiment, then, is an act, not a law; an exercise, not an element of the soul. Hence religion, viewed as sentiment, can exist in the soul only when the soul exercises itself, or acts in a particular manner. It is not true, then, to say, as some of us do, that the religious sentiment is a fundamental law, an indestructible element of human nature. If it were so, we must have the sentiment at every moment. No man, at any moment of his existence, could be without it. But we can have no sentiment without being conscious of it. We are never more conscious than in our sentiments. Sentiments are inconceivable without consciousness. We lose sentiment, just in proportion as we lose consciousness. If then, the religious sentiment be an ever present phenomenon of the soul, we must at every moment of our lives be conscious of it, at least when we are conscious at all. But this is by no means the fact. There are men who rarely, if ever, experience the sentiment; and there are moments in the lives of the most devout, when they have no consciousness of it. The power or capacity to experience the sentiment is, no doubt, innate, a fundamental law of human nature; but the sentiment itself is born and dies with the exercise of that power.

Passing now over religion regarded as mere sentiment, to religion as idea; is it, in this last sense, a law of man's nature? Mr. Morton in this last sense makes religion consist in the ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good. This is all well enough. But these ideas, are they constitutive elements of the *faculty* of reason? Man is born, we presume it will be conceded us, with all his faculties; at least in germ. If reason is one of his faculties, if these ideas are constitutive elements of reason, then he must be born with them. The question, then, is simply, are these ideas

innate, elements of the soul; and does seeing them by intuition mean detecting them in the soul itself? This was not the doctrine Mr. Morton intended to teach, but it is perhaps authorized by his language.

We have no faith in the doctrine of innate ideas,—a doctrine unjustly ascribed to Descartes. Descartes says expressly that all he means by innate ideas is, that the power or faculty, by which we think certain thoughts, God, for instance, is innate. By intuition we have in none of our writings understood seeing by looking *in*, but as the word itself says, seeing by looking *on*. The soul sees nothing by looking into itself. Nay, it can never turn itself round so as to look at, much less into itself. It is the looker, the seer, and the seer and the seen are as distinct in fact, as they are in logic. When we speak of looking within, we use *within* merely in opposition to the world of space. By *intuition* we understand merely the power of the soul to perceive ideas, and by ideas we mean objects or realities of that world which transcends time and space. All ideas,—and we use the term in the original Platonic sense,—are transcendental. In asserting man's power to perceive them, we coincide with the transcendentalists; but in asserting, as we also do, that it is out of the soul, out of the *me*, and not in it, that they exist, and that we perceive them, we depart from what we suppose is a characteristic feature of American transcendentalism.

We deny utterly, that these ideas are constitutive elements of human reason, regarded as the faculty or power of knowing. We shall spend no time in justifying this denial; for since the time of Locke it has not been necessary to show that there are no innate ideas. The faculty or power of perceiving, or recognizing these ideas, we however, do hold to be innate, a fundamental law of human nature; and the fact that man does perceive them is a fact of his natural history; and if he did not, his actual intelligence would not be what we know that it is. This we presume is all, under the present point of view, the author of *Charles Elwood* intended to assert; certainly this is all that the facts he adduces go to prove. But admitting all this, admitting that man aspires by virtue of a law of his being, or an innate power, and perceives these transcendental ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, by means of a fundamental power of his soul, it may still be asked, if no foreign or special agency be requisite to induce him to aspire, and to lead him to the

actual perception or recognition of these ideas. If we understand the author of the book before us, he takes it for granted, though he does not expressly say so, that man does aspire, naturally, from his own inherent energy, and that he does perceive these ideas, without any agency but the spontaneous operations of his own reason. At least this may be inferred from his language, though evidently contradicted in his own mind by the peculiar views he adopts concerning reason and inspiration.

Now while we are by no means prepared to maintain absolutely that man does not aspire naturally, that is, by force of his own nature, without any foreign quickening, we are still further removed from maintaining that he does. Taken as he is to-day, in the bosom of Christian civilization, we admit that he does aspire by the force of his own nature, and both as sentiment and as intelligence. But we have no evidence to satisfy us, that this is universally true of mankind. Many facts go to prove the contrary. Man is progressive because he aspires, and all men have undoubtedly the capacity of progress. But we are not sure that all are naturally progressive; for we do not find progress wherever we find man. Savage tribes are not progressive; ages on ages pass away and bring no improvement in their condition, no progress in their ideas. Hence, we infer that they do not aspire. If they did aspire they would come out of their savage state. But we have no record of any savage people emerging by spontaneous effort from the savage state into the civilized. This is asserted by Niebuhr and admitted by Constant, either of whom on this point is high authority. The African negro, as a race, does not aspire, or at least only to a feeble degree. He can therefore be made contented and apparently happy in a condition from which the proud Caucasian, under the influence of Christianity, recoils with horror. Those negroes, who among us aspire, are stimulated by the example of their Christian neighbors, and have for the most part blood of another race running in their veins.

Moreover, the traditions of every civilized people,—and we own that we are disposed to consider all traditions of great historical value,—ascribe the origin of their civilization to foreign influence, never to indigenous and spontaneous effort. It is a sacerdotal or a military colony from a more advanced nation, a providential man, or some divine interposition, that quickens their faculties, commences their

education, and sets them forward on the path to civilization. The facts, so far as we can come at them, seem to authorize us to say, that if man has the natural capacity to aspire, he does not naturally aspire, that is, by the simple force of his own nature. He is not naturally progressive. In order to make him aspire some power or influence, foreign to himself, is necessary to quicken his faculties, kindle his aspirations, and compel him to struggle. Divested of what civilization has done for him, placed at the lowest round of savage life, he is naturally indolent, careless, improvident, averse to all exertion, shrinking from all effort. His greatest delight is to eat and to sleep. If the sense of hunger or some outward circumstance arouse him to a sudden effort, he relapses into his torpid state at the earliest possible moment.

Nor is it any more evident that man attains at first to the *idea* of God, than it is that from the first moment of his existence he aspires. The idea of God we hold to be an intuitive perception to-day in the bosom of civilization; but we have no evidence that it is an intuitive perception in the minds of those who yet linger in the lowest forms of savage life. The first thought of the first human being, no doubt, contains, if we may so speak, the germs of the idea of God; but ages on ages of growth are necessary to develop and ripen it into the sublime conception of the Divinity entertained by Moses, Socrates, or Leibnitz. To-day, the Christian philosopher, in the language of Leibnitz, "thinks God," but the savage does not. The idea of God belongs to advanced life, to the growth of the natural faculties, not to the primitive man. It is only by successive efforts, and by repeated revelations, that man attains to it, as is evinced by the slow and successive amelioration of his forms of religious worship.

In this view of the case, we must take the remark, that man is naturally religious, that religion is a fact in man's natural history, with some grains of allowance. Taken as we find him to-day, in the bosom of our own civilization, he is unquestionably naturally religious. Our children naturally aspire; and our philosophers, with Leibnitz, "think God." Our faculties, by the nurture of ages, and through the care of an ever-watchful Providence, have become equal to the sublime thought. But when we speak of man universally, man of all times, all we can say is that he has the natural capacity to *become* religious, and whenever his natural faculties, by providential circumstances or influences, are

stimulated into activity, he *is* religious. More than this we do not think we are warranted in saying. To say more than this, would require us to assert that man aspires, where we have no evidence that he aspires; and entertains the sublime conception of God, where we find no traces of it, or at best only the miserable *fetish* of the stupid African. The worship of the *fetish*, no doubt, tells the philosopher that there the idea of God may one day be entertained, but just as surely that it is not entertained now.

Nevertheless, Mr. Morton is not obnoxious to all the criticism here implied. He is answerable mainly for the inaccuracy of his language, into which he was betrayed by his admiration for the work of Benjamin Constant. His argument drawn from intuition remains unaffected by any thing we have said, because in the intuitive perception of the most stupid savage, *we* can see, what the savage does not, the idea of God. The error is in supposing that because we, turning back upon those intuitions, discover it there, the savage himself must necessarily have done so. Mr. Morton undoubtedly did fall into this error, in part; but he never meant to say that the savage really was conscious of entertaining the idea. He thought, however, that he was justified in saying it was there, because he had satisfied himself that it was a necessary conception of reason. The apparent contradiction implied here, in asserting the presence of the idea in the intelligence of the savage, while the savage knew it not, he thought he escaped by means of Cousin's doctrine of the impersonal and spontaneous reason.

II. We come now to the doctrine of the impersonal reason, borrowed from M. Cousin, of whose philosophy it is one of the most striking peculiarities. We felt, as has every man who has been at all under the influence of religious ideas, that these ideas have a character of independence and authority. They seem to be at once man and to legislate for him; and he seems to be unable to withdraw himself from their presence, if indeed from their dominion. This fact led us to adopt, up to a certain point, Cousin's doctrine, and to make it the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. As far as it really serves as the basis of this demonstration, though not so far as it enters into the form of the argument, we believe it unquestionably sound. The author of *Charles Elwood* never intended to adopt it in its fullest extent, and he thought he had escaped all that was unsound in it. But in this he was mistaken. There runs

through all he says on it the same confusion which meets us in Cousin himself.

Cousin defines reason to be a faculty of human nature, that faculty by which we know all that we know, and in all the degrees of knowledge, from the highest to the lowest. He also contends that reason is impersonal and objective, in us, our only light, but not *us* nor ours. Being impersonal and objective, it is good authority for the objective, an independent witness for what lies outside of us, indeed for whatever it reveals. It reveals the absolute, therefore, the absolute exists; God, therefore God is. But against this there lie several very weighty objections.

1. If reason be a faculty of human nature, it is absurd to call it impersonal and objective. A faculty is merely a power of the soul. To say that the soul has the faculty of reason, is merely saying that the power to know is inherent in it, essential to its existence, belonging in fact, to its very being. It is then merely an aspect of the subject itself, and we might as well in this case call the subject, the *me*, objective and impersonal, as the reason.

2. To assert that reason, regarded as our faculty of intelligence, is impersonal and objective, is to deny that we ourselves are persons. Cousin places personality chiefly in liberty or activity. But liberty or the power to act is not the characteristic of personality. Animals have the power to act as well as we, and yet they are not persons. Personality is never predicated of unintelligent beings, nor indeed of all intelligent beings. The dog, the ox, the horse, are intelligent, yet we cannot call them persons. Personality is not constituted till we attain to a high degree of intelligence, to the perception of moral, universal, and necessary truths; that is, not till we come to that degree of intelligence, which goes by the special name of reason. None but reasonable beings are, in any human speech with which we are acquainted, allowed to be persons. Divest us of personality,—and we should be divested of it, if our faculty of reason were objective,—and we should cease to be moral and accountable beings. Then all foundation for morality would be destroyed.

3. If reason be our only power of knowing, as Cousin asserts, and it be also impersonal and objective, then we in ourselves must be incapable of knowing. How then come into relation with intelligence? How can an essentially non-intelligent being be even enlightened by an objective

intelligence? If there be no light within, how can there be recognition of the light without?

4. If reason, in the sense that it is one of our faculties, be identical with the world of immaterial and necessary truth, as Cousin alleges, he merely reproduces the doctrine of Père Malebranche of "vision in God," for reason in this sense he tells us is the Word of God, the Logos, identical in the last analysis with God. Man then does not see at all, but God sees in him.

5. If reason, as we have seen, be essential to our personality, to transfer it from us to God is to transfer our personality to God, to sink us in God, and to destroy all distinction between his acts and ours; which in this case would be pantheism.

6. The doctrine is psychologically false. In the fact of human knowledge it is not God nor the reason that knows, but the *me* itself. Whatever be the object or the sphere of knowledge, it is always I who know. I as invariably and as necessarily ascribe the act of knowing to myself, as I do the act of willing. I have as direct consciousness that it is I who know in the fact of intelligence, as I have that it is I who will in a fact of volition. On his own principles, then, Cousin can no more term reason, regarded as our power to know, objective, than he can activity or our power to will.

7. The power to know, and to know even those eternal verities which Cousin so eloquently treats under the names of the true, the beautiful, and the good, constitutes the chief dignity and glory of our being. To declare this power objective, not ours, is to rob us of all this glory and dignity, and to degrade us even below the animal creation, almost to a level with inanimate matter.

8. The element of necessity, Cousin detects in the intelligence, though simultaneously involving objective existence, is not sufficient to establish the fact of the objectivity of the *power* of intelligence. The same element of necessity may be detected in sensibility; and to a certain extent in activity itself. Our liberty is not complete. We can even will only according to given laws, not of *our* enacting, and only within given bounds,—bounds which we have not prescribed, and which we cannot outleap.

These objections are conclusive; no reasoning can obviate their force. And yet, in the face of these very objections,

we are disposed to maintain that there is a sense in which reason is impersonal and objective.

The word reason may be taken in two senses. In one sense, it means what Cousin calls the absolute, the world of absolute ideas, immaterial and necessary truth; in the other sense, the faculty or power by which we recognize this absolute world. In the first it is impersonal and objective; in the second personal and subjective. Cousin nowhere to our knowledge distinguishes between these two senses of the word. But does he really confound them? Does he mean to assert that reason in both senses is one and the same? We confess that we feel unable to decide. His language and his arguments would seem to authorize the assertion, that he holds that the absolute ideas, and the power by which we recognize them, are identical. The probability, we think, is that his mind has not been drawn distinctly to the point in question. And yet, if he does confound them, he only does what others have done before him. Kant confounds them by absorbing the absolute or transcendental reason in reason as a faculty of human nature, and thus lays the foundation of his peculiar kind of idealism, which prepares the way for the egoism of his disciple, Fichte. If Cousin confounds them, it is by absorbing the subjective reason in the objective, which would lead to Spinozism, and in some sense justify the charge of pantheism, which has been so often brought against him both at home and abroad. However this may be, we have his own authority for saying that he means by reason, in the sense in which he contends it is impersonal and objective, "the world of absolute ideas, the world of immaterial and necessary truth," which he treats in his course for 1818, on the philosophy of the absolute, under the names of the idea of the true, the idea of the beautiful, and the idea of the good. He uses here both the term idea and the term reason in the genuine Platonic sense. According to Plato, reason is the world of ideas, and ideas are very nearly if not quite what we mean by universal and necessary truths; of which sort are the truths contained in the propositions: The same thing cannot both be and not be: the whole is greater than its part: that which is not cannot act: no phenomenon can begin to exist without a cause: the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: reason ought to govern the passions: men should do as they would be done by, &c. True science, according to Plato, consists in a knowl-

edge of ideas, that is a knowledge of these universal and necessary truths, these eternal principles of things. Now, understanding reason in this sense,—and this is really a legitimate and common use of the word, as is evinced by the frequency with which we hear, "he should submit to reason," "reason dictates," "he will not be governed by reason," "that is a truth of reason." "reason bids us do this," "reason bids us not do that,"—taking reason, we say in this sense, Cousin is right in pronouncing it objective and impersonal; for in this sense it is not *us* nor ours, *me* nor mine. But in this sense it is as distinct from reason as a faculty of human nature, as is *sight* considered as something seen, from *sight* considered as the power to see.

Strictly speaking, reason should not be termed a faculty of the soul. They, who call it a faculty, mean thereby the power of perceiving the ideas or truths of reason in the sense already defined. This has been regarded as a distinct faculty of the soul. Hence we find men distinguishing, or trying to distinguish, between reason and understanding, between the power by which we perceive the objects of time and space, and that by which we perceive the objects of the world lying beyond them. But there is no ground here for any distinction. The power by which we perceive in one world, is precisely the power by which we perceive in the other. The conditions, degrees, and objects of knowledge may vary, but the *power* is in all cases one and the same faculty of the soul. We perceive by one and the same power the corporeal world and the ideas of reason. To avoid confusion, we ourselves call this power by the general name of *intelligence*, or power to know. Man with us is not a reasonable being because reason is one of his faculties, but because he has the power to perceive the truths of reason, and to follow the dictates of reason. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to quarrel about words, and we shall not object to calling our faculty of intelligence by the term reason, if in this sense it be distinguished from reason as the general term for the world which transcends time and space, the world of immaterial and necessary truth.

We may consider man as an intelligence, seeing, perceiving, or knowing in three worlds: 1. In the world of space, which seeing or perceiving is called sensation. 2. In the world of time, called in regard to time past, memory, in regard to time to come, presentiment or foresight—history

and prophecy. 3. In the world of ideas, the world of reason, the transcendental world in modern phraseology termed intuition, or intuitive perception. Intuition, with us, is as applicable to seeing or perceiving in the one world as in another; for with us all knowledge is intuitive, that is, by looking *on* the object. In the longest chain of reasoning each link is intuitively perceived, and reasoning is nothing but placing a given object in its several parts and relations, immediately before the mind's eye.

Now, to establish the objectivity of reason, according to our view, is to establish the objectivity of the transcendental world of which we speak, of these absolute ideas, called by Cousin the ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Has Cousin succeeded, according to his own system, in doing this? This is the boast of his philosophy. To show how it may be done, was the problem he had to solve, as it is the problem of every philosopher, who wishes to go out of the sphere of the subjective, and obtain a solid basis for science. We confess, that after the maturest thought we have been able to bestow on the subject, after having wavered long in our judgment, and disposed from a strong personal feeling to find Cousin always in the right and to award him the highest praise, we are obliged to return to the judgment we expressed in a paper on his philosophy, inserted in the *Christian Examiner* for September, 1836, though we sustain that judgment by other and stronger reasons than those we were then able to adduce. We see him perpetually on the verge of solving the problem; nay, we admit that he virtually does solve it, but not systematically, not scientifically, not legitimately. His argument is, after all, but a paralogism. He shows, what few will deny, that these ideas are at the bottom of human intelligence; he shows that the human intelligence cannot be developed without them, and that we are necessitated to accept them, to believe in their objective validity. All this is well. But this does not advance him a single step on the Scottish school. It merely demonstrates, what Reid himself had done equally well a long time before him, that these ideas are necessary or first principles of belief.

Cousin merely proves, according to his system, that these absolute ideas are necessary elements of human intelligence, understood not as our power to know, but as the effect of the exercise of that power. They reside, if we may so speak, in reason. But reason he regards ever as *in us*.

True, he *says* reason is not *us*, but he places it after all in the *me*. Whatever is *in* the *me* must be the *me*. By teaching, as he does, that it is in the *me* that these ideas are seen, he necessarily contradicts his own assertion that they are objective. He falls here into the very common error of representing the *me*, if we may so speak, as the *locus* of ideas. Locke defined ideas very well, when he called them "objects about which the mind is immediately conversant," but destroyed their objective character by supposing it to be in the mind that the mind converses with them. Cudworth treats them as absolute ideas in his *Immutable Virtue*, with rare sagacity, and labors hard to prove their legislative character; but fails in consequence of considering them as furnished by the mind's own energy, and as residing in the mind. This same view is taken of them by our American transcendentalists, who regard them as laws of the soul, sometimes as the soul itself, and understand by intuition, seeing them by looking into the soul. But it is idle to pretend that what is in the soul is objective; that is, that what is in the soul is not in the soul, but out of it. Nor will Cousin relieve himself by proving these ideas objective to liberty, or the power to act. He himself, notwithstanding some assertions to the contrary, expressly denies that liberty, or activity, constitutes the *me*. According to him, the *me* is an active, intelligent, and sentient subject. The power to know is as essential to the *me* as the power to act. In proving these ideas to be exterior to liberty, then, he does not prove them to be exterior to the total *me*, that is really objective to man himself, that is again, virtually *not-me*.

We grant that Cousin proves that these ideas are objects of human intelligence, that is, objects of thought. But this was not the main point to be made out. The main point to be made out was that they are not only objects of thought, which nobody questions, but that they are really and truly *not-me;* that is, that they exist out and independent of the subject thinking them. This point, the boast of his philosophy, he has not established, and he has been prevented from doing it by that very psychological method on which he so strenuously insists, and which we ourselves have heretofore insisted on with equal earnestness. According to this method, the soul studies its own phenomena in itself, by an interior light called consciousness, as it studies the exterior world by the exterior senses. The soul, then,

can study itself by immediate consciousness. It, then, stands face to face with itself, and may be both the subject studying and the object studied. Hence the *me*, as Jouffroy innocently asserts, may be at once both a *me* observing and a *me* observed. Grant this, and what is the evidence that these absolute ideas, though objects of thought, are not nevertheless really subjective, belonging to the *me* taken as the object of its own observation? Cousin's philosophy, we therefore assert, does not and cannot carry him out of the subjective, into the region of the *not-me;* for the *me* observed is no less *me* than the *me* observing. All he attains to is an objective *me!*—or an objective subject, none the less subjective, however, for being objective. His philosophy, then, is really, according to his own principles, if interpreted from the point of view which recognizes the subject at all, a system of pure idealism; if interpreted from the objective point of view, a system of absolute pantheism. For, with all his eclecticism, he really establishes no distinction between subject and object.

To this conclusion we must come, if we take his principles, as officially declared in his lectures, and push them to their last results. But Cousin has suffered few facts in metaphysics to escape him. He has himself, and apparently without knowing it, and at some expense of systematic consistency, furnished us, in some of his *Fragments*, with the means of relieving both him and ourselves of all embarrassment.* The simple fact is that the *me*, being the subject, that is, the thinker, is not and cannot be the object. But as there can be no thought without an object, for it is impossible to think without thinking something, it follows that the objective element of every thought is really and truly *not-me*. These absolute ideas, then, inasmuch as they are undeniably objects of thought, are not only objective to the intelligence, as Cousin proves them, but objective to the *whole me*, and therefore *not-me*, existing out of the *me*, and independent of it.

Cousin is, then, after all, substantially correct in asserting the objectivity of reason, understood as the world of absolute and immaterial truth; he has only failed in proving it to be so, by failing to follow out certain principles which he has himself recognized. Practically he is right, scientifically he is wrong. But, the objectivity of reason in

* Fragmens Philosophiques, Paris, 1834, p. 243.

the only sense in which it is not absurd to assert it, was, after all, the main problem. Cousin, therefore, in attempting to establish the objectivity of reason, as the means by which to arrive scientifically at an objective world, is somewhat out in his logic. His demonstration in this case would be a demonstration of the fact to be demonstrated as the means with which to demonstrate it. We therefore think, with all becoming deference, that his long, tedious labors, on this point, leave us scientifically right where we were when he commenced them; though we feel, at the same time, that they have upon the whole greatly tended to advance metaphysical science.

Assuming now, what the author of *Charles Elwood* assumes, but does not demonstrate, that these absolute ideas of the true, the good, the beautiful, are objective, out of the *me*, and legislative for it, as we now see that they are, we must contend that his demonstration of the existence of God is worthy of being accepted. These ideas constitute reason. They are absolute, consequently, reason itself must be absolute. This absolute reason is not God, but is, as Plato calls it, his Logos, Word, or Speech, and implies him as necessarily as thought implies a thinker. This, the author of *Charles Elwood*, we think, has demonstrated. He has demonstrated, in our judgment now as well as eight years ago when the demonstration was written, the absolute necessity of a God; and this demonstration, in fact, if not in form, rests on as firm a basis of certainty, as that on which rests the certainty of our own existence.

But, let this not be taken for more than it really is. This demonstration of the necessity of a God is not a knowledge of God. God, to speak strictly, is never an object of knowledge. We have heretofore used language on this subject, that needs some modification. We have assumed, and not without justice, that the absolute ideas, of which we speak, are the basis of all intelligence. These ideas being absolute, constituting the absolute reason, we have supposed to be in the last analysis identical with God. Now as these ideas are, to a feeble extent at least, intuitively perceived by all men, we have held, though we know not that we have ever so asserted, that God is known by intuition. This is stating the matter too strongly. In the first place, immense numbers of our race have almost no perception at all of these absolute ideas. They and we and all nature are immersed in them, swim as it were in the

mighty ocean of the transcendental, but the transcendental is rarely disengaged by the mind, and is never seen, except so far as it is revealed in the concrete and contingent, with which for the most part it is confounded. The larger part of mankind do not look beyond the outward visible object, and,—to speak the language of religion,—live only the life of the senses. Their thoughts to the wise man, to the philosopher, involve these absolute ideas, but they themselves know it not, and therefore may be said practically not to think them at all.

Then, in the next place, *these ideas are not God.* Doubtless they contain a revelation of God, and therefore he enters into them, as a man enters into his thought; but they are not he, any more than man's thoughts, or his words, are himself. But even if they were God, we know them at best only to a feeble extent. We know truth no further than we become acquainted with that which is true; and of the beautiful, what know we beyond the beautiful objects we have seen? Or of the good? We have the power of recognizing the true, the beautiful, the good, intuitively, up to a certain extent, *when the objects to which they belong are presented to us;* but our knowledge of them does not transcend the portion of them contained in these objects, or which these objects manifest. These ideas are absolute, universal, eternal, but our knowledge of them is finite, relative, particular, and transient. We may know that they are absolute, and imply an absolute God; but we, alas! are finite and relative beings. We may recognize the absolute necessity of an absolute and infinite God, full of power, wisdom, and love, but our knowledge must be always a relative and limited knowledge. In proportion as our knowledge of these absolute ideas, in the divine works which reveal them, extends, may our knowledge of God *in his manifestation* extend. But, beyond this, knowledge of even the manifested God is not possible.

We may unquestionably attain to the discovery of the logical necessity of God. Thus far we think Mr. Morton in *Charles Elwood* has gone. But this implies no extension of our knowledge of God. God is not learned in these logical abstractions. The God that we may know is not the God *above* the universe, but the God *in* the universe; and it is by studying him in the universe, that we learn what we may know of him, not by sinking the universe, and seeking by abstraction to attain to a pure spirit dwelling in eternal soli-

tude, but ineffable glory, beyond. Doubtless he is over all, but as over all, in his awful supremacy, we cannot approach him. We can know of God only some aspects of his divinity, as revealed in his works. We may hear his speech, but we cannot see his face; listen to his awful word, but never behold the Speaker. This is the sublime doctrine of Christianity, which commands us to behold the glory of the Father in the face of his Son, and teaches us that it is the Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, not the Father himself, who is the object of human knowledge. We must then honor the Son as we do the Father, because the Son, the Word, is all that is revealed to us of the Father. We must, in plain terms, limit our ambition to a knowledge of God as he reveals himself; study him in his works, and in the records of his providences, love him in all nature, especially in the heart of man, but bow down with lowly reverence before the thick darkness with which he hides his face from all mortal vision.

III. With the doctrine of the impersonality of reason must go the necessity and legitimacy of the division of reason into spontaneous reason and reflective reason. We are not sure that we have rightly seized what Cousin really meant by this division; for we find upon a closer inspection of his works than we had made when writing *Charles Elwood*, that he gives more than one account of it, and we are not able to make his several accounts harmonize with each other. But as near as we can come at his meaning, under a general point of view, he understands, by spontaneous reason, reason operating independently of the *me*, by its own inherent force and energy; and by reflective reason, reason operating in subjection to our will. In the first, the *me* does not enter as subject; in the second, it does in some sort so enter.

Reason, taken objectively, is the world of absolute ideas, of necessary truth, the Logos, Word, or Speech of God. In spontaneous reason, then, the subject, the intelligent force, or agency at work, is not man, but God. Whatever, then, the reason spontaneously reveals is revealed by God himself. The spontaneous revelations are, then, supernatural, really and truly divine, and deserve all the authority usually ascribed to divine revelation. This is the view Mr. Morton takes in *Charles Elwood;* and it is on this view that he rests his explanation of the fact of inspiration. Mr. Morton is a firm believer in divine revelation, in the full signifi-

cance of the term. If he errs, it is not in his belief, nor in the doctrine he teaches; but in the account he gives of it. His purpose was so to explain it, as to enable the unbeliever to grasp it, and to sustain it by analogous facts in his own experience. But his explanation will not abide the test of criticism.

This explanation, it may be seen at once, rests on the objectivity of reason. But we have found reason, as the faculty of intelligence to be not objective, but subjective and personal. It is, then, the subject itself, under one of its aspects. The subject that knows is always the *me*. To assert, then, the spontaneity of reason is only to assert, in other words, the spontaneity of the *me;* that is, that the *me* is in itself active, capable of acting from its own inherent energy. And this again is only asserting the freedom of the *me;* for the only intelligible definition of freedom is the power to act. Spontaneity is the highest possible expression of freedom. Then the *me* is never more present than in its spontaneous phenomena. There is nothing which it can be more truly said to do than that which it does spontaneously. This is admitted by Cousin himself, when treating of the spontaneous activity of the *me* in relation to morals. The highest virtue consists in the fact that the soul is in such a state that its natural aspirations, its spontaneous emotions, are in harmony with the will of God; so that it obeys God without deliberation, without reflection, from its own natural promptings. It is then sanctified. Raising to this state a fallen soul, a prey to debased and debasing appetites and depraved tastes, is that change of heart which religious people demand, and which goes by the name of new birth, or regeneration. It will not do, then, to say that the acts we perform spontaneously, whether as force or as intelligence, are performed by a subject or agent which is not *me*. The more spontaneous our acts, the more strictly are they ours, the more strictly subjective and personal are they. The subject in spontaneity, then, is not God, but *me*, if we understand it as predicated of reason as the faculty of intelligence.

Nor shall we gain any thing by understanding spontaneity as predicated of reason taken as the absolute, the world of immaterial and necessary truth. Our first perceptions of this world are unquestionably prior to reflection. We have entertained these absolute or transcendental ideas before we have sought them. We found them to be facts of our

intelligence, of our knowledge, the first moment we ascertained its contents. How came they there? Evidently, says Cousin, without any agency of ours. But in this he is wrong. For if there had been no exercise of our power of knowing, would they have been facts of our knowledge? Say, these ideas, without any agency of ours, spontaneously present themselves before us, but we are by nature inherently unintelligent, or, if intelligent, we do not exercise our intelligence, would they be recognized? Of course not. The spontaneous presentation of these ideas before our minds, which is all that spontaneity when predicated of reason can mean, would not give us, then, the actual perception of them, for the act of perceiving is always *our* act.

Cousin has been misled by the improper view he takes of the *me*. He, though not without asserting to the contrary, as we have said already, makes the *me* consist in liberty, or the power to act *as naked force*. Spontaneous activity of the *me*, as naked force, he expressly admits to be personal; but the spontaneous activity of the *me*, as intelligence, he contends, is not personal. But, according to his own philosophy, the *me* does not, and never can, act as naked force, for this very satisfactory reason, that it is not in itself a naked force. He recognizes three fundamental faculties of human nature: activity, or power to act; sensibility, or power to feel; and reason, or power to know. The *me*, then, according to him, is essentially an active, sentient, and intelligent subject, or being. It must, then, whenever it acts at all, act as an intelligent and sentient force, and it is in this fact, the unity and triplicity of the soul, that he finds the psychological basis of eclecticism, as he calls it, or synthetism, as it should be more properly called.

Certainly there can be no fact of perception without an act of the percipient subject. Cousin improperly assumes that this act, which he calls attention, is that of the subject as mere force, when it is, and must be, according to his own principles, an act of a *percipient* force; both because the particular force in question is inherently percipient, and because no perception could follow the act of a non-percipient force. The act of perceiving is, then, necessarily as subjective when the object perceived spontaneously presents itself as when it is sought by reflection. The force or agency perceiving is not the object spontaneously presented, but the subject itself. This is so obviously true that, had it not been for his mutilation of the *me*, and his

effort to make out the knowing faculty to be objective, Cousin could never have overlooked it, or asserted to the contrary.

There are unquestionably two classes of intellectual phenomena which Cousin has done well to recognize. But he errs in considering one class to be less subjective than the other. The true distinction between them is that which Leibnitz has marked, of *perception* and *apperception*, or perception without consciousness, or without the recognition of ourselves as subject perceiving, and perception with this recognition. This is the real distinction Cousin has in mind, as any one may see who will read his essay on the *First and Last Fact of Consciousness*, to be found in his *Fragmens Philosophiques*.

To make this distinction intelligible, it is necessary to define the meaning of this word *consciousness*, a word used with much vagueness, and concerning which, as a philosophical term, people generally have no clear or precise notions. *Cogito, ergo sum*, said Descartes, I think, therefore I am. Descartes did not mean here to offer an argument for his existence, but simply to state the fact in which he found it. We have no direct perception of ourselves. We cannot see ourselves in ourselves. We only recognize ourselves in the phenomenon. Our knowledge never attains to being in itself, it only attains to the necessity of being, and to so much of being as enters into the phenomenon. This is as true in regard to ourselves as we have shown it to be in regard to God. We know being, as Cousin himself has shown, only under the relation of cause. It is only under this relation that we ever find or recognize ourselves; though not as naked cause, but a cause that knows and feels as well as wills; in one word, that thinks. Thought expresses our highest activity, and in its pure and primitive synthesis. It is a complex phenomenon, at once action, cognition, and sentiment, responding to the three-fold power of the soul, to act, to feel, and to know. Now, in thinking, we always recognize ourselves in the phenomenon which we term thought, as subject, or the one who thinks. If we decompose the thought, we shall find it made up of three elements: subject, or thinker; object, or that which is thought; and their relation, or the form of the thought, or, in other words, what the mind takes into its view of both subject and object, that is, notion, or conception. The recognition of ourselves in the fact of thinking,

as the subject thinking, is precisely the fact designated by the word consciousness, which added to the perception of the object constitutes what Leibnitz calls *apperception.* This fact was called by Descartes *consciousness* (*cum-scientia*), because it is something which goes along *with* knowledge, that is, perception of the object; *apperception* (*ad-perceptio*) by Leibnitz, because it is something in addition to simple perception. You perceive a rose. This is perception. You recognize yourself as the subject who perceives it, that the perceiver is you and not another; this is apperception, or consciousness. Now all those phenomena, in which we recognize ourselves as subject, are apperceptions, or perceptions with consciousness; all those, in which we do not recognize ourselves as subject, are simple perceptions, or perceptions without consciousness.

That there are these two classes of phenomena, is very obvious and very certain. Man is essentially an active and percipient subject. He must, then, while living, always act; and as he cannot act without perceiving,—for being intelligent in his essence, he cannot act as force without acting as intelligence,—he must perceive always and all that comes within the range of his vision; and perceive, too, in all the three worlds with which he stands in relation. But nothing is more certain than that he does not always perceive with consciousness. The power of apperception, as Leibnitz, who has treated this subject better than any one else, affirms, is only a higher degree of the power of perception. But we apperceive, that is, are conscious of perceiving only in the few stronger and more marked instances of perception. In general our perceptions are too feeble and confused for us to recognize ourselves as their subject. They may serve indeed to keep alive a dim and obscure sense of our existence, but the mass of them are too feeble to give us a distinct recognition of it.

Now, it is by virtue of these feeble and confused perceptions, which play a much more important part in the conduct of life than is commonly supposed, that these absolute ideas, of which Cousin speaks, come to be facts of our intelligence, prior to their being found there by reflection, and prior to our having consciously sought them, or been conscious of thinking them. These are rightly termed facts of spontaneity, for they have been perceived by the spontaneous activity of the soul. But this does not in the least separate them, as to their quality, from the other class of facts.

It is by the inherent power of the soul, that these are perceived, and it is by the same power, only in a higher degree of exercise, that the soul perceives in what is called reflection, so much so that in reflection it not only perceives, but knows that it perceives, is able to find itself as the subject perceiving. The subjective act of perceiving is by virtue of the same power, and is as spontaneous in one case as in the other.

Nor do these feeble and confused perceptions, which we have without knowing that we have them, approach any nearer the fact of inspiration, or afford any more solid ground for our faith in objective realities, than the more distinct and vivid perceptions, which we call apperceptions. No doubt, in these as in the others, reflection may discover the fact of a percipient subject and of an object perceived. But the simple fact that the object is perceived without the subject being conscious of perceiving it, does not constitute any additional evidence that it is veritably *not-me*. We think, therefore, that Cousin finds in the fact of spontaneity or in unconscious perception, no explanation of the fact of inspiration, no evidence of the objectivity of reason, and none which he does not also find in reflection, of the existence of a *not-me*, the great points to be made out by its assistance.

M. Cousin, we are disposed to be believe, has been, in all his discussions on the objectivity and spontaneity of reason, preoccupied by the desire to refute Kant's idealism and Fichte's egoism. His great aim has evidently been to show that the *me* does not create those absolute ideas, as Fichte seemed to teach, and that they are not mere modes, laws, affections, or categories of a subjective reason, as was taught by Kant. The assertion of the objectivity of reason negatived the last; of the spontaneous operation of reason, the former. He, however, succeeds in neither case. For in asserting the objectivity of reason he begs the question between him and Kant. Do the best he can, he has nothing but reason with which to prove reason's objectivity. But the validity of the assertion by reason, of its own objectivity, was the point to be made out. In regard to Fichte he shows, indeed, what Fichte never asserted, that the *me* does not create those ideas by free, conscious effort. But he was still obliged to admit the intervention of the *me*, as percipient subject, in the facts of spontaneity, or else to deny the agency of the *me* in any of its phenomena not resulting from its

conscious and deliberate activity, or from reflection,—a denial that would have not only made sad work of psychology, but have as completely upset all morality as the sensation transformed of the school of Condillac.

The refutation of Kant and Fichte, and therefore of all idealism, egoism, and scepticism, whether atheistic or pantheistic, is in a simple fact, which Cousin alleges over and over again and which he seems never to have comprehended,—the fact already stated that *the objective element of thought is always not-me.* The error of Kant, and the error which has led astray his whole school and all others, is the assumption that the *me* does or may develop itself as pure subject, or, in other words, be its own object, and therefore at once subject and object. Kant assumes that the *me* develops itself, without a foreign object, in cognition; hence he infers that all knowledge is purely subjective, and asserts the impotency of reason to carry us out of the sphere of the *me.** Fichte, taking Kant's critique as his starting-point, without reference to his doctrine concerning practical reason, asserted the power of the *me* to be its own object, and sought the proof of it in the fact of volition. Hence he fell into the absurdity of representing all ideas as the products of the *me,* and even went so far as to tell his disciples how it is that man makes God. A bold man, that Fichte; but he lived long enough to correct some of his speculative errors. Cousin seems to have fallen in part into the error of Fichte, while seeking to get rid of it. He seems never to have got quite clear of the notion that the *me* can be its own object, notwithstanding he asserts the important fact that the object is *always not-me.* The truth is, the *me* is never object; it is always subject, and subject only. It finds and can find itself only as thinker; it never does, then, find itself as object thought. And as there can be no thought without an objective element, this element is necessarily *not-me.* This is a fact of the very highest importance in science; but a simple fact resting on precisely the degree of evidence that we have for our own existence. This is the great fact Cousin has strug-

*We know very well that this was not the real doctrine of Kant; that it was only demonstrated by him to be the result, to which all philosophy must come that *is based on pure reason.* He himself relied on practical reason, that is to say, on plain common sense; and his purpose of writing critiques of pure reason, was to demonstrate the unsatisfactory character of all purely metaphysical speculations. A wise man, after all, was that same Emanuel Kant.

gled through all his writings to establish, but which he, after all, has not established, and which, though asserting it, he has failed entirely to use,—misled, as we have already shown, by his physchological method.

The fact, that the object is always *not-me*, established on the degree of certainty we have stated, science becomes possible and legitimate. The certainty of knowledge, when carried into the objective, is precisely what it is in the sphere of the subjective. *There is no purely subjective, or purely objective knowledge.* We cannot think without finding ourselves as subject and that which is not ourselves as object. We find ourselves only in thinking. Consequently, we find both the *me* and the *not-me* in the same phenomenon, by the same light, and with equal certainty. They are both fundamental and indispensable elements of thought. Without the *me*, no thought, because no thinker; without the *not-me*, no thought, because no object to be thought. Here is the whole mystery solved, and philosophy and the universal faith of mankind placed on the same basis. Mankind believe in an objective world, because they think it, and cannot think without thinking it. Philosophy can add nothing to this, obtain no other basis for faith, and needs no other.

The question as to the validity of our knowledge, that is, as to the grounds of science, disposed of,—which we venture to maintain, in opposition to M. Cousin, is the first question in philosophy, not the last,—then come up the questions concerning what we actually know, and what are the sources and conditions of knowledge. We must answer the question, what do we actually know? by drawing up an inventory of the wealth of experience; for all actual knowledge is by experience, nothing being *a priori*, but the capacity to know. Under the head of sources and conditions of knowledge, must be considered the several ways in which knowledge is obtained, and the means we possess of extending our own knowledge and that of the race. In this department of philosophy must be considered the great and striking fact of inspiration, natural and supernatural, human and divine,—a fact which plays a more conspicuous part in the origin and progress of human knowledge than even religious people themselves contend. We did intend to treat this subject of inspiration in this present article, but we have left ourselves no space to treat it at sufficient length, to satisfy either ourselves or our readers. We,

therefore, leave it to be a distinct topic of consideration on some future occasion. We will only say at this time, that the views we have heretofore offered on inspiration are not broad enough to embrace the whole subject, and by leaving out some important considerations, but imperfectly explain it so far as they do embrace it.

But we have given enough of metaphysics for one quarter, and must bring this unexpectedly protracted article to a close, and that too, while we leave much unsaid, which we had proposed to say. In the course of the article, we have spared neither ourselves, nor our master in philosophy, M. Cousin. The criticisms on ourselves will be taken, we presume, in good part; but those on Cousin, considering the relation we have been supposed to hold to his philosophy, will most likely excite some surprise, and call forth a new edition of the old stereotyped charge, that we have changed our opinions again. This charge has been rung in our ears from early boyhood, and we confess that it has ceased to be musical, and become somewhat monotonous and wearisome. Would that our good-natured critics could find some other fault in us, so as to be able to introduce a little novelty and somewhat of variety into their accusations. Both for our readers' sake and our own, we would that we never had occasion to modify our opinions once expressed. But we are too poor in virtue to be able to part with enough to purchase that consistency which is maintained only at the price of wilfully shutting the eyes to the light, or by obstinately adhering, in spite of conviction, to one's first utterances. If we were never conscious of having erred, we should never have occasion to modify the opinions we had once expressed. It is doubtless best never to err; but if we belong to a fallible race, and cannot well avoid falling into error, the next best is probably to adhere to one's errors no longer than till one discovers that they are errors. For ourselves, we are still disciples, and we have not the least doubt, notwithstanding our proficiency, that there are many things for us to learn. And that we may be free to learn them, we resolve never to be the slave of our own past,—the slave of our own shadow. Others may do differently, but perhaps not more wisely; and after all he perhaps is not least deserving of confidence who is the first to detect and expose his own errors.

Nevertheless, we are far from admitting that we more frequently change our opinions than most men, who are

accustomed to think for themselves, do theirs. The principal difference between them and us is that they are prudent enough to keep the greater part of their changes to themselves, or to their few intimate friends, while we are so imprudent as to send ours all out to the public as they come. Still we could, were it worth our while, very easily convince this same public, that we have by no means undergone the frequent changes of opinion that they imagine. The great current of our faith has always flowed on in the same direction, and the doctrines we are putting forth to-day, are the doctrines, enlarged and systematised, which we have always been seeming to ourselves to be putting forth, ever since we have been known to the community. The only changes we are conscious of, and the only changes we have acknowledged, have occurred in relation to our views of the value or soundness, of the views of others,—views which we partially adopted for a time, without making all the qualifications and limitations they demanded. Our faith has been and is the same. Where we have investigated a subject for ourselves, and relied on the free action of our own mind, we have rarely had occasion to change our views.

Even in the criticisms we have offered on Cousin's philosophy, we have said nothing not substantially anticipated in former remarks upon it. We have, it is true, placed our objections to that philosophy in a more prominent light now than we had done before, because we are confident they are of more importance than we formerly considered them. Every man in criticising favorably, or unfavorably, any system, must view it from the position where he stands. When we approached Cousin's philosophy at first, we felt deeply the need of a profounder, a more religious philosophy, both for ourselves and for our countrymen, than that taught in our schools. We did not feel able to construct such a philosophy as we saw was needed; we knew no one amongst us that was able. There was too great indifference on the subject. It was necessary to kindle up an interest in philosophical studies. It was at that time more important that our countrymen should think than it was what they should think. Philosophy had no audience. We thought, and so thought some of our friends, that of all philosophical writings within our reach, Cousin's were best adapted to the wants of our countrymen. Our first aim was to get them read and studied, confident that by so doing we should pre-

pare the way for a sound philosophy, even in case Cousin's should be found to be not altogether satisfactory. It was the best, the most satisfactory, that we were acquainted with. It had great and positive merits, and we felt that it was admirably adapted to the state of philosophic thought in our community. We therefore did what we could to commend it. We had no disposition to dwell upon its defects, for our purpose was not to criticise it, but to induce others to study it. We commended it not for these defects, but for its merits. But, we own that these defects were greater than we at the time thought them, and now that an interest is awakened among us in philosophical studies, we have felt that it was time to point them out, as they had not been pointed out before.

But we still maintain our respect for Cousin, as a philosopher, and as a man. We abate nothing of what we have heretofore said in his praise. If his philosophy, taken as a whole, is not all that we at first thought it, we still contend that he deserves a high rank among the eminent men, who have at different epochs contributed to the progress of metaphysical science. His writings contain nearly all the materials requisite for constructing a sound system of philosophy. There is scarcely a point involved in the whole subject, on which he has not shed more or less light. We have borrowed from him the very light by which we have been enabled to criticise him; and if we are able on some points to offer a more satisfactory explanation of our mental phenomena than he has done, it is to him that we are indebted for our ability. We know very little that we would say, which he has not already said, or implied; and if we were asked what books were best to be studied by one wishing to form just philosophical views, we know of none that we could more conscientiously or unreservedly recommend than his. They are the best, all things considered, that we are acquainted with. Whoever would become familiar with metaphysical subjects, must study them. They have a permanent value, which no progress in science, or changes of doctrine can altogether destroy. We are pleased, therefore, to find them introduced as text-books in our venerable University at Cambridge: and equally pleased are we, too, that their introduction has not caused the expulsion of Locke from the same university; for we are not ashamed to own that our respect for Locke is every day increasing and we would not repeat the severe things which

the indiscreet zeal of his admirers has, on some former occasions, induced us to say of him. The more we study him, the more are we struck with his merits. The philosophy which commends itself by detracting from the imperishable glory of such a man as John Locke, can be in vogue only for a day, and must soon take its place with the things that are as if they had not been.

Cousin is a true philosopher, and would have given us a sound philosophy in all its parts, if he could have undertaken to do it at once, in a regular systematic treatise. His errors and defects grow, we apprehend, from his having studied philosophy somewhat after the fragmentary manner in which he has treated it in his writings, and from having confounded, too much, philosophy with the history of philosophy. He has nowhere given us a complete system of philosophy; and we confess that we do not find ourselves able to mould all that he has at different times advanced into one and the same system. We find, or we seem to ourselves to find, in his writings the elements of incongruous systems, which are not, and cannot be made parts of the same whole. We have been forced to this conclusion by undertaking to mould his scattered fragments into a complete and systematic body of philosophy, an undertaking we have been compelled to abandon. We could not succeed. We have, however, attempted the construction of a system on our own account, with what success it is not for us to say, though with a success more satisfactory to ourselves than we anticipated. We have the satisfaction of feeling that, for the first time in our life, we have a system, which, though not constructed without assistance, is yet as a system our own. Some of its elements appear in this article; and those familiar with metaphysical matters will not judge them unimportant. The whole system will be laid before the public at the earliest day possible*, and we are confident, when seen as a whole, it will be found able to reconcile many jarring creeds, and in no small degree to meet the wants of both the old school and the new. This much we may say in advance of its publication that, viewed in relation to the systems of philosophy already extant, it assumes English philosophy as its starting-point; that is, it takes up philosophy where it exists in our literature, and in our national character, and continues it; but

*The system here meant is begun, but not completed in *Synthetic Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 58-129. ED.

attains to all those moral, spiritual, and religious results, for which we and others have valued the metaphysical speculations of modern France and Germany. Without claiming for man more than finite powers, or pretending to solve all problems, it will, we think, show a solid basis for science and religion. We pretend not, however, to have made any discovery that will supersede the necessity of divine revelation, or a childlike trust in the wisdom and goodness of Providence, whose ways are often dark and mysterious, and whose purposes are not seldom past finding out. Man does well to aspire; it is the glory of his nature, and the condition of his advancement; but he does well also to remember that he is a limited being, and his intelligence but a feeble taper burning in the bosom of infinite night. For a feeble distance it may furrow the darkness, and as it grows by burning, it may furrow it further and still further; but can never overcome it and enlighten infinity.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

[From the Democratic Review for May and June, 1843.]

THE conception of a Universal History of humanity belongs almost to our own times, and is said to be due to the Cartesian school of philosophy; although that school, by taking its point of departure in the pure reason as manifested in the individual consciousness, was and needs must be altogether unhistorical in both its principle and tendency. Nevertheless, by assuming all truth to be geometrically demonstrable, and therefore demanding in every subject of human inquiry geometrical evidence, Cartesianism necessarily creates the need of a Universal History, and naturally suggests its possibility. If all truth be logically demonstrable from the data furnished by the individual reason, then, whatever has appeared, and whatever may appear, in the history of our race, must be logically inferable, and as it were capable of being reproduced or foreknown by mere reasoning. This school by virtue of its principle taught men to look upon history as realizing or developing a plan, and therefore, as capable of scientific exposition.

By the Universal History of humanity, we do not understand so much a complete narration of all the facts or events of the life of humanity in time and space, as their scientific explication. In constructing it, we assume the facts to be known, spread out as it were before us, and we merely ask, as we contemplate them, what mean these facts? What is their principle? What is their law? Do they develope, or realize a plan? Can they be reduced under a general law, and referred to a common origin? If so, what is this origin, this law, or in one word, this plan? By Universal History, then, we understand not what commonly passes for history, but the *Philosophy* of History.

Universal history, in the sense here taken, is possible only on condition that the various facts and events of the life of mankind, originate in some permanent principle, according to some universal law, in subordination to a general plan or design; and on condition that the plan, the law, and the principle are ascertainable. The universal historian assumes that nothing happens by mere chance, or falls out through mere will or arbitrariness; that, in fact, nothing takes place without having been foreseen and provided for. All is subordinated to a plan. What is this plan? What purpose was the life of humanity intended to serve? What grand scheme does it realize or develope? We must be able to answer this question, before we can comprehend the history of our race, or form any tolerable judgment concerning the good or the evil of its various facts and events. The plan or scheme once known, the whole becomes comparatively easy; for that alone is good which facilitates its realization; and that alone is evil, which tends to hinder, retard, or thwart it.

The answer to the question here raised, is virtually the answer to the question, what is the final cause of man and of men? For what was man made? For what do individual men and women exist? Why are we here on this globe, with just such natures as we have, and just such environments? Here is the question of questions. All are concerned with this question. Sooner or later it comes up in all hearts. The rustic following his plow, the shepherd tending his flocks, as well as the naturalist in his laboratory, and the philosopher in his painful psychological analysis, alike ask this fearful question, and seek, each in his own way, to wring out from Nature an answer. Many answers have been suggested, many an Œdipus has guessed at the riddle

of the Sphinx, but she sits as ever at the way-side proposing it anew. The mystery of the Man-child remains, for all that philosophy has done or can do, yet unexplained. It is the book which John saw in the right hand of him that sat upon the throne, written all over within and on the back-side, sealed with seven seals, and no man is able to open the book or to loosen the seals thereof; for in each man the self-same mystery is renewed. Yet the Lion of the tribe of Judah prevails to open the book, and in proportion as we become wedded to Christ, we are able to learn somewhat of its significance, and to cease to weep that man is and always must be a mystery unto himself.

We have no intention of answering this question, which, if we were able to do, we could not do without leaving the field of philosophy, and trenching too far on the field of theology, for our present purpose, and also for the general design of the Journal in which we are writing. We have asked the question before to-day, and have asked it out from the very depths of despair, in the terrible agony of feeling all things giving way beneath us. We have asked it of ourselves, of our brethren, of the heavens and the earth, of the past and the future, of the living and the dead, and that too, when we could wring out no answer but echo repeating in the distance our own question. Whether we have found an answer, whether we have found peace or not, or whence, there is no occasion to say. This much, let it suffice us to say, that we believe life taken in its largest sense, as the life both of the individual and of the race, has a plan, a wise and good plan, worthy of the infinite Wisdom and Love in which it originated. So far as our present purpose is concerned, it is enough to say that man was made for progress, for growth. The historian should always assume man's progressiveness as his point of departure, and judge all the facts and events he encounters according to their bearing on this great central truth.

Strictly speaking, progress cannot be the final cause of man's existence; for progress itself unquestionably consists in going to the end, or in realizing the plan in reference to which man was created, and exists. We must determine in some degree the end for which man was made, before ever we can determine what is or is not progress. But through the Lion of the tribe of Judah, through the Gospel, that end, for Christendom at least, is determined, and the solution of the problem is at the bottom of every *Christian*

conscience. As Christians we all have an obscure presentiment, if not a clear and distinct perception of it; and do seize it, if not by sight, at least by faith. We also assert, as Christians, man's progressiveness, for we never fail to repeat that it is his duty to labor incessantly to realize the end for which God made him. We may be permitted, then, in what follows, to assume that there is an end to be realized in and through the life of humanity; that it is man's duty to aspire always to this end; and that his progress, whether regarded as the race, or as an individual, consists in going to it. The practical question, and the question we propose now to consider is, what is going to this end for which man was made, and by what means or agencies do we go to it? In other words, what is human progress, and how is it effected?

I. THE WAR-THEORY.

M. Michelet begins his Introduction to Universal History, by asserting that "with the world commenced a war which must end with the world and not before,—that of man against nature, of spirit against matter, of liberty against necessity. History is nothing else but the recital of this interminable struggle." He further adds in a note on this passage, "I felicitate with all my heart the new apostles who are preaching the gospel of a pacification near at hand; but I fear the treaty will serve only to materialize spirit. The industrial pantheism which believes that it is about to become a religion, knows not that religion, in order to have the least life, must spring from moral liberty, instead of falling into pantheism, which is the grave of all religions."

This note, written in 1831, was levelled at the Saint-Simonians, then a powerful sect, threatening to gain a complete mastery over the French mind; and so far as intended as a protest against their unquestionably pantheistic tendencies, it was not only excusable but justifiable: and yet we are obliged to pause a moment before we can altogether accede to this doctrine of eternal struggle which M. Michelet assumes as his point of departure. It rests on the assumption of two originally hostile principles or forces between which there is and can be no peace. However disguised, this is nothing but the old Manichean heresy, the old Persian theory, oriental dualism, which divides the universe between Ormuzd and Ahriman, two eternal and indestructi-

ble principles, one good, the other evil. It assumes spirit to be good and holy, matter to be evil and unholy; man to be free, nature to be bound "fast in fate;" and finally, nature to be inherently hostile to man, always in the way of his perfection, and needing always to be combated, overcome, subdued, as the condition of his progress.

This theory M. Michelet appears to have put forth as the means of escape from Saint-Simonian pantheism, and the rationalist fatalism of the Hegelian school, introduced into France by M. Cousin, and incorporated substantially in his Course on the History of Philosophy, in 1828. The motive has been to save human freedom, which the prevailing theories threatened to annihilate, as an element that must count for something in the history of humanity. So far we applaud the motive, and accept the statement. But is this theory of two antagonist forces, of the necessary, the invincible and eternal hostility of spirit and matter, well founded? Is there in reality any ground for assuming it?

For ourselves, we confess that we regard this theory as the fundamental heresy of ancient and modern times. Disguise the matter as we may, we shall be obliged, in the last resort, as we have intimated, in order to maintain it, to adopt the old theory of oriental dualism, against which the church struggled, and almost in vain, during the first six hundred years of its existence. It loses sight of the profound significance of the doctrine of the Trinity, which lies alike at the basis of Christian theology, and of all sound philosophy whether of man or of nature. With mere duality, we admit that we have and must have war, and war only; but when we have apprehended the profound mystery of the doctrine of the Trinity, we have learned that the mediator or middle term, the reconciler of the two extremes, is integral in the original ground and cause of creation; that is to say, in the Origin, or rather in the Original of all things, there is an indissoluble synthesis, not secondary but primitive, of the two forces which we have called hostile, by virtue of the fact that the Original is not, as the theory we are considering teaches, a Duality, but a Trinity. The two terms are reconciled, or made one, by the presence of the third. In the Original of things, then, there is, and there can be, no absolute and invincible necessity for the hostility assumed.

In all mystical philosophy and theology, the number three has been called the holy number, and the perfect number,

and not without reason; for it brings together always the two extremes, and makes them one, a perfect whole. This number which we find in the Original of all things, that is to say, in the infinite and ineffable God himself, we find repeated throughout the universe in each order of creation, and in each individual creature. "*Mundus universus*," says an old writer, "*nihil aliud est, quam Deus explicatus.*" The universe is nothing else but God expressed. The original type, pattern, model, or exemplar of all creatures, after which all were made, and without reference to which was nothing made that was made, was eternal with God, in his own infinite Logos or Reason, in the very beginning with him, in his own ineffable Essence. The Trinity which we find to be *essential* in God, must then of necessity be repeated through all his works. Consequently the conditions of peace, harmony, unanimity, must be always present in all parts of his universe, and within the reach of every individual creature, so long as that creature is found in its normal state.

Nor are we satisfied with the representation of our relation with nature as a relation of hostility, and therefore assuming progress to consist in overcoming and subduing it. We see nowhere the evidences of this hostility. In their origin man and nature are nearly related; and man is so made that he is incapable of living, of exhibiting the least sign of vitality, save in and through the most intimate and friendly union with nature. Cut off from communion with nature, deprived of light, air, heat, moisture, from the various, necessary, and appropriate food which he derives from the outward world, and assimilates to himself, man would instantly cease to be a living man, lose all actual existence, and become at best a mere potentiality or possibility. Nature then is not unfriendly to man, is not his enemy, which he must fight, subdue, and if possible annihilate; but she is a genial friend, his generous assistant, the chief minister to his life and pleasure. Man unquestionably acts on nature, as nature acts on him; there is a mutual action and re-action of one upon the other, as the condition of life; this action and re-action is from opposite directions, and therefore man and nature may be said to stand opposed one to the other; but after all there is no hostility in the mutual opposition. The two forces, the moment they meet, embrace, and are henceforth one.

Still more objectionable, in our view, is it to assert a

necessary and eternal hostility between spirit and matter. This is the oriental dualism in its worst form. But spirit and matter are never—no, never—in nature, providence, or grace, encountered as hostile forces. In no point of view we can take—moral, social, religious, philosophical—is there ever the radical distinction between spirit and matter this theory supposes; and nowhere do we ever find two orders of existences, one spiritual, the other material. Matter is utterly inconceivable without a spiritual basis; and spirit is equally inconceivable without a body. The assertion, not unfrequently made, that man is a soul—meaning by soul, spirit, as distinguished from a material body—is as false as it would be to say that man is a body—meaning by body, matter, as distinguished from spirit. Man is not spirit; man is not matter; nor is he spirit *and* matter; but, as we have said in our *Synthetic Philosophy*, spirit in and through matter. Man disembodied would be no more man, than the body is man when deprived of the spirit. We here assert the inseparability of spirit and matter—not by any means their identity. To assert the identity of spirit and matter is to fall either into spiritualism or into materialism, either of which were no better than the dualism we are condemning, and both of which we as studiously eschew as the saint does Satan.

The error of this dualism is in assuming spirit and matter to be two distinct and independent existences, or, more scholastically, substances. We have regarded them as ultimate. But neither of them is ultimate, or substance in itself. Back of both spirit and matter is the τὸ ὄν of the Greeks—being itself, or absolute substance. Substance—that which stands under, in the language of the schools, supports accidents—is ultimate, and in the highest sense is God —τὸ ὂν ὄντος, Substance of substance, Being of being, and as we have learned from his revelations, not only Being of being, but *essentially* wise, powerful, and good; whence we learn again that absolute Being, Being in itself, is absolute Wisdom, Power, and Love, the ineffable and ever-blessed Three in One, and One in Three.

If we have found the Original of all things to be a Trinity, as we are taught by Christian theology, so do we find also a corresponding trinity in the manifestation. When we ascend to God, we find him a Trinity, the three terms of which are—1. Power; 2. Wisdom; 3. Love. These three, in their absolute unity and triplicity, are absolute

Being, regarded as being in itself. Starting now from being in itself, proceeding, so to speak, from God to creation, we find three terms, which are—1. Being, or the Essential; 2. The Ideal; 3. The Actual.

Now, according to the doctrine laid down, that the original type of all things is eternal in God, this second trinity, as well as the first, must be repeated throughout the universe, in each order of creation, and in each individual existence. Every being, every subject, whether of discourse or of thought even, must in its degree represent the absolute, and be capable of being contemplated under the threefold point of view of the essential, the ideal, and the actual. We say *represents*. We do by no means affirm, whatever some may at first sight suppose, that because each being or subject necessarily represents the absolute, therefore each being or subject is absolute, therefore the infinite God; nor a part of God, nor an emanation of God, as pantheism impiously teaches. The particular being or subject represents the absolute, and is the absolute only under the point of view of subject of its own phenomena, or cause of its own effects; but it is itself finite and phenomenal in relation to a higher subject. Man, if we contemplate him solely in relation to his own phenomena, stands for the absolute; he in this relation represents God, is, as it has been said, the Shekinah of God; but he represents him only in a finite and relative manner, for there is a subject which transcends man, and of which he is but a faint image, a dim shadow.

Taking these three distinctions, the first, the essential, is in itself inapproachable and ineffable; the second, the ideal, which is the word of the first, is what we call spirit; the third, the actual, that is, the incarnation, so to speak, of the word, is what we understand by matter.* In our technology we should substitute ideal and actual for spiritual and material. In every subject we should recognize, nay, in fact, we do recognize, both the ideal and the actual. The

*Our readers must not misapprehend us here; we are still in the domain of philosophy, and very far from attempting any invasion of the peculiar province of the Christian theologian. If we seem to give a universal interpretation to the Christian mystery of the incarnation of the Word, of "God manifest in the flesh," it is because that mystery has universal analogies, which we cannot but point out, and which we do without any intention as a philosopher of giving a universal application to what as a Christian theologian we, in common with our brethren of the church of Christ, hold to be a special truth. We hold the incarnation of the Word to be a special truth, but a special truth of so high an order as to contain within itself the universal truths to which we refer.

actual necessarily implies the ideal; for if there were no ideal, what would there be to be actualized? The ideal necessarily demands the actual; for without the actual, it would be to us precisely as if it were not, for only so far as actualized is it ever cognizable.

In the order of existence, the essential precedes the ideal, and the ideal the actual. This order, Schelling, Hegel, and the American transcendentalists, boast that they reproduce in their systems of philosophy. They boast of being able to begin with the essential, and from that to proceed to the ideal, and thence to the actual. Thus, from their knowledge of God as absolute being, they can tell *a priori* what will be his Word; and from their knowledge of the Word, foretell what is and must be the actual. This, if it were possible, would place philosophy on the same basis with geometry, and make all concrete existences in time and space logically demonstrable from the data obtained from our knowledge of absolute being in itself. Hence Hegel contends that the system of the universe is only a system of logic, and hence he asserts the identity of the ideal and the essential, of idea and being. But all this boast is vain. It claims for man the power of knowing the absolute in itself, and therefore claims for man confessedly finite, absolute knowledge, which would imply that he himself is absolute, and therefore not finite, but infinite. The boast is also vain, for in the order of knowledge we are obliged to reverse the order of existence; we rise through nature up to nature's God, instead of descending from God through man to nature. None but God himself can know according to the order of existence, for none but he can know being in itself, and from the absolute knowledge of the cause, have a perfect *a priori* knowledge of the effect. We, finite as we are, can see the ideal only in the actual, and the essential only in the ideal: the glory of the Father only in the Son, God only in his works, that is, his works of creation, providence, and grace. Here again we find the truth of the mystery of the incarnation of the Word; and also are able to waive the old controversy between the spiritualists and the materialists, as we have shown in our *Synthetic Philosophy*.

Now if the spiritual, that is the ideal, is seized only in the material, that is again in the actual—which is only saying that the cause is seized only in the effect, the actor only in the act—whence, we would ask, is this original, invincible, and eternal antagonism between spirit and matter?

Spirit, that is, the ideal, inasmuch as it always transcends the actual, as in life the conception is never overtaken by the execution, is, we own, superior to matter; and taken in its highest sense, as the infinite ideal of God, which he is realizing in creation, it is unquestionably eternal, while matter, which is but spirit actualized, is necessarily not eternal, but created in time. Yet if inferior and subsequent to spirit, and distinguishable from it as the effect from the cause, we would ask how can this involve its hostility to spirit, so that it can, as it now does, find room for itself only in proportion as it repugns and annihilates it? We might as well say that we can live only by destroying the works of our own hands, when in fact it is in creating, in producing, not in destroying, that we do or can live.

We may here be referred, we are aware, to the alleged hostility between our soul and body, as an example and a proof of this eternal war of spirit against matter; but we deny, in toto, the fact of this alleged hostility; we deny that there ever is, in the normal state at least, any disharmony between the human soul and body, or that their relation is ever any other than that of union and peace. In the first place, matter is as necessary to man's existence as a living soul, if not to his mere being, as a virtuality, as spirit itself. The method so common of speaking of man under the division of soul and body is hardly scriptural. We are told in Genesis, that "the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man *became a living soul.*" Man is a soul—at least a *living* soul—only when he is spirit actualized in a body. In the next place, we never find man as spirit on one side, constituting as it were one camp, and man as body on the other side, as the other camp. There has never yet been adduced a single well-attested fact, that man ever exists, or is capable of performing a single act as spirit separate from body. Into all of his phenomena, at least so far as he knows, he enters as a living soul, as the living synthesis of the spiritual and the material. Hence it is, that we as Christians profess in the creed, not only to believe in the life everlasting, but also in the resurrection of the body; for the conception of a future life, save as embodied spirits, is impossible.

We have run into many absurdities concerning spirit, and no wonder, for spirit in itself is absolutely inconceivable. Men have talked about it as if it were in the full sense of

the term a substance, a separate, an independent, and an eternal order of existence; and in these days of ours, they have even pretended that we are capable of recognizing it intuitively, distinct and separate from all material embodiment. All this is nonsense. We can form no notion whatever of spirit, save as the spirit *of* somewhat. Thus we say, spirit of the thing, of the remark, of the discourse, of man, of God. It is always, as it were, the word which some one, or something speaks: abstract the subject of which it is predicated, abstract the speaker, and it is to us as if it were not. In the material we unquestionably perceive that which is not material, but spiritual. This is the truth the materialists overlook or deny. But we perceive the spiritual *only in and through the material*, not separable, if distingnishable, from the material. This is the truth the transcendentalists and spiritualists overlook and deny. The synthetic philosopher overlooks, denies neither, but accepts the spiritual in and through the material, asserting the two as wedded in indissoluble union, and made one in the fact of life.

We have dwelt the longer on this point, because we look upon the assumption of the original and necessary hostility of spirit and matter, as productive of the very worst consequences. It supposes a sort of antagonism between the soul and body which does not exist; between one class of our interests and another which ought never to be admitted. Assuming it, one class have anathematized the body and all its interests, and have seemed to suppose that whatever tends to promote the social and physical well-being of man, is of the earth earthy, sensual, devilish, and not to be tolerated. Another class, assuming the same distinction, have predicated purity of the soul alone, and impurity solely of the body; and have allowed the grossest sensual indulgence, alleging that the soul takes no part in the lusts of the body, and is not sullied by them. The soul is the only essential part of man, wherefore then trouble ourselves, if it remain pure, about what is of the body alone? Another class still, seizing the same distinctions, affirm that all sin originates in the body, and as we throw off our bodies when we die, it follows that death frees us from all sin, and being freed by death from sin, we need no intercession of the Redeemer, and have nothing to fear in the world to come from what we have done while on the earth; thus saying virtually to all men, "Come, let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we shall die, and through death be cleansed from all

iniquity, and enabled to rise at once into infinite bliss." Let the view be taken which we have endeavored to set forth, and so far as doctrine is influential, men will study to maintain "a sound mind in a sound body," to provide for man as "a being made to live in a body," as Bossuet says of him; to unite under the same law of love, both spiritual interests and material, to reconcile the duties of time with those of eternity, to serve God by serving men, and to win heaven hereafter by creating a heaven here on earth.

We do not, then, agree with Michelet that our condition here is necessarily that of eternal hostility, if we are to speak as philosophers; nor do we admit that progress consists in overcoming and subduing a hostile nature or rebellious matter. Nature, matter, necessity, are our friends, without whose presence and efficient aid we could not live even for a moment. Is the germ in the acorn at war with the light, air, warmth, and moisture, without which it could by no possible means grow into the oak? No doubt we are here for struggle, for effort long-continued and well sustained, yet not to overcome nature, but to live in harmony with nature and by its friendly co-operation. Our progress consists not in overcoming external enemies, in removing external obstacles, but in filling up the void in ourselves, in positively enlarging our own being by actualizing more and more of the infinite ideal that hovers for ever over and before us. The struggle to enlarge ourselves, not by removing others—for our difficulty is not in being repressed from without—but by a positive growth, in obedience to an internal want, and according to an internal law, is undoubtedly very admissible; yet it is also in our judgment very distinguishable from an interminable war against hostile forces which threaten every moment to overwhelm us from without. In this last case there is no peace for us, no orderly, tranquil growth: but in the other, the view we take, life becomes truer and intenser in proportion as it ceases to be a state of war. We cannot consent to regard peace as a state of death, and to hope for life only in perpetual combat. Peace between man and God, interest and duty, time and eternity, body and soul, nature and humanity, freedom and necessity, so far from being incompatible with life and growth, is their indispensable condition, the one thing after which all men yearn, that which the Son of God came to bestow, and which he gives to all his true followers, saying, "peace be with you: my peace give I unto you." That belief in the

possibility of this universal peace, this universal reconciliation of all things, when the sword shall be beaten into the ploughshare and the spear into the pruning-hook, the wolf and the lamb shall lie down together, and the lion shall eat straw like the ox, is no dream, we may read in the upleaping of all hearts to greet it when announced; in the fact that in the Original of all things there are the foundations of it; and in the often asserted fact, that every normal exercise, whether of mind or body, is throughout God's universe accompanied by pleasure.

II. THE HUMANITARIAN THEORY.

But leaving now this war-theory, if we may so denominate it, and for the most part the question of what is progress, we pass to the consideration of another theory, which we shall take the liberty to denominate the humanitarian theory, because it recognizes no agency in the progress of humanity, but that of humanity itself. The ablest exponent of this theory we have met with, is the late Professor Théodore Jouffroy, in whose premature death philosophy has lost a sincere friend, and the eclectic school founded by Cousin, one of its brightest ornaments. We hold the memory of Jouffroy in great respect. We acknowledge ourselves not a little indebted to his philosophical writings for many valuable hints, and for many hours of true pleasure. He has often instructed and delighted us by his transparent thought and calm good sense. His *Prolégomènes au Droit Naturel*, is one of the very best, if not the very best work on the philosophical grounds of morality which can be found in any language, and had it been written from the Christian point of view, instead of the point of view of mere psychological analysis, we should have no fault to find with it. Its fault is the fault of all philosophical works, written since the time of Bacon and Descartes, that of assuming the possibility of finding sufficient data from which to demonstrate the highest order of truths, without a resort to divine revelation as made by providential men, and especially by God's only begotten and well-beloved Son,—an assumption which, if it were warrantable, would declare divine revelation a fable, or at best a work of supererogation.

The theory we are now to examine, is to be found in an essay written in 1825, entitled *Réflections sur la Philosophie de l'Histoire*, published in Jouffroy's *Mélanges Philosophiques*.

Jouffroy, in his theory, assumes that the human race is subject to perpetual movement and transformation, the cause and law of which it is the province of the philosophy of history to investigate. This movement and transformation "must have a principle, and as the effect is limited to man, a principle which acts on him alone. Now what is this principle? Where is it to be sought? Not in the theatre on which man is placed for development. This theatre, which is nature, is common to him with the brutes that do not change; this theatre, besides, is the same to-day that it was yesterday, that it always will be. Human mobility cannot come from this. If it does not come from the theatre, then it must come from the actor. There is a principle of change in man which is not in the brute."

Man's conduct is influenced and determined by two moving forces; the tendencies of his nature, and the views he forms concerning the different ends to which these tendencies aspire. The tendencies are invariable, like human nature itself, so that we cannot find the principle of change in them. The views (*les idées de l' intelligence humaine*) vary from one time to another, in one country and another. In these, the ideas of human intelligence, then, is to be found the principle of change in human things. "All the changes which take place in the condition of man, all the transformations which it has undergone, proceed, then, from the intelligence, and are the effect of it; the history of these changes, then, in the last analysis is only the history of ideas, which have succeeded one another in human intelligence, or, if it be preferred, the history of the intellectual development of humanity."

Here the principle of all change, therefore of all progress, is assumed to be in man himself, and not in his nature, nor in the tendencies of his nature, but solely in the ideas of his intelligence. By ideas of intelligence, Jouffroy does not mean, we take it, ideas in the Platonic sense, for in this sense the ideas of our intelligence no more change than the tendencies of our nature themselves, but properly the notions or views which we form of those ideas, or of the ends we ought to labor to realize. Now, if the theatre on which we are placed, that is, nature, undergoes no change, that is to say, if no change occurs without to produce a corresponding change within, and if man's nature and tendencies are in themselves necessarily invariable, we would ask whence the principle of the change in even our intelligence? Human

intelligence can be only the result of the factors assumed; and if the factors remain invariable, how is it possible to vary the product?

"The development of the human intelligence," says Jouffroy, in continuation, "is of a two-fold nature; it is spontaneous and reflective." But does this relieve us of our embarrassment? What is the spontaneous development of human intelligence? According to Cousin it is an impersonal development of intelligence, a development in which human freedom, human personality does not intervene, and therefore the agency at work in it is *not-me*. Whatever change there can be introduced into human intelligence through spontaneity, must in reality come from without, and imply a change in that which Jouffroy tells us changes not. According to Jouffroy himself, the spontaneous development of the intelligence is that which takes place without any intervention of human will, in which we receive ideas from without, from external objects, without having sought them. But man remaining in his nature and tendencies always the same, and the *without* never changing, it is evident that the principle of change cannot be found in the spontaneous development of the intelligence. Can we find it then in the reflective development of the intelligence?

Jouffroy, in another writing on *Philosophy and Common Sense*, explains the difference between spontaneity and reflection by the difference between *seeing* and *looking*, *hearing* and *listening*. Both he and his master Cousin teach us that reflection adds nothing to the materials furnished by spontaneity. It is altogether retrospective, for we must *see* before we can *look*, and we never *listen* till we have *heard*. All that we do in reflection they both tell us is to explain, to comprehend what the individual and the race had previously realized from spontaneity.

Now will Jouffroy pretend that no change is introduced into human things, till reflection has passed over the wild weltering chaos of spontaneity, and reduced its confused and discordant elements to systematic clearness, order, and harmony? Not by any means. He contends that both individuals and communities are perpetually changing their ideas spontaneously, and he regards the various religions, not even excepting the Christian, which have at various epochs obtained, and exerted so powerful a control over individuals, nations, and even the race, as the products of the spontaneous development of human intelligence. Even

according to his own doctrine, then, the principle of change in human intelligence cannot be found in reflection. We have shown that, from his premises, the invariability of the outward and the permanency of the inward, man's nature and tendencies, it cannot be found in spontaneity. We ask then again, where will Jouffroy find the principle of change in the human intelligence, in which alone according to him is to be found the principle of change in human things?

This question convicts this humanitarian theory of impotency. Jouffroy seeks to account for the various facts and events which make up the life of humanity, without going out of humanity itself. Vain attempt, for the best of all possible reasons: humanity regarded either in the individual or in the race, does not suffice for itself, does not live by virtue of itself alone. Herein is the condemnation of the theory of development, whether spontaneous or reflective. All in human life is not developed from the original germ. The life of man is a growth, and growth is not development but an accretion, and instead of being effected by unfolding what was originally within, it is effected by assimilating according to an internal law, or vital process, appropriate food from without. This fact, Jouffroy seems to us to have overlooked, and the overlooking of this fact has vitiated his whole theory of history. If the principle of change in human things were alone in humanity itself, then humanity would contain in itself the whole principle of its life, and would have no need of going out of itself in order to live. This would lead to pure idealism, and in fact to absolute egoism.

We recognize, of course, man's activity, as all who have read our chapters on *Synthetic Philosophy*, know very well; but he can only act *with* that which is not himself, never by and in himself alone,—can never see, for instance, where there is nothing to be seen. So, whatever change we find in him, we must account for it by seeking a corresponding change out of him, in combination with which the change in him has been effected. The simple fact, then, that there is movement and transformation in human things, is a proof to us that Jouffroy is wrong in assuming the invariability of nature and of all races except man. Creation, as a whole and in its details, is never the same for any two successive moments. It is in a perpetual change. All changes under the very eye of the spectator, who himself changes with all. The principle of change is to be sought in a source higher

than nature, higher than man, in the principle and cause of all things, in God himself. If God did not contain in himself the principle of change as well as of immutability, he could not be a creator. There is no alternative between the admission of this principle and pantheism, or the absolute *unityism*, so to speak, of Xenophanes and the old Eleatics. If this principle of change be in God himself, as it must be, or he could not create, for to create is to act, and to act is to change,—if, we say, this principle of change be in God himself, the Original and cause of all things, then it must, according to the principle that each creature represents in its own degree the Creator, be found in all the races and individuals of creation. It is by virtue of this principle repeated in all, in a greater or less degree, that all creatures from the highest to the lowest are active, capable of producing effects. We find the principle of change in man, we find it in animals, we find it in nature, and therefore we pronounce all active, and deny the old doctrine of passivity. But the principle is finite in each, and is in no one sufficient to account for the phenomena which its life exhibits. All live by intercommunication, and all changes take place by intercommunication, action and re-action, but in none without the presence and the active interference of the original principle whence all have sprung.

It has always seemed to us that Jouffroy felt the impotency of his own doctrine. He allows us freedom, scope for our own activity properly so called, only in the sphere of reflection, that is to say, only in contemplating and explaining the past. In a more or less faithful exposition of the past his whole philosophy ends. We see this in his paper *De la Sorbonne et des Philosophes*, in which he exposes with great acuteness, clearness, and impartiality, the principal characteristics of the controversy between the old theologians and the philosophers of the Voltairian school. Yet he does it as a mere spectator, as one who has no interest in the great questions debated, although those questions are of vital import to the life of humanity. He has nothing to do with them. He stands on the serene heights of a calm philosophical indifferency, from which he can look down unmoved upon the vulgar herd debating the great questions of God and man, life and death, time and eternity. Their insignificance is so great that the earnestness with which they are discussed can scarcely raise a smile on his placid features. Well, M. Jouffroy, what would *you* have us do?

"Leave things to take their course. You can explain what has been, that is all. For instance, you can convert Christianity into philosophy." And then what? "Why, then,—then,—Christianity will disappear, and for religion we shall have philosophy." And then? To this then, Jouffroy seems to have had no answer; and having reached the end of his philosophical career, died, as would die the human race, were they to be restricted to his philosophical theory. The truth is, Jouffroy was always dumb before the future. His doctrine was in reality a doctrine not of progress but of immobility, and he found himself unable to propose any thing for man to do. By restricting himself to human freedom alone, he lost that freedom itself, and reached fatalism through liberty.

We always, even in the days of our greatest admiration for Jouffroy, felt something of this. We found that we could take part in the affairs of our fellow-men, in the church, in the state, or the neighborhood, only at the expense of systematic consistency; and under his influence we found ourselves becoming cold and indifferent, regarding all things as alike worthy, and assuming the only wise way to be to let all things come and go without interposing to hasten or retard, to make them better or worse. It was detecting this tendency in ourselves, that alarmed us, and made us feel how impotent was the eclecticism we were professing. Away with it, we said, on the new waking up of the soul; let us have a philosophy that requires us to do somewhat, and that can tell us what to do,—a philosophy that explains the past only to enlighten and to quicken us in regard to our future action, or let us have none. God's curse and man's curse too, on each and every system of philosophy that is merely retrospective. But enough. Jouffroy has gone where, we doubt not, he will learn that indifferency is not the sublime of philosophy, and where he will see that all truth is living, and that whoso has found it, has always his eyes turned towards the future, and his heart towards the continued progress of his race, for whom he will live and toil, and if need be, die in exile or dungeon, on scaffold or cross.

III. THE RATIONALISTIC THEORY.

Similar, under more than one aspect, to the theory just dismissed, is that of Cousin, developed in his *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, Professé à la faculté des Let-*

tres, 1828, a theory which we denominate the rationalistic because it assumes the point of departure of human history to be in the spontaneous development of ideas, or perhaps more strictly accurate, in the development of the impersonal reason.

The theory which we are now about to examine is in its more essential features borrowed from Hegel, between whom and Cousin there was a warm personal regard and friendship; but we shall set it forth as we have it from Cousin, because we are not sufficiently acquainted with Hegel's own system, to be able to rely on our own understanding of it; and because, from what we know of Cousin, we feel always assured that a system of philosophy, as it has passed through his hands and received his approbation, has come to us in its least objectionable form.

The rationalistic theory assumes that whatever enters into human history, necessarily pre-exists in the human intelligence. The whole life of humanity in time and space, consists in developing or actualizing in its deeds the ideas of its intelligence. All these ideas, however manifold and diverse they may appear to the superficial observer, are reducible to three categories, 1. The idea of the infinite; 2. The idea of the finite; 3. The idea of the relation of the two. These three ideas are the constituent elements of human intelligence, of human reason—of reason, intelligence in itself, therefore of God; and are in fact God. They being essential in the original ground and cause of all things, must be reproduced in all things. God can create only according to the laws of his own intelligence, that is to say, only according to the three ideas named. Hence creation taken as a whole and in detail can be nothing but a manifestation of the infinite, the finite, and their relation. Of course, then, humanity in its life can only develope, manifest, or actualize the same. Certainly you can find nothing in creation not found in God the creator. In the Creator is found only these three ideas. Then is nothing but these three ideas to be found in creation. Nothing can be found in the history of humanity, not to be found in humanity itself; and as nothing but these three ideas can be found in humanity, it follows that nothing but these three ideas can be found in the history of humanity. We know now, *a priori*, what we are to look for in the history of mankind.

If the whole life of humanity consist in developing these three ideas, we may ask, does it develope them simultane-

ously or successively? They all coexist in all epochs, but the human race developes them under the predominance first of one, then another, and then the last. The predominance of one does not exclude, but subordinates the other two, and always is one or another predominant. The predominance of an idea constitutes an epoch. As there are three ideas, so must there be three epochs in the life of humanity, that is to say, in history; and as there are only three ideas, so can there be only three epochs. The life of humanity is all embraced, then, within three epochs which, from the predominance of the one or the other idea, are termed, 1. The epoch of the infinite; 2. The epoch of the finite; 3. The epoch of the relation of the two. But in what order does humanity develope these ideas? It does it in the order we have named. The life of the race begins under the predominance of the idea of the infinite; it then passes under the predominance of the finite, and then having exhausted both the infinite and the finite as separate, exclusive elements, it seeks to unite the two, and bring about union and peace. Hence eclecticism.

But does the human race commence its life by freely, voluntarily undertaking to develope the idea of the infinite? Not at all. Reason is impersonal, objective, *not-me*. It has, as we have seen in Jouffroy, a twofold activity, that of spontaneity and that of reflection. The spontaneous activity of the reason is an activity in which human personality, human will or freedom does not intervene. *We*, properly speaking, in spontaneity are not active, but passive; we are seized and carried away by a force not our own, which is out of us at the same time that it is in us, and is in us without being *us*; and a force which we are impotent to resist, and of which we can give no account. In fact, in the last analysis, this force, or the agency at work, is that of the infinite and eternal God, who himself carries us away whithersoever and howsoever he pleaseth, or rather not as he pleaseth, but according to the inward necessity of his own being. The reflective activity of reason or intelligence, is reason or intelligence subjected to the intervention of human freedom, and therefore, to human infirmity.

We have seen that all the facts of human history must pre-exist in the intelligence; but in which form? The spontaneous, or the reflective? Not the reflective, as we have seen in commenting on Jouffroy, for certainly, reflection only turns back, contemplates, and explains what is

already in the memory of the individual or in that of the race. Hence, all the facts of history must pre-exist in the spontaneous intelligence, that is to say, in the impersonal reason. Hence, all the facts of human history must be impersonal in their principle and origin. Then, again, the human race, in its various and complex life in space and time, must be considered merely as the medium through which, without any agency of its own, spontaneous intelligence, that is to say God, is exhibiting or actualizing the three original ideas of which we have spoken.

It will be seen that this gives to the facts of human history an impersonal character. For this impersonal character Cousin very earnestly contends. As all the events which occur do really come from the impersonal reason, that is to say, from God, it follows that individuals are in no way personally responsible for the events which may happen, whatever their character or tendency. Nay, why speak of individuals? Individuality is always personal, and there is nothing personal in history. History knows no individuals; it knows only causes, only ideas; and individuals and nations have no reality, no significance for the historian, but as they represent certain ideas or causes. When two armies meet, what see we? Two masses of individuals collected and drawn up? Not at all. There are no men there. There are only two opposing ideas there, which have met to decide on the battle-field which shall be permitted to rule the future of humanity.

Excluding in this way all intervention of human personality, we must look upon a nation or a people merely as *representing* the idea; never as obtaining an idea, and by its own free activity, under a sense of its own moral responsibility, consciously, with forethought laboring to carry it out, or to realize it in all the details of practical life. The force or agency observable in the life of the nation is always back of the nation, acting out through the nation, never the real agency of the nation itself. It is a foreign power, acting in and through it, rolling over and subjecting all its phenomena; so that the idea given, we can tell beforehand what will be the life of the nation or the facts of its history.

In the same way, too, we must regard great men, heroes, philosophers, statesmen. These are not, as we sometimes fancy, great personalities, but merely the representatives of ideas or epochs, and instead of giving predominance to an idea which has been revealed to them and not to the mass,

and thus founding an epoch in history, they merely reflect better than any of their contemporaries the idea already dominant in all hearts, and working as a sort of *Welt-geist* in the whole community. We may indeed study an age, or a country, in its great men; but not because these men create the character of the age or country, impressing upon it, as it were, the stamp of their own personality, but because they sum up, are the *résumés* of its dominant ideas and tendencies. Thus, Alexander does not invade Asia, and with his handful of Greeks put an end to the power of the "Great King;" it is the idea or spirit of the Greek people, incarnating itself in Alexander, that does it. That idea or spirit is great, and reveals to you the character of the Greek people; but Alexander himself, as a personality, was a very pitiable concern, killing over his cups his best friend, and dying himself in a drunken bout.

Finally, as all comes from the impersonal reason, which in the last analysis is the Word of God, nay, God himself, we must absolve history from all blame, and accept whatever has been as that which must be, which had a right to be and to be just what, when, and where it was. The nation, party, cause, idea, at any time or in any country triumphing, triumphs by divine right. So no more sympathy with the defeated, the conquered; no more regrets; might gives right; and success is the stamp of merit.

This theory, which we have but slightly indicated, but which, we presume, most of our readers are already familiar with, for it is not now that Cousin is for the first time to be introduced to the American public, it will be seen differs from that of Jouffroy only in its greater profoundness, systematic harmony, and in its more clear and distinct assertion of the impersonality of the spontaneous intelligence. It is by this clear, distinct, unequivocal assertion rendered even more liable than Jouffroy's system, if possible, to the objection of excluding human agency from all intervention in the production of the phenomena of human history. Cousin unquestionably asserts human freedom, but he in reality, notwithstanding some attempts to the contrary, recognizes it only in the sphere of reflection. The whole of human history originates in the intelligence, so far as it has a human origin at all; not in the reflective intelligence, but in the spontaneous, which, while it is human, is not human. No man is or can be more particular to admonish us that reflection originates nothing. Nay, the whole of his system

of ontology rests upon the assumed fact that the agency at work in the spontaneous reason is *not-me*. All that reflection can do, that is, human agency properly so called, is to cast its eye over the past, clear up, explain, and legitimate what has been. Certain it is, then, that according to this theory, the facts of human history have their origin in an extra-human source, and therefore that individuals and nations can do nothing to direct, to impede, to hasten, or to retard the march of events.

It is the vice of this theory, that by excluding human personality from history, it annihilates humanity itself. Humanity lives only in individuals, and individuals are all entire in their personality. If we assert the impotency of individuals, of personalities, we necessarily assert the impotency of humanity. If we assert the impotency of humanity, it is idle to talk of the history of humanity. Humanity itself disappears, and with it disappear all the events of history. We could not, if this theory were embraced, feel ourselves responsible beyond the sphere of our individuality. We must feel that our good and evil could not go beyond ourselves, and in no way affect the course of history. Our existence in this case would, as Cousin has himself said in speaking of old pantheistic India, cease to be taken seriously, and all things would appear to us of equal worth, or worthlessness. We should fall into a state of absolute indifferency, smoke our pipe, and say, "God is great, what is written will be." Cousin, as well as Jouffroy, seems to have felt this. He is a man of an active temperament, of great energy, and noble sympathies, and yet he has no answer to the question, What shall we do? He says, humanity has done, humanity is doing, or rather, God in humanity is doing so and so; but pray, M. Cousin, tell us what *ought* humanity to do, and we as individual manifestations of humanity? No answer! We have interrogated your writings, we have questioned in all lights, in all moods, and demanded of them in all tones an answer to this question, and we have found only this cold, heartless answer, "Do nothing; fold thy hands and leave thyself to be borne onward by the irresistible current of the spontaneous reason." Suppose we resist, and seek to withstand this current? "Do so if you will, it makes no difference. The current flows on, and you with it, whether willingly or unwillingly." Carlyle's doctrine of Hero-worship, which concentrates all humanity in personalities, and reduces all history to biogra-

phy, equally objectionable as it is for a contrary reason, is yet infinitely more vital, and therefore infinitely less harmful in its influence than this rationalistic pantheism.

Then, again, the view which this doctrine leads us to take of the plan all history has been realizing is any thing but flattering. That plan dwindles down into a petty affair which seems, to ordinary minds at least, altogether unworthy of even human wisdom, to say nothing of divine wisdom. If we may believe Hegel, the father of the doctrine, the infinite God and all his works through all the past have been engaged expressly in preparing and founding the Prussian monarchy, and his gracious majesty Frederick William is the last word of creation and progress: according to Cousin, God in creation and providence, humanity in its alternate passage from the development of one idea to that of another, has had in view nothing more nor less than the preparing and establishing of the charter which his most Christian Majesty, Louis XVIII., was pleased to grant to his loving Frenchmen, the solution, by "superior wisdom," according to our philosopher, of the problem which had hitherto baffled the wisest of statesmen, the profoundest of philosophers, nay, the utmost powers of humanity itself, both spontaneous and reflective. But, alas, for the prophetic power of philosophers, the "three days" of July, 1830, overturned this charter which had come out triumphant from the battle of Waterloo, and which was destined to rule the future of humanity, and beyond which there was nothing to be obtained, or even desired! Here, however good an historian eclecticism might be, it at least proved itself no prophet. But we see here, Cousin applying to France what Hegel applies to Prussia, and with equal logic and truth. An Englishman in 1832, might have done the same for England, and maintained that all the past, God and nature, all the powers of the universe had been engaged solely in drawing up and carrying through Parliament, the Reform Bill; and we, good Americans as we are, might grow eloquent in describing the Mayflower as a *résumé* of all the past, and as freighted with all the future of humanity; or leaving the Mayflower, transfer ourselves to the Hall of Independence and say, here is what the past has been laboring to bring forth; or we may come to the Convention which framed our federal constitution and say the same thing; or to a still later day, an event of a different order, point to the pages of our own Journal, and exclaim with

just pride, Behold here in this *Democratic Review* what God, man, and nature have conspired to produce, and which contains the last word they have uttered, or have to utter. According to the view we are considering, we may as well say of one event as of another, it is that for which all the past has labored ;

> "While man exclaims, 'see all things for my use,'
> 'See man for mine,' exclaims the pamper'd goose ;
> And just as short of reason he must fall,
> Who thinks all made for one, not one for all."

But this theory is not only impotent before the future, it does not suffice even to explain the past. The human race, it is assumed, is always engaged in the development of either the idea of the infinite, that of the finite, or in fine that of the relation of the two. Be it so. The race began with the infinite, and the old Indian world gives us an example of what is the character of the race subjugated by the dominant thought of the infinite. It then passes to the finite. The characteristics of this epoch we find in the Grecian states between the Homeric epoch and that of Alexander. Then it passes under the idea of relation, which creates an epoch extending from the death of Alexander to the downfall of the western Roman empire. Then commences a new series, in which the human race passes again successively, in the same order, under the dominion of the same ideas. From the sixth century to the sixteenth, that is from the establishment of the barbarians on the ruins of the empire to the reformation, a period of about one thousand years, the idea of the infinite predominates ; from the reformation to the end of the French revolution at Waterloo, the idea of the finite is in the ascendant ; since then, we of the nineteenth century have passed under the idea of relation, and consequently are in the last epoch of the series, which is that of reconciliation, peace, union, *eclecticism*.

Now, if this be so, will Cousin tell us, how he accounts for the difference we assuredly find between these epochs in the second series from the corresponding epochs in the first ? If the facts of history depend on the predominant idea of the epoch it concerns, then should the history of the middle ages be precisely a reproduction of the history of ancient India. But such is by no means the case. The difference between the middle ages in Europe, and ancient India, so

far as regards facts, events, all the details of public and private life, is greater than the differences between the middle ages, and the epoch of the finite which followed the reformation. Now, these differences are inexplicable on the hypothesis in question. This hypothesis has excluded human personality; it also excludes Providence, save as it comes to us through the spontaneous reason, which is always the same, operating not by volition, but by an inherent necessity; consequently it recognizes no cause for these differences, and therefore must deny them, which it cannot do, or it must admit its own inadequacy.

But not only the race itself passes successively under the dominion of these three ideas in time, but it passes under them in space. That is, while one people is developing the infinite, another is engaged with the finite, and still another with the relation of the two. But we ask the same questions here that we have already asked. According to the principles of the theory, the people developing the infinite in one series should repeat without variation the life of the people who developed the same idea in another series, which is never the case. Modern Germany does not repeat ancient India, Paris does not repeat Alexandria or Rome; London does not repeat Tyre, Carthage, or Athens. Why not, if the same idea predominates in the one as in the other?

We ought, it is true, to take into our view, climate and geographical position. "Give me," says Cousin, "the geography of a people, and I will give you its history." Very well. Is not the geography of Egypt what it was under the Pharaohs? Is its history the same? Is not the geography of Greece what it was in the days of Miltiades, Pericles, Plato, and Alexander? Is there no difference in the facts of the history of modern Greece and those of the history of ancient Greece? Alas, of Greece nothing but its physical conditions remain: "All, all, except their sun, is set." Of Rome, too, may we not ask the same? There sits she on her yellow Tiber, as of old, and Italy lies under the same serene sky, and along the same valleys and mountains, and is washed by the same seas; and yet who hears any longer in her silent streets the heavy tramp of the old Roman soldier? Where are her Scipios, her Gracchi, and her Cæsars? Jerusalem lies too in the same latitude, has the same geographical position as in the days of David, Solomon, Ezra, and Herod. Has no change come over the spirit or the body of its history? These changes, which make up the

common-place of sophomoric declamation, and from which even the poet draws no little of his pathos, are unaccountable in the hypothesis we are considering.

Nor is it true that great men, heroes, philosophers, statesmen, are merely the representatives of the dominant ideas of their epochs. They found epochs, they do not represent them. Popular men, "great popularities," as the French call them, we admit, echo merely the dominant views and feelings of their age and country; but these are never great men; these are not the founders of states and empires, nor are they founders of systems which the world accepts. Every truly great man is in the world without being of the world. The world knows him not. He moves about a strange, unaccountable figure; men stare at him, and wonder what he means; or they drive him into exile, force him to drink the hemlock, or crucify him between two thieves. Witness Moses, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Descartes, even Locke. All men whom the world has finally agreed to call great, who have done aught for what was to them the future, were to a greater or less extent disowned by their age, misconceived, or persecuted by it; and it was only by triumphing over opposition, overcoming obstacles, that they finally attained to the rank they hold.

We solemnly protest against this historical optimism which Cousin labors to establish. We cannot, we will not believe that success is always the test of merit, and that the party that triumphs is always the party of humanity. In our folly we have so exclaimed time and again, and yet how often have we seen virtue borne down by triumphant vice, cunning circumventing honesty, and the righteous cause cut off by the prosperity of the wicked! Grant that humanity triumphed at Marathon and Salamis; did it triumph at Hastings and Rossbach, Aboukir, and Waterloo? Are there no calamities in history? Nothing tragic? May we never weep over the defeated? never feel for Zenobia in the triumphal train of Aurelian? Must we always desert the cause as soon as fortune forsakes it, and bind ourselves to the cause which is in the ascendant, and hurrah in the crowd that throw up their caps in honor of the conqueror? Perish the thought! Loyalty to the legitimate sovereign, when fallen, in exile or in chains, as well as when seated on his throne in full prosperity; to the cause of the wronged and down-trodden, when all are dumb before it; to the right when all have deserted it, preferring affliction with the peo-

ple of God to the pleasures of sin for a season, is, thank God! a virtue, and the noblest virtue, which we human beings are blessed with the privilege of exhibiting. God permits, as well as commands us to aspire to this generous and disinterested virtue, and this permission is by no means the least of his favors towards us. We envy not the heart that can look, for instance, on Ireland, trampled on as she has been for seven hundred years by the iron heel of the conqueror, and not utter the deep and blasting curse on the oppressor, and in the name of God and humanity demand for her warm-hearted sons their native right to nationality and independence. In this world defeat is full as often owing to the crimes of the conqueror as to the vices of the defeated. Witness unhappy Poland.

But enough. We have not made these strictures on Cousin's theory of history, for the purpose of joining our voice to swell the clamor already raised against him both at home and abroad. We have defended and will defend him against all opposition, come it from what quarter it may, as one in whose writings the friends of philosophy will always see enough to command their gratitude and their admiration. They who sneer at him as superficial, as a mere "hasher up" of other men's thoughts, betray only their own ignorance either of his labors or of philosophy itself. The writer of these strictures assuredly has reason to be grateful to him; for to him he is indebted for nearly all that there may be in his own philosophical writings worth retaining. Cousin has not fallen into a single error for which we cannot find in some one or other of his writings a corrective; and we rarely, if ever, have any occasion to find fault with him when he speaks out from his own mind, and not from his masters. He has been betrayed into most of his errors by his deference to others. Left to himself, to the workings of his own noble mind and generous sympathies, he would have given us a philosophy worthy of all acceptation. He wants confidence in himself, and is too easily dazzled, and for a time misled by the brilliant theories of others. He commenced his philosophical career as the disciple of the Scottish school as expounded by M. Royer-Collard, a great man, no doubt, but who knew of philosophy little more than to protest against the sensism of the old French philosophy of the school of Condillac. But the Scottish school of Reid and Stewart, admirable as it certainly was for its good intentions and its valuable psychological observations, could not

long satisfy such a mind as Cousin's and in the second year of his instruction, as professor of philosophy in the Normal School, he passed to the German school of Kant. Shall we blame him for pausing a while on the rigid old German: nay, for being for a while subjugated by the master mind that had held all Germany under the iron rule of the invincible categories? And yet, his Course of Philosophy for 1818, made when he was only twenty-six years of age, shows that he, if still in some degree a disciple of Kant, is by no means his slave, but a free disciple; nay, that he has detected and exposed the fundamental vice of the Kantian categories; and we doubt, if in the whole range of philosophical literature, a more remarkable work for depth, clearness, and truth, prepared by so young a man, can be found, than this Course for 1818. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, each in turn, as well as Proclus and Descartes, have had their influence, which has been more or less unhappy; but none of them, nor all of them together, have been able to retain him; and as he gradually recovers his independence, we see him approaching nearer and nearer to a system which shall be free from all the objections which have been urged against his past labors. He is now in the very prime of life, being only in the fifty-first year of his age, younger, we believe, than was Kant when he published his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, and therefore altogether too young to be judged as a man who has finished his labors.

Cousin as a writer is confessedly one of the ablest masters of his language; as a scholar, nobody questions his eminent ability and attainments. Even Lerminier and Leroux, his two bitterest and most formidable enemies, concede him erudition of the highest order, as his comments on Plato, Aristotle, his edition of Proclus, his history of ancient philosophy, and his more recent work on Abelard and the middle ages, abundantly evince. His translation of Plato is a monument to his learning and ability, of which his countrymen may well be proud. We have nothing to begin to compare with it in English. As for understanding Plato, the mere English reader might as well study him in the original Greek as in Mr. Taylor's *un*-English translation. The only portion of Plato tolerably Englished, that we have seen, is Shelley's translation of the Banquet, but which after all by no means compares with Cousin's. As to Cousin's metaphysical ability, we point to his reduction of the categories of Kant to the two categories of substance and cause,

demonstrating that it is only in the category of cause that we seize the category of substance; and to his analysis of the fact of consciousness, showing that thought is an intellectual phenomenon, with three inseparable and imperishable elements; namely, subject, object, and form; two great facts which contain in themselves all the positive progress, even according to the admission of Leroux, a competent judge, that philosophy has made since the time of Descartes, and which we have adopted, in our chapters on *Synthetic Philosophy*, as the basis of our own system. As yet, so far as at present informed, we do not think Cousin has derived from these original discoveries of his all the advantages they really contain. We have found them, since we arrived at the same results by an independent process of our own—for till we had so done we had no conception of their profound significance—fruitful in the greatest and richest results. But it is not too late for him to make his own original discoveries—not the labors of others—the basis of his own system; and when he does so, he will give us a philosophy to rank with the philosophies of the greatest masters of this or any other age.

We have felt, in criticising as we have done some portions of Cousin's past labors, that these statements were due to him; nay, they were due to us, that we might not seem to deny the merits of the master without whose labors we should never have presumed to aspire to a place, however humble, among the cultivators of philosophy. The fundamental errors of Cousin's teachings thus far, belong not to him, but to modern philosophy itself. These errors are two; one lying at the bottom of the empirical school, and the other at the bottom of the rationalistic school;—the first of the Baconian, the second of the Cartesian. Cartesianism starts with a fundamental error, namely, the sufficiency of pure reason as manifested in the individual consciousness. We will not say that the Cartesians never borrow any thing from empiricism; that is, make no use of facts learned only from experience; but the sufficiency of the individual reason is the principle of the school. Thought is regarded as a purely intellectual act; and hence the formula of the school, *cogito, ergo sum*, I think, therefore I am. All, according to this principle, is found in reason, and is capable of being demonstrated *a priori*. This is the fatal vice of the whole continental philosophy, as represented by Cartesianism in France, Wolfism and Hegelism in Germany, against which

the *Critique of pure Reason* may be considered a virtual but indistinct protest.

The Baconian school proceeds on an error of an opposite kind. It assumes, very properly, that all knowledge begins with experience, but recognizes in the fact of knowledge no *a priori* element. Hence, after passing through the sensism of Hobbes, pausing awhile with the good sense of Locke, it terminates in the materialism of the old French school. Against the dogmatism of the Baconian school, Hume may be considered as protesting in like manner as Kant has against that of pure reason; and it is worthy of note, that Kant and Hume, so far from being opposed one to the other, do virtually occupy the same ground. The practical reason of the one, is nothing but the common sense of the other. Both deny the impossibility of demonstrating external reality from the point of view of pure reason; the one resting it on the irresistibility of the "categories" of reason, which is purely subjective, and therefore no authority out of the subject itself; and the other, on a "belief" of which we can never get rid, but for which we have and can have no scientific basis.

No man has seen more clearly than Cousin these two fundamental errors, and no man has sought more earnestly to escape them both: but in all his dogmatic teachings which we have seen, they both are reproduced. The first named we find everywhere in his theorizing on history; the second, in his separation of psychology from ontology; as if the human *me*, or soul, of which psychology investigates the phenomena, did not represent being, and as if we could assume the existence of the soul, study and classify its phenomena, without entering into the region of ontology, which is the science of being. This error led him to make psychology, in his method of philosophizing, the basis of ontology, when the very assumption of the possibility of psychology without ontology, that is, of a science of phenomena without any subject or being manifesting itself in them, is a plain and positive denial of the possibility of our ever going out of the phenomenon at all.

And yet Cousin has solved the problem, and as it seems to us without knowing it. The solution, however, is not as Kant supposed in making all knowledge begin in sensible experience, and in contending that the subject, or mind, out of its own funds, on occasion of the sensible experience, furnishes an *a priori* element, which was not in the sensible

fact itself; nor in contending that we have two faculties of knowing, as does Jouffroy, one for knowing the external, and the other for knowing the internal; nor by distinguishing between the logical order and the chronological order, as Cousin himself does in his examination of Locke, although that distinction is very real; but all simply in what he himself has so often demonstrated, and so earnestly insists on, and which is really the basis of what he calls ontology, namely, the fact that we never seize the category of being, or substance, save in the category of cause; that is, the subject in the phenomenon, the actor in the act. The rationalist assumes that we can seize being in itself; the empiricist, that we seize in the phemenon only the phenomenal; the synthetist, which Cousin should be, and is when he is himself, asserts that in the act we seize the actor, and have the power to perceive the spiritual in the material, as we have stated in a foregoing part of the present essay.

We here leave the rationalistic theory of the history of humanity, to follow with an examination of the providential theory, or the view of history which explains its facts by the constant intervention of Providence,—the religious theory properly so called,—under which head we propose to bring out what we hold to be the true view.

IV. THE PROVIDENTIAL THEORY.

The providential theory, which probably in some form is recognized or intended to be recognized by all philosophers, may be contemplated under two different points of view: 1. The pantheistic view. 2. The religious view. In what we have to offer on each, we shall make Cousin our representative of the first, and Bossuet of the second.

1. Cousin is a professed eclectic, and it is the boast of his system of history, that it excludes no element from its appropriate share. Under a certain point of view, he assuredly does admit all the elements that can be conceived of as at work in human affairs. But granting that he admits all the elements, does he in his account of them, recognize and describe them all in their true character? In order to answer this question, we must return upon his system for a few moments, and contemplate it under a different point of view from that under which we have already contemplated it. He recognizes five elements in human history, five original ideas, whence have proceeded, and to which may be referred as their source, all the facts of the life of humanity

considered collectively or individually. 1. The idea of the useful; 2. The idea of the just; 3. The idea of the beautiful; 4. The idea of the holy; 5. The idea of the true.

The first creates industry, and the mathematical and physical sciences; the second, the state, government, jurisprudence; the third, the fine arts; the fourth, religion (*cultus*); the fifth, philosophy, which clears up, accounts for, and verifies the other four. That these five elements exhaust human nature, there can be no doubt; that all the facts of human history in time and space, however various or complex, can be all included by the historian under the respective heads of industry, politics, art, religion, and philosophy, is unquestionably true; and so far Cousin's boast of having in his eclecticism overlooked no element of human life, is well founded. But in the creation of industry, politics, art, religion, philosophy, does humanity work alone and on her own funds; or does Providence come to her assistance? If Providence intervenes, is it in the form of a fixed, permanent and necessary law of humanity; or in the form of a free, sovereign power, distinct from humanity, graciously supplying her from time to time with new strength and materials to work with? Here lies the whole question between Providence in the pantheistic sense, and Providence in the religious sense.

Under the point of view we are now considering the subject, Cousin is to no small extent a disciple of John Baptist Vico, born at Naples, 1668, educated in the study of the ancient languages, the scholastic philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence, known as the author of the *Scienza Nuova*, or New Science, a work of vast compass, of immense power, and a mine of rich and profound thought, too little prized and studied by even our best scholars. Vico, though recognizing religion, and the action of Providence, yet starts from the principle that humanity is, so to speak, her own work. God acts upon the race, but only by it, in its instinctive operations. He explains nearly all the facts of human history from the political point of view; but he traces the various laws of nations, the manners and customs, and all the materials which enter into the history of humanity, to the "common sense of nations." Humanity is divine, but there is no divine man. The great men of ancient history, poets, prophets, sages, legislators, are not to be taken as individuals. They are mythical personages, creations of the national thought of their respective nations and epochs,

formed by the slow accretions of centuries. God does not speak to men by special messengers, does not guide and govern them by outward religious establishments; but he speaks to the race in its own instincts, and out from these spring up all the religious, artistic, philosophical, and political institutions of all nations and epochs.

The only objection we can find that Cousin makes to this doctrine is, that Vico takes, in his explanation of the facts of history, too exclusively the political point of view, and makes too much depend on the government and the laws; —an objection which we feel is well founded. But Cousin agrees with Vico, if not in deducing all from the "common sense of nations," at least from what amounts to the same thing, the common instinctive wants and aspirations of the race. God undoubtedly is; and undoubtedly is in all the events of history; for it is in him that we live, move, and have our being: but he enters there only in and through the instincts, or spontaneous intelligence of humanity. Ascertain what is common to the race, regular, permanent, reproduced with each new generation, and you have ascertained the word, the law, and the providence of God so far as concerns human beings. Whatever of wisdom, energy, power, there may be for good, to aid us in achieving our destiny, in the spontaneous reason which lies at the basis of human life, so much aid we receive and continue to receive from our Maker, but no more.

To justify us in this statement, we translate his own account of "History as a manifestation of Providence."

"History reflects not merely the movement of humanity; but as humanity is the *résumé* of the universe, which is a manifestation of God, it follows that, in the last analysis, history is and can be only the last counter-stroke of the divine action. The admirable order which reigns in it is a reflex of the eternal order; the necessity of its laws has for ultimate principle God himself—God considered in his relations with the world, and particularly with humanity, the last word of the world. *Now God considered in his perpetual action on the world and on humanity is Providence.* It is because God, or Providence, is *in nature*, that nature has its necessary laws, which the vulgar call fatality; it is because Providence is *in humanity* and in history, that humanity has its necessary laws, and history its necessity. This necessity, which the vulgar admit, and which they confound with the exterior and physical fatality which does not exist, and by which they designate and disfigure the divine wisdom applied to the universe,—this necessity is the unanswerable demonstration of the intervention of Providence in human affairs, the demonstration of the government of the moral world. The great facts of history

are the decrees of this government revealed to humanity by its own history, and promulgated by the voice of time. History is the manifestation of God's providential views in relation to humanity; *the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself.* If humanity has three epochs, it is because Providence has so determined; if these epochs follow one the other in a given order, it is still by an effect of the laws of Providence. Providence has not merely permitted, it has ordained (for necessity is everywhere its proper and essential characteristic) that humanity should have a regular development, so that this development should reflect something of itself; something intellectual and intelligible; because Providence, because God is intelligence in his essence and in his eternal action, and in his fundamental moments. If history is the government of God rendered visible, all is in its place in history; and if all is in its place, all is good, for all conducts to an end prescribed by a beneficent power. Hence the lofty *historical Optimism*, which I do myself the honor to profess, and which is nothing else but civilisation placed in relation with its first and last principle, with him who has made it in making humanity, and who has made all with weights and measures for the greatest good of the whole. Either history is an insignificant phantasmagoria, and therefore a bitter and cruel mockery, or it is reasonable. If it is reasonable, it has its laws, and necessary and beneficent laws; for all law must have these two characters. To maintain the contrary is to blaspheme existence and the author of existence." *

We do not choose to interpret this passage without considering it in the light of Cousin's subsequent explanations and modifications. We assuredly, in designating his view of Providence the pantheistic view, do not wish nor intend to prove him a pantheist, which he is not, save in certain tendencies, against which he always seeks to guard, though in our judgment not always with complete success. Pantheism consists in absorbing the universe in God; in making the universe, not an image of God, the visible outshadowing of the Invisible, but identical with God; in making the finite and relative forces at work in the universe, not merely work after laws originally impressed upon their natures, and which are indistinct copies or transcripts of the law of the divine activity itself, but in making these finite and relative forces identical with the infinite Force; so that, strictly speaking, there is throughout the universe only one and the same Force displaying itself. Cousin protests against this view time and again, almost to weariness, and in general succeeds in escaping it.

*Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie, Leçon VII., pp. 37–39. Paris, 1828.

Nevertheless, this view of Providence which we have given as his, and which we find distinctly stated in the passage we have introduced, is, if not pantheism, at least on the declivity to pantheism; inasmuch as according to it, it is only *in* the inherent and necessary laws of nature, that we can find the divine action *on* nature, and only *in* the inherent and necessary laws of humanity, that is, in humanity itself, that we can find the divine action *on* humanity. This resolves Providence into what Vico calls the common sense of nations, into what we commonly call the instincts of the race, and identifies it with spontaneity, the source and principle, according to Cousin, of all the facts of the life of humanity. Now, we are far from contending that in the life of humanity, we can always separate by a broad and continuous line the divine action from the human; but, nevertheless, we must not confound or identify the two actions, if we mean to escape the error of pantheism. But where, on the ground here taken, shall we find in the facts of human history, not the *separation*, but the *distinction* between the divine action and the human; or where find the force properly and strictly human, and the force properly and strictly divine?

It is a capital objection to this theory of Providence, that, while it is brought forward to show, among other things, a safe and solid ground in the very wants of the human soul, and instinctive indications of the race, for religion, it is, when once admitted, fatal to all religious exercises. According to Jouffroy, religion belongs only to the human intelligence in a *given stage of its development;* Vico has the air of confining it to the first of his three epochs, which is the epoch of ignorance, of infancy; and Cousin himself places philosophy *above* religion, of which he makes it the judge. The moment we have learned through philosophical culture that religion is a creation of an original and inherent want of the human soul, and that religious institutions are only the result of the instinctive efforts of the race to meet and provide for this want, religion and religious institutions lose all their authority, all their appropriateness, and are inevitably rejected. If God intervenes in human affairs only through the transcendental side, only in the inherent and necessary laws of human nature itself; if he be only the fixed, the permanent, the necessary in human action, where is the room for prayer, praise, sacrifice, or devotion? Who could pray to his own instincts, sacrifice to the spontaneity of his

own nature, or build temples to the permanent, fixed, and necessary laws of his own activity? There would be no divine will to propitiate, no sovereign and efficacious grace to supplicate, no extra-human aid to be implored or to be hoped for; no divine sympathy for us in our trials, no solace in our afflictions; no divine counsel to direct us in our doubts, and to guide us through the darkness which at times envelopes us, to the clear radiance of truth and love. Do the proud oppress; do the haughty insult; do the wicked triumph, and trample the righteous in the dust; are the poor neglected, and left to perish? there is no appeal to the divine justice which may interpose, to a righteous God who may come to the rescue of the poor and the oppressed, and overwhelm the wrong-doers with his judgments, and chastise them for their insolence and want of love to their brethren; for God intervenes only in the common sense of nations, the instincts, or the spontaneous aspirations of the race, and these are always the same, invariable in time and place; and, therefore, since impotent to prevent iniquity, of course impotent to redress it. Evidently, then, religion can be a fact of human history, only so long as we are destitute of philosophy. We must cease to be religious the moment we are sufficiently enlightened to comprehend the origin, nature, and tendencies of religious institutions. This is what Cousin himself, on more than one occasion, significantly hints, and it is what his friend and pupil Jouffroy expressly asserts.

We see here the fundamental vice of modern philosophy itself, and in its later as well as in its earlier developments. Its grand error is found in the point of departure of Cartesianism. Descartes assumes the sufficiency of reason, as manifested in the individual consciousness, to account for all that can appear in the life of humanity. Obviously, then, nothing can be admitted as an integral, an essential, or as a permanent and necessary part of human life, that does not come in through humanity as the operating cause. The old French philosophers, a much wiser and worthier set of men than we commonly allow—plain, straightforward, outspoken, and the sworn enemies of all cant and humbug,—saw very clearly, that *on this principle*, religion, since its very essence is in the recognition and worship of a supernatural and superhuman Providence, could not subsist a moment after men had once come to see whence had originated their religious institutions, faith, and disciplines; and, therefore, they

said all plainly that religion originates in human weakness and ignorance. They considered religion, therefore, a reproach and a shame, and as such condemned it, and labored to teach men philosophy; so that they should be able to cast it off, and live without it. The Germans saw this, but shrunk from the conclusion. Warm, and somewhat devout of heart, they would retain religion; subtle of brain, and speculatively inclined by temper and education, they would retain philosophy; so they set themselves with right-down German earnestness at work to reconcile the two. They sought the source of religion, as a fact of human history, in human nature itself, and found man endowed by nature with a religious sense or faculty, which some of them called *religiosity*. Now, said they, the controversy must end. Here is religion a very element of man's nature; it grows out of a fundamental want of his being, and therefore religion he has, and must, and will have, as long as he continues to be human. This philosophy was imported into France by Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant, and in a modified form was accepted by Cousin and Jouffroy. But, after all, this was merely a new version of the very doctrine of the old *philosophes*. At first, it seemed to be something else, and many an inquirer thought he had found what he was looking after. But, alas! the discovery of the origin of religion *in human nature* destroyed the possibility of *religiousness*. The *religiosity* was struck from the list of human faculties the moment it was discovered to be a faculty; because then it lost all its character of sacredness and authority, and men who understood the secret, could regard only as a mere sham or pretence all religious exercises. Religion was no longer a law imposed on man by a lawgiver, but something growing out of his nature, standing on a level with industry, politics, art, and the like. Here was no God to worship, but an instinct to follow; no extra-mundane sovereign to obey, but an internal law to develop. There was something like mockery in kneeling down to pray, for who should hear our prayers? How could an honest man, bring his gift to the altar? The pious feeling, the religious state of mind, was no longer possible. Our knowledge banishes our religion, on the German system, as well as on the old French system. There can be religion only where there is not only the belief in God, but a belief that God intervenes in human affairs through the side of the

actual as well as through the side of the transcendental; for then only can there be any room for religious exercise.

Unquestionably God intervenes in human affairs through the necessary and invariable laws of nature and of humanity —what we call his intervention through the side of the transcendental; but this intervention is not what we call, nor what the religious world has always called, *Providence*. This intervention is ontological, and the relation it implies is not that of Providence, but that of Creation. Unless we adopt pantheism outright, and make the action of man and of God one and identical, to say that God intervenes only under the relation of Creator, is to assume that he has in creating man given him all that he ever gives him, made in the very elements of his nature all the provision for his whole life, here or hereafter, that man needs, or that he does or will make for him. Now, this is precisely what we understand, not by Providence, but by the *denial* of Providence.

But, as we have already shown, though from another point of view, this theory of the non-intervention of Providence, save through the fixed and permanent laws of human nature, will not suffice to explain and account for the facts of human history. By it we may explain and account for what is fixed, permanent, uniform in history; but how explain by its light, or account for what is exceptional, variable, individual, diverse? Vico, by his "common sense of nations," can only explain what is common to all nations; not by any means what each nation has in its life that is peculiar to itself. We have seen that we cannot do it merely by the aid of climate and geography. The difference of races may do somewhat; but if we assume, or even if we do not assume, that all the varieties of the human race have sprung from the same family, this difference will be insufficient to account for all the diversities which we find in the lives of different nations and individuals. On this ground, we ask again, what shall we do with *providential men*, who come at long intervals of time and space, and by their superhuman virtue, intelligence, wisdom, love, and power of sacrifice, found systems and eras, redeem and advance their race? History presents us, at least *tradition* presents us, these men standing by the cradles of all nations, as the founders of their respective civilisations. These men cannot come as the ordinary developments of humanity, for humanity cannot of itself surpass its uniform type. What shall we say of

them? Shall we boldly deny their existence as individuals, and with Vico declare them vast collective beings; understanding by Homer, not "the blind old bard of Scio's rocky isle," but a long series of bards and rhapsodists, the Homerides; nay, not the Homerides merely, but the whole Greek people embodying itself and history, through the whole epoch of its earlier and heroic life, in a sublime Iliad, and a didactic Odyssey? Shall we say that there was no Moses, but the Jewish people, emancipating themselves from servitude, who obtain after various trials and vicissitudes a country, and establish a fixed code of laws, political, civil, and religious? And Zoroaster, and Pythagoras, and Plato, and Confucius, the heroes, sages, poets, prophets, and philosophers, founders of states and empires, the benefactors of the race, whose very names cast a spell over us, and make us thrill with the love of glory—must these all dissolve at the first touch of criticism, as spectres at the approach of morning light, and leave us to be dissipated and deadened in the vague and indeterminate masses heaving and rolling in a wild, maddening chaos, borne blindly, without perceiving why or wherefore, hither and thither, by every wind that sweeps over them? As well strike the Divinity from heaven as dispeople the earth of its heroes. No; these providential men, these angels of God, these messengers of truth and love, were not mere fictions, the mere impersonations of the thoughts, feelings, and deeds of the masses in their respective nations; but they were great and glorious *realities*, almost the only realities on which the eye can seize and repose, through all the long vista of the past. No; critics and philosophers, having spoiled us of our God, do in common charity spare us the glorious army of saints and martyrs, heroes, prophets, apostles, and sages, by whom our race has been redeemed and blessed. To spare us these is not to rob the masses of their glory, for their glory is that they love, and reverence, and cherish the memory of these, and profit by their diviner lives.

Moreover, this theory which recognizes God, not in the exceptional, the individual, and the diverse, but merely in the fixed, the uniform, the identical, and the necessary in human history, refutes itself. Nothing is a more uniform, universal, and permanent fact of history, than this very belief that Providence intervenes in human affairs on the side of the actual, as well as on the side of the transcendental. All ages and nations have believed in not only a gen-

eral but a special providence—a providence intervening for individuals and nations, and through specially appointed nations and individuals as agents, or ministers. According to the theory in question, this belief can have resulted only from the presence of God in human nature, and therefore must have the highest stamp of truth the theory does or can recognize. If the theory be true, this belief must be true; therefore, if the theory be true, the theory itself must be false.

The error of the advocates of this theory, arises from their assuming that all in the life of humanity must be a development of humanity itself. But humanity does not suffice for itself. The Creator has not merely created man, placed him here, and left him to the natural workings of the original principles of his being, as the Epicureans teach, but he remains ever near him, watching over him with a tender love; and intervenes to aid his growth, and the accomplishment of his destiny. This brings us to

2. The religious view of Providence. We have objected to Cousin's doctrine that it gave no place to human freedom; we object to it now, that it gives no place to divine freedom. Unquestionably, Cousin asserts that the human *me*, as Leibnitz contends, is a force, a cause, and really is no further than it is free; but in tracing virtually, if not expressly, all the facts of history to the impersonal reason, and assigning to the reflective reason, in which alone the *me* intervenes, only a retrospective agency, he renders this liberty of the *me* altogether unproductive, and therefore as good as no *me* at all. Unquestionably also, he asserts, and it is a capital point in his philosophy, that God is cause, and substance, or being, only in that he is cause; therefore necessarily asserting his freedom, for a cause not free is no cause—the cause being not in *it*, but in that which binds or necessitates it. But in his account of the divine intervention, he recognizes that intervention only in creation. It is, as we have seen, solely an ontological intervention, coming through the side of our permanent nature, affecting us in the fixed and unalterable laws of our being, and not through our life, our actions, and reaching our substantive existence through our phenomenal existence. Therefore, whatever freedom there was in creating us, there can be none in governing or controlling us. The divine action is limited, restrained by the laws or nature of the creature. God can act only in these laws; nay, these laws

are *his* action. There is and can be no divine influx but these laws themselves. Consequently, God is not and cannot be free to correct their action, or to give them a new direction, or an *additional* force, as may be required for the greatest good of the race, unless we lose them entirely, and fall into absolute pantheism. From the first point of view, we lose man, from the last, we lose God.

The simple objection we here raise to Cousin is that he recognizes the divine intervention in human affairs only in the nature with which God has created or creates us. As this nature, according to him, is fixed and unalterable, we have and can have no *free* intervention of Providence in the actual affairs of individuals or of nations. It seems to us that a little attention to the language of an apostle would have rectified this theory. It is, says St. Paul, whom we dare quote as a philosopher as well as an inspired apostle, if indeed the former is not presupposed in the latter—it is in God that "we *live* and *move* and have our being." Cousin says it is in God that we have our *being*. Our ontological existence given, our whole phenomenal existence is given. But if this were so, why did the apostle not stop with saying, "in God we have our being?" But our ontological or substantive existence being given, our whole phenomenal existence, that is to say, all the facts of our lives, all that we can exhibit in our actual living and acting, is *not* given. *All does not flow out of the laws of our own being or the original principles of our nature.* Our actual lives exhibit the presence of other principles and agencies, and among these is that to which all the world gives the name of Providence. In him we *live* and *move*. We depend on God for our being; he, as it were, stands under us, and upholds, continues us in being by the continued presence—active presence, for God is never a mere looker on—of his creative energy. So far Cousin. But we, who are thus created, constituted, as active forces, are yet unable to act, or to produce in our own sphere, that is, to live and move. We are equally dependent on God, on the other side, on the presence, the *active* intervention of God for the conditions of life and motion. This last intervention, inasmuch as it is *supernatural*, not restricted to our mere natures, but comes in and affects our lives, and the principles of our nature through our living, and therefore not bound by them, is the true providential intervention. It is a free intervention, and therefore implies the divine sovereignty. It enables us to

feel that God is free at any moment to intervene in our behalf, to reward us for our virtues, to console us in our afflictions, to redress our grievances, and to punish us for our offences.

We have made Bossuet, a celebrated Catholic bishop, author of the *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, the representative of this religious view of Providence, because it is from it, as his point of sight, that his history is conceived and written; also because he is among the earliest of those who have attempted a universal history. This work has had a great reputation, and it must be owned that it is written with great eloquence and power, with the force and dignity becoming an eminent prelate of the church; yet regarded as a history, it is unquestionably very defective—defective considering the state of historical knowledge at the time it was written, and much more so now. Its merit is that it is written from the point of view of Providence, and designed to show the active intervention of Providence in the affairs of this world to reward and to punish, to solace and to succor, and especially its intervention in the rise, progress, and decline of states and empires. But the prelate sees seldom the *people*,—seldom condescends to bestow a thought on the domestic and every-day life of the masses; he dwells in the Temple, or follows the Court and the Camp.

The French claim for Bossuet the high honor of having been the first to conceive the plan of a universal history, written in a philosophic spirit, from a given point of view; but possibly without sufficient foundation. Bossuet's originality is more in the execution than in the conception of his work, the plan of which was given him by the church herself, was indicated in Genesis, and had been rough-sketched, at least, by St. Augustine in his *De Civitate Dei*. Moreover, the *History of the World*, by Sir Walter Raleigh, which preceded the *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* by more than half a century, is conceived in the same spirit, written from the same point of view, and with virtually the same thought. Sir Walter finished only a third part of his work as originally designed; but he has, in the masterly preface to the part completed, sketched the plan of the whole. As a mere history, though by no means without its merit, it unquestionably falls far below the work of the Catholic prelate; but the Preface and Introductory Chapters, philosophical and theological, are written with great vigor and majesty of thought,

with a pathos, a richness and a magnificence of style and language, hardly surpassed, if equalled, by any thing of the kind we are acquainted with, and show, among other things, how little philosophy has really advanced since the pretended reforms introduced by Bacon and Descartes.

But if Sir Walter, as is the case, asserts the fact of Providence, and undertakes to write the History of the World, in order to establish its certainty, and to illustrate its operation in human affairs, and must, therefore, take precedence of Bossuet; he does not, it must be admitted, seem to have clearly and distinctly conceived of history itself as the realization of a grand providential scheme, and therefore cannot with strict propriety, notwithstanding his philosophy and philosophic spirit, be ranked among philosophical historians. Perhaps, after all, Bossuet is the first not to conceive of history as the realization of this providential scheme, for that, as we have said, was given him by the church, and to some extent by the Jewish history recorded in the Scriptures; but the first, while asserting the supernatural intervention of Providence, to develop the systematic character of this intervention, and to give a regular and continuous history of it, in its relations and connections with the more mundane history of states and empires.

Saint Augustine had conceived, and to some extent sketched the history of the rise and progress of TWO CITIES, one of which he called the "City of this world," whose end is destruction, the other of which he called the "City of God," whose end is to remain forever the empire of the saints, and the habitation of the just. Here is unquestionably the germ of the *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle.* But Saint Augustine wrote not as the historian, but as the polemic and the dogmatist; while Bossuet writes almost always as the simple historian, only as the historian of principles rather than of mere facts and details. He is writing for the instruction of the Dauphin, and his design is indeed to prepare his royal pupil, should Providence call him to the throne, for the proper discharge of his duties as sovereign of France. He writes, therefore, from the point of view of religion and politics, with the evident design of showing from the history of God's providence, and that of renowned states and empires, that no policy of a prince, however wise to mere human apprehension, can ever be successful, if it in any respect runs counter to the laws of God, as displayed in his providential dealings with mankind. He sought to incul-

cate the wholesome lesson, always inculcated by the Catholic church, and always needing to be inculcated, whether the political sovereignty be vested in the one, the few, or the many, that there is a King of kings, a Power above the state, who is the true Sovereign, and whose laws can never be transgressed with impunity. Nor this only; he everywhere sought to show, by implication, however, rather than by express assertion, what the English Solomon, James the First, in his *Remonstrance for the Divine Right of Kings, in reply to an Oration of the Cardinal du Perron*, undertakes to controvert, namely, that this true Sovereign, this King of kings, Law of laws, to which the civil magistrate owes allegiance, has on earth even, a visible embodiment, and a representative, other than that which may be conceived of as existing in the state itself. He therefore contends for two empires— 1. The empire of the people of God, the religious. 2. The empire of men, the political.

In his view, these two empires are not co-ordinate, though co-existing; nor does he make the first subordinate to the second, raising the civil power over the ecclesiastical—the human over the divine—as do the Anglicans in their theory of the reformation; and as does James, especially in his *Remonstrance*, or defence of kings; but he makes the religious empire, which derives its authority immediately from God himself, supreme, and proclaims it from his episcopal chair as the law of the political power;—a doctrine humbling to the pride of kings, and which, through the long period from the establishment of the barbarians on the ruins of the Roman empire down to the reformation in the sixteenth century, had caused an almost unbroken war between the civil government and the ecclesiastical. Protestantism, under its social aspect—not to speak of it under its theological aspect, with which we have now no concern—is the successful protest on the part of the civil magistrate—civil governments—against this doctrine, then asserted by the church, and still its doctrine, though for the present suffered to lie in abeyance.

From this point of view, Bossuet proceeds to sketch the two empires, but more especially the religious empire, and to trace the uninterrupted succession of the people of God, the depositaries of the supreme Law. In the history of this empire he finds the history of God's providential intervention in human affairs. The design of this providential intervention is to raise up, educate, and conduct to

truth, and justice, and love, an elect people, eminently and strictly the *People of God*. Bossuet traces the history of this people from the Creation, down through Seth, Noah, the patriarchs, Moses, the Jewish nation, to the coming of Christ, and then no longer in a single nation, but in the apostles and the church, gathering and forming into one compact body the people of God from *all* nations; for in the seed of Abraham, which is Christ, all the families, kindreds, and nations of the earth were to be blessed.

It will be seen from this statement, that the Catholic bishop writes his history solely from the point of view of the Christian church. His point of departure is in Genesis, and his point of arrival is the consummation of the people of God in Jesus Christ, through the Gospel. We, of course, have no fault to find with this point of view. It is the only point of view from which the history of humanity can be written, or should be written. But, then, we must understand it well, and be careful that we overlook nothing which it permits us to see. Undoubtedly, Providence intervenes through the medium of an elect people; undoubtedly, too, the Jewish people prior to the coming of Christ, and the Christian church, are to be regarded as standing at the head of this people; but it would be unjust to leave all the rest of mankind to the mere law of nature, and untrue, to say that no rays of divine light had penetrated to them but through the inherent and necessary laws of nature and humanity. The false religions of antiquity were not altogether the creations of the devil, but corruptions, or imperfect, incomplete embodiments of the true religion. The grand defect of Bossuet is in not comprehending, except in its theological sense, the spiritual communicability or transmissibility of life. The fact of this communicability in the City of God, or in the history of the people of God, he recognizes and asserts, as the church has uniformly done, under the dogmas of Communion and Apostolic Succession. But, though the life communicated from one subject to another, is supernatural, yet that it is communicated by a natural, not by a supernatural law—this is what this eminent prelate does not seem to have learned. But we are so made that we do transmit our lives to others by another mode than that of natural generation. We will try and explain this fact, though at the expense of repeating what we have said on several former occasions.

Life is the term by which, when men are the subject of

it, we express all the phenomena which a human being exhibits in time and space. Life, predicated of the supernatural agent sent to redeem, enlighten, and sanctify us, is the phenomena exhibited by that agent; but when received by us, it becomes in us, not life, but the *power* of life. Hence, the life of Moses became, when communicated, the power of a higher life to the Jews; so the life of our blessed Saviour communicated to us, becomes in us the power of life, or the power of God in the soul, to live a higher and a truer life.

Life is communicated from one subject to another, between which there is intercourse, by virtue of the fact, that no subject lives but by communion with an object. A man cannot *see*, when or where there is nothing but himself to be *seen*. Yet to see is a fact of life. Seeing, if decomposed, will be found to be compounded of two elements, one of which is himself, the subject; the other is that which he sees, namely, the object. The *seeing*, that is, the fact expressed by the word, will vary as you vary either of these elements. Change the subject, or change the object, and the fact itself assumes a new character. Take another fact of life, namely, *love*. Now man may, perhaps, experience the *want* to love, where there is no object to be loved; but this want or *need* of loving is not love. We love only where there is something loved. Love, then, as a fact of life, is compounded, in like manner as seeing, of two elements—the subject loving, and object loved. Now, change the man, the subject loving, and you change the character of the love; change the character of the object loved, and you equally change the character of the love. So of any other fact of what we call our life. Now, from this, we obtain the important conclusion, *that what we call our life, or our act*, is not all in ourselves, does not all depend on ourselves, nor derive its whole character from ourselves, but depends jointly on ourselves and on that which is not we, and derives its character jointly from ourselves and from the object in conjunction with which we live or act. Here is the profound significance of the Christian doctrine of communion.

Now, assume a providential man, that is, a man qualified by the special interposition of his Maker, to exhibit to the world a higher order of spiritual and moral life than the world had hitherto known or been capable of. They who should come into personal communion with him, would live

by him, and their life would partake of his fullness. He would be the object—not the *end* in reference to which—but the object *in conjunction* with which, they would live; consequently his higher and diviner character would be communicated to their acts, so that in acting they would act him as well as themselves, would literally live his life. Here is the secret of the well-known influence of example. The *fact* of this influence has always been known and insisted on; the *law* or *philosophy* of this fact has not, till quite recently, been discovered. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Wherefore? Because our life is composed of two elements, one the subject, which is ourselves, the other the object we are in relation with, which is not ourselves; and as the life partakes of the character of both the subject and the object, it follows necessarily that, if the object be corrupt, that part of our act depending on it will also be corrupt. So good communications have the opposite effect, and purify our manners, and for the same reason. The object in relation with which we live being better than we are, more elevated and holy, evidently, as our acts must derive somewhat from it, our life will be purified and elevated. The fact here stated everybody knows; the *reason* of the fact is all that is novel in the statement. Who of us has ever conversed for one half-hour with a really great and good man, but has felt that a virtue has come out of him to us, and that we ourselves are lifted up, and are no longer, and never can be again, what we were before? This law, which we call the spiritual communicability of life, creates what we denominate, from a French legal term, the mutual *solidarity* of the life of the human race. By this all are not only ontologically, that is, in the common principles of their nature, members of one race; but all are members of one and the same community, and members one of another, living, in their various degrees, one and the same *life*.

Now, admitting the providential intervention to be in the form and manner asserted by Bossuet, that is, through a peculiar, an elect people of God, it does not follow that it was necessarily confined to that people. We admit the insulation of the Jewish people, for a long series of years, that is to say, from their settlement in Palestine under Joshua to the Babylonish captivity; but the providential intervention was not delayed till Moses. The name of Abraham is spread all through the East, and reappears in the Brahma of

the Hindoos—a sure evidence that this patriarch was not the patriarch merely of a petty tribe, living isolated from the human race. The memory of Noah is preserved in the universal traditions of the Asiatic, and in fact of the ancient European world. The *Bereshith* is a compend of a divine philosophy, which evidently was diffused far and wide long before Moses—at least in a form more or less pure. Moreover, man had no sooner fallen, than the gracious Creator interposed in his behalf, and commenced the divine economy that was to effect his final recovery and exaltation to a state far above that which he had lost by his expulsion from Eden. The evidence of this is in Genesis. "Adam also knew his wife again, and she brought forth a son, and called his name Seth, saying, God hath given me another seed for Abel whom Cain slew." The meaning of the word Seth is *Repairer*, and strictly, "repairer by way of knowledge;" thereby indicating that the work of *reparation* had commenced, the divine knowledge was communicated to the race which was finally to grow brighter and brighter till it deepened and broadened into the Sun of Righteousness, through whom the race was to be renewed and sanctified.

This divine economy for the recovery of man, commenced in the infancy of the race, before the Flood. The light is transmitted through the line of Seth, or people of God, till the Flood, then continued through Noah and his sons, who commence, as it were, a new series for the human race. But this was before the building of Babel, and the dispersion of mankind, and consequently while the whole race dwelt together and spoke one and the same language. They lived then all in communion one with another, and consequently all must in some degree have partaken of the divine life which had been renewed after the fall, and which was still preserved among them. All commmunication was not cut off even by the dispersion, which took place at the building of Babel, as we learn from the universal reverence paid to the Patriarch Abraham. Consequently, keeping in mind the spiritual communicability of life, we may reasonably infer that the providential life deposited with the children of Seth, was communicated even to the gentiles, and was the seed of whatever was true, beautiful, and good in their respective traditions. We are loath, then, to believe that the gentiles were disinherited by their heavenly Father, and left exclusively to the dim and flickering light of the law

of nature. Placed as the people of God were in the midst of the empires of the world, the law of human life must have been miraculously changed, if they had not communicated even to the heathen somewhat of their own divine life.

So, too, when we come down to the times of the people of God under the church. We unhesitatingly admit the church to have been the depositary of the faith, of the sacred traditions; in one word, of the new life, communicated to the human race by him who was the Way, the Truth, and the Life; and that it was only through it the life could spread out and permeate and renew the mass of men in time and space. But by this very law of which we speak, placed as the church was in every land, as an illuminated city, its light must spread beyond the boundaries of the city itself. The church and those not, in a Protestant sense, technically of it, must necessarily meet at a thousand different points in the general commerce of life, and therefore must the new life be communicated and diffused; so that the grace of God which bringeth salvation would in some sense, and to a certain extent, really appear unto *all* men. Who will undertake to say that there is, at this moment, a single people on the globe, to which more or less of the life of Christ, by virtue of the communion of the human race, has not been communicated?

While, then, we accept the prelate's general point of view, and readily admit that Providence is specially manifested in the religious empire, represented by the Jewish people prior to the coming of Christ, and by the Christian church since, yet we are not willing to regard the effects of this providential interference as shut up within the limits of this empire, or as confined exclusively to the peculiar people of God. The patriarchs, the Jews and the church were made the depositaries, so to speak, of Providence, not for themselves as ends, but as the instruments and ministers of God in accomplishing his purposes, which concern the entire human race. In explaining what is called profane history, as well as in explaining sacred history, we are to recognize, in its true *religious sense*, the providential intervention, mediate at least, if not immediate.

We have here another objection to the *Discourse on Universal History*. If we have not mistaken its scope and design, the end it represents Providence to have in view in his intervention in human affairs, is the rearing up and

growth of the religious empire. This was already asserted in Saint Augustine; it is repeated still more emphatically in the *Philosophy of History*, by Frederick Schlegel—a work unduly praised by some, and unjustly decried by others. Schlegel represents God as having in view in the whole life of humanity solely the manifestation, the glory, and, so to speak, the realization, of the Word. To this all is subordinated, and made subsidiary. We do not question the truth of this, under a certain point of view. But what we do question, is the assumed fact that the people of God are selected out from the world, placed under the religious empire, solely for their own exclusive good. That the end is the revelation, the glory, and the realization in humanity of the divine Word, which selects the people of God, and is their power of life, we freely admit; but we venture, with all deference, to affirm, that the true sense of the church is and always has been, that the people of God in this world are selected as the *medium* of God's providence to the race,—not merely that the divine life may be communicated to the chosen people themselves, but that through them it may be communicated to all men. The Jews before, and the church since the coming of Christ, are to be regarded as the depositaries of the faith, the witnesses to the truth, the agents and ministers of God in effecting or carrying on his purposes of love and mercy towards all mankind; for God is no respecter of persons, but the God and father of all, over all, blessed for ever more.

Leaving now all further criticism by the way, passing over Herder, who, in his *Reflections on the Universal History of Humanity*, is an inveterate rationalist, and may be read with more pleasure for his poetry than for the light he sheds on the philosophy of history, we proceed to sum up, and set forth, briefly, but distinctly, our own answer to the question which now concerns us, namely,—By what agencies is progress effected?

The historian, who wishes to give really a universal history of mankind, must unquestionably treat that history under the five-fold division of Industry, Politics, Art, Religion, and Philosophy, as contended by Cousin, for these are all indestructible elements of the *life* of humanity; but in considering these in relation to their origin, their cause, their progress, it will not be enough to consider them as originating in certain permanent and indestructible wants of human nature. In other words, nature given as their

theatre, and man also given with his inherent and permanent wants, still all the facts of the life of mankind would not be given; we should yet have no industry, no politics, no art, no religion, no philosophy. It is here we separate from Cousin. If we understand him, since Providence intervenes only in nature and in the permanent laws of humanity, nature and humanity given, all the facts of human history are given. This we deny. Human history is explained only by the recognition of three elements as at work in its production. 1. Nature; 2. Humanity; 3. Providence.

Jouffroy excludes nature and providence; for he finds the principle of change in human things only in the human intelligence; Cousin, by tracing all to the impersonal reason, and recognizing the divine action only in the fixed, the permanent, and the necessary, virtually, while contending for them, excludes both humanity and Providence; Bossuet takes no note of nature, and makes quite little of humanity, and therefore gives us an exaggerated view of Providence. But neither can be excluded without vitiating our philosophy of history.

1. Nature is not the mere passive theatre on which man is placed to display his activity, but is herself an active force, and progressive even. Cousin, after Leibnitz, has demonstrated—and we also, in our *Synthetic Philosophy*, have done the same to all who understand us—that no being or object is conceivable by us but under the category of cause, and only in and so far as it is a causative force. The grain of sand on the sea-shore is cognizable by us, conceivable even, only in that it is a force, producing in conjunction with our activity an effect on us. The atomic theory of matter is not sound, and must give way to the monadic, as it already has in the minds of the most eminent cultivators of science. The physics taught in our schools need revising still more than our metaphysics; and the time, we trust, is not far distant when we shall cease to talk of the *vis inertiæ* and the *infinite divisibility* of matter. The chemist will find that the resolution of all material forms into the gaseous is not the last word of analysis, and does by no means bring him to the ultimate, the primitive ἐντελέχειαι, *entelechiæ*, or active forces, of which matter is but the compound. All substance, in the last analysis, will be found to be immaterial, possessing inherent activity, capable of making an effort (*conatus*) from its own centre.

Nature is not only active, but progressive. This is demonstrable from the very conception which we have, and cannot but have, of God, if we conceive of him at all. Our only conception of God is of him as cause, creator, but as an infinitely powerful, wise, and good cause. He is essentially cause, and not merely a potential cause, but actually, eternally, and universally a cause. In causing or creating, he is realizing his own infinite ideal in space and time. But space and time are limited, and can contain only the finite. Creation, therefore, or the universe, viewed either as a whole or in detail, must be incomplete—can be only a finite realization of the infinite; consequently, only an *imperfect* realization of the divine ideal.

It must be now and always an imperfect, that is, incomplete realization of the divine ideal, because, if it were not, the ideal being infinite, the creation would be infinite. An infinite creation is an absurdity. The creator cannot create that which surpasses himself. If creation were infinite, it would, as there can be but one infinite, be greater than the creator himself. Then a finite creator would be equal to the work of an infinite creation, which, of course, no one can admit. That which can be defined, bounded, is finite. The universe must needs be bounded, defined, by the power and wisdom of the Creator, and, therefore, must always be assumed to be finite.

But God is essentially a creator, always and everywhere a creator. His ideal is infinite, and he never relaxes, so to speak, the creative effort to realize it. Consequently, the realization must be for ever becoming nearer and nearer complete; which implies, through the continuous creative energy of its author, a continuous progress of the universe towards the full and perfect realization of the infinite ideal. Hence, the progressiveness of nature herself. Not that nature is internally progressive by her own agency, regarded as distinct from the divine agency; but progressive by virtue of the continuous creative effort of its original author.

The same conclusion, to a given extent, is obtained also empirically. They are very careless observers, as well as unsound reasoners, who say that all in God's universe is perfect, all but man, whom they usually except

> "Look on yonder earth;
> The golden harvests spring; the unfading sun
> Sheds light and life; the fruits, the flowers, the trees,
> Arise in due succession; all things speak

Peace, harmony, and love. The universe
In nature's silent eloquence, declares
That all fulfil the works of love and joy,—
All but the outcast man. He fabricates
The sword which stabs his peace; he cherisheth
The snakes that gnaw his heart; he raiseth up
The tyrant whose delight is in his woe,
Whose sport is in his agony."

This is not true. Man is not the only blot on the fair face of creation. Of all the Creator's works he is acquainted with, man is the most perfect, for he confessedly stands at the head of this lower creation. Would-be poets and sentimental lovers of nature may speak of his littleness, of his weakness, meanness, and of the grandeur of interminable forests, of mountains and cataracts, of extended plains and boundless oceans; but what are these, in contrast with the human soul, the free thought, the disinterested affection, the heroic deed? They who, standing by the Falls of Niagara, profess to feel their own littleness before the huge mass of waters pouring over a ledge of rocks, know very little of the grandeur of the human soul; for there is more sublimity, did they but know it, in the faintest aspiration after God than in all that mass of waters a thousand times over.

But we see nowhere in nature the perfection boasted. The earth on which we stand—of what is it constructed but of the ruins of a prior world? Are there no pestilential damps, no noxious effluvia, no earthquakes, volcanoes, blights, mildews, abortions? "The whole creation," says Saint Paul, "groaneth in pain." Religious men have everywhere noted these marks of imperfection, and have accounted for them by supposing that when man sinned, all creation fell with him, that all nature for his sake was cursed. This way of accounting for these imperfections may or may not be satisfactory—a point on which we are not now called to decide—but its popularity proves, at least, that the experience of mankind is against the hypothesis of the perfection of all the Creator's works.

Then, on the other hand, in some measure, we are able to trace, as we have said, empirically, the progress of the earth, of man, and of several races, besides man. Geology, imperfect as we regard that science as yet, shows us the gradual formation of the globe, and in the several strata it discloses marks the successive steps of its progress. The earliest remains of organic life are those of coarse vegetables,

spreading out their broad leaves as huge lungs, and deriving their nourishment solely from the atmosphere. These decaying, form a mould on the hitherto naked rocks, whence may spring finer, more delicate, and more complicated organizations, till we come to the present stage where we ourselves are. Everywhere does nature seem to begin rude, coarse, with an "apprentice hand," and to be everywhere and always improving upon her own types. The same progress may be traced in the animal races. It is not true to say that the beaver of to-day is no wiser than the beaver of four thousand years ago. We may observe, too, the great improvements effected in domestic animals, and their superiority, under various aspects, over those of the same families which have continued untamed, or that have relapsed into the savage state.

Man, in consequence of his being made to live in a body, lives in intimate union with nature. He feels and responds to every change in the atmosphere that surrounds him. As nature advances in her own organization, so does he advance in his; which advance in his bodily organization is reproduced in his moral and intellectual phenomena. It is sometimes contended that the physical man has degenerated. That this is true in some localities, in consequence of the artificial life to which individuals are driven by the extremes of luxury and poverty, we need not question; that in some favored tribes or families among the ancients, as the Eupatrids among the Greeks, and the Perses proper from whom were taken the Persian kings, the human body was, through physical education, brought to a greater degree of perfection than is the case at present with the general average, we do not deny; but if we take the great mass of the population of the globe, we shall find that the human body has improved in its beauty, strength, and symmetry, and still more in the delicacy of its organization. Especially will this be true, if we confine our remarks to those who are the children of Christian civilisation. This is evinced again in the more generous and humane sentiments and delicate sensibility which the Christian world possess over the ancient pagan world, demanding in art the life and movement of painting, rather than the silence and repose of sculpture.

The constant amelioration of physical nature, effected by the continuous realization by the Creator in it of more and more of his infinite ideal, and by the re-action of man in cultivating and embellishing, through industry and art, the

world in which he is placed, is among the causes, under Providence, of human amelioration and progress. The historian, as we said, on a former occasion,* of the philosopher, must take into view the history of the globe itself, trace its changes and ameliorations, and their connection with the phenomena of human life. This is a branch of history that has as yet been but slightly cultivated; but it opens to a field of vast extent, rich in facts, prolific in instruction, and affording no little food for speculation.

2. While we reject the notion that all in the life of humanity is *developed* from itself, and is nothing but its own creation in answer to its own inherent wants, we must still recognize humanity in every fact of human history, and there too as a free, active, productive cause, though a limited cause, working in conjunction with other causes, never alone. To a great extent, human history depends on human volition. If Miltiades had not defeated the Persians at Marathon, or if Themistocles had not destroyed the Persian fleet at Salamis, the whole course of ancient history would have run differently; and yet this depended, to no inconsiderable extent, on the skill and bravery of a few Greek leaders and a mere handful of followers. Shall we, under pretence of exalting the race taken as a mass, or even in our humility before Providence, rob those brave Greeks of their glory, who stood in the gap and repelled the armed millions which Asia would pour in to crush young European liberty? No; we who live to-day are their debtors; and it is not too much to say that Marathon, Platea, and Salamis, prepared Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and Yorktown. These Greeks might have proved cowards and traitors, been false to themselves and to humanity; and had they been so, we should all have fared the worse. If Alexander had not invaded Asia and Africa, and by so doing founded the Egypto-Grecian and the Syro-Grecian empires, who will say that the course of human history would have flowed on all the same? Or if Cæsar had not conquered Gaul and Britain, and with his Celtic legions crossed the Rubicon? And did the failure of Porsena to dismantle Rome, or of Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, to march upon the city, change nothing in human history? A little more concert, skill, and bravery on the part of the Anglo-Saxons, prior to and at the battle of Hastings; or on the part of the

*Vol. I, p. 45.

burghers at Rossbach; or more prompt obedience on the part of some of Napoleon's officers at Waterloo; or less firmness in sustaining a murderous fire on the part of the English, and how different would have been the history of the world! Or if General La Fayette placed at the head of the French revolution of 1789, at the head of the legislative assembly in 1815, or at the head of the nation in 1830, had been at all equal to his position at either of these epochs, who sees not that the course of events would have been very different from what it has since been? The wisdom and virtue of individual statesmen and leaders, of nations, and of private citizens or subjects, must count for much in human history; and it is permitted to hold in execration the traitor who, like Dermot M'Morogh, sells his country to the foreigner, or like Burke turns renegade to liberty, and prostitutes his powerful intellect and gorgeous eloquence to the cause of the tyrants and oppressors of the people, as this great man did in his attack on the French revolution.

3. Providence undoubtedly intervenes so as to secure in the details of history, the execution of the divine purposes; but it does not follow from this that nothing is to be found in human history not there by the express will and appointment of God. For were it so there would be small space left for human agency, and there would and could be no *crimes*. Human action on the large scale on which history contemplates it, as well as on the narrow scale on which it is contemplated by practical ethics, is alike the action of individuals. Humanity, though itself transcending all individuals, yet lives and actualizes itself only in individuals. All human action then is individual action, and is subjected to the laws of individual action, and each individual is accountable, in his individual capacity, for his share of that action, whether it be good or evil. A nation can be rewarded or punished only by rewarding or punishing the individuals that compose it; therefore we protest against any ethical rule that would declare the action of a given nation good, moral, right in relation to the national will, but morally wrong in relation to the individual volitions of which it is the aggregate. No people can be separated from its government. The individuals which compose the nation, just in proportion to their co-operation or acquiescence in the action of the government, share its merit or its blame. If then we acquit, with Cousin, the history of

humanity of all blame, so must we acquit all individuals of all blame in their private as well as their public capacity, which would be to assert contrary to the universal convictions of the race, that there is never in human action any sin, iniquity, or transgression of the laws of God.

In recognizing the intervention of Providence, then, we must not so recognize it, as to imply that all goes on in obedience to the laws of God, as if man and men were at every moment doing what God wills or commands them to do. The purpose of God, it is admitted, is not frustrated; but this purpose is to leave man free within given limits, and to reward him if he exercise his freedom properly, and to chastise him if he abuse it. Providence is unquestionably to be found in all the facts of human history, but not there to contravene human freedom, and by a sovereign agency to compel men to do this or to do that. He is there to make the very wrath of man to praise him, and to restrain indeed the effects of that wrath so far as it cannot be made subservient to the divine economy for the government of humanity. The general course of humanity is onward, towards the realization in individual and social life of the perfect law of liberty. When the Jews refuse to perform a certain work in this progress, God rejects them and calls the gentiles. He has given us Americans a certain work for humanity; he is with us ready to grant us all the assistance we need in executing it; but if we refuse to do it, he will cast us off, and raise up another people to inherit the glory that might have been ours. Whether we execute this work or not, will depend on ourselves, on our own intelligence and virtue.

The true view of providential intervention in human affairs is that taken by Lessing in his tract on the *Education of the Human Race*, which represents our heavenly Father intervening as an educator, giving us now one lesson, and now another, according to our wants and proficiency. But the educator does not do all. The pupil must work; and if he exert not his own faculties, the lessons and offers of assistance of the educator will prove unavailing.

The fact of providential intervention is established by all history, in the fact that in all ages, among all nations and tribes however rude and barbarous, we find some form or forms of religious worship. The universal existence of religious institutions is taken, we own, by our modern philosophers, to be only a proof of the universality and innate-

ness of the religious sentiment. This is to some extent the doctrine of Benjamin Constant in his work—a great work too—*De la Religion Considérée dans sa Source, ses Formes et ses Développements*, and which is set forth with much eloquence and a good deal of learning, but without any sound philosophy or true reverential feeling, by Mr. Theodore Parker, among ourselves, in his huge volume entitled *A Discourse on Matters Pertaining to Religion.* But the religious sentiment is a fact of *human life*, not an element of man's *nature*, and, therefore, cannot be innate, that is to say, born with us. Man is not naturally religious, in the sense the lion is carnivorous, and the sheep gregarious, that is, by virtue of an indestructible and essential law of his nature. But inasmuch as religion, in some form, is a *fact* of the universal life of humanity, since no fact of life is the product of a single factor, it follows that everywhere the object of the religious sentiment, to wit, the Divinity, must be universally, to a greater or less extent, immediately or mediately present with humanity, and cognizable, or rather perceptible, by the human intelligence. The universal belief in God becomes therefore a proof of the fact that God is; as the universal belief in his providential intervention becomes a proof of that intervention.

They who question Providence, and undertake to explain all on the theory of development, the theory in vogue with our American transcendentalists, and which is reproduced in nearly all our works on education, proceed on the hypothesis that man natural aspires. This natural aspiration, the theatre being given, suffices for all. If this were so, a doubt might indeed be cast on the reality of providential intervention. Man, we admit, aspires, and is progressive because he aspires. But man is not naturally progressive, saving progress only as he is carried along with the onward course of the universe itself, which, as leaving him in the same relative position in the universe, is not recognizable by us as progress. Savage tribes are not progressive. Hence we infer that they do not aspire. If they did naturally aspire, we should sometimes see them by their own unassisted efforts coming out of the savage state, and indigenous civilisation springing up. But this is never the case. We have no record of a savage tribe emerging, by its own spontaneous efforts, from the savage state and coming into the civilized state. This is admitted by Constant, and asserted

by Niebuhr, either of whom on this point is a competent authority.

Moreover, the traditions of every civilized people—and we own that we are disposed to regard all traditions as of great historical value—uniformly ascribe the civilisation to foreign influence, never to indigenous and spontaneous effort. It is always a sacerdotal, military, or industrial colony from a people already civilized; some providential man; some divine interposition, a Vishnu, a Buddha, a Thoth, a Bacchus, or a Ceres; a Minos, a Moses, a Pythagoras, or a Zoroaster, that quickens their faculties, commences their education, leads them out of the savage state, and sets them forward in the path of civilisation. The facts in the case, so far as we can come at them, prove that if man has the natural capacity to aspire, he does not naturally aspire; that is, not by the simple force of his nature. And this follows necessarily from the fact we have so often insisted upon, that man cannot perform a single act save in conjunction with an active force which is distinct from that active force which he calls himself. And that this other force is not external nature, is established by the fact already stated, that the savage, left to his own nature and the external universe, is not progressive, does not come out of his savage state. In order to make the savage aspire, a foreign influence is necessary; for he is, so far as we know him, *naturally* indolent, careless, improvident, averse to all exertion, shrinking from all continued effort. His chief luxury is to eat and to sleep. If the sense of hunger, or some outward circumstances, arouse him to a sudden effort, the immediate demand complied with, he relapses without delay into his former torpid state.

Taking this view, rejecting the theory of development, as worthy only of the genius of the author of the *Doctrine and Discipline of Human Culture*, and the *Orphic Sayings*,* and recognizing, as an unquestionable historical fact, that man and nature combined, are not sufficient to bring men out of the savage into the civilized state, civilisation itself becomes a proof, as religious people have always considered it, of the intervention of Providence in human affairs. History becomes then a proof of Providence, and *a fortiori*

* A. Bronson Alcott, whom a shrewd Englishman, lately come among us, is trying to persuade us to receive not only as *the* great man of America, but of the age, and who himself boasts of being to the nineteenth century what Jesus was to the first.

of the existence of God. Here is a fact which we commend to our natural theologians. They seek in the order, harmony, and beauty of nature the evidences of design from which they pass by induction to an original designer; without finding fault with them for this, though some question the value of their argumentation, we may tell them that in the course of history, in the passage of man from the savage to the civilized state, in the numerous facts everywhere recorded and everywhere attested, transcending the combined powers of man and nature, they may find evidence much more to their purpose, altogether more striking and more conclusive. The works of providence are a far better demonstration of the existence of God than the works of creation.

If we find in human history three agencies at work, namely, nature, humanity, Providence, we must bear in mind that these all three intervene and work after one and the same original law, type or model, eternal and *essential* in the infinite mind or Logos. This follows from the doctrine of correspondence which Swedenborg after Leibnitz, Leibnitz after Plato, and Plato after Pythagoras and Moses, insist upon, and which is reproduced by Schelling in his doctrine of the identity of the real and the ideal. We believe ourselves to have demonstrated that the original idea, or type, of all creation is eternal, essential in God the creator, and that it is represented by each order of creatures, and each individual creature, each in its own degree, and from its own special point of view. Creation is God himself revealing and realizing out of himself, his own eternal, consubstantial Word. Each creature speaking out from its own centre echoes it, and thus it continues to be echoed, though fainter and fainter, through all actual existence till we approach the infinite Void. Could we but hear the voice of the veriest grain of sand, we should hear the same Word that in the beginning said, "Let there be light and there was light," or that, clothed with flesh, over the wild tempestuous sea of Galilee, said to the winds and waves, "Peace, be still," or at the grave of Lazarus to the sleeping dead, "Come forth."

Now, inasmuch as the action of the three forces we have enumerated, do all follow one and the same original law, history, which is the product of their union, becomes, so far as its law is concerned, capable of scientific exposition. We shall also obtain the same general result, whether we undertake to explain it from the point of view of humanity alone,

nature alone, or Providence alone. This is wherefore Cousin, in dividing history into three epochs, and characterizing each epoch in the manner we have seen, is substantially correct. Wherefore, too, Bossuet seizing solely upon the providential point of view, yet gives us the true law of history. But, this general exposition of history must not be taken for more than it is worth. It gives us after all only abstractions, the mere skeleton, not the living body, the warm flesh and blood of history. We cannot in this way arrive at the *facts* of history, but merely at the *law* which governs the facts; which facts, owing to the element of freedom, we recognize in both man and Providence, can be learned only empirically. The freedom of man gives to the course of history in a certain epoch or country a certain direction, which while it alters not the law of Providence, will yet determine in some sense the character of its application. The same Providence that interposes to assist and further, may now interpose to obstruct, and to chastise; and the actual facts of history must be different in the one case from what they would be in the other.

In conclusion, if we have made intelligible the thought with which we have written, we may say that the course of human history depends in no slight degree on the voluntary activity of individuals. Nature and Providence are in it, but men may by their wickedness pervert its course, though not with impunity; and by their wisdom, and virtue, and energy, they may aid it onward in obedience to the will of God, and the good of their race. Here we find, what theorists have denied us, the room, the motive, and the sanction needed for human virtue. The *room* is, in the space we allow in history to human freedom; the *motive* is obedience to God, and the welfare of humanity, which last must always receive damage from individual ignorance, vice or crime; and the *sanction* is in the ever present Providence to aid and reward us in well-doing, and to chastise us, or to cut us off, as a people, or as individuals, in evil-doing. Here we are free to counsel, to warn, to rebuke. Humanity lives only in the life of individuals. Then let statesmen, kings, emperors, priests, philosophers, and scholars, nay, all individuals, whatever their degree, position, or ability, lose no time in making all possible efforts to enable and to induce all men, in public or in private, to live in strict obedience to the perfect law of liberty; and in making these efforts, let them know that God and nature work

with them, and they may do all things. And let them know also that if they will not make them, not only shall all humanity fare the worse, but the Judge of all the earth will do right, and will one day demand of them wherefore they have been unprofitable servants.

THE PRESENT STATE OF SOCIETY.*

[From the Democratic Review for July, 1843.]

Whatever the book he writes, Mr Carlyle may well adopt from Schiller for his motto, *Ernst ist das Leben;* for although he plays many pranks, and cuts many literary capers, which are not much to his credit, life with him is a serious affair, and he writes always with an earnest spirit, for a high, noble, and praiseworthy end. He may often offend our fastidiousness, he may often vex or disappoint us by the vagueness or defectiveness of his views, but we can never read him without having our better feelings quickened, and getting a clearer insight into many things. We have come even to like his style,—that is, in him and for him, though by no means in and for others. It is natural, free from all literary primness and affectation, sincere, earnest, forcible, —admirably adapted to all the varieties and shades of thought, and moods of mind of the writer; responding with singular felicity to all the natural undulations of the soul; and, when read aloud, to those of the voice. This is especially true of the *History of the French Revolution*,—a great work, and almost the only one in our language deserving the name of history, and before which your Robertsons, Humes, Mackintoshes, and brotherhood, shrink to their proper dimensions.

Carlyle is a thorough master of language. We know no writer, ancient or modern, who so clearly apprehends the deep significance of speech; or so fully comprehends the profound philosophy there is in the ordinary terms of every-day life. True is it, in more senses than one, that our only sure way of arriving at psychology is through the

*Past and Present. By Thos. Carlyle. Boston: 1843.

medium of words; and not at psychology only, but at philosophy, the everlasting truth and fitness of things. All speech is significant; and if blest with clear insight we may seize the profoundest and most far-reaching truth, by turning over a very familiar word, and looking at it in the light of the primitive fact it was used to designate. One sees this in the half-serious, half-sportive remarks of Plato on the origin of names in the Cratylus, and especially in Vico's tract on the *Wisdom of the Ancient Italians, as collected from the Latin language.* There is scarcely a page, scarcely a sentence even, in Carlyle, in which he does not throw a new and surprising light on some intricate subject, by a dexterous use of a very familiar word. He lays open the word, and makes you see the fact, the thing, of which it was originally the sign, and of which it is still the sign, if the sign of aught. True, all this is done very quietly, by using a capital initial letter, italicising a syllable, separating a compound word into its original elements, or by giving a Latin equivalent for an Anglo-Saxon term, or an Anglo-Saxon one for a Latin; and since it is done so quietly, it is no doubt overlooked by the great majority of his readers, who, because they overlook it, call him obscure and unintelligible. "I do not understand you." "Sir, I am under no obligation to furnish you ideas and brains also." True, dear Doctor Johnson, but if we do not furnish our readers brains as well as ideas, how large a proportion of them will catch even a glimpse of our meaning on the most familiar topics we discuss? To perceive another's sense, or sense in another's words, we must have some little sense of our own; —a melancholy fact, and which will delay some weeks the complete success of our excellent societies for the Universal Diffusion of Knowledge.

There is no wisdom in sneering at him who truly studies words. Words, even the idlest, are signs, and signs of things, realities, which things, realities, are to be come at only through the signs. The term *God* and the adjective *good*, are one and the same word; and from this we learn that our Anglo-Saxon ancestors called by one and the same name, the supreme being, and that which it is proper to be, to desire, to do, or to possess. Therefore, say our wise modern philosophers, our Anglo-Saxon ancestors believed that the supreme being is good; thus proving that Balaam's ass, or rather that Balaam himself, yet liveth and speaketh. Say, rather, therefore, they believed and incorporated into

their every-day speech, the great truth, the foundation and spring of all heroism, that nothing is proper to be sought after, to be done, or possessed, which is not Godlike, or divine. They found not God in good; but good in God. What shall I be? A *God*-man, God-like. What shall I do? That which is God-like. What shall I prize? A God-ly soul. They did not conceive of Good, independent of God,—make that conception the standard, and bring God to it, as before a tribunal, to ascertain whether he conformed to it, or not; but they regarded God himself as the standard, and whatever conformed to him, they called *good*, and said, That be, do, possess, live for, die for,—nothing else is worth a wish, or a thought.

We note in Carlyle, with great pleasure, an unceasing effort to make his readers remark the significance, the wonderfulness of what is ordinary and familiar. To him the thaumaturgic WORD sounds out from all, from the least as well as from the greatest; and the Infinite is spoken by the grain of sand, as well as by Andes or Himaleh. Even silence is eloquent to him, and the dumb are not mute. He has a truly genial and loving soul,—a ready sympathy with and for all in God's universe. There is at times something startling and fearful in this universal sympathy, and the unexpected analogies it enables him to discover and disclose. All nature becomes sacred; the universe a temple; each living thing, each thought, each feeling a shrine; We stand on holy ground; we fall down and worship; we are filled with awe; we hold our breath; we feel that we are in the very Sanctum, the very PRESENCE of the Infinite God.

But it is not our intention to enter into any inquiry concerning the general or particular merits, characteristics, or peculiarities of Mr. Carlyle. He is no stranger to the American public. This much, however, we may say, that he is almost the only contemporary English writer of much note, whose writings give us any signs of vitality, or that promise to leave any trace on his age or country. Your Wordsworths, Talfourds, Wilsons, Bronghams, Macauleys, Bulwers, and the like—*ernst ist das Leben*, we have no time to waste. Bulwer, we are told, has given up romancing, and betaken himself to serious study; we hope that he will yet do somewhat that will survive, by a few years, the natural term of his pilgrimage. Carlyle, with all his faults, is the only *live* Englishman it is our good fortune to know; and he, though alive, we are sorry to see, like all his countrymen, is *ailing*.

Yet most thankful are we, that in these days of Cant and Humbug, Puseyism and Chartism, Communisms and Manchester Strikes, there is even one Englishman, who though ailing is not dead nor dying. God's blessing on him! May he soon be restored to perfect health, and it be long before he needs his Viaticum!

The book before us is a remarkable, but a melancholy production; it is the wail of a true manly heart, over the misery and wretchedness he sees everywhere around, and from which he himself is not exempt. No man sees more clearly the comic, or feels more keenly the tragic there is in our age, especially our English and American portion of it; yet no one views with a truer or more loving spirit the universal wrongs and sufferings of our Saxon race. He is sadly, nay, at times terribly in earnest; but his voice loses never its melody in becoming indignant; his heart is grieved, and his soul is sick, and his whole being laments over the miseries, the meannesses, the cants, the emptinesses, the quackeries, of the evil times on which we have fallen; but he laments in sorrow not in wrath,—in anguish of spirit, but not altogether without hope. In his very severity, in his most scorching rebukes, he is mild, tolerant, loving to all that *is;* intolerant only to sham, mere make-believe, vacuity, Nothing pretending to be Something. We like his earnestness, and also the cheerfulness, so to speak, which he maintains even in his profoundest sorrow.

We cannot undertake to give any thing approaching an analysis of the very remarkable book before us, decidedly the best Carlyle has yet given us. It is unlike any thing else ever written by any other man, and no critical review can give the reader not acquainted with the general character of Mr. Carlyle's writings, the least conception of it. It has a purpose, or rather many purposes,—a general bearing, and many special and particular bearings; but these are not to be summed up and given in a line; they come out from the book as a whole, and can be gathered only by a close and attentive, we may say, a frequent reading of the whole book. The great aim of the writer is not to teach one lesson, but many lessons; and these not so much by formal statements, as by presenting the various topics on which he touches, in such light, or rather lights, as shall compel the reader to see and feel their significance, and draw his own moral.

Mr. Carlyle divides his work into four books; the first

he entitles Proem; the second, The Ancient Monk; the third, The Modern Worker; the fourth, Horoscope. The work properly presents us, though in a strange, fitful, indirect, striking, not always satisfactory light, society as it was under feudalism and the Catholic church; society as it now is under the Protestant and industrial order; with some glances at what it should and must become if it is to be at all. What was yesterday? What is to-day? What do you propose for to-morrow? You are not where you were; you cannot remain where you are; whither are you tending? How will you arrive *there?* These are great questions, on which we shall do well to linger awhile.

The book opens with a chapter headed Midas, in which we have a sketch of the present state of life in England, not as tourists may represent it, but as it actually is. We extract the greater part:

"England is full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want in every kind; yet England is dying of inanition. With unabated bounty the land of England blooms and grows; waving with yellow harvests; thick-studded with workshops, industrial implements, with fifteen millions of workers, understood to be the strongest, the cunningest and the willingest our earth ever had; these men are here; the work they have done, the fruit they have realized is here, abundant, exuberant on every hand of us: and behold, some baneful fiat as of enchantment has gone forth, saying, 'Touch it not, ye workers, ye master-workers, ye master-idlers; none of you can touch it, no man of you shall be the better for it: this is enchanted fruit!' On the poor workers such fiat falls first, in its rudest shape; but on the rich master-workers too it falls; neither can the rich master-idlers, nor any richest or highest man escape, but all are like to be brought low with it, and made 'poor' enough, in the money-sense or a far fataller one.

"Of these successful skilful workers, some two millions, it is now counted, sit in Workhouses, Poor-law Prisons; or have 'out-door relief' flung over the wall to them—the workhouse Bastille being filled to bursting, and the strong Poor-law broken asunder by a stronger. They sit there, these many months now; their hope of deliverance as yet small. In workhouses, pleasantly so named, because work cannot be done in them. *Twelve hundred thousand* workers in England alone; their cunning right-hand lamed, lying idle in their sorrowful bosom; their hopes, outlooks, share of this fair world, shut in by narrow walls. They sit there, pent up, as in a kind of horrid enchantment; glad to be imprisoned and enchanted, that they may not perish starved. The picturesque Tourist, in a sunny autumn day, through this bounteous realm of England, descries the Union Workhouse on his path. 'Passing by the Workhouse of St. Ives in Huntingdonshire, on a bright day last

autumn,' says the picturesque tourist, 'I saw sitting on wooden benches, in front of their Bastille and within their ring-wall, and its railings, some half hundred or more of these men. Tall, robust figures, young mostly or of middle age ; of honest countenance, many of them thoughtful and even intelligent looking men. They sat there, near by one another ; but in a kind of torpor, especially in a silence, which was very striking. In silence : for, alas, what word was to be said ? An earth all lying round, crying, Come and till me, come and reap me ;—yet we here sit enchanted ! In the eyes and brows of these men hung the gloomiest expression, not of anger, but of grief and shame and manifold inarticulate distress and weariness ; they returned my glance with a glance that seemed to say, "Do not look at us. We sit enchanted here, we know not why. The sun shines and the earth calls ; and by the governing powers and impotences of this England we are forbidden to obey. It is impossible, they tell us !" There was something that reminded me of Dante's Hell in the look of all this ; and I rode swiftly away.'

"So many hundred thousands sit in workhouses, and other hundred thousands have not yet got even workhouses ; and in thrifty Scotland itself, in Glasgow or Edinburgh City, in their dark lanes, hidden from all but the eye of God, and of rare benevolence the minister of God, there are scenes of woe and destitution and desolation, such as one may hope the sun never saw before in the most barbarous regions where men dwelt. . . . . Descend where you will into town or country, by what avenue you will, the same sorrowful result discloses itself ; you have to admit that the working body of this *rich* English nation has sunk or is fast sinking into a state to which, all sides of it considered, there was literally never any parallel. At Stockport assizes a mother and father are arraigned and found guilty of poisoning three of their children, to defraud a 'burial society' of some 3*l.* 8*s.* due on the death of each child ; they are arraigned, found guilty, and the official authorities, it is whispered, hint that perhaps *the case is not solitary, that perhaps you had better not probe further into that department of things.* 'Brutal savages, degraded Irish !' mutters the idle reader of newspapers, barely lingering on this incident. Yet it is an incident worth lingering on ; the depravity, savagery and degraded Irishism, being never so well admitted. In the British land, a human mother and father, of white skin, and professing the Christian religion, had done this thing ; they, with their Irishism and necessity and savagery, had been driven to do it. Such instances are like the highest mountain apex emerged into view, under which lies *a whole mountain region and land, not yet emerged.* A human mother and father had said to themselves, What shall we do to escape starvation ? We are deep sunk here, in our dark cellar, and help is far. Yes, in the Ugolino hunger-tower stern things happen ; best-loved little Gaddo fallen dead on his father's knees ! The Stockport mother and father think and hint : Our poor little starveling Tom, who cries all day for victuals, who will see only evil, and not good in this world ; if he were out of

misery at once; he well dead, and the rest of us perhaps kept alive? It is thought and hinted, at last it is done. And now Tom being killed, and all spent and eaten, is it poor little starveling Jack that must go, or poor little starveling Will? What an inquiry of ways and means!"—pp. 1–4.

These individual instances show to those who will think, the abject misery and wretchedness to which the working population of England is reduced. What poverty! and this too in England, the richest nation on earth, perhaps the richest the world ever saw; and in England now, richer, with a greater abundance of supply for every want than at any former period! Think of this, linger long, oh, reader, and thoughtfully on this, for it is full of instruction.

"Nor are they," continues Mr. Carlyle, "of the St. Ives workhouses, of the Glasgow lanes, and Stockport cellars, the only unblessed among us. This successful industry of England, with its plethoric wealth, has as yet made nobody rich; it is an enchanted wealth, and belongs yet to nobody. We might ask, which of us has it enriched? We can spend thousands where we once spent hundreds, but can purchase nothing good with them. In poor and rich, instead of noble thrift and plenty, there is idle luxury alternating with mean scarcity and inability. We have sumptuous garnitures for our life, but have forgotten to *live* in the middle of them. It is an enchanted wealth; no man as yet can touch it. The class of men who feel that they are truly better off by means of it, let them give us their name!

"Many men eat finer cookery and drink dearer liquors—with what advantage, they can report, and their doctors can; but in the heart of them, if we go out of the dyspeptic stomach, what increase of blessedness is there? Are they better, beautifuller, stronger, braver? Are they even what they call happier? Do they look with satisfaction on more things and human faces, in this God's earth; do more things and human faces look with satisfaction on them? Not so. Human faces gloom discordantly, disloyally on one another. Things, if it be not mere cotton and iron things, are growing disobedient to man. The master worker is enchanted, for the present, like his workhouse workman; clamors, in vain hitherto, for a very simple sort of 'liberty': the liberty 'to buy where he finds it cheapest, to sell where he finds it dearest.' With guineas jingling in every pocket, he was no whit richer; but now, the very guineas threatening to vanish, he feels that he is poor indeed. Poor Master Worker! And the Master Unworker, is not he in a still fataller situation? Pausing amid his game-preserves with awful eye,—as he well may! Coercing fifty-pound tenants; coercing, bribing, cajoling; doing what he likes with his own. His mouth full of loud futilities, and arguments to prove the excellence of his corn-law; and in his heart the blackest misgivings, a desperate half-consciousness that his excellent

corn-law is *in*defensible, that his loud arguments for it are of a kind to strike men too literally *dumb*.

"To whom then is the wealth of England wealth? Who is it that it blesses; makes happier, wiser, beautifuller, in any way better? Who has got hold of it, to make it fetch and carry for him, like a true servant, not like a false mock-servant; to do him any real service whatsoever? As yet no one. We have more riches than any nation ever had before; we have less good of them than any nation ever had before. Our successful industry is hitherto unsuccessful; a strange success, if we stop here! In the midst of plethoric plenty, the people perish; with gold walls, and full barns, no man feels himself safe or satisfied. Workers, Master Workers, Unworkers, all men come to a pause; stand fixed, and cannot farther. Fatal paralysis spreading inwards, from the extremities, in St. Ives workhouses, in Stockport cellars, through all limbs, as if towards the heart itself. Have we actually got enchanted, then; accursed by some God?

"Midas longed for gold, and insulted the Olympians. He got gold, so that whatsoever he touched became gold, and he, with his long ears, was little the better for it. Midas had misjudged the *celestial music-tones;* Midas had insulted Apollo and the gods: the gods gave him his wish, and a pair of long ears, which also were a good appendage to it. What a truth in these old fables!"—p. 5–6.

"*We have more riches than any nation ever had before; we have less good from them than any nation ever had before.*" England, with fifteen millions of workers, with machinery increasing man's productive power many thousand fold, making cotton at twopence an ell, and yet some five millions of her population sustained just above the starving point, and not always *above* it! What a theme for reflection here! Has the productive power of this God's rich and glorious earth become exhausted? Is there not yet room on its broad and inviting surface for many millions more of workers; are there not yet immense tracts waiting to be tilled; immense treasures yet to be dug from its fertile soil? Whence comes then this strange anomaly, that men with cunning brains, well-made bodies, strong and active limbs, can find no work to do, whereby even the simplest means of subsistence may be obtained? Here lies the question. The tendency is throughout all Christendom to bring us to the point not only where no small portion of the population can obtain the lowest wages for work done, but where they can obtain no work to do. Already in England has it come to this. Millions say, "Let us work,—for the love of God let us work, and give us in return the humblest fare

and the scantiest clothing, so we do but keep the life in us, and we will be forever grateful."

Vain prayer! "Ye naked, starving, begging workers, there is no work for you; ye have already worked too much; ye have already produced more than we can find markets for; ye are suffering from over-production."

"*Over-production.* Just Heaven, what meaneth this? We have made too many shirts to have a shirt to our back; grown too much corn to be allowed to have a loaf to keep the breath in the bodies of our wives and little ones! *Over-production*, is it? Ha, ha, warehouses and corn-ricks can burn! Torches, torches there! We will soon put an end to this over-production."

So will, and may, and do, we had almost said, *should*, desperate men, forced to the starving point, reply to the taunt of over-production. These million workers, in the Manchester insurrection, last summer, striking work, standing mute, looking gloomily, are significant of much, and may tell Master Workers and Master Unworkers, that the mute will ere long find a tongue, and the dumb will speak, and through harsh brazen throats, startling them from their soft beds, to behold factory and palace sending up their red light on the midnight sky; ay, and it may be, to behold royal and noble blood flowing once and again on the *Place de Grêve*. Millions of hands striking work, because no work is to be had whereby men can keep the breath in them, will soon find work, and that of the direfullest sort. It is not we that say it, it is all history that says it, it is the human heart that says it. Master Workers and Master Unworkers, look to it, that ye press not the masses beyond the bearable point. Poor humanity will bear much, go for long ages with sorrowful eye and haggard face, bent to the earth; patient as the dull ox; but there is a point where, if submission does not cease to be a virtue, it at least ceases to be a possibility; and nothing remains but for her to draw herself up and turn upon the tyrant and battle it out. Better die struggling for freedom, for life, than to die timid, crouching slaves, to be buried in graves of our own digging.

We understand,—we believe nothing of this modern doctrine of the *legal* right of revolution; nor do we believe that violent revolutions are the best method of working out social reforms, and advancing humanity in freedom, religion, morality, well-being. In all countries where there is any thing like established order, or where there is a governing body that

admits but the slightest element of progress, and under which men *can* live ; more especially in a country like ours, where there is a constitutional order in full force, which, if not perfect, yet contains in itself the elements of progress ; we can countenance no measures of reform not allowed, not sanctioned by that order itself. But in this world there are specialties, and each of these specialties must always be decided on its own merits. In this country, as we have said over and over again for years, touching political organisms, we must be conservative, and study to preserve the order established by the wisdom of our fathers, aided by a beneficent and ever watchful Providence ; because it is only by so doing that we can work out that higher order of civilization for mankind, which it is our mission to work out. But they know little of the spirit that burns in us, of the deep indignation we feel towards all who wrong or neglect their fellow men, and ride rough-shod over their brethren, who fancy that we hold or teach doctrines of tame, unqualified submission. While there is the least chink through which can reach us one, even the faintest, gleam of hope, we will submit and work on ; but when the last gleam expires, when nothing remains but blackness and total extinction, we parley no more ; we cease to discuss, to plead ; we seize the brand and turn on the tyrant, and DIE shall he or we. It is an awful thing to see brother hewing and hacking the flesh of brother, and strewing the ground with the limbs and trunks of precious human beings ; but it is more awful to see a whole nation of workingmen bound hand and foot, dying starved, while there is bread enough and to spare ; a thousand times more awful in time of peace and plenty, to see poor human mothers driven to devour the flesh of their own offspring, of the dear ones who have drawn life from their own breasts !

But we must pass not too lightly over this subject. Can there be a more sorrowful sight, can there be a stronger condemnation of an order of things, than this simple fact of men, able-bodied men, with rational souls and cunning right hands, willing, begging to work, and yet finding no work to do whereby they can get their victuals ? Certainly not, say all men with one voice. Well, then, friends and countrymen, is it only in England that we stumble on this fact? What, we ask, are we coming to in this country, here where there are so many millions of acres of rich, fertile lands, waiting to be tilled? We have not yet come, it may be, to

the Glasgow lanes and Stockport cellars, of which Carlyle speaks, but we *have* come very near to the St. Ives work-houses; but we have come to the point where there are many thousands of our people who can keep the life in them only as fed by the grudging hand of public or private charity. In 1829, it was reckoned that in Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, there were eighteen thousand females, sempstresses mostly, unable to obtain work for more than two-thirds of the time; and yet if getting work all the time, for sixteen hours a day, receiving therefor only about sixteen dollars a year with which to furnish fuel, food and clothing; many of these wives with sick or disabled husbands; many of them widows with two, three and four small children to support. So said the benevolent Matthew Carey. The matter must be worse now. In this wealthy, charitable, industrious, Christian city of Boston, where we now write, we have come, the last winter, to our bread and soup societies! Bread and soup societies for the poor, already in this blessed land of America, free, democratic America, and in the very heart of thrifty, religious New England! So alas! have we managed it. We may wince at the statement; may offer all manner of explanations of it, such as influx of foreigners, stagnation of trade, want of confidence, John Tyler administrations; but there stands the fact, in open, broad daylight, that able-bodied men and women, ready and willing to work for their food, nay, coming to you, and with tears in their eyes, begging you to give them work, have been kept through the long winter just above the starving point,—and we fear in all cases not above,—only by soup and bread dealt out by charitable societies in tin porringers. Just before the breaking out of the French revolution, some poor peasants came to the court, and asked for bread and got—a new gallows; which shows how it fares with the people under the monarchical method of governing. St. Ives work-houses, Glasgow lanes, Stockport cellars, and the present condition of Ireland, where, out of a population of eight millions, one-third are reduced to feed on third-rate potatoes, these scantily obtained, and failing altogether for nearly a third of the year, show how they manage matters under an aristocracy. Soup and bread societies for men and women able and willing to work, in Boston and other cities, show to what a pass things may come under the virtuous and intelligent rule of the democ-

racy ; which, considering the advantages with which we started, the vast quantities of fertile lands still lying waste, and our youth, vigor, and elasticity, is pretty well, and may be thought to prove that, if we have not as yet come up with kings and nobilities, we are in a fair way of overtaking them, and, if it were possible, of even going beyond them.

Here we are, then, in our own country, in the most favored part of it, renowned the world over for its industry, and thrift, frugality and economy, and wise management, come to such a pass that a portion—we will hope as yet not a large portion—of our population can get no work, no opportunity whereby to eat their bread in the sweat of their face. The fact is undeniable. It cannot be glossed over. It is here. We can lay our hands on it. These soup and bread societies are no fiction. Alas! the necessity there was that they should be, is also no fiction. With our own eyes we have seen poor children gliding along the cold streets, thinly clad, with their tin cans to receive their modicum. We have set our own feet in the miserable dwellings of those who have been thus fed, and knelt down in prayer by the poor man dying of a fever brought on by anxiety and insufficient food.

The newspapers told us some time since of a well educated, respectable man, brought up before our police for stealing a parcel from a dry goods shop. On the trial, it came out that he was well nigh starved, could get no work, and had taken the desperate resolution of stealing in order to gain the *privilege* of being sent to the *House of Correction* so as not to die starved. To such straits had it come with him, that he regarded it as a favor to be sent to the House of Correction. A poor man, a worthy mechanic, in Philadelphia, this last winter, can find no work; comes to the magistrate and begs to be locked up in the cell of the City Prison; so that he may find the food which he knows no other method of procuring. One rejoices to know that the benevolent magistrate granted him his request.

Now, in all soberness, we ask, if a state of things in which such incidents can occur, do occur, however rare, is the best that we can have in this nineteenth century, in this blessed land of America, of universal suffrage, universal education, under the blessed light of the Gospel, dotted all over with industrial establishments, school-houses, and churches? Is this a God's world, or is it a devil's world? O, dear countrymen, say what you will, decidedly this is not a question for

England only; it is also a question for you. In God's name, in humanity's name, do not blink this question. Answer us, nay, not us, but your own hearts, if you are prepared, in the face of that sun which shines so gloriously on all, the lowly thatched cottage as well as on the lordly palace, to say that you solemnly believe that in the decrees of Providence, in the riches of infinite Love, and of infinite Grace, there was nothing better for us than these bread and soup societies, this begging to be locked up in jail, and stealing in order to be sent to the House of Correction, so that the life may be left in us?

We might go further, in proof of the sad state to which we are coming or have already come. We are told, on tolerable authority, that in this city of Boston, which we take it is the model-city of this country, there are some four thousand wretched prostitutes out of a population of about one hundred thousand. This fact is not only a lucid commentary on our morals, but also on the difficulty there is in getting a living by honest industry; since prostitution is resorted to in this and all other countries rarely through licentiousness, but chiefly, almost wholly, through poverty. We are also told by the agents of the police, who have the best means of knowing, that the principal supply of these victims to poverty and men's infamy, comes from the factories in the neighboring towns!—no uninteresting comment on the workings of the factory system, built up by our banks and high tariffs, and which the chiefs of our industry have taken, and are taking so much pains to fasten on the country!

But whence come these sad results? There must be somewhere a fatal vice in our social and industrial arrangements, or there would not, could not, be these evils to complain of. Never, till within these last few centuries, were men, able and willing to work, brought to the starving point in times of peace, and in the midst of plenty. "Gurth," says Carlyle, "born thrall of Cedric the Saxon, tended pigs in the wood, and did get some parings of the pork. The four-footed worker has already *got* all that the two-handed one is clamoring for. There is not a horse in all England, able and willing to work, but *has* due food and lodging; and goes about sleek-coated, satisfied in heart. Is this such a platitude of a world, that all working horses shall be well fed, and innumerable working men and women die starved?" We do not believe it; we will, thank Heaven! believe no such thing. Whence, where, and what, then, is the funda-

mental vice of our modern society, especially in this our Saxon portion of it?

On this question Mr. Carlyle's book throws some light, though, it must be owned, often of the fitful and uncertain sort. In general, and in rather vague terms, it may be answered that this vice is in the fact that men have substituted the worship of Mammon for the worship of God. Mammonism has become the religion of Saxondom, and God is not in all our thoughts. We have lost our faith in the noble, the beautiful, the just; we have lost our faith in the Highest, and have come to believe in and to worship the lowest, even Mammon,—

> "Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell
> From heaven; for even in heaven his looks and thoughts
> Were always downward bent, admiring more
> The riches of heaven's pavement, trodden gold,
> Than aught divine or holy else enjoy'd
> In beatific vision."

The demonstration of this fact, and a full and impartial description of the worship of Mammon, would be a service of no mean worth to our countrymen; but who shall undertake to perform it? The other day we chanced to drop a word which was misconstrued into a growing distrust of liberty, and voices in all parts of the country were loud and harsh in condemnation; should we now but *exercise* the liberty of telling our countrymen the simple truth, and of directing their attention to the error, the original sin whence has sprung the present disordered state of society, there would be no end to the berating we should receive from these same loud and harsh voices,—ready always to cry lustily for liberty, but most ready to condemn all who are really her efficient friends and servants. We boast, in this blessed land of Washington and Jefferson, of our freedom; we are free, ay, free as the winds that drive through our valleys or sweep over our broad plains and inland oceans,—to echo the public voice, to have no opinion of our own, and to say only what everybody believes or nobody takes the trouble to disbelieve. We knew, once upon a time, a young man, brought up in the wild freedom lingering yet in some few of our mountain homes; an earnest, simple spirit, who had the strange fancy when he came to dwell in cities and in the midst of civilisation, that he should be sincere, transparent, and speak out always, when speaking at all, the simple,

naked truth, without any circumlocution or reticence, as he found himself commanded by the Highest, and as all public Teachers and Able Editors exhorted him and all men to do. Foolish youth from the mountains! It was never intended by these Lights of their age, that thou shouldst *exercise* freedom of thought and freedom of speech, but merely that thou shouldst, in high-sounding and well-turned periods, laud freedom of thought and freedom of speech, and tell thy admiring countrymen what fine things, beautiful things they are. Poor young man! We own that, with all thy folly, we loved thee. Thou hadst a noble heart, a brave spirit, and we confess that we have watered with our tears the turf on thy early grave. But notwithstanding our inward admiration of thy free and generous nature, we have finally resolved to take warning by thy melancholy fate, and to be like our countrymen generally,—wise and prudent. Humbly do we beg pardon for having said in our folly, that what the demagogues tell them about their intelligence and virtue is all a humbug. It was an unwise, an imprudent word. We will no more repeat it. We will henceforth be silent, merely pointing, in our good city of Boston, to soup and bread societies for able-bodied men and women, ready, willing, begging to work, who yet can get no work to do; to four thousand victims of man's infamy, the number kept good by a surplus factory population; to the honest, intelligent, even well-educated man, driven to steal, in order to gain the, to him, inestimable favor of being sent to the House of Correction. Dear friends, most wise and virtuous demagogues, all you say of the dear people, of their intelligence and virtue, is, no doubt, very true, very sweet—for you have sweet breaths—and may we never be again left to question your veracity; but these four thousand——, these soup and bread societies, this privilege of being sent to the House of Correction, or of being locked up in a dungeon?

We have some thoughts on the origin of the evils we have touched upon, but which, were we to tell them all plainly, and honestly, and unreservedly, would, we fear, create such a hubbub and general confusion, that we should lose henceforth the power not only to be heard, but even to speak at all. There can be no question that within the last three hundred years there has been a most wonderful increase of industrial activity; of man's productive power; and of the aggregate wealth of the world. Great industries, so to speak, have within these three hundred years

sprung up, never before conceived of; man has literally made the winds his messengers, and flames of fire his ministers; all nature works for him; the mountains sink, and the valleys rise before him; the land and the ocean fling out their treasures to him; and time and space are annihilated by his science and skill. All this is unquestionable. On the other hand, equally unquestionable is it to him who has looked on the matter with clear vision, that in no three hundred years known to us, since men began to be born and to die on this planet, upon the whole, it has fared worse, for soul or for body, with the great mass of the laboring population. Our advance, it would seem, has been that ordered by the militia captain, an "advance backwards!" This statement may or may not make sad work with our theories of progress of the race, progress of light, of political and social well-being, and all that: but it is a fact, an undeniable, a most mournful fact, which get over we cannot, try we never so hard.

For these last three hundred years we have lost or been losing our faith in God, in heaven, in love, in justice, in eternity, and been acquiring faith only in human philosophies, in mere theories concerning supply and demand, wealth of nations, self-supporting, labor-saving governments; needing no virtue, wisdom, love, sacrifice, or heroism on the part of their managers; working out for us a new Eden, converting all the earth into an Eldorado land, and enabling us all to live in Eden Regained. We have left behind us the living faith of the earlier ages; we have abandoned our old notions of heaven and hell; and have come, as Carlyle well has it, to place our heaven in success in money matters, and to find the infinite terror which men call hell, only in not succeeding in making money. We have thus come—where we are. Here is a fact worth meditating.

We boast of our light; we denounce old feudalism and the middle ages, and fancy it worth a *Te Deum* that we have got rid of them; and yet, the impartial and clear-sighted historian being asked, what period he lingers on, when, all things considered, it proved best with the great mass of the European population, answers, without hesitation, the period when feudalism and the church were in their greatest glory; that is, from the tenth to the end of the fourteenth century. Compare the condition of what Carlyle calls the "workers" of England, the land of our

ancestors, during that period, with the condition of the corresponding class at present, and one is almost struck dumb by the contrast. Cotton, as Carlyle says, is cheaper, but it is harder to get a shirt to one's back. Cotton is produced at two pence an ell, and shirts lie piled up in warehouses, and men go about with bare backs. For food, even Gurth born thrall of Cedric, did get some parings of the pork; the poor mother and father of the Stockport cellar, alas! none. For spiritual food, the poorest had faith and were instructed at least in the elements of the Christian religion; inquiries recently made into the condition of the population employed in the English collieries, show that human beings do grow up in the nineteenth century, in rich, ay, and *Christian* England, who know not even the name of their Maker, save by hearing it desecrated; and all accounts agree that the morals of the colliers are superior to the morals of the factory operatives. In the highest departments of thought and genius, the contrast is hardly less striking; our most advanced philosophers were anticipated; we are scarcely able even to copy the Gothic church, the last word of Christian architecture; and Dante has in poetry no rival, unless it be Shakspeare.

During these and the preceding four hundred years, more work was done for humanity, under an intellectual and social point of view, than was ever done, in a like period, since history began. A writer, not to be suspected of undue partiality, in touching upon this period and upon the action of the church, is forced to say, "During the greater part of that period, by means of her superior intelligence and virtue, she—the church—ruled the state, modified its actions, and compelled its administrators to consult the rights of man, by protecting the poor, the feeble, and the defenceless. It is not easy to estimate the astonishing progress she effected for civilisation during that long period called by narrow-minded and bigoted Protestant historians, the dark ages. Never before had such labors been performed for humanity. Never before had there been such an immense body, as the Christian clergy, animated by a common spirit, and directed by a common will and intelligence to the culture of the moral virtues and the arts of peace. Then was tamed the wild barbarian, and the savage heart made to yield to the humanizing influences of tenderness, gentleness, meekness, humility, and love; then imperial crown and royal sceptre paled before the crosier; and

the representative of him who lived, and toiled, and preached, and suffered, and died in obscurity, in poverty and disgrace, was exalted and made himself felt in the palace and in the cottage, in the court and in the camp, striking terror into the rich and noble, and pouring the oil and wine of consolation into the bruised heart of the poor and friendless. Wrong, wrong have they been, who have complained that kings and emperors were subjected to the spiritual head of Christendom. It was well for man that there was a power above the brutal tyrants called emperors, kings, and barons, who rode rough-shod over the humble peasant and artisan,—well that there was a power, even on earth, that could touch their cold and atheistic hearts, and make them tremble as the veriest slave. The heart of humanity leaps with joy, when a murderous Henry is scourged at the tomb of Thomas á Becket, or when another Henry waits barefoot, shivering with cold and hunger, for days, at the door of the Vatican, or when a Pope grinds his foot into the neck of a prostrate Frederick Barbarossa. Aristocratic Protestantism, which has never dared enforce its discipline on royalty and nobility, may weep over the exercise of such power, but it is to the existence and exercise of that power that the *People* owe *their* existence, and the doctrine of man's equality with man, its progress." *

The writer here quoted, is hardly just to the feudal aristocracy. The old feudal lords and barons were not a mere dilettante aristocracy, a mere unworking aristocracy, consuming without doing aught for the general work of production. They were, in fact, then a working aristocracy, and did work in their rude way, and contrived to do no little work of the governing sort; for which the governed did fare the better. In matters of fighting they did the hardest, and bore the first and heaviest blows. It was their special right, not to lead only, but to do the work of killing and of being killed. They did in some sense, in return for what they received, yield a protection to the people, and take some kind of care of them. If the serf, before serfage was abolished, labored for his lord, the lord owed him a reciprocal obligation, and must see that he had wherewithal to eat and to be clothed. If fixed to the soil, the serf had a right to his support from it. These old barons, moreover, did not entirely neglect the commons in contending for the

*Ante. p. 67.

interest of their own order, as we may learn by consulting Magna Charta. The service they rendered to society, was no doubt an inadequate return for what they received; but nevertheless it was some return, and the castle of the Lord, *law-ward*, according to Carlyle, was a tower of strength not only to its owner, but also to the hamlet lying under its walls; and the proud dame, my Lady, *Loaf-distributor*, was not seldom a gentle benefactress to the humble, confiding, and grateful peasants. If it was a privilege to be high-born, so was it a privilege to have the high-born among us.

On this part of the subject, Mr. Carlyle's book may be consulted with considerable advantage. He has not said all he might, nor all that we wish he had. He has given us a very pleasant glimpse of one aspect of life in the middle ages, that represented by the Ancient Monk; but we wish it had comported with his plan to have given us a clearer insight into the condition of the rural population, the cultivators of the soil, the thralls, sockmen, farmers, peasants, and their relation to their landlords, masters, or owners. We confess that on this subject we are not so well informed as we would be. It is a great and interesting subject, but from the glimpses we catch now and then of it, we are fully convinced that the relation between the two classes which then subsisted, was decidedly preferable to that which now is; even your modern slaveholder is obliged to recognize a relation between him and his slave of a more generous and touching nature than any recognized by the master-worker between himself and his workman. The slave when old or sick must be protected, provided for, whether the owner receives any profit from him or not; the master-worker has discharged all the obligation to his operative he acknowledges when he has paid him the stipulated wages. These wages may be insufficient for mere human subsistence, and the poor worker must die; but what is that to the master-worker? Has he not paid all he agreed to pay, even to the last farthing, promptly? We have not heard on our southern plantations, of Stockport cellars, of bread and soup societies by the charitable, and men stealing in order to be sent to the House of Correction so as not to starve. This much we can say of the slave, that if he will tend pigs in the wood, he shall have some parings of the pork, and so long as his master has full barns he is not likely to starve; would we could say as much of the hired laborer always!

But the chief thing we admire in the middle ages, is that

men did then believe in God, they did believe in some kind of justice, and admit that man, in order to reap, must in some way aid the sowing; that man did, whatever his condition, owe some kind of duty to his fellow man; and admit it, not merely in theory, in caucus speeches, or in loud windy professions, but seriously in his heart and his practice. But we have changed all that, we have called the religion of the middle ages superstition, the philosophy which then was cultivated, miserable jargon, and the governing which then went on, tyranny and oppression. We have learned to blush at the page of history which speaks of Hildebrand, and St. Anselm, and the enfranchisement of the communes, and would if we could blot it out. It is a reproach to a man in these times and in this country to name it without execrating it. The age which covered Europe over with its Gothic churches, and with foundations and hospitals for the poor, produced St. Anselm, Abelard, St. Bernard, and Dante, Chaucer, old John of Gaunt, and Magna Charta. De Montfort, William Longbeard, Philip Van Arteveld, Roger Bacon, Albert Magnus, John of Fidanza, Duns Scotus, and St. Thomas Aquinas, is a blank in human history! Thank God we have outgrown it, got rid of it. We are no longer superstitious; we have made away with the old monks whose maxim was "work is worship;" we have struck down the last of the barons; we are free; we have the Gospel of the cotton mill, *laissez-faire*, save who can, and the devil take the hindmost, and we can do what we please with our own. A notable change this, and worth considering. How was it brought about, and what has been the gain?

We cannot go fully into the inquiry this question opens up. The middle ages brought the human race forward not a little. What most strikes us is the moral and spiritual exaltation which everywhere meets us. Man, through the faith nurtured and strengthened in him by the church, became great, noble, chivalrous, energetic. This immense spiritual force accumulated in the interior of man during the four centuries named, overflows in the activity, bold adventure, vast enterprises, and important discoveries which commence in the fifteenth century. We note here four things resulting from it, which have especially contributed to the change of which we speak: the invention or rather general use of gunpowder; the revival of letters; the invention of printing; and the maritime discoveries in the East and the West. These are considered, we believe, the princi-

pal agents in effecting what we have been pleased to call the progress of modern society.

1. The art of war, as carried on prior to the introduction of fire-arms, which did not come into general use before the fifteenth century, was accessible for the most part only to the noble class and their retainers. It required so long a training, so great bodily strength and dexterity, and so much outlay in the equipments of the individual warrior, that artisans and peasants could make up but a small part, and never a very efficient part of an army. The chief reliance was, and necessarily, upon the nobility, the knights, and gentlemen. In this case the king was always more or less dependent on his nobles, and could rarely go to war without their assent and active aid. This restrained the royal power, and prevented the *centralization* of power in the hands of the monarch. The invention and general use of fire-arms lessened the importance of the cavalry, in which only the lords and gentlemen served, and increased that of the infantry, composed of commoners. The monarch was able to dispense then, to a certain extent, with the services of his nobility, and to find his support in the people, artisans and peasants, easily collected and speedily disciplined. By thus introducing the infantry into the royal armies, as the main reliable branch of the service, a rude shock was given to the power and independence of the nobles. From that moment the feudal nobility began to wane, and the power and independence of the monarch to increase.

The decrease of the power of the nobility served to weaken that of the church. The people naturally, with their instinctive wisdom, would cleave to the monarch, who employed them in his armies. They saw themselves now admitted to a share in an employment which had been previously, for the most part, the prerogative of their masters, and proud of being admitted to the high privilege of killing and being killed, they fancied that they were by this admission virtually enfranchised, and raised to an equality with those who had hitherto been their superiors. The rudest peasant, with a firelock in his hand, was more than a match for the bravest, strongest, best disciplined, and completely armed knight. Hence, all the tendencies of the people would be, in any contest, so far as possible, to support their royal masters. In the commons, then, royalty found its support against the nobility, and even against the church. At least, by admitting the common people into the royal armies,

royalty weakened, or to some extent neutralized their affection for the ecclesiastical power, which in any contest between it and the church was of vast importance.

2. The revival of letters, as it is called, that is, of the study and reverence of *heathen* literature, which followed the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, had also a powerful influence in bringing about the change we have noted. The church, during the middle ages, had paid great attention to education; it had covered Europe over with universities and schools. In the early part of the fifteenth century, education was almost as general throughout the principal states of Europe as it is now; the actual amount of instruction one is tempted to believe was greater, though perhaps a smaller number could read and write. The Bible had been translated into the vernacular language of Englishmen prior even to Wyckliffe, which would indicate that the Saxon population were able to read. There was, at any rate, a very general mental activity throughout Europe, as the relics of the popular ballads and literature of the time bear witness. The mind was prepared for the new literature which was then brought to light. The Greek scholars, with Greek subtlety and Greek sophistry, were dispersed, by the taking of Constantinople, over the principal Latin states; the study of the ancient heathen literature went with them, and the several schools of ancient Greek philosophy had their disciples and champions in the very bosom and among the high dignitaries of the church herself. Its obvious and unquestionable superiority, as to the perfection and beauty of its form, over the richer, profounder, more varied, and earnest, but less polished literature of the fathers and the church, secured it a ready adoption and an almost universal authority. In this fact we are to discover a powerful cause operating to destroy the power of the church and the order of civilization it had built up.

During the preceding centuries the nobles, being almost wholly occupied with governing, fighting, and doing their part, as they could, in the general affairs of society, had left literature almost entirely to the church. But, in the fifteenth century, in consequence of the change already noted in the art of war, their original occupation was to a considerable extent taken away, and they began to turn their attention towards letters. The schools and universities began to send out scholars from the lay commoners, and we had for the first time in Europe, since the establishment of the barba-

rians, an educated and literary laity. The surface of education had been greatly extended; and always in proportion as education extends laterally does it lose in depth. The diffusion of education among the laity had created an immense class of superficial thinkers, half-educated, always worse, more to be dreaded than those who have no education, as simplicity is always preferable to ignorance fancying itself wisdom. We had then just the state of mind necessary to welcome the heathen literature of which we speak. Its very superficialness, want of earnestness and strength, when compared with Christian literature, was a recommendation, and facilitated its reception.

The effect of this revived heathen literature, on the tone of thought, and its general bearings on Christian faith, are not always duly considered. The fathers of the church in the first five centuries had culled out from it all that Christianity would assimilate to itself, and made it an integral part of the common literary and philosophic life of the church. We had in the church all of heathen Greece and Rome that was worth retaining, or that could be retained in consistency with our faith as Christians. The human race then did not need the revival. No good could come of it; for nothing new, but exploded heathenism, was to be obtained from it. The revival was then in very deed a revival of heathenism. It was hostile to Christianity, and deeply prejudicial to the faith of Christians. And so history has proved it. We speak advisedly. We know very well the estimation in which the ancient classics are held, and that one may as well speak against the Bible as against them. But, what is this so much boasted classical literature? We admit the exquisiteness of its form; the perfection of the execution; we, too, have our admiration for the divine Plato; we love as well as others an Aristotle, and find much in the Greek tragedians that we love and admire; but we cannot forget that the whole body of ancient Greek and Roman literature is heathenish, wanting in true religious conception, in genuine love of man, in true, deep, living, Christian piety. Permit us to quote here, what we wrote on this subject some seven years ago, from another point of view, it is true, and with a far different aim, but still with substantially the same faith:

"By means of the classics, the scholars of the fifteenth century were introduced to a world altogether unlike, and much *superior* [perhaps not] to that in which they lived,—to an order of ideas wholly diverse

from those avowed or tolerated by the church. They were enchanted. They had found the ideal of their dreams. They became disgusted with the present, they repelled the civilization effected by the church, looked with contempt on its fathers, saints, martyrs, schoolmen, troubadours, knights, and minstrels, and sighed and yearned, and labored to reproduce Athens or Rome.

"And what was that Athens and that Rome which seemed to them to realize the very ideal of the perfect? We know very well to-day what they were. They were material; through the whole period of their historical existence, it is well known that the material or temporal order predominated over the spiritual. * * * Human interests, the interests of mankind in time and space predominate. Man is the most conspicuous figure in the group. He is everywhere, and his imprint is upon every thing. Industry flourishes; commerce is encouraged; the state is constituted and tends to democracy; citizens assemble to discuss their common interests; the orator harangues them; the aspirant courts them; the warrior and the statesman render them an account of their doings, and await their award. The *People*—not the gods—will, decree, make, unmake, or modify the laws. Divinity does not become incarnate, as in the Asiatic world; but men are deified. History is not theogony, but a record of human events and transactions. Poetry sings heroes, the great and renowned of earth, or chants at the festal board and at the couch of voluptuousness. Art models its creations after human forms, for human pleasure, or human convenience.

"There are gods and temples, and priests and oracles, and augurs and auguries, but they are not like those we meet where spiritualism reigns. The gods are all anthropomorphous. Their forms are the perfection of the human. The allegorical beasts, the strange beasts, compounded of parts of many known and unknown beasts, which meet us in Indian, Egyptian, and Persian mythology, as symbols of the gods, are extinct. Priests are not a caste, as under spiritualism, springing from the head of Brahma, and claiming superior sanctity and power as their birthright; but simple police officers. Religion is merely a function of the state. * * * Numa introduces or organizes polytheism at Rome, for the purpose of governing the people by means of appeals to their sentiment of the holy; and the Roman pontifex maximus was never more than a master of police.

"In classical antiquity religion is a function of the state. It is the same under Protestantism. Henry VIII., of England, declares himself supreme head of the church, not by virtue of his spiritual character, but by virtue of his character as a temporal prince. The Protestant princes of Germany are *protectors* of the church; and all over Europe there is an implied contract between the state and the ecclesiastical authorities. The state pledges itself to support the church, on condition that the church support the state. Ask the kings, nobility, or even church dignitaries, why they support religion,

and they will answer with one voice, 'Because the people cannot be kept in order, cannot be made to submit to their rulers, and because civil society cannot exist, without it.' The same, or a similar answer will be returned by almost every political man in this country: and truly may it be said, that religion is valued by the Protestant world as an auxiliary to the state, as a mere matter of police.

"Under the reign of spiritualism all questions are decided by authority. The church commanded, and men were to obey, or be counted rebels against God. Materialism, by raising up man and the state, makes the reason of man, or the reason of the state paramount to the commands of the church. Under Protestantism, the state in most cases, the individual reason in a few, imposes the creed on the church. The king and parliament of Great Britain determine the faith the clergy must profess and maintain; the Protestant princes in Germany have the supreme control of the symbols of the church, the right to enact what creed they please."*

The revival and general study of the classics, tended by their character to destroy the power of the church of the middle ages, to introduce an order of thought favorable to the supremacy of the civil over the ecclesiastical order, the effect of which is seen in the sudden growth of the monarchical or royal authority, which took place at the close of the fifteenth century, and the beginning of the sixteenth. The influence of this heathen literature, breaking the authority of the church, and the use of fire-arms superseding to some extent the co-operation of the old feudal nobility, combining, enabled the European potentates to shake off the authority of the church, and to establish themselves in their independence. The cause of Protestantism was eminently the cause of the kings, and under the social and political aspect,—the only aspect in which we now consider, or wish to consider the subject at all,—was the cause of the people, only so far as it was for their advantage, to lose the protection of the church, and the feudal noble, and to come under the unrestrained authority of the civil magistrate,—an authority which was not slow to degenerate into unbearable tyranny, as we see in the English revolution in the seventeenth century, and the French in the eighteenth. But fire-arms and classical literature succeeded, by bringing the laity into the literary class, and the commoners into the armies, in breaking down the authority of the church, destroying the old feudal nobility, and in establishing the independence of kings and the temporal governments, and not merely in what were called Protestant countries; for the

*Ante, pp. 17–20.

principle of Protestantism triumphed throughout Europe for a season, in the countries remaining Catholic in name, as well as in those that became avowedly Protestant. Francis I. and Charles V. would have done what did Henry VIII., the princes of the north of Germany, and Gustavus Adolphus, if they had not humbled the church, and for a time compelled the Holy See to succumb to their interests and wishes.

The independence of civil governments established, and the kings, freed from the dominion of the church and the checks of the old feudal barons, were not slow to adopt a purely worldly policy; and before the close of the fifteenth century, the policy now termed Machiavellian, was adopted and avowed by every court in Europe,—that is to say, a policy wholly detached from all moral and religious doctrines or principles. Machiavelli was born at Florence, of a noble family, in 1469, and, though often execrated, was a great and learned man, and by no means ignorant or destitute of morality. He was *the politician*, the statesman of his epoch, and may be consulted as the highest authority for the maxims on which rested the policy of the European courts at the period under consideration.

3. The invention of printing on movable types, we are far from thinking,—far, very far from wishing to intimate,—is not destined to effect the greatest good; but we are equally decided that, up to the present moment, it would be difficult to say whether it has been productive of the more good or evil. We will not so far dishonor ourselves as even to say that we are the friends of knowledge and universal enlightenment; we know no advocates of ignorance; we have no sympathy with those, if such there be, who would withhold education from any portion of the human race; but we repeat that we regard half-education as worse than no education. We are not ashamed to avow our agreement with Pope, that

> "A little learning is a dangerous thing
> Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring;
> There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
> But drinking deeply sobers us again."

The great mass of our American people can read and do read the newspapers, and many other things; and all of them fancy themselves competent to sit in judgment on all matters human and divine. They are equal to the pro-

foundest philosophical speculations, the loftiest theological dogmas, and the abstrusest political problems. Filled with a sense of their own wisdom and capacity for sound judgment, they lose all teachableness, and are really in a more deplorable state than if they made no pretensions to general intelligence. Unquestionably we must pass through this stage of superficial knowledge, which merely engenders pride, conceit self-will, before we can come to that of true enlightenment; and therefore we do not complain, but submit to the present evil, consoling ourselves with the hope of the glory hereafter to be revealed. Nevertheless, it is an evil, deny it who will.

Printing, by multiplying books and making the great mass of the people readers, serves to foster the spirit of individualism, which is only one form of supreme selfishness. He who has not the humility to learn, the meekness to obey, who feels that he has no superior, but that he is as good as you, will soon come to feel that he owes no duty but to himself; and that the true morality in his case is to take care of Number One. In this way the invention of printing, co-operating with the causes already mentioned, tended to destroy the church and nobility of the middle ages, to substitute pride, intractableness and egotism for the old spirit of submission and self-denial, and therefore aided on the change we have noted. Ignorance and self-sufficiency pervert Heaven's choicest blessings; and the Bible itself, thrown into the hands of the mass incompetent to its interpretation or right understanding, becomes, we are often obliged to own, a savor of death unto death, and generates endless sects and interminable strife, as fatal to the cause of piety as to individual and public happiness.

4. On the heels of all this, materialism in philosophy, virtually if not expressly, arrogant individualism in matters of faith, selfishness or a refined or even gross Epicureanism in morals, and the independence and centralization of the civil power in the hands of the absolute monarch, adopting and acting, as Cæsar Borgia and Ferdinand of Aragon, on a policy wholly detached from religion and morality, came the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, and of this Western Continent. Already had men's minds been drawn off from high spiritual subjects; already had they begun to be heathenized, and of the earth earthy; the church was reduced to be a tool of the state; the minister of religion shorn of his sacred authority and converted into

a police officer. The world was ripe for a new order of things; for entering into the career of industrial aggrandizement, the accumulation of treasures on earth, forgetful that moth and rust may corrupt and thieves break through and steal. The newly discovered worlds afforded the means both of increasing and of satisfying this tendency. A sudden change came over the whole industrial world; visions of untold wealth floated before all eyes; and men who would in the twelfth century have been content to lead lives of self-denial, and to labor as peaceful monks, seeking in their quiet retreats for the crown of God's approval, were crossing all oceans, penetrating into all forests, digging into all mountains, in pursuit of GOLD. The love of gold supplanted the love of God; and the professed followers of Christ no longer made pilgrimages to the Holy Land, but to the Gold Coast, to Florida, Mexico, and Peru, in pursuit not of the sacred relics of saints and martyrs, monuments consecrated by faith and love, but of the fabled Eldorado. Commerce took a new flight, and in a few years manufactures began to flourish, great industrial establishments to spring up; science and inventive genius came in—Manchester, Leeds, Lowell, —an immense operative population wanting shirts to their backs while shirts are lying idle, piled up in warehouses, and they starving in the midst of abundance!

We have here glanced at some of the causes which have operated to destroy the religious faith of the middle ages, to abolish the worship of God in Christian lands, and to introduce the worship of Mammon,—all-triumphant Mammon. Going along through the streets of Boston the other day, we remarked that it has become the fashion to convert the basement floors of our churches into retail shops of various kinds of merchandise. How significant! The church is made to rest on TRADE; Christ on Mammon. Was any thing ever more typical? The rents of these shops in some cases, we are told, pay the whole expense of the minister's salary. Poor minister! if thou shouldst but take it into thy head to rebuke Mammon, as thy duty bids thee, and to point out the selfishness and iniquity of the dominant spirit of trade, thy underpinning would slide from under thee, and thou wouldst——. But land is valuable; and why should it lie idle all days in the week but one, because a meeting-house stands on it? Ay, sure enough. O, blessed thrift, great art thou, and hast learned to coin thy God and to put him out at usury! But what hast thou gained? Thou art care-

worn and haggard, and with all thy economies, begrudging Heaven the small plat of ground for his temple,—Heaven who gives thee all, this whole earth, so much broader than thou canst cultivate, thou hast to provide bread and soup societies for the poor starving men and women, who would work, but can get no work.

Here we are, in Ireland, every third person reduced to live on third-rate potatoes, these scantily obtained, and for only thirty-six weeks in the year; in England and Scotland, with dark lanes, Stockport cellars, and St. Ives work-houses, Manchester insurrections, gloomy enough; in France, no great better, daily *émeutes*, kept down by sheer force of armed soldiery; and in this country, following rapidly on in the same way, godless and heartless, sneering at virtue, philanthropy, owning no relation of man to man but what Carlyle terms "cash payment." What is to be the upshot of all this? Dear countrymen, we have before to-day told you all this; but though you are wise, intelligent, virtuous—the freest, noblest, meekest, humblest people that ever breathed this blessed air of heaven, we see nothing that you are doing to guard against worse, or to remedy what is bad. We read the newspapers, the protecting genii and guardian angels of the land. We seize the leading editorials, and in the simplicity of our heart and the eagerness of our spirit ask, What cheer? Surely, with so many Able Editors, all toiling and sweating at the anvil, all devoted heart and soul to the public good, we must be safe, and the means of averting the calamity dreaded must be within our reach; the remedy must be found out and insisted on. Alas! brother editors, we love and honor you; but we must say, we see not as ye touch the problem, conceive of it even, far less propose a solution. Ye are all at work with details, with petty schemes, proposing nothing that comes up to the mark. Some of you talk of Home Industry; the wisest among you talk of Free Trade; none of you, as we hear, speak of God, and tell your readers that for a people who worship Mammon, there is no good. Nay, you must not speak of these matters; for if you do, who will advertise in your columns or subscribe for your papers? Nay, how many subscribers will our friend, the Editor of this Journal, lose by inserting this very Article? Are we not trenching at every moment on forbidden ground? Do we say one word that party leaders will not turn pale or look cross at? What political capital can be made out of what

we say? Alas! brother editors, do not think we intend to upbraid you. God knows our condition is not one to be envied. With the whole weight of the republic on our shoulders, and we, alas! none of the strongest in bone or muscle! God pity us! For to carry this huge republic, with its Mammon worships, and its Christian churches reared on traders' shops, and its party strifes, its rush for office, its forgetfulness of man's brotherhood to man, its morality of Let us alone, Save who can, and the devil take the hindmost; workers no longer finding work to do; master-workers counting their obligations to their workmen discharged in full when the stipulated wages are paid; it is no easy matter.

But, after all, what is the remedy? Let us not deceive ourselves. The whole head is sick, the whole heart is faint. Our industrial arrangements, the relations of master-workers, and workers, of capital and labor, which have grown up during these last three hundred years, are essentially vicious, and, as we have seen, are beginning throughout Christendom to prove themselves so. The great evil is not now in the tyranny or oppressions of governments as such; it is not in the arbitrary power of monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies; but it is in the heart of the people, and the industrial order. It is simply, under the industrial head, so far as concerns our material well-being, in this fact, this mournful fact, that there is no longer any certainty of the born worker obtaining always work whereby he can provide for the ordinary wants of a human being. Nor is this altogether the fault of the master-workers. To a very great extent, the immediate employer is himself in turn employed; and as all who produce, produce to sell, their means of employing, constantly and at reasonable wages, evidently depend on the state of the market; workmen must, therefore, with every depression of trade, be thrown out of employment, whatever the benevolence of the master-workers.

Nor is it possible, with the present organization, or rather *dis*organization of industry, to prevent these ruinous fluctuations of trade. They may undoubtedly be exaggerated by bad legislation, as they may be mitigated by wise and just administration of government, but prevented altogether they cannot be. For this plain reason, that more can be produced, in any given year, with the present productive power, than can be sold in any given five years,—we mean sold to the actual consumer. In other words, by our vicious

method of distributing the products of labor, we destroy the possibility of keeping up an equilibrium between production and consumption. We create a surplus—that is a surplus, not when we consider the wants of the people, but when we consider the state of the markets—and then must slacken our hands till the surplus is worked off. During this time, while we are working off the surplus, while the mills run short time, or stop altogether, the workmen must want employment. The evil is inherent in the system. We say it is inherent in the *system of wages*, of cash payments, which, as at present understood, the world has for the first time made any general experiment of only now, since the Protestant reformation.

Let us not be misinterpreted. We repeat not here the folly of some men about equality, and every man being in all things his own guide and master. This world is not so made. There must be in all branches of human activity, mental, social, industrial, chiefs and leaders. Rarely, if ever, does a man remain a workman at wages, who could succeed in managing an industrial establishment for himself. Here is our friend Mr. Smith, an excellent hatter, kind-hearted, charitable, and succeeds well; but of the fifty hands he employs, not one could take his place. Many of these journeymen of his have been in business for themselves, but failed. They are admirable workmen, but have not the capacity to direct, to manage, to carry on business. It is so the world over. There must be chiefs in religion, in politics, in industry; the few must lead, the many must follow. This is the order of nature; it is the ordinance of God; and it is worse than idle to contend against it. The great question concerns the mode of designating these chiefs, and the form of the relation which shall subsist between them and the rest of the community. Our present mode of designating them in the industrial world—in the political we manage it in this country somewhat better—is obviously defective, and the relation expressed by wages, in our modern sense of the term, is an undeniable failure. Under it there is no security, no permanency, no true prosperity, for either worker or master-worker; both hurry on to one common ruin.

This, we are well aware, will not be believed. We do not believe ourselves ill. We mistake the hectic flush on the cheek for the hue of health. "We have heard," say our readers, "this cry of ruin ever since we could remem-

ber, and yet we have gone on prospering, increasing in wealth, refinement, art, literature, science, and doubling our population every thirty years." Yes, and we shall continue to prosper in the same way. The present stagnation of trade will last not much longer; business will soon revive, nay, is reviving; and we shall feel that the evil day is too far off to be guarded against. We shall grow richer; we shall build up yet larger industries; the hammer will ring from morning till night—till far into the night; the clack of the cotton-mill will accompany the music of every water-fall; the whole land be covered by a vast network of rail-roads and canals; our ships will display their canvas upon every sea, and fill every port; our empire shall extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Northern Ocean to the Isthmus of Darien; we shall surpass England as much as ancient Carthage surpassed the mother Phœnicia; be the richest, the most renowned nation the world ever saw. All this, it needs no prophetic eye to foresee; prosperity of this sort we may have, shall have. It is not of outward, material ruin we speak. But what will avail all this outward prosperity,—our industries, our wealth, our arts, our luxuries, our boundless empire, our millions of people, if we contain in our midst a greater mass of corruption, of selfishness, of vice, of crime, of abject misery and wretchedness, than the world ever saw before? And yet, such will be our fate if we continue on in the path, nay, the broad road, in which we are now travelling.

But once more, we are asked, what is the remedy? Shall we go back to the middle ages, to feudalism and the old Catholic church? No, dear countrymen, no. This is no longer possible even if it were desirable. We have got fire-arms, heathen literature, printing, and the new world; with these it is not possible to reconstruct the middle ages. How often must we remind you that there is no going back? Who ever knew yesterday to return? From the bottom of our heart we believe these much decried middle ages were far preferable,—regarded as definitive,—to our own. What we have as yet obtained by departing from them,—unless we make it the stepping-stone to something more,—is far beneath them. The Israelites in the wilderness, we must needs believe were,—saving the hope of reaching the promised land,—worse off than in Egypt making bricks for their task-masters; but this promised land, flowing with milk and honey, lay *before* them, not behind them, and could be

reached not by returning to Egypt, but by pressing *onward through* the wilderness. We pray thee, gentle, or rather *un*gentle reader, not to misinterpret us, on this point, as thou art wont to do. No more than thou dost do we believe in the perfection of the middle ages, as much as we may admire them, and as much superior to the present as we certainly hold them. We would not bring them back if we could. They do not come up to our ideal of what is most desirable for the human race; nor to what is attainable even. They had many and heavy drawbacks. Out from under the veil of romance, which time and genius have woven for them, we see ever and anon the ghastly death's head peering. No wise man regrets their departure; no wise man labors to reproduce them; and herein the Schlegels and Oxford divines are not wise, and do but kick against the pricks. We grieve not that we can have these ages no more; that feudalism is gone, and the church of Gregory VII., that Napoleon of the ecclesiastical order, is gone, never to return; but we do grieve that in getting rid of them, we have supplied their place by nothing better; by nothing so good. In contrasting them with the present, we have wished to show our countrymen that they should not be contented with the present, nor despair of something better; for better once was and may be again; though not in the old form.

But if we would not reconstruct the old feudal and Catholic society, we would have what feudalism and mediæval Catholicity sought to realize; and to some extent, though in a rude and imperfect manner, it may be, *did* realize. We would have men *governed*, and well governed, let who will be the governors, or what form adopted there may be for selecting them. God's curse and humanity's curse also do and will rest on the no-government schemers. Satan himself was chief anarch, and all anarchs are his children. Men need government, nay, have a *right* to demand government, without which there is no life for them. We would also see revived in all its mediæval force and activity the Christian faith, and as the interpreter of that faith, the Christian church, one and indivisible; the ground and pillar of the truth; clothed with the authority which of right belongs to it; and enjoining and exercising a discipline on high and low, rich and poor, as effective as that of the middle ages, but modified to meet the new wants and relations of Christendom. There is no true *living* on this God's earth, for men who do

not believe in God, in Christ, in the ever present spirit of truth, justice, love; in the reality of the spiritual world; nor without the church of Christ, active and efficient, authoritative over faith and conscience, competent to instruct us in the mysteries of our destiny, and to direct us wisely and surely through the creation of a heaven here on earth, to a holier and higher heaven hereafter. We must revoke the divorce unwisely and wickedly decreed between politics and religion and morality. It must not be accounted a superfluity in the politician to have a conscience; nor an impertinence to speak and to act as if he believed in the eternal God, and feared the retributions of the unseen world; nor inconsistent with the acknowledged duties of the minister of religion, to withhold absolution from the base politician, the foul wretch, whatever his private morals, who will in public life betray his country, or support an unjust policy through plea of utility or mere expediency. It must not always be in vain that a public measure is shown to be unjust in order to secure its defeat, or just, in order to secure its adoption. Nations must be made to feel that there is a Higher than they, and that they may lawfully do only what the Sovereign of sovereigns commands. Right must be carried into the cabinet councils of ministers, into legislative halls, into the bureaus of business, and preside at the tribunals of justice; men must be made to feel deep in their inmost being, whether in public life or in private life, that they are watched by the all-seeing Eye, and that it is better to be poor, better to beg, better to starve, than to depart in the least iota from the law of rigid justice, and thrice blessed charity. This is what we need; what we *demand* for our country, for all countries; and demand too in the reverend name of him who was, and is, and is to be, and in the sacred name of humanity, whose maternal heart is wounded by the least wound received by the least significant of her children.

But how shall this faith be reproduced? It is not for us to answer this question. There are, as we compute, some fifteen thousand clergymen in this country, of all names and grades; all, we are bound to presume, good men and true; apostolic men; laboring with an eye single to the glory of their Master in the salvation of men; able ministers of the New Testament, comprehending all mysteries, and competent to unfold to us the destinies of man and society; speaking with an unction from the Holy One, words of truth

with power, as men having authority. To these belongs the prerogative to answer the question proposed. We have no disposition to encroach on their peculiar province. But, holy fathers, permit us with all respect for your order, to ask, you being what we have presumed, how happens it that truth dies out of the hearts of the people, that God's altars are everywhere digged down, and those of Mammon set up? It is not for us to rebuke an elder, but, holy fathers, does not this fact speak of neglected duty, of unfaithfulness to your charge? Your profession falls into disrepute; your flocks run after strange gods, and set up those to be gods which are no gods. Some of your most zealous supporters, who are severest against those who reverence you not, who carry around the box of charity, put a penny in but do take a shilling out; your well dressed hearers, in their soft cushioned pews, smile or sleep when you talk of heaven, of hell, of eternity, of man's accountability and the necessity of seeking heaven by self-denial, by crucifying the world, and exercising faith towards God and charity towards men. These old-fashioned notions seem to be outgrown, and men fancy themselves now gliding on safely to the Celestial City, as our friend Hawthorne has it, on recently constructed railroads, with Apollyon himself for conductor and chief engineer. Could this have happened, holy fathers, if you had been faithful to the great Head of the church? O, it is a fearful thing that you and we shall be compelled to answer at the dread tribunal for the faith of this people! God will ask of us, Where are the children I committed to your charge? What shall we have to answer?

Politically, also, we need something, and something may unquestionably be done, especially in this country where the people are supreme, inasmuch as the people are wise and virtuous. Were it our province to suggest any thing to be done under this head, we should recommend the complete destruction of the paper-money system, the repeal of all measures facetiously called protection of home industry, which tax one interest for the purpose of building up another, and labor for the enhancement of the profits of capital; and the adoption of a uniform measure of values, so that men shall buy and sell by the same measure, and trade cease to be only a respectable form of gambling with loaded dice. But, we are told that the great merit of the politician is to find out and conform to the will of the people; we will therefore make no proposition. There are at least in

this country, computing federal and state officers, from president down to tide-waiters, and governors down to field-drivers, all told, not less than some hundred and fifty thousand office-holders, to say nothing of twice as many office-seekers, hardly if at all their inferiors. These are the political chiefs of the people. The people are virtuous and intelligent. They will always therefore select the most virtuous and intelligent of their number for their chiefs. These office-holders, therefore, are and must be held to be a fair and full representation of the virtue and intelligence of the American people.

Now, it belongs to these, the selected chiefs of the people, to introduce and carry through all needed political reforms. Political Chiefs, you are intrusted with power; you have the confidence of the people; you are selected by us to be our governors and guides. Now, in the name of our common country we call upon you, since you unquestionably have the ability, to put an end to the evils we have complained of, so far as they belong to your department. We are sure the people, if they are as wise and as virtuous as you tell them they are, and have made them believe they are, have never wished the political state of things which now is. We are sure, that the great mass of your constituents, however they may err as to means, do really prefer good government, which maintains freedom for all, and which at least gives us this simple kind of liberty of which Carlyle speaks, to buy where we can cheapest, to sell where dearest. Do you then regard this will, resign your functions, or work out something better than we now have; and better not merely for rich capitalists and trading politicians, but better for our poor sister the washerwoman, and the still poorer sister, the sempstress, with her three little children growing up in ignorance, to be corrupted by the rabble rout with which they must associate.

Of industrial reforms properly so called, we speak not. Owenisms, Saint-Simonisms, Fourierisms, Communisms, and *isms* enough in all conscience are rife, indicating at least, that men are beginning to feel that the present industrial relations are becoming quite unbearable. Three years ago, we brought forward our "Morrison Pill," but the public made up wry faces, and absolutely refused to take it; so much the worse for them. We cannot afford to throw away our medicines, even if they are quack medicines. We cease attempting to prescribe. We leave this matter to the nat-

ural chiefs of industry, that is, to bank presidents, cashiers, and directors; to the presidents and directors of insurance offices, of railroads and other corporations; heavy manufacturers, and leading merchants; the master-workers, in Carlyle's terminology, the Plugsons of Undershot. Messrs. Plugsons of Undershot, you are a numerous and a powerful body. You are the chiefs of industry, and in some sort hold our lives in your pockets. You are a respectable body. We see you occupying the chief seats in the synagogues, consulted by secretaries of the treasury, constituting boards of trade, conventions of manufacturers, forming home leagues, presiding over lyceums, making speeches at meetings for the relief of the poor, and other charitable purposes. You are great; you are respectable; and you have a benevolent regard for all poor laborers. Suffer us, alas! a poor laborer enough, to do you homage, and render you the tribute of our gratitude. Think not that we mean to reproach you with the present state of industry and the working men. We have no reproaches to bring. But, ye are able to place our industry on its right basis, and we call upon you to do it; nay, we tell you that not we only, but a Higher than any of us, will hold you responsible for the *future* condition of the industrial classes. If you govern industry only with a view to your own profit, to the profit of master-workers, we tell you that the little you contribute to build work-houses, and to furnish bread and soup, will not be held as a final discharge. If God has given you capacities to lead, it has been that you might be a blessing to those who want that capacity. As he will hold the clergy responsible for the religious faith of the people, as he will hold the political chiefs responsible for the wise ordinance and administration of government, so, respected Masters, will he hold you responsible for the wise organization of industry and the just distribution of its fruits. Here, we dare speak, for here we are the interpreter of the law of God. Every pang the poor mother feels over her starving boy, is recorded in heaven against you, and goes to swell the account you are running up there, and which you, with all your *financiering*, may be unable to discharge. Do not believe that no books are kept but your own, nor that your method of book-keeping by double entry is the highest method, the most perfect. Look to it, then. What does it profit, though a man gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Ay, respected Masters, as little as ye think of the

matter, ye have souls, and souls that can be *lost*, too, if not lost already. In God's name, in humanity's name, nay, in the name of your own souls, which will not relish the fire that is never quenched, nor feel at ease under the gnawings of the worm that never dies, let us entreat you to lose no time in re-arranging industry, and preventing the recurrence of these evils, which with no malice we have roughly sketched for you to look upon. The matter, friends, is pressing, and delay may prove fatal. Remember, there is a God in heaven, who may say to you, "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you; your riches are corrupted, and your garments are moth-eaten, your gold and silver is cankered; and the rust of them shall be a witness against you, and shall eat your flesh as it were fire. You have stored up to yourselves wrath against the last days. Behold the hire of the laborers who have reaped your fields of which you have defrauded them, crieth out; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth." This is not our denunciation; it is not the declamation of the agrarian seeking to arm the poor against the rich; but it is God himself speaking to you now in warning, what he will hereafter, unless you are wise, speak to you in retribution.

THE CHURCH QUESTION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1844.]

I HAVE not introduced these *Tracts*, which have created so much excitement, and concerning which so much has been said and written during the last few years, for the purpose of going into a critical examination of their literary, or their theological merits; nor, indeed, for the purpose of entering far into the question of the claims of the Anglican church to catholicity, which they open up; but because they happen to furnish me with a convenient text for some rather desultory remarks on the very important religious movement of which they are one of the pregnant signs.

So far as they broach the claims of the church of England to be *the* catholic, or *a* catholic church, I probably should not altogether agree with their learned and pious authors. Regarded as a question of outward organization and canonical communion, the claims of the church of England to catholicity, on her own admitted principles, do not appear to me to stand on any better footing than those of the other Protestant communions. She holds, and rightfully, that the holy catholic apostolic church is supreme, under God, in all matters of faith and discipline. It is true, she adds, it is not lawful for the church to ordain any thing contrary to, or besides God's word written, to be believed for necessity of salvation; but this does in no wise impair her authority; because she is the keeper and interpreter of the word written, as well as of the word spoken; because it is she herself, by virtue of her authoritative interpretations of the word, that prescribes and interprets the limitations and extent of her own powers; and because she alone has the right to judge of their infraction, and also of the mode and measure of redress. She cannot suffer the individual member, or any number of individual members, as such, to judge her acts, or to plead the sacred text against her decisions; for this would be to authorize dissent and individualism against which she protests.

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*Tracts for the Times. By Members of the University of Oxford. New York: 1839.

Now it is undeniable that from the sixth to the sixteenth century, to say the least, the church of England had no separate, independent existence. It was an integral portion, canonically considered, of the Catholic church, the acknowledged head and centre of which were at Rome. This Catholic church, one and indivisible, including all national or local churches in communion with it, was, during the period I have named, supreme, and therefore competent to legislate on all matters of faith, discipline, and church organization for *all* its members. Whatever modifications in regard to faith or discipline, or to the constitution and administration, the distribution or concentration of power, she chose to introduce, she was competent to introduce; and they must override all ancient usages inconsistent with them, and be as obligatory on all the members as if they had existed from the beginning. Grant, if you will, that in some cases the modifications, or by whatever name you choose to call them, which were actually introduced, were injudicious, contrary to the principles of the Gospel, oppressive even,—although this is hardly admissible by a good churchman,—redress could rightfully be sought only in and through the orderly and official action of the church herself, that is, in and through the body; not in and through the members acting on their own responsibility.

We must not forget the *unity* of the church. There is no reserve to be made in favor of *national churches*, as if the church existing in a given nation were an independent church, subsisting by itself and holding communion with the church existing in other nations, not as the necessary condition of its own vitality, but as a mere act of Christian and ministerial courtesy; for this would be to deny both the unity and catholicity of the church. It were a real rending of Christ's seamless garment. The church of Christ knows no geographical boundaries, no national limitations, no national distinctions. The member of Christ's church here in Boston is a member of it in every part of the world, and in communion with the whole body, wherever it is. If not, it is idle to talk of unity and catholicity. Assuming these principles, which the church of England does and must assume, as the foundation of her own claims to catholicity, I see not how she can justify herself in separating, as she did in the sixteenth century, and setting up a particular communion, without going the whole length of dissent, and abandoning entirely her own principles. On

the ground, then, that it is necessary to have maintained from the first the unity of the Lord's body unbroken, I think she not only fails to prove herself to be *the* catholic church, but to be, in the catholic sense, even a church at all.

But I do not wish to pursue the discussion. The question in this form is to me one of only secondary importance. I own that the church of England has never been able to convince me, on the ground she assumes, of the validity of her claims; but shall I therefore seek to unchurch her? God forbid! There is and can be but *one* catholic church. If she is that church, all not in communion with her are unchurched; and all who are not members of her communion are out of the pale of the church; therefore out of Christ; therefore, again, out of the way of salvation. Shall I say all this? Shall I say that all the members of the Roman Catholic church, of the Greek church, the Armenian church, the Lutheran, the Presbyterian, the Congregational, the Methodist, the Baptist are out of the way of salvation, and can be saved only by becoming members of the church of England? It were a terrible responsibility to say so. On the other hand, shall I say that all who have lived and died in the church of England since the time of Henry and Cranmer, have lived and died out of Christ? I dare not say so.

The fact is, those of us who believe in, and seek the unity of the Lord's body, must be careful how we lay down principles which unchurch all but our own particular communion, or which would exclude from the church of Christ, in the sense necessary for salvation, and which is a higher sense too, than that of mere outward communion, any particular body of professing Christians which maintains the Christian principles and spirit in the lives of its members. The great question of *the church* should be looked at from a higher and broader point of view than that of particular communions. The outward form of the Lord's body has been broken into fragments; but it was an *immortal* body, and each particular fragment, however small, or however far the adversary may have cast it abroad in the earth, is still quick with its original life, and cannot die. Instead, then, of contending that this or that particular fragment is the whole body, and contains all the life, the real friends of the unity and catholicity of the church, imitating, as Milton says, the careful search of Isis after the scattered frag-

ments of the torn body of the good Osiris, should seek them in every place of opportunity, and bring them *all* together, to be moulded anew into one homogeneous and lovely form of perfection.

Entertaining these views, I read with pain that portion of these tracts which is directed against the church of Rome, and also that portion which attacks Dissenters. What I have just said of the claims of the church of England, though I have a very great respect for that communion, may well show, in the unpleasant feelings it may awaken in the breasts of its members, how very impolitic it would be, to say nothing more, for any particular communion to set up to be *the* church catholic, and, therefore, to unchurch all the rest. Each communion unchurched is provoked to bring forward its own claims; and, instead of peace and unity, we have strife and division; each crying out, "Ye are heretics and schismatics; the Temple of the Lord is with us; we are *the* church; only they who worship with us can be saved." We are all called, whatever the name we bear, whatever our rank or influence in the Christian world, to a higher and a more Christian work. We are all called to labor for *reunion*, for the restoration of the unity of the church; unity of polity, of faith, and of discipline. But we must, if we will labor with success, take our stand on an eminence which overlooks all these sectarian divisions and causes of strife and bitterness, and seek to unite men in the very unity of the Christian life, the deep, the eternal, the creative principle of Christian unity, which is Christ himself. In other words, we must rise to a full comprehension of that *higher unity* which is the principle and cause of the unity of polity, of faith, and of discipline; and whilst we are engaged in doing this, our first and most pressing work, all these secondary and minor questions touching the claims of particular communions should be laid on the table. Perhaps they will never need to be called up.

The truth is the church—I speak generally—has lost the clear sense of the profound significance of her own organization, doctrines, sacraments, and symbols. In the present state of things, unity of polity becomes a mere *forced* unity, the unity of aggregation, not of a living body. The effort, therefore, at this moment, should not be to effect outward unity and canonical communion, but to recover the significance of the church herself. Christianity, as a divine scheme

of mediatorial grace, has become to the great majority of the Christian world an enigma of which few, if any, retain the key. The great mass of church-goers, nay, of church-teachers, have no conception of the profound significance of the church. They, therefore, lose all respect for her as a divine institution, and come to regard her mainly in the light of an auxiliary to the police, as a useful institution for keeping the lower classes in order, and for preventing men from cutting one another's throats. What is the church? What mean her dogmas, her sacraments, her symbols? Who among us is able to answer? or who among us attempting to answer, but babbles some profane nonsense, or repeats words whose sense escapes him? Here, it strikes me, is a great and primary question to be answered, *the question of the church itself;* and just in proportion as we succeed in answering this, we may be assured that the true centre of church unity will disclose itself, and the principle which is to reunite even outwardly the torn body of our Lord will begin to operate.

And here I find the redeeming principle, and the great and exceeding value of these Oxford Tracts. From below the horizon, if we have eyes, we may see, like the sun emerging from the ocean, rising into full view, the great and permanent question of the church itself, of the real Catholic church. These Oxford divines have felt the workings of the great and universal problem itself; they have begun to feel that the church, as manifest in the world, nay, as existing in the minds of the great mass of churchmen, priests as well as laity, is not precisely the church,—is, in fact, far, very far, below the true church of God; they have begun to catch some glorious glimpses of *unity* and *catholicity*, and to feel somewhat of the divine life these impart and must impart; and they have come forward, as the humble but earnest advocates of unity and catholicity,—to recall the church to a sense of her rights, her prerogatives as the church of God, as the necessary condition of fully discharging her high mission in the salvation of the world here and hereafter. What if they have seen and done all this with the eyes and the hearts of church-of-England men, and have sought to narrow the question down, as far as possible, to the alleged "insular prejudices" of their own nation? Let us leave all this,—which is lamentable enough to all not of their communion, and proves them to be but men,—let us leave all this by the way, and not suffer it to disturb our

prejudices, or to bias our judgments. There is good enough in these Oxford divines, and the sort of good, too, not over-abundant in modern times, to entitle them to our gratitude and respect, and to make us thank God for their labors, were their church-of-Englandism a thousand-fold more prominent and offensive than it really is.

I do not look upon the movements of these Oxford divines as indicative, on their part, of a wish to return to Rome, as their enemies allege; they are far enough from being Romanists; they are undeniably genuine church-of-England men; but they are possessed of a sentiment which will be found too big and too expansive for the church of England, and which will absorb it eventually in the true Catholic church. Their movements indicate to me a presentiment of something superior to what the church, in point of fact, in their days, really is; and a growing desire, an intense longing to see the Catholic church restored to her unity, her freedom, and her authority, prepared to resume and carry on the great work in which she was engaged in the middle ages, and which was, to a considerable extent, interrupted by the rise of Protestantism. In this point of view, these tractarians broach a higher than a Roman or an Anglican question, a question which concerns all Christendom, in fact, all humanity; and in the discussion of which all Christendom must take part. It is a great question; an agitating question; a powerful question; a terrible question; which will not pass over the world without changing its face. Let no one be deceived. This question is no ephemeral question to be put at rest by a newspaper paragraph, or even by an elaborate article in our graver Reviews. It has its roots deep in the very heart of our age, and is nourished by all our wants, hopes, aspirations, and tendencies. I repeat, it is not a question which concerns merely this or that particular communion; it concerns not merely Oxford divines and church-of-England men; it concerns not merely the Protestant Episcopal church of this country, in which it has broken out; it reaches the whole Christian world, and all communions, papal, patriarchal, episcopal, presbyterian, congregational, trinitarian, unitarian, Armenian, Calvinistic, all alike are concerned in it; for it is the great question of the Christian church itself, in that high and profound sense in which it transcends and embraces all particular communions. It asks the significance of this great moral Fact before which we stand, and before which the more advanced nations of the

earth have stood or have bowed down with awe and submission for eighteen hundred years. What means this Fact? Is it a phantom, an illusion? or is it a reality? Has it a being? If so, what is it? What is it here for? What are its rights, prerogatives, duties, means?

Now, I say, here is the question of questions for our age. We have, for the last three hundred years, been losing sight of the main question; we have been concerning ourselves with collateral points, with mere details, proposing petty amendment to amendment, till the original question has been buried under the mass and left out of the debate. These Oxford divines, without precisely understanding the original question, without having exactly made up their minds how to vote on it, yet firmly persuaded of *the fact* of such original question, have come forward and moved it; not with a view of stifling the debate, but to recall it to the main question. The main question is now coming fairly up before the great Christian parliament; and if the speakers will only keep to the point, the debate will not only be full of interest, but of instruction, and tend to the profit of the whole Christian world.

These Oxford divines represent a great movement already commenced throughout Christendom toward unity and catholicity. But have they seized and have they presented the true ground of unity and catholicity? Do they give us evidence that they have gone to the bottom of the question, and seized the elemental principle of Christian unity and universality? I think not. They do not seem to me to have detached the question from its accidents, and to have considered it in itself, independently of its applications to this or that communion. They do not seem to me to have grasped the key of this great moral Fact, and to have become able to see, independently of the great authority of tradition, its profound, universal, and eternal necessity. They have bowed to the tradition; but the *reason* of the tradition? but the *reason* of the historical phenomenon? This seems still concealed from their view and almost unsuspected. They have, then, themselves seen the main question only by faith. It lies further back than they have gone, deeper than their plummets seem to have sounded. I take up Dr. Pusey's sermon on the Eucharist; I find him recognizing a fact there, and laboring to prove that in the best days of even the church of England, it was very generally believed that there was a fact there; but what this fact

is his sermon does not tell us. He calls it the *Real Presence;* that is to say, a fact, and not the symbol of a fact; but this does not tell us what the fact is. I take up the dissertation on Baptism; I find here, again, that Baptism is very properly declared to be a *fact*, not the mere symbol of a fact, or rather, as with the majority of Protestants, of a *no*-fact; but what *is* this fact? No answer. We are left in the dark. So of all the other matters touched upon. I find, and am most happy to find, that everywhere it is affirmed that there is fact, reality; but what the fact, what the reality *is*, we are nowhere told. These divines, therefore, are chiefly commendable for calling our attention to the fact that the church really means something, rather than for having told us what it means.

The method of these divines is also defective. It is the historical method. They seek to instruct us as to the significance of the fact in question by piling quotation upon quotation. But, Reverend Doctors, this will not answer; for the sense of these quotations has escaped us. We all know very well what are the *words* the fathers used, but what have the fathers *meant* by their words? We gain nothing by being told what they have said, for the question is not as to what the fathers have said, but what the fathers have meant. We all know the canons, the rubrics, the creeds, and the catechisms in which the church has embodied her sense of her own significance; but what do these mean? what has the church meant by them? Why do you light tapers upon the altar? Why do you turn to the East in prayer? Why do you kneel when you come to the word Jesus? We know the church commands us to believe in the Trinity; but what is the profound significance of this doctrine? What is the *fact* which lies under it? The church gives herself out as the medium of our union with Christ, through whom we have access to the Father. But what does this mean? The church insists upon apostolic succession and canonical appointment. Go to the bottom of this and tell us what it means. The age, Oxford Divines, has grown weary of idolatry: it is weary of mere images, symbols, representations; and demands to be made acquainted with the true God, the infinite *I-Am*, not with the *I-appear*. As yet, we have done nothing but to erect an altar to the *unknown God*. But this ye have done, God be thanked! ye have declared your firm faith that God is,

and that in all holy things there is a reality, the *Numen* as well as the shrine.

The great evil is that we have, as before said, lost the profound sense of the Christian mysteries, of the church and its dogmas, sacraments, and discipline. Quotations, then, from the accredited fathers of the church cannot avail us; because these quotations are, as it were, part and parcel of the church, and their sense escapes us, as does hers. It is necessary, then, to go further, to look deeper, and, by profound meditations on the very nature of things and of God's providential dealings with humanity, to find the lost key to the mysteries of Christianity. We are now as the Jews who had lost the true pronunciation of the sacred Tetragram; and prophecy, and inspiration, and the power to work miracles abandon us and leave us to our merely human resources. We must find again the sacred NAME, and its right pronunciation; and then, but not till then, shall we be able to know him whom we now ignorantly worship. In other words, it is in the study of the *philosophy* of the church, and not in its mere outward history, that we are to find the key to its mysteries, and to become acquainted with their significance, with the facts they cover, that is to say, with the Christian ontology itself. Our Oxford divines seem to me to have neglected the philosophy of the church, and therefore to have failed to show us the real principle of unity and catholicity. I find them reproducing the phenomena of the church but not its ontology; and yet it is its ontology that is the principle of its phenomena.

I find no fault with the Oxford divines for reviving obsolete customs, and for studying to restore the liturgy of the church to its former completeness; although, were I of the church of England, acknowledging episcopal authority, I should hold it as improper for a private presbyter to revive an obsolete custom, on his private authority, as it would be for him to introduce a new one, the rubric to the contrary notwithstanding. What has fallen by general consent into desuetude, though still standing in the rubrics and canons, is virtually repealed, and can properly be revived only by the supreme legislative authority. But this is no affair of mine. I have no doubt that many things have been cast off that it will be well to resume. But, do our Oxford divines ask if these practices which they are seeking to revive have, or can have the same significance for worshippers to-day that they had formerly when they were faithfully observed and evi-

dently attended with the best results? Can it ever do good to revive, or to create, as it were, "with malice aforethought?" Bring us back the sense of these old practices, that we need; but that sense may perhaps, now and hereafter be better expressed in other, and even very different, forms. The great question, the main question, is not the restoration of the ancient forms of church discipline, but the restoration of the original sense of the church, and of the church herself to her true place in the economy of Providence, as the condition of more effectually discharging her high functions. This is the question, the real question of the age; and after all, it is the real question with these Oxford divines, and they should, therefore, have proposed it clearly, distinctly, unencumbered by any minor questions about details, however important these minor questions may become when the main question is disposed of.

I repeat, the church question is not a question of details, of particular communions, of dogmas, nor of constitutions. It is not, whether we shall adopt this or that symbol of faith; whether we shall accept and observe this or that form of social or private worship; whether we shall contend for the papal, the episcopal, the presbyterian, or the congregational method of constituting the church; it is not, where the authority of the church shall be lodged, nor how its administration shall be provided for; all of which may become questions, and grave questions, too; but, what is the church itself? what its office, and what its authority, however constituted, or however named? This I believe is the first and main question to be disposed of by our own age.

Touching the constitution and discipline of the church, I say, in passing, the church is herself supreme. No precise model of the one, or minute details of the other, are given in the New Testament. It was evidently the desire of the founders of the church to leave the constitution and discipline of the church to be shaped according to the exigencies of time and place; and the sacredness of this or that form of the one or the other must be supported, not by texts of scripture, but by the inherent authority of the church herself to adopt such forms, from time to time, as in her wisdom she judges proper. If we deny to the church this authority we make her an empty name, an institution without reality, a mere appearance, an optic illusion, about which no wise or sober man will concern himself for a moment. The question then comes up, Has the church

this authority? If so, whence does she derive it? And this leads us back to what we have called the church question itself, and requires us to comprehend the whole scheme of God's mediatorial grace.

It is by no means my intention, in the present article, to try my hand at answering this question of the church. That I have some thoughts on the subject, I should be sorry to be compelled to deny; nay, that I have attained to some proximate solution of the problem, caught at least a transient glimpse of the profound significance of the mighty moral fact before which we and all Christendom stand in awe, I firmly believe; but my present purpose has been merely to state the question and to offer some few practical observations on the movements commenced and commencing, by our age, which indicate a desire to return to unity and catholicity, that is to say, to the church of God.

How the fact that the sense of the church, of its dogmas and ritual has been lost can be reconciled with this other fact for which we strenuously contend, namely, that the Spirit of Truth which leadeth into all truth, is ever present in the church, its organic principle, its vital force, I shall attempt on another occasion to explain. It suffices for the present to assume the broad, obvious, undeniable fact that this sense *has* been lost. We may find evidence of this anywhere throughout all Christendom, at any time since the disappearance of the great names of the middle ages. Perhaps no single cause has contributed more to this result than the philosophical movement commenced in the twelfth century by Abélard,—the real father of what we call by courtesy, modern philosophy. Abélard was the first to work that mighty change in philosophy by which it leaves the ontological question, that is to say, theology, the eternal verities of things, and comes to concern itself solely with phenomena. He has placed in the Christian world the system of philosophy known as conceptualism. Anselm and others had asserted the reality of ideas, making them the essential forms or the essences of things. William de Champeaux following did the same, only taking care to distinguish between ideas, or genera, properly so called, and mere mental abstractions, and thus gave to realism a systematic form. Rosceline, founder of the nominalist school, denied all reality to ideas, to genera and species, to the essential forms of things, and called them empty words, as Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley have since done. Peter

Abélard, a brilliant genius, rendered famous by the love of the noble Eloïsa, but of whom morally considered, the only good thing I have to say is, that this noble and true-hearted woman loved him, and never ceased to love him,—between these two schools came, I say, Peter Abélard, and denied the reality of ideas, against the realists; and that ideas are mere empty words, against the nominalists; by asserting them to be conceptions of the mind. Here was philosophy, at once, placed on the point of leaving the study of the deep significance of things, to take up the study of our own mental phenomena, and, therefore, of having for its subject henceforth, not ontology, but psychology, and for its problem not, What is? but, What do we conceive or think we know? This philosophy of Abélard, this conceptualism nobly withstood by William of Champeaux, St. Bernard, and the orthodox clergy of the time, nevertheless virtually prevailed, and it has penetrated to the foundation in the system of St. Thomas, which is even yet the approved philosophy of the church. Now, the least reflection will suffice to show that conceptualism leads directly to the study of the phenomena of our own souls, our internal affections, and therefore to the neglect of the objective and eternal verities of things. The neglect of these objective and eternal verities, in which lies the profound significance of the church, its dogmas and ritual, could not fail to obscure, and finally to obliterate from the minds of even the best instructed, that sense itself. After the prevalence of this philosophy, this conceptualism, the last word of which we have seen in the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, no great theologian appeared. Theology, in fact, ceased to be studied; attention was soon almost wholly engrossed with ancient heathen literature, and philosophy, properly so called, was pretty much forgotten. The theological works which appeared were mere excerpts from older works, or attempts to dilute and adapt the older and profounder works to the modern delicate tastes and weak stomachs.

The church, regarded as an institution, a visible organization, taken generally, became, in consequence of this and other causes coinciding and coöperating, a mere rind, or external husk or shell, from which the inner substance, the *meat* was lost, or, at least, in which no substance or meat was seen or suspected to exist. This is strikingly true when we come down to the last century. I take the church

of England: it has become a mere auxiliary of the police, or a provision for gentlemen's younger sons. The qualification for a bishopric was, proverbially, to have edited a Greek play. Its doctrines, practically considered, dwindled down to a meagre rationalism, and an eminent prelate was able to declare Christianity to be only "a republication of the law of nature." The sacraments no longer signify any thing, and the whole ritual has become an empty form which the fox-hunting parson thinks *quite too long.* It eschews all that is profound or mysterious, all that demands long meditations, or excites deep and ardent feelings. It goes decorously to church, pays a moderate sum to the well-dressed, well-bred, pleasant-spoken clergyman, who, it is understood, is to be only moderately in earnest, and to discourse in well-turned periods and in a calm and regularly modulated voice on the moral virtues and the duties of private life, on the importance of public decorum and a respectful observance of the outward forms of piety and devotion. As to that deep and living faith which overcomes the world, as to that profound love, that overwhelming sense of duty, that awful power of sacrifice, which will take captive, and make one brave all dangers, endure all evils, and submit to all tortures in the service of God or of men,—why it is prudent to leave such deep, strong, and uncontrollable matters in the depths of the soul, unquickened, for they might carry us too far, disturb the settled order and decorum of society. In the German church matters are no better. There is more learning, more mental activity, more diligent study; but no profounder thoughts, no nearer approach to the original sense of Christianity. The tendency to rationalism is still stronger; rationalism is systematized and avowed; Christianity is stripped of all its mysteries; all that cannot find entrance through the narrow aperture of a rationalist's mind, whether in history, in doctrine, or in discipline, is pared off, and this is called rendering Christianity *intelligible*, *comprehending* Christianity!

In Catholic countries things go no better, if so well. His Holiness is a respectable old gentleman who resides at Rome; mild and amiable in his manners; learned, polite; corresponds with the philosophers; writes a very agreeable letter to Voltaire, and can find it in his heart to reprove the arch-infidel for nothing but the false quantity of one of his verses. The more active of the educated classes are openly or secretly hostile to the church, and its dignitaries smile

upon, and even fraternize with the *philosophes*. Bergier and others, who defend it, do so in an apologetic tone, and on infidel principles. Theology becomes a branch of physics, and God is demonstrated by the telescope and scalpel; at least, till a Lalande exclaims, *Je n'ai jamais vu Dieu au bout de mes lunettes*. Then a portion gave up God, and the remainder held their peace. In our own country, the outward form varies, but the spirit is the same. No theology, no profound philosophy, at best only passable psychology with a Jonathan Edwards; the church is not recognized, hardly even in name; to speak of its unity and catholicity is a scandal, and to intimate that Baptism and the Eucharist mean somewhat, are not signs without significance, is to confess one's intimate relations with the Scarlet Lady of Babylon. So completely has the sense of the profound things of the church escaped us, that we define it "a voluntary association of believers for religious purposes;" look upon the Eucharist as merely commemorative of departed worth; and perceive no shocking absurdity in hearing it asserted by the most numerous denomination amongst us, that the only proper subjects of baptism are they who have already been regenerated! No wonder, then, that the great mass marvel why the church is here, are puzzled to make out what business it has to be here at all, look upon it as an old and useless ruin, respectable, perhaps, in the eyes of a few antiquaries, but serving only to harbour bats, owls, ravens, and other birds of ill-omen, and to encumber the site which could be advantageously occupied by a cotton-mill, or a neat two-story dwelling-house, painted white, and ornamented with green Venetian blinds, or at best by a lyceum, a school-house, an anatomical or a chemical laboratory.

Now, against this state of things throughout all Christendom a reaction has commenced. The adversary, who, if possible, would deceive the very elect, has gone the length of his chain, and can go no further; Michael descends again to shorten the chain of the old serpent, the dragon that drew after him a third part of the stars of heaven; the man of sin is arrested, the sacred central fire, which was smothered, and which seemed for a time to the superficial to be extinguished, but which never ceased for a moment to burn in the heart of the church, is growing intenser, and begins to expand and send its vital warmth toward the extremities, which for so long a time have been cold and lifeless; churchmen begin to feel that they have wasted their substance in

riotous living, that they have been feeding on husks, and are well-nigh starved; and, blessed be God! the memory of the long forgotten *home* returns, and they remember that in their Father's house there is bread enough, and to spare, and they say to themselves, "We will arise and return to our Father's house." They remember that they have a Father, which for a long time they had forgotten. They feel that they need not be the lone, starving wanderers in a far country, fatherless and desolate, which they have been. There is yet a *home* for them. The tendency is now everywhere to return and find again this long deserted home. This is a glorious tendency, full of significance, and of hope. It is this tendency which is represented by the Oxford divines: this is the significance of *Puseyism*. This is the significance of what a shallow rationalism calls retrograde movements, now to be seen throughout the Christian world, in every communion, from the Roman down to our own Unitarian; and this is wherefore I hail these movements with hope, with joy, with thanksgiving.

But it is precisely here that I begin to feel a serious embarrassment. I would return home; where is this home? Of these numerous buildings I see, which is my Father's dwelling? The tendency, I have said, is to unity and catholicity, and that, not merely in a refined metaphysical sense, but in the sense of outward form and institution, as well as of inward spirit and feeling. The tendency is no longer to Quakerism, the only respectable tendency the religious mind has felt since the disruption of the church in the sixteenth century. Men cannot feed on air, or live in utter nakedness. They demand unity and catholicity of faith, polity, and discipline. Then, amid all these rival institutions, these fragmentary churches so called, into which the body of our Lord has been broken, which is the true catholic apostolic church? This is the question, and it is one, disguise it as we will, which cannot but embarrass for a time the sincere and earnest inquirer. Here I am, have run through nearly the whole circle of the sects in pursuit of a home, seeking rest and finding none. The tendency of the age, the Christian *Welt-geist* has at length taken fast hold of me; I have come to believe in the one holy catholic apostolic church, and to see and feel the need of a *one* temple, and a single altar, to which all the tribes of Israel may repair. But where shall I go? With which of the numerous communions shall I seek fellowship

as the condition of being in the true church, and therefore in the way of salvation? The Roman communion? and by so doing declare it to be my solemn belief that salvation is absolutely unattainable in the Greek church, the Armenian church, the Anglican church, the Lutheran church, the Presbyterian church, the Congregational church, the Baptist church, the Methodist church? No. I cannot do this. Say then the Anglican, or any one of the others, and the same question follows. If I can be saved without joining one of these communions, then no good reason can be assigned why I should seek to join any one of them; if I can be saved in any one of them, then is there no just ground for preferring one to another. But, in joining any one, I do say, if I know what I do, that I not only prefer one to all the rest, but that I hold that it, of all, is the only one in which salvation is possible, and that out of that there is no salvation for me. I cannot, therefore, seek fellowship with one, as a serious, honest, intelligent man, without, in my own belief, unchurching all the rest. This I shrink, as it seems to me every intelligent and fair-minded man must shrink, from doing. Where, then, can I go? Literally, I can go *nowhere*.

Now, here is, if I mistake not, a very serious and embarrassing question, a preliminary question, which must be met and disposed of, before we can proceed a single step. I have, since I came to believe in the unity and catholicity of the church, thought much and anxiously on this question; and, without wishing in the least to disguise its difficulty from myself or from others, I will, with all modesty, deference, and humility, give, briefly, the best answer I have been able to obtain.

I begin by assuming that no solution of the problem, which really unchurches any Christian communion, will answer the purpose. The moment such a solution is proffered, each communion which is unchurched is provoked, as I have said, to bring forward its rival pretensions; and each claiming to be a church and, therefore to be independent in respect to all others, there is no common umpire to whom the dispute may be referred, and whose decision will be recognized by all as binding upon all. The Bible is not this umpire, because the Bible is all in the meaning which the living interpreter gives it, and each communion interprets it differently from the others. The Episcopalian, the Presbyterian, the Congregationalist, each appeals alike to

the Bible; but has the Bible as yet settled their rival pretensions? Individual reason, or private judgment, will not answer; because each man's private judgment is in no small degree the product of the peculiar traditions of his own special communion; and because it is never the same in the case of any two individuals. The whole history of Christendom, since the time of Luther, demonstrates the utter impracticability of attaining to unanimity by means of individual reason. Moreover, the individual reason is authoritative only for the individual. To make it the umpire would be to set up the reason of one as the standard, and to require all the rest to conform to it, which would be the grossest tyranny conceivable. My individual judgment is the equivalent of my neighbour's; to require me to submit mine to his, or him to submit his to mine, would be an outrage which every true man at all conscious of his rights, dignity, and duty would, if need should be, resist even unto death. There is, then, as I have said, no common umpire, to whose decision recognized by all as binding, the rival claims of these conflicting communions can be brought and settled. We are forced then, by the very necessity of the case, by the actual condition of Christendom, to begin by so far recognizing the claims of all, as to bring the special claims of no one into discussion,—unless some one, indeed, insists on unchurching all but itself; and even then we must suffer ourselves to do it only so far as it is necessary to rebuke it for its arrogance and exclusive spirit.

Perhaps my meaning would be best expressed by saying that we should begin by waiving all discussion of the claims of rival communions. This discussion is really unnecessary, and cannot fail to be mischievous. Let us begin, then, by assuming that the Lord's body has been broken into fragments, but that each of these fragments is, in a degree, a living fragment and capable of imparting more or less of Christian life. No one of these fragments must assume to be the *whole* unbroken body of the Lord. This premised, let there be no discussion as to who broke the body, or as to which fragment, upon the whole, retains the most of the original body, or to which we should do best to assimilate; but, let the question be, How shall all these fragments be brought together and reunited in one unbroken body, so that the whole Christian world may be really one?

Here, then, is my answer: Do you ask, *which* is the true church, that is, *which* is the Lord's body? I answer, *No*

one; that is, no one is it, all and entire. Do you then retort and say that the church has failed, and that I assume the true church to be no longer extant, save in a refined and metaphysical sense, thereby falsifying the promise of our Saviour that he would build his church upon a rock, and the gates of hell should not prevail against it? I deny your charge. I say, the true church, the holy catholic apostolic church, does still exist, and has never for one moment ceased to exist, but exists at the present moment in a fragmentary state. This existence in a fragmentary or broken state is very different from not existing at all. It is the church still, but the church no longer in its full glory and power, which in fact is implied in our very inquiry; for if it were, it would at once be recognized. We prefer representing the church as a body broken rather than as a vine, and the several communions as branches; for these branches must all through the main trunk intercommune, and receive their nourishment from the root, or else they would be dead branches, abiding not in the vine. If those separate churches are branches, where is the trunk? that is to say, where is the central church which receives the sap from Christ, the Root, and circulates it through the branches, thus giving life and growth to the whole plant? I do not understand this notion of branch churches without a main trunk. To me the church is the *body* of our Lord, bearing to him a relation analogous to that borne by our bodies to the vital force, or organic principle, which creates and preserves them living *organisms*. Now I can easily conceive of the body being broken, and yet without the parts being torn so far asunder as to have absolutely no intercommunion; and this is to me an exact representation of the present condition of the church. It is the torn and bleeding, but not yet dead, body of our Lord.

So much for the church as it is. Now, the real problem is not, to which of these parts I must assimilate; therefore, the preliminary question, with which communion shall I seek fellowship? disposes, as it were, of itself, and ceases to be a question at all. It is only by taking a false view of the Christian world as it is, that it ever comes up to trouble us. The question disturbs us because we begin by assuming that some *one* of these communions must be *the* true catholic apostolic communion, and that the rest are no Christian communions at all; instead of assuming in the outset, as we should, that all are but so many fragments of one and the

same catholic apostolic communion. In any one of these communions you are in the church, and therefore have no occasion to ask, Where shall I go? Stay where you are.

The true question for the inquirer is not, Which is the true church? but, What can be done to bring all the fragments together, heal the broken body of Christ, and clothe it again with his seamless robe? And, after all, this question is not so difficult as some might suppose. Assuming that all the professedly Christian communions extant, save one, must be unchurched, the matter is indeed difficult; for then you can reach unity only by proselyting, only by converting all the members of these unchurched communions to your own, which beginning by setting up, as you do, your own as *the* church, the only church, and the whole church, is utterly impracticable, as the experiment of the last three centuries abundantly demonstrates. But, on the ground I assume, it is comparatively easy. We have but to observe the process of nature in healing a wounded body in order to ascertain at once the law which is to govern our efforts. Nature carries on her curative process by throwing off the bruised flesh and forming new flesh simultaneously, and by one and the same operation, by virtue of the *vital principle* which is in the broken body, and equally, though it may be in unequal degrees, in the several parts. The restoration of unity, and the absorption of all particular communions must go on simultaneously, and be effected by virtue of the *living principle* still in the broken body of our Lord and in all the fragments into which it has been broken.

Now, is there in all these fragments this one vital force, this organic principle, by virtue of which the whole body may be healed, unity recovered, and division absorbed? I contend that there is, and that just in proportion as we address ourselves to this vital force we shall be successful in healing all these divisions which we now deplore in the church. Beneath all this diversity which strikes us on the surface there is, though but partially operative, the fundamental principle of unity. It is to this principle that we must look, for unity can only be effected by appealing to a principle common to all. Unity by conversion of one communion to another, much more of all communions to one, is out of the question. The union must come, if it come at all, by means of efforts possible to each communion while continuing to be a particular communion. That is, the work to be done for the recovery of the unity and catholicity of

the church, as a body as well as a spirit, must be a work possible to the Roman Catholic, without his becoming a Protestant, to the Protestant, without his becoming a Roman Catholic; to the Anglican, without his becoming a Presbyterian or a Congregationalist; and to the Presbyterian, or the Congregationalist, without his becoming an Anglican.

Now, what is this principle? It is, answers one, the spirit of Christ, that is to say, Love. Love is the grand principle of union, and, just so far as all possess it, they do really become one, one with one another, one with Christ, and, through him, one with the Father. Nothing more true; but this overlooks a very important fact and assumes the presence of love as the principle of the unity of the church, whereas it is the unity and catholicity of the church which we need as the condition of producing love in the hearts of its members. This answer makes the unity and catholicity of the church the end, whereas love is the end, and unity and catholicity are the means. With this multiplicity of jarring and hostile communions, whence the love necessary to unite them? If with these jarring and hostile communions you can obtain the love, what do you want the unity and catholicity for? Here is the fallacy of most of the grounds of Christian union proposed, in our day, by our church reformers. These all forget the mediatorial character of the church and fall into the superstition of regarding it as an end; they all forget, moreover, the helplessness into which the sinner falls through sin, the destruction of his moral power which is the inevitable consequence of sin, and, therefore, that he cannot, of himself, without divine assistance, rise to the possession of the Christian spirit or to the practice of the Christian virtues, and, furthermore, that it is only as the medium of this divine assistance that the church question assumes the least gravity.

What, then, is this principle common to all, and to which we may appeal? It is not a special dogma, a special form of church government, but the real belief still retained by all, though in a sense more or less feeble, of the unity and catholicity of the church. Now, I say that, however much these particular communions may differ in all else, every one does, in reality, though it be unconsciously, hold that the vital principle of the church must needs be one, that the church is the living body of our Lord, the depositary, and authoritative interpreter of his word, whether the written word or the spoken word. Here, then, is the foun-

dation on which we must build ; here, in this common belief as to what the church really is, what are its rights, prerogatives, and duties, is the principle through the workings of which we must recover unity and catholicity. Here the reader may see why I have dwelt so emphatically on the importance of moving the main question of the church itself. It is simply and solely because this question will disclose both the necessity and the ground *of unity and catholicity* This question can be moved in the bosom of any one of the communions extant, freely discussed and the true answer proclaimed, without the least infraction of its order, or subjecting ourselves to its discipline ; and moved, too, and the true answer insisted upon, without, as would be the case with any other question, bringing one communion into conflict with another.

The matter now grows plain. We are to seek unity and catholicity by moving what I have called the church question. We are to grasp the true theory of the church which at bottom is asserted, as I have said, by every communion, and to hold it up in the bosom of the very communion in which we are, as the Oxford divines have done, and are doing, in the bosom of the Anglican communion ; and this will prove effectual. It may be done in every communion, because every communion, without knowing it, does hold it as one of its elements. It may, then, be brought into operation in every communion in an orderly manner ; not, I own, without ultimately destroying that communion as a particular and independent communion ; but this is the very end sought; for, what do we seek, in seeking unity and catholicity, but the absorption of all particular communions in the one catholic communion? There are, moreover, in all communions, at this very moment, individuals who are oppressed with a sense of the present torn and bleeding state of the Lord's body, and who sigh and yearn to heal its bruises, and restore it to its pristine health and vigor. Let these, then, where they are, turn their attention to the paramount question of the church, revive the true theory of the church, and preach it. I say, the true theory of the church, not the method of outward organization, where authority shall be vested, or how its administration shall be provided for ; but the true theory of what the church is, what are its powers, its rights, and its duties. Settle this, and it is already pretty well settled, thus far, in their minds, and then preach it. Let every one who has come to believe in, and

to long for the great principles of unity and catholicity, preach them from his own stand-point; the Congregationalist from his congregational pulpit, the Presbyterian from his presbyterian pulpit, the Anglican from his episcopal chair, the Roman Catholic from his old cathedral; and let it be done here in Boston, in New York, in Baltimore, in Oxford, at Berlin, at Paris, and at Rome; and instantly it will be seen that throughout all Christendom, in the bosom of the most exclusive and hostile communions, there is a real unity of faith as to what the church as a body really is, and as to what are its mission and its authority.

When so much shall be done all is done; for this very theory of the church, becoming predominant, recognizes in the church herself the inherent right, by virtue of the indwelling Christ, to settle authoritatively all the other questions which may or can come up. All that would then be requisite would be to call, as would then be practicable, a new council to adjust the bases of renewed communion, outward polity, and discipline. Let this new council, which would be a sort of ecclesiastical congress, be composed of delegates from *all* Christian communities extant which believe in the holy catholic apostolic church, and are willing to submit to its authority, and abide its decisions fairly and formally promulgated. I see no serious difficulty in the way of doing this. I am much mistaken if the movement that must lead to it is not already commenced. The few who would not submit to the canons promulgated by the new œcumenical council, would be rightfully regarded as heretics and schismatics, for they would have no excuse for not hearing the voice of the church. Moreover, they would be morally powerless against the church healed of its divisions and reinvigorated, and they would soon be absorbed.

This result obtained, the church no longer obliged, as in the first three centuries, and in these last three, to struggle for her very existence, would resume her work of social amelioration,—interrupted by the rise of Protestantism, and delayed by the obstacles thrown in her way by infidelity and the supremacy of the temporal authority,—and devote new and unsuspected energies to the moral, intellectual, and physical elevation of the poorer and more numerous classes. Then the kingdom of God will come, and really and confessedly dwell with men; then will be in very deed fulfilled this scripture, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because

he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, the recovering of sight to the blind, and to set at liberty them that are bound."

Is this an idle dream? O, no! God has promised it, and all Christendom is crying out for it. The great question comes up, Catholicism or individualism, which becomes again, church or no-church, which in the last analysis is religion or infidelity. Disguise the matter as we will, we must all rally at the one or the other of these battle-cries. Can there be a question, to which the great mass of the Christian world will respond? Protestantism, in all it has peculiar to itself, in all that distinguishes it from genuine Catholicism, no longer responds to the religious, or even the social, wants of the soul. It is weighed in the balance and found wanting. Through all our souls have we, who have been educated under its influence, felt its utter insufficiency. We have sought to supply its defects in mysticism with the Quaker, in rationalism with the modern Lutheran, in naturalism with the old English and French deists, in pantheism with modern philosophers, in socialism with Owen and Fourier; but all in vain. Let loose, like Noah's dove from the ark ere the water had abated, we have found no resting-place for the soles of our feet; and, weary with our endless flight over the wild and weltering chaos produced by the deluge of rationalism and infidelity, we return and beat against the windows of the ark, impatient till the patriarch reaches forth his hand and takes us in. Struck with the perpetual miracle of the church, some among us bow down and worship; others find their way back, through history and tradition; others, again, like the writer, find, where least expecting it, their philosophy reproducing, and the wants of the soul suffering from the ravages of sin redemanding, unity and catholicity. In one way, or another, thank God, we shall all finally get back, and the new will become old, and the old will become new. There will be one fold and one shepherd; one faith, one baptism, one heart, and one mind; and it will be as the second coming of the Lord to reign with men, and to make the salvation of God appear unto the ends of the earth, when all flesh shall behold his glory and rejoice together. Even so, Lord Jesus, come quickly, and let the whole earth say, Amen.

NATURE AND OFFICE OF THE CHURCH.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1844.]

We have received the following letter without name or date, but post-marked "Philadelphia, January 10." It probably was not intended for publication, but we insert it, because it affords us an opportunity to offer a few additional remarks, not uncalled for, on certain points touched upon in the article on *The Church Question*, and because it is only in this way that we can acknowledge its reception. Should the writer address us again, we hope he will give us his name, for he wants not the capacity to render it honorable, be it what it may.

"Sir:—I have been reading the first number of your Review with deep attention and admiring interest. You have the power of doing good or evil beyond most men of our age and country, and with it a fearful responsibility. God has blessed you with a fearless heart, and a tongue, as you rightly say, 'trumpet-toned,' and, what is better, true to your heart's convictions. With those convictions mine harmonize, in many of the great points to which you call attention. But in some, to me, of all-absorbing interest, I believe you wrong, and think I see *why* you are wrong.

"Most truly do you set forth the *rights* and *powers* of the living Body of the Son of God. Of its *nature* and *office* you have yet to learn.

"How can *you*, who so powerfully appeal to the '*fact* of eighteen hundred years?' set aside the *historical* view, by which, alone, you get at that fact? *History* teaches you and the world, that the church of God *is*, and *has been*, through eighteen centuries. To history I appeal, to show *what* it is, (in its external development—its *shell*, in which the meat must be, and without which there can be no meat) and *where it has been*. By the same evidence by which I know that God has ordained a man, in and by whom to redeem and judge the world, by that same evidence I know *how* this life *has been* perpetuated, and *is to be*, until his coming again. The *inner life* of the church no history can touch—it is a thing of *experience*, and experience only. But the *organized* life of the one Body has been seen, heard, looked upon, and handled, from the day of the apostles until now. Your own beautiful adaptation of the fable of the quest of Isis seems excellently to point out the πρῶτον ψεῦδον of your present view of the church you are so nobly disposed to serve. *Why* did not Isis *succeed* in revivifying the re-collected fragments of the torn body of 'the good Osiris?' Because the *reproductive* organs had

been *lost*. Typhon had whelmed them in the sea—that symbol of the storm-tossed, noisy multitude, who have no ear for history, no eye for the seal of God's own signet. Were you right—which you most certainly are not—in supposing the sects to be the fragments, yet instinct with life, of Christ's living body, some *one* of them must *have*, and develope, the reproductive power, before that Body can be revivified by reuniting. You long for the *μία πίστις* and the *ἓν βάπτισμα*. How is it you have not seen that the latter must *precede* the former, and that *it* is the result of the *μία κλῆσις* (*ἡ κλῆσις* of Paul) which is *a thing of history*. Whom has God *commissioned* to baptize men *into* the Body of his Son ? and how is that *commission* known ? is *the* concerning question of our day. Settle that, and church authority can show itself, ay, and develope itself, too.

"But *your* theory of *development* is wrong. Most truly you assert a *continuous inspiration*. But of what kind? of invention? of addition? No ; but of *living breath*, of *vocal utterance*, of *articulate expression* of the ONE, unchangeable, changeless, Eternal Word. God changes not. Man changes not. The world changes not. Its phases are *phases* only ; the *one* message which was from the beginning, is now, and ever shall be. *With it* the church came into the world, and goes on her way through it. Her progress is a progress *toward eternity*, not *in time*.

"Go on, Sir, in your outspoken zeal ; but beware of speaking without *searching* further. You are yet but a '*forscher*' ; you have grappled a fragment of the truth, and a precious one, but not the whole. You have vibrated from your *ultra* Protestant position at the beginning of your course, to the other extreme of the arc of oscillation. You have yet to find the centre. Believe all you do of the church's *life*, and *work;* but neglect not her *organization*. You have but one half of the 'mystery' which Paul saw symbolized in human marriage. You know the church as the Body of Christ. You have yet to know her as his Bride, on whom he is ever begetting children, who are to her instead of fathers (Ps. 45.) the means of perpetuating herself in time and for eternity. You know the *being* and the *power* of the living Temple of the Almighty ; do not, I entreat you, blind yourself and others to its *mission*."

Our anonymous friend and correspondent mistakes, entirely, the questions we were discussing, and the general bearing of our remarks. If he had paid more attention to the questions we ourselves raised, and less to those with which he himself is preoccupied, he would have spared us his objections. In what we said on the church question, we were not required to enter largely into the question of the *nature* and *office* of the church.

We raised the question indeed, stated it to be the great and paramount question of the day; but we did not undertake to answer it, for we had, at that time, another object in view. Our real purpose was to show, 1. That, throughout

Christendom, there is a strong tendency to return to the unity and catholicity of the church; 2. That, to effect this return, it is necessary to take up the great question of the church itself; 3. That this question may be taken up and discussed in the freest and fullest manner, in any or all of our professedly Christian communions; 4. That the answer, the germs of which each sect may find in its present faith, so far as it believes in the church at all, once obtained, all particular communions will be destroyed, by being absorbed in the catholic communion.

Now, with what thought could we have written this? On what does our argument rest for its validity? And on what conditions could the means we suggested be adequate to the end we proposed? Supposing we understood ourselves, and were not merely sporting with our readers, we must have implied, what indeed we stated; 1. That men have broken away from the church because they have lost the sense of its profound significance; and, 2. That the recovery of this sense, that is, a full understanding of the true nature and office of the church, will bring them back to the one catholic communion, because, the moment they come to perceive the true nature and office of the church, they must perceive that a church not one and catholic, can be no church at all? Does this imply ignorance of the *nature* and *office* of the church on our part?

We assure our friend that, if he supposed we were suggesting a plan for making up, creating, or reconstructing a catholic church, he did us great injustice. Our inquiry was not, How may the church recover its unity and catholicity? but, How may professedly Christian communions find their way back to the one catholic church? The church has never lost its unity and catholicity, for it cannot lose them without ceasing to be the church of God. The church never stands in need of reform. The censures we bestowed, in our remarks, were not bestowed on the church as *an organization*, but on the church, in the modern Protestant sense, as *an assemblage of individuals;* that is, upon churchmen. The church was as pure in the days of Luther and Calvin, as it was in the days of the apostles, though, doubtless, many of its members, and some of its dignitaries, even, were corrupt, and abused their powers and privileges. The reform we demand is never of the institution, but of the individuals. We believe in no church that can ever need reforming.

We do not overlook the church as an *organization*, for the church, in any other sense, is to us no church at all. The church is an organic body, existing in time and space, under one visible as well as invisible Head, with one common centre of life, out from which, through communion, flows the life to all its members. We may, indeed, recognize a holy brotherhood, the spiritual priesthood, the invisible church, as some call it, composed of all holy persons, whether in this world or the other,—the grand communion of the saints; but this is not what we mean by the catholic church. The catholic church is the divinely instituted body to prepare us for admission into this glorious company of the saints. Like that Gospel net, it gathers all, both good and bad; for we come into it, not because we are sanctified, but that, through its ministries, we may be sanctified. Through its ministries Christ, who is its head, its life, and its efficacy, works for our redemption from sin, and reconciliation with the Father, and our practical holiness.

We do not set aside, nor count of little consequence, the *historical* view of the church. If our correspondent had read what we said, with a little more attention, he would not have suspected us of doing so. The Christian world is broken up into particular communions. Whence the cause? In the fact that churchmen have lost the profound significance of the church. What is the remedy? To take up the question of *the church itself*, and ascertain what it is, what its nature, rights, duties, mean. Now, this question, we said, and we say still, cannot be answered by the historical method of the Oxford divines; for the very simple reason that it is not a question which relates to the history of the church, but to its philosophy. The historical method is the proper method, when the question is, *which* is the church? but not when the question is, *what* is the church? And it was only in relation to this last question, that we asserted its insufficiency.

We do not agree with our correspondent as to the order in which the several problems, relating to the church, should be taken up. He wishes us to go, in the first place, into history, and ascertain *which* is the catholic church; and afterwards come to the question, *what* is the church. But, if we know not what the church is, before we go into history, how shall we know what to look for? Or how shall we know when we have or have not, found the catholic church? The great evil under which we suffer is not so

much *wrong*-churchism, as it is *no*-churchism. The great mass of the people have no real, serious, earnest belief, in the church at all. They see no necessity for it, nor why they cannot just as well commune with Christ without, as with, union with his body. Nay; they look upon the church as something interposed between them and Christ, and as separating them from him who is the life of the soul, instead of uniting them to him. It is, in fact, to the great mass, either a stumbling-block, or foolishness. They have lost the sense of the profound mystery of the Incarnation, and will own no church but what they term holy principle, by virtue of which, every man is, or may be, his own priest, and his own church. A reaction has, doubtless, commenced against this no-churchism; but the great mass are still unbelievers in the necessity of the church as the instrument, in the hands of God, of bringing us to Christ. Here is the fact our correspondent overlooks. He supposes the age already ripe for the question, *Which* is the church? But the age demands first, to be shown that any church at all is necessary. Before you appeal to history to determine what body God hath commissioned to baptize, you must prove that baptism itself is necessary, and that an outward divine commission to baptize is essential. Before all, then, we repeat it, the great question is, the question of *the church itself*. What is the church here for? What is its nature? What is its mission? What are its rights? What is its authority? What the ground of its authority? What the principle of its operation, and efficiency? These are the questions which are to be answered, and these are not to be answered by appeals to history, but by profound meditation on the philosophy of the church, and on the nature and constitution of things in general. These are great questions, and not to be answered by a few quotations from the fathers.

Nor is this all. Broach the question of which is the church, before men are well grounded in what the church is, and you only provoke the wrath of rival communions, aggravate the evils of sectarianism, already so intolerable, and put still further off the day of union and catholicity. There are some questions, which the wise man, however firmly persuaded in his own mind, will adjourn till they can be profitably discussed.

We accept what the writer of the letter says of the reproductive powers of the church, and should regard our-

selves as having made but little proficiency in our knowledge of the mystery whereby children are begotten unto the Lord, if we had yet to learn the church as the mystic Bride of the Lamb, or to be told that without a spiritual mother there can be no spiritual births. The *πρῶτον ψεῦδον*, of which he speaks, is the very mother falsehood into which we did not fall, and the very last we could possibly be guilty of, with our general doctrine concerning the genesis and transmission of life. It is not safe always to infer one's ignorance from one's silence.

We did not represent sects, which are so far removed as to have absolutely no intercommunion, and absolutely no access to the common centre of life, as *living* fragments of Christ's body. We stated, that the church, understood as the great body of professed believers in Christ, exists, at present, in a broken and fragmentary state; and we contended that each fragment has some portion of Christian life. Can this be denied? Will any man with his eyes open, at least, with his heart open, contend that any one Christian communion extant contains, within its own pale, all the Christian life now circulating in Christendom? Will Protestants deny that there is a Christian life within the pale of the Catholic communion? Not unless they are mad. Will Catholics say there is nothing of Christian life in any of our Protestant communions? They may say our life is feeble, and that the fruit we bear is rich neither in abundance nor in flavor; but they will not say that we have no Christian life at all, that we are absolutely cut off from all communion with Christ. We contended, and we still contend, and pray God that we ever may contend, if it be necessary, that all sects, *not as sects*, but as professing Christians, however they got it, or get it, do exhibit somewhat of the Christian spirit, have, in some degree, partaken of the divine life which God in Christ has communicated to the world. Then, all these communions are, in some way, connected with Christ, and to be reckoned in our account of his body.

Yet, it does not follow from this, that we deny the church to be a single organic body, or that we reject apostolic succession and canonical appointment. By contending that there is a Christian life in each sect, we do not, necessarily, contend that each sect has a valid and sufficient ministry. All we have contended is, that the ministry of each sect is sufficiently valid to authorize it to labor, with all zeal and

diligence, to bring its own communion into Christian fellowship with the one catholic apostolic communion. If you find yourself invested with authority in a revolted province, you have the right to exercise that authority for the maintenance of order and the restoration of the authority of the legitimate sovereign. More than this we did not contend for, because more than this was not required by our argument. Doubtless, a further question may be raised, but into that we do not enter.

Our correspondent is, unquestionably, a churchman. He ought, then, to comprehend us, and perceive, at once, what we were contending for, even though not explicitly stated. We were not discussing the question in its bearing on individuals, but on communions. We contended that the question, between the several particular communions and the catholic communion, should not be regarded as a question between the church and paganism or Mahometanism, nor as a question between the church and individuals not professing to be members of Christ's body. It must be regarded as a question between communions, separated by what, in technical language, is called a schism. The *heresy*, be there more or less of it, is abandoned, the moment we become willing to hear and obey the church. We will suppose, then, that the several communions have come to comprehend and believe the church, to own, and to be willing to come under, its authority; the question which now comes up concerns simply the schism. The schism is now to be healed; and we contend that it is to be healed without the particular communion being required to break up its religious order, or give up its ministry. Congregations may come into communion with the church, through their bishops or pastors. The question concerns, then, the conditions of canonical communion for the clergy of the several sects; and this question, which is of great importance in its practical bearings, we proposed should be settled, as it easily may be, on catholic principles, by a new council. Are we understood?

But we are told, in addition, that "some *one* of the sects must have and develop the reproductive power of the church." We believe we understand this. It means, we suppose, that only one of the existing communions has a truly apostolic ministry. As to this, much may be said, and we must be careful that analogies do not lead us away from the truth. We, however, willingly concede, that the

reproductive power of the church is indivisible; for, if it could be divided, and become the property of distinct communions, no argument could be offered for unity and catholicity; in fact, the unity and catholicity of the church would be words without meaning. If, then, we assume that the church still exists, unmutilated, in all the fullness of its reproductive energy, we must, undoubtedly, assume that the reproductive power, and the reproductive organs, are possessed by one communion alone, and that the rest, if they have life at all, can have it, only through communion with that one.

But, it is possible, that the reproductive energy, though still retained, is, by the disruption of Christendom, somewhat impaired in the communion which still retains it. We admit that there is still the one catholic apostolic communion, unbroken: but the power and efficiency of that communion, in generating and communicating life, though not destroyed, are yet greatly impaired, and, to no little extent, rendered inoperative by our sectarian divisions. The Evangelist says, Christ "did not many mighty works" in a certain place, "on account of their unbelief." The same thing happens to the church itself. Not merely they who are in a state of schism suffer, but the whole body suffers, and no longer performs, unimpeded, its proper functions. The whole church suffers by the distractions and divisions of the so-called Christian world. This is wherefore we speak of it as the torn and bleeding, though it be still the living, body of Christ. We say, then, the reproductive energy, though still retained by the Catholic church, is not possessed by even that church, at present, in all its vigor. A work is necessary to be done before it can resume its functions, and prosecute its labors with the requisite energy and success. It is not a reform *within* that it needs, but the removal of obstructions from without. It is the church, the Catholic Apostolic church, the spiritual mother of us all, but, alas! not the church in full strength, full glory, and full operation. This is the ground we take, because it is obviously true, and involves no contradiction of Catholic principles.

But waiving this; we go further, and maintain, that all communion with the one Catholic church has never been entirely cut off. The regular channels may have been blocked up, and the communication become irregular, feeble, and insufficient; still, there has been, and is continued, *some* communion, through which, Christian life may,

and does, find its way from the heart to the extremities. How this can be, we hold ourselves abundantly able to show, and will show, on some future occasion. We will only say now, that, while we contend earnestly for a regular apostolic ministry, as indispensable, essential, to the very being of the church, yet, we are not prepared to say, that Christian life can be communicated only by the laying on of the hands of the bishop. Apostolic succession and canonical appointment have a profounder significance than some formal, narrow-minded churchmen suspect. The Gospel is a system of realism, and everywhere acknowledges the *Real Presence*. The Holy Ghost dwells in the church not merely by way of promise and external appointment, but *really*, in the fullness of his life-giving energy. The divine life enters into every holy man, and every holy woman. Communion with the holy, even though they are not in orders, is a medium of life. A virtue goes out from every good and pious Christian. We cannot meet and converse with a saintly man or woman, for one half-hour, without receiving a divine *influence*, as well as impulse. A holy energy is imparted to us, and we never can be again what we were. In this way, every true Christian becomes, in some sense, a priest, and diffuses the Christian life even beyond the sphere of the regular priesthood. Here is the significance of that promise, "I will make you priests and kings." We must not, in our laudable endeavours to sustain the outward priesthood, overlook this glorious and blessed spiritual priesthood. Doubtless, we should speak with great delicacy, and maintain great soberness in our views, lest we run into the errors, extravagances, and absurdities of the old Montanists. We must, undoubtedly, take care not to make our views of this priesthood a pretext for fanaticism, irregularity, and abuse of the regular ministry. It does not everride, supersede, or oppose, the regular priesthood; but operates under it, in harmony with it,—continues and extends its influence. Within its legitimate sphere, the Catholic church has always asserted it, and it was only the abuse of it, it condemned in the Montanistic heresy. Now, who can say how much of Christian life has been diffused by this spiritual priesthood, by the lives of holy men and women, far beyond the sphere of the *direct* operations of the regular ministry? Here is a subject deserving more consideration than it usually receives from churchmen.

Then, again, the sects have not yet exhausted all the life

generated and communicated by the church, prior to the disruption of the Christian world in the sixteenth century, sustained to some degree, as it has been, by the Bible, the literature of the church, and numerous foundations and social institutions, all running back and having their root in the church, prior to that epoch. Moreover, all have, in various ways, participated in the life generated by the labors of the church since that epoch, which, though not equal to its previous labors, yet have not been altogether inefficacious. The church is the city of God, an illuminated city, set on a hill, and sends out its rays to enlighten many who dwell not within its walls.

We have no room to treat at length the theory of development, which our correspondent so positively condemns, nor to rebuke him, as he deserves, for *his* theory of pantheistic immobility. The church contains, 1. The Life; 2. The *philosophy* of the Life. The Life is the principle, the law, the indwelling force, or energy, and is, strictly speaking, the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete. This changes not; but its assimilation to human nature, and practical realization in the life of man and of men, is a progressive work, and involves development and growth.

The philosophy of the church, that is, its exposition, interpretation, and practical application of the law of life, must needs be subject to development and growth. In this mutable world, and changing life, new questions are perpetually coming up, or old questions in new forms, which are to be decided. The written Word, no doubt, contains the principle, the law applicable to each particular case; but the application itself demands an authoritative interpreter. The law does not change, but men's views of it change, and so do the questions to which it needs to be applied. The outward *form* and *discipline* of the church, while the principles of each remain unaltered and unalterable, may often need modifying, to adapt them to the altered conditions of society. The church, we contend, has the inherent power to make such alterations in them, from time to time, as in her wisdom are necessary; and this power she has always claimed and exercised. No man will venture to say, that the outward form, the usages, and discipline of the Catholic church, have remained unvaried from the time of the apostles.

Similar remarks may be made in respect to general science and philosophy. Nothing that concerns fundamental prin-

ciples can be altered; but the exposition of these principles is always affected more or less by the state of science, and the prevailing philosophy, at the time it is made. It may so happen, that the church may sanction an exposition, which, though true in substance, shall yet be faulty in form; for, while the truth is universal and eternal, the form, under which it is set forth, may be local and temporary. At the time of setting it forth, this form may be as necessary as the Greek language when speaking to Greeks, or the Latin when addressing the Romans; but subsequently, when other modes of thought and expression have become current, it may prove inadequate, and become the occasion of misapprehension and error. Instances of this kind could be enumerated. The church, in all cases of this kind, needs the power to revise; and to adopt such new forms of expression as will better convey her exact sense. The church should also have the power to appropriate to herself all the solid improvements, or real discoveries, which may be made, from time to time, in general philosophy, physical science, or any department of human knowledge; for her office is to blend in one harmonious whole, in one person, so to speak, the human and divine, what is supernaturally derived and what is obtained by the natural exercise of our faculties.

Now, here, in short, is what we mean by the power of the church, to develope and apply to practical life, the great principles of life contained in the Gospel. In claiming this power for her, we have not gone beyond her own theory, though we contend that she has reluctantly submitted to practise always on this theory. But she may assert it, and fearlessly conform to it, for, as the church of God, she possesses a *continuous inspiration*, which gives her the right and the ability to interpret and apply the law. We did not imply that this inspiration revealed new principles, but merely stated that it authoritatively interprets and applies what is already contained in the Gospel. We are afraid our correspondent overlooks the fact, that Christ *dwells*, in the person of the Holy Ghost, in the church, and that he, therefore, sees in the church no ability but what is derived from external appointment and promise. If so, we tell him he has yet to learn what means the mystery of the *Real Presence*, without which, Christianity were a mere system of philosophy, and the church nothing but a collection of dead forms, arrogant pretensions, and senseless ceremonies.

That we are still a "*forscher*," we own, but we hope we

are sometimes, at least, a *finder*, as well as a seeker. Perhaps, we shall be able to satisfy our good friend, if he will wait patiently, that we have found more things than he is disposed to give us credit for. We have many things to say which we have not yet said. But all in good time. On this question of the church, we are sure of our ground, for we are attempting no innovation. We see very clearly the end to be reached, and the road that leads to it; but we must be allowed to proceed at our own pace. We cannot be tempted to turn aside, either to the right hand or to the left, to please, or to avoid displeasing, friend or foe; nor to engage in any discussion which we hold to be premature, or not likely to be profitable to the cause of unity and catholicity.

With regard to the personal fling at our supposed *vibration* from one extreme to another, we can only say, that we are quite accustomed to such flings, or, if the writer prefers, such admonitions. But we have never been able to persuade ourselves, that the *via media* between truth and error, God and man, life and death, as much as we have heard said in its praise, is either the pleasantest or the safest road. A church, which is the mean between the two extremes, has no attractions for us. Death is to us none the less ghastly and repulsive for being decked out in festive robes, and surmounted with cap and plume. Truth is always an extreme view. Either there is life for us or there is not. If there is life for us, as we believe there is, it must be derived either from God or from man. Protestantism, pushed to its extreme principles, derives it from man, and puts man in the place of God, as we may see in all the political, economical, and philosophical theories to which it has given birth. If it is right, if man be sufficient for man, then let us say so, and be consistent with ourselves. But if man is not sufficient for man, and if life can come only from God, then let us take the other extreme, and seek life from God alone, through the only medium, so far as we know, that he has established.

NO CHURCH, NO REFORM.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1844.]

Believing in and desiring the return of the Christian world to the unity and catholicity of the church, I propose now to offer some reasons which, in my judgment, go to prove that the question of this return is the first and paramount question of our age and country; because, till this question is settled, and the church rehabilitated in its authority and glory, no scheme of practical reform, individual or social, political or industrial, can be successfully attempted. In the present article I attempt to establish only the proposition, No Church, no Reform; in another article, I shall continue the discussion, and endeavour to demonstrate the impossibility of succeeding without the unity and catholicity of the church as an outward visible body or institution, through which will be given us one Lord, one faith, one baptism, or, in other words, unity of faith and discipline.

I do not know that I can take any better method of explaining or of establishing my first proposition, than to state the problems of social reform as they have come up in my own mind, and the difficulties in the way of their practical solution, which I have encountered in my own experience.

It is now over twenty years since my attention was first called to questions of social reform, and I was led to reflect on the discrepancies which everywhere exist between society as it is, and society as all, in their serious moments, feel that it should be. I was struck, as have been so many others, with the wide disparity of social conditions, the general degradation of the operative classes, and the immense advantages which capital, in our industrial systems, holds over labor. I soon discovered that the whole tendency of modern industry is to separate capital and labor, and to create a numerous proletarian class, whom the representatives of capital may coerce into laboring for the mere minimum of human subsistence, and whose labor must depreciate in value to themselves nearly in the ratio of its productiveness. From that moment I was seized with a passion for social reform, and solemnly consecrated myself to the work

of discovering and applying a remedy to the evils I saw and deplored.

My first solution of the problem was sought in the principle of *selfishness*. The *causes* of existing evils, I assumed to be in the vicious organization of society. Society, as at present organized, creates everywhere an antagonism of interests. Rewards are not proportional to works. We pay a premium for iniquity. The priest lives by our sins; the lawyer by our quarrels; the doctor by our diseases. So is it everywhere. It is for the interest of the trader to cheat —to buy under value, to sell over value; it is for the interest of the master to oppress the workman, by paying the least possible wages for the greatest possible amount of work; of the workman to oppress the master, by getting the greatest possible amount of wages for the least possible amount of labor. Thus is the interest of one everywhere opposed to the interest of another; and every man, in pursuing his own interest, must needs, as far as possible, overreach and supplant every other man.

If the *causes* of social evils are in the universal antagonism of interests, the remedy must be sought in so remodelling society as to harmonize the interest of each with the interests of all. How shall society be remodelled so as to effect this result? This was the problem, and, no doubt, a problem not easily solved. But, at the time it first came up, I regarded the difficulty as extrinsic, rather than intrinsic. The difficulty lies, I said, in the fact, that attention is turned elsewhere. Instead of turning their attention to the solution of this problem, men are wasting their time, their thoughts, and their energies, in seeking to escape imaginary tortures in an imaginary hell. And why is it so? It is all the work of the priests, who have an interest in our sins, and, therefore, an interest in preventing us from ameliorating our condition. They must keep us poor and miserable, in order to maintain their influence over us. Men take refuge in heaven, only when they despair of the earth. Then, Down with the priests! and, as the church creates the demand for priests, then, Down with the church! and, as the church rests on faith in, and worship of, unseen powers, then, Down with all religious faith and worship! We must drop from the airy heavens to the solid earth, dismiss the fables of the priests, and betake ourselves to the acquisition of genuine science. As soon as we do this, we shall be able

to solve the problem, and convert the earth into the abode of science, peace, and plenty.

All this was plausible, and in harmony with the general tendency of thought and speculation, for the last hundred and fifty years, throughout what are regarded as the more advanced nations of Christendom. What wonder, then, that it captivated, for a time, a young socialist, feeling, in his own heart every wound inflicted upon the heart of his brethren? I found, as I supposed, the priests, the church, religious faith and worship in my way, and I merely sought to clear the path for my onward progress. Well, these all cleared away, so far as I myself was concerned, I proceeded to solve the problem, and solved it, not by *Communism*, as did Robert Owen, but by *Association* and *Attractive Industry*, as did Charles Fourier. I do not claim to have drawn out, in my own mind, a complete system of association, nor to have established all the laws of attractive labor; I had not arranged all the details; but I do claim to have seized all the great principles of the practical part of Fourierism, long before Fourier's name was heard of in this country, and even before it had attracted much, if any, notice in his own. My plan was, to organize men and women into corporations, in which the capital should be held by the corporators as joint-tenants, and the profits be shared by each, according to his or her works. The corporation or community was also to be a school of science, literature, and art, in which science and art should combine to render both labor and study pleasant and attractive.

But the solution obtained, the remedy found, there remained the serious difficulty of reducing it to practice. How to get the remedy applied? The machine is cunningly devised, beautifully constructed, and will work admirably, if it be only once set a-going. But it will not set itself a-going. I must then have some power, by which to put it in operation. Whence this power? Selfishness, or each man's sense of his own interest, will keep it in motion, after it is once fairly in operation; but will it suffice to set it a-going? In my simplicity and inexperience I thought it would. Was it not for every man's interest to adopt the plan? What, then, had I to do, but to show men that it was for their interest to adopt it? Alas! a short experiment satisfied me that I had reckoned without my host. It required, for its introduction, that very union of interests, which I proposed its introduction to effect. Then, how,

without its aid, get men, now separated, and mutually repellant, through prevailing antagonism of interests, to unite, and to coöperate for its introduction? I need, then, the effect of the successful operation of my plan, as the condition of putting it into operation! This will not do. Selfishness, then, will hardly suffice as the motive power.

Is it not so? Here am I, sacrificing my time, my substance, my reputation, my health, for the purpose of remedying social evils. Am I selfish? Am I governed solely by a sense of my own interest? Not at all. Can the reform be effected without similar sacrifices? No. There must be some individuals, at least, who are governed by disinterested motives, and who are capable of making great sacrifices. Then, no reform without the presence and activity of a non-selfish element, that is to say, without benevolence, disinterestedness, sacrifice.

But, after all, is it so certain that selfishness will suffice for the successful operation of the machine, even when once put into operation? Of what is society, as it now is, the result? Of absolute selfishness, and nothing else? No; selfish as men have been, and are, there has been more or less of disinterestedness at work from the first. Abstract what is due to this, and leave only what is due to selfishness alone, and shall we have any thing better? Then, how maintain, after all, this exquisite harmony in the community, where each individual member regards himself as the centre of the world, and labors continually to make all gravitate towards himself? Can there possibly be a common centre of gravity, where there are, say, fifteen hundred separate centres, all equally attractive? Or can equilibrium be maintained, if the centres be unequal? The community, organized on selfish principles, can be nothing but a community of inherently repellant and antagonist forces, and its only bond of union must needs be the principle of absolute and universal disunion. Then I shall need love, disinterestedness, sacrifice, not only to introduce my plan, but also to secure its successful operation.

Here, then, in a new difficulty. Men now are selfish, and the love, disinterestedness, and power of sacrifice, needed to effect the reform, they do not possess. We have them not; how shall we get them? The discovery of the necessity of a non-selfish order of sentiments brought me out of the cold and heartless philosophy of the eighteenth century, and intro-

duced me into a new moral region. I now found myself alongside of the gifted and philanthropic Channing, with whom, in my humble way, I became a fellow-laborer. But my difficulties were not removed. The problem, how to get the love, the disinterested affections, the power of self-sacrifice, continued to torment me.

Meditation on this problem brought me back, in some degree, to the Gospel, which placed the excellence of character in love, charity, fraternity. Its first and great commandment was, that we love one another as Jesus hath loved us; that is, well enough, if need be, to die on the cross for our fellow-men. Well, here in Christianity, said I, for which, in name, at least, men still have some respect, I shall find the motive power I need. Cheered and animated, I went forth and preached the Gospel of love, charity, brotherhood, and many were the burning words I let fall, and not altogether in vain. But, alas! I was not yet through with my difficulties. I could stand up and say to men, "Love one another; be ready to die for one another;" but this would not make them love. It was merely saying, "Be ye warmed, be ye filled, be ye clothed," while I imparted not the things whereof they had need. What the corrupt and selfish, who were oppressing their brethren, and through whose want of love the world was made a vale of tears and a field of blood, most needed, was, not to be told their duty, but to be made to do it; not to know that they *ought* to love, but to be actually induced to love. They would assent to my preaching, they would applaud my zeal, tell me I was preaching the true Gospel, and then go and sin as before. I might preach, till doomsday, the Gospel of love; but, unless I had some power to infuse the *power* of love, "the power to become the sons of God," into their hearts, man would continue, as of old, to be the plague and tormentor of his kind. No. I have not got hold of the lever yet. It is in vain that men are told what the Gospel demands, if there be not the authority to discipline them into obedience; in vain that I demand the disinterested affections, unless I can impart the power that calls them forth. Men are not redeemed by the teachings of Christ, but by Christ himself, by his being formed in them, the wisdom of God and the power of God, and through his indwelling Spirit constituting them sons of God, and heirs of the heavenly inheritance.

We have erred, and been carried away into vague speculations, windy declamations, and idle sermonizings. Modern

sects seem to take it for granted, that all Jesus was needed for was, to remove, in a forensic sense, certain obstacles in the way of our salvation on the side of God, and simply to teach us what we ought to be and to do, in order to be saved. I came, with Dr. Channing, to the conclusion, that the Christian life is the life of disinterestedness, charity, brotherhood, that whoever has the spirit of Christ is a true Christian; and I then assumed the Christian life as the means of effecting the social reforms I contemplated. Wherein was I wrong? Is not the Christian life the life of pure, disinterested love? And will not this life, if lived, effect all needed reforms? Unquestionably. But Christian life is the end, reforms are only the means of attaining to it. When we live that life, we have already all good, and no evil can befall us. Nor is this all. How shall we get men to live the life of Christ? If men only lived the life of Christ, we should have no difficulty; but the evil is, they do not live this life, and the very question is, How to induce them to live it?

Here is a difficulty, out of which Dr. Channing and my Unitarian friends did not help me. They said, and said truly, that we are Christians only by living the life of Christ; they said, and said truly, that the fruits of this life are love, charity, brotherhood; but the means of inducing men to live this life they did not tell. This is the great and troublesome question. How shall we answer it? Shall we say, Come to Christ, and all needed wisdom and power to live the life shall be imparted? Doubtless the wisdom and power we need are Christ himself, and all who come to him will receive them. But what means this *coming* to Christ? To come to Christ is, to come into *moral harmony* with him, to obey the divine law, and to be one with God. He who has come to Christ, in this sense, already lives the Christian life. To propose coming to Christ, as the means of obtaining the power to live the Christian life, is to tell a man to live that life as the condition of obtaining the ability to live it!

No, this will not do. Here is the man morally dead, and nothing will answer that does not reach him where he is, and raise him to life. What is not able to raise the dead, to say to those dead in trespasses and sins, and who, therefore, are without power in and of themselves to move, "Come forth," as said the Voice to Lazarus in his grave, will be inadequate to the demand. You tell me, and you tell me

truly, that Christ is this power, that it is he who can, and who does, raise the dead; but death and life do not stand in immediate relation, Christ and the sinner stand at the opposite poles. Some medium, then, is needed, to connect the two extremes, to bring the unholy within the sphere of the influence of the holy. It is Christ, indeed, that comes, but only through his prepared body, his ministry, that reaches the sinner where he is, and begets him to moral life and soundness.

The sinner, we are told, comes to Christ by faith; but, prior to his coming, he can exercise only the *sinner's* faith, which, from the nature of the case, cannot be a faith that unites him to Christ; but, at best, only a faith that brings him to the baptismal font. The faith that makes him one with Christ, which is "the evidence of things not seen, and the substance of things hoped for,"—a faith which overcomes the world, and enables him to hold communion with the Father,—the blessed privilege of the true disciple,—is not possible to the sinner before he has been raised from the dead, and made alive in Christ. It cannot be proposed, then, as the means of obtaining the wisdom and the power which we need, in order to live the true life of Christ; for it is itself the fruit of that wisdom and power. It is a product, not of the moral state in which the sinner is before regeneration, but of that moral state into which regeneration introduces him. So faith cannot serve as the medium of bringing us into moral harmony with Christ, because it is itself a result of that harmony, and presupposes it.

There can be no doubt, that, to a certain extent, the preacher is the medium through which Christ and the sinner are brought into relation, but he is not, and cannot be, a sufficient medium. Here is the rock on which all modern reformers split. They proceed on the hypothesis, that, if men do but come to a knowledge of what the truth demands, there is no difficulty as to the practical realization. They begin by calling a true *doctrine* of truth, the *truth* itself, and then, because the truth has always the inherent power to sanctify, conclude the doctrine will realize itself. Proclaim the truth, say they, and it will make to itself hands, erect the temple, and institute the practical worship of God. So I for a long time believed, preached, and wrote. But such is not the fact. The fallacy is not, that truth is not vital, puissant, and able to do to the uttermost all we ask of it, but in the fact that what we proclaim as the truth is not

the truth, but the *philosophy* of truth. Truth is the living power, the ontological principle; not, as we too often, in our shallow philosophy, define it, the agreement of our ideas with their objects. The doctrines we preach may be true, and are true, so far as they give a correct view of the truth, but they are not truth itself. They may be important, indispensable, in bringing us to the truth, within the sphere of the influence of the living ontological Principle; but it is not our belief in them that gives us the power to will and to do, but truth itself, that of which they are true doctrines. Our theory of truth, that is, our philosophy, may be adequate and sound, yet it by no means suffices for our redemption and sanctification. Here is the profound *realism* of the Gospel, and here we see how opposed to it are our modern conceptualisms and nominalisms. The church condemned as heretics both Roscelinc and Abélard.

Nor are we obliged to rest here. All history comes in confirmation of this conclusion as to the inefficacy of theory, of doctrine, or philosophy, however true or sound it may be. We may regard Christianity under two points of view. Under one point of view, it is the eternal Word; not the word which God spoke, but which God speaks. In this sense, it is the Word incarnated, "God manifest in the flesh," for the salvation of men. We may also regard it, under another point of view, as the *philosophy* of this eternal, and living, and therefore creative Word. In this last sense, it is philosophy, or theology; that is, a doctrine, or rather *the* doctrine of life; not doctrine of life because it gives life, for the Word gives life only as being life itself, but because it explains the origin, principle, and genesis of life. Now, in this sense, as a philosophy, Christianity is older than the Advent of our Saviour. Plato had many very just views of Christian truth; Cicero, Apollonius of Tyana, Seneca, and others, taught morals not at all inferior to those we find in the gospel. The best instructed Christian may study, even to-day, many of the productions of gentile philosophers and moralists with advantage, and find much to illustrate and confirm his faith in the doctrines of the New Testament. Yet what have these philosophers and moralists done for the world? They wrought no moral or social revolution, changed no old customs, abolished no superstitious practices. They in no sense purified the national religion, or the national manners. Rome, after her own great moralists and her acquaintance with Grecian philosophy, became

more corrupt than ever, and her religion degenerated from its ancient grandeur and severity into Bacchic orgies and Isiac obscenities and prostitutions. Why was this? and why, the moment the same doctrines are taken up and preached by a few humble fishermen and tent-makers, do they found an institution which changes the whole face of the moral world, just in proportion as it extends, and which subsists, even to this day, in all the freshness and vigor of an immortal life? Because the philosophers had only doctrines, and because the fishermen and tent-makers had, besides the doctrines, that of which the doctrine treated,—Truth itself; for they communicated not merely the words of Christ, but Christ crucified, the wisdom of God, and the power of God, —him who declares himself to be the way, the truth, and the life.

Our blessed Saviour did not come merely to teach the truth, for he was it; he did not come to establish a true philosophy, for he was that of which all sound philosophy is the doctrine. The purpose of his mission into this world was to found the kingdom of God on earth, which should be the Kingdom of kingdoms, and in which he should live and reign as King of kings and Lord of lords. His apostles were able to build up this Kingdom, because he was with them, and they had him by whom all things are created, and were, therefore, able, through him, to do all things. There was with them, living in them, and acting through them, the very creative Word which had framed the worlds, and by whose energy all creation is sustained, and by whose life all creatures live. Thus were they powerful; thus were they able to overcome the world, and to establish the kingdom of God. But if they had had only the doctrine, they could have founded no kingdom. What could they have done, as simple teachers, beyond what had been already done by the great philosophers and moralists of the gentile world? Philosophy has never founded any thing, has never been an institutor. All its creations are confined to a narrow space, and limited to a brief period of time. Where are the institutions of the early sects, which undertook to build on doctrines? Where is a single institution that was founded on a doctrine? No greater constructive genius ever appeared than John Calvin. He undertook to organize the reformation, and to found the reformed church. Where are his institutions now? Are they living realities? No; they are merely a heavy volume

called *Christian Institutes*, lying on the shelves of a few theologians, rarely read, still more rarely studied. All Protestant sects undertake to build on doctrine, and they all fail, and universal Protestantdom complains of disorganization, of anarchy, chaos, and cries out, from the depths of its misery, for reform, for reorganization, for a living institution. We are authorized by all experience to say, that the power men need to work out their salvation, social or individual, must come through the communion of truth, of God, not merely through the communication of a just view of God, or of God's Word. "Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you."

Assuming, now, that the speculative knowledge of truth, or a just view of truth, will not suffice, then we can receive the power we need only by some ministry which can communicate truth itself, the *Real Presence*. No scheme of reform, then, is, or can be, practicable, that does not bring along with it the "wisdom of God, and the power of God," for its own realization. It must be an institution embodying the Holy Ghost, and able to communicate the Holy Ghost. We say an institution. If it be a doctrine, it will be inadequate; if it is the truth uninstituted, it is beyond our reach. Truth, as pure spirit, is for us as if it were not. We ourselves, not being pure spirit, but the union of spirit and body, can come into immediate relation with spirit, and commune immediately with it, only as it is, like ourselves, the *union* of spirit and body; consequently, we can stand in immediate relation with the truth only as it is embodied. Here is the profound significance of the Incarnation, and wherefore it is always Immanuel, or God with us, "God manifest in the flesh," that redeems and sanctifies.

Let us try our reformers by this test. We will take up, for instance, Fourierism. This proposes to reform the world by means of Association and Attractive Industry. Well, is Fourierism truth, or is it only a doctrine of truth? It is a doctrine. Is the truth, of which it is a doctrine, embodied, instituted, on the earth? No. Then Fourierism, granting it to be a just view of truth, a true account, as it professes to be, of the laws of the Creator, will amount to nothing. Go even further; assert and establish its identity with Christian philosophy, it amounts to just as little, for Christianity is not efficacious as the philosophy of truth, but as the truth itself.

But assuming Fourierism to be truth, and not a mere

theory of truth, it could not answer your purpose; for it is, at best, merely truth in the abstract, truth unembodied. It was not born, as is the living child, the union of spirit and body; it was not born, as was the church, the Spirit of Truth that leadeth into all truth embodied, or instituted; therefore, was not born a *living* thing. It is not *living* truth,—at least to us. How, then, can it give life? or accomplish a work of social renovation and growth?

But, waiving this, and taking Fourier to be merely a seer of truth, and recorder of what he saw, then, Fourierism is only a theory. Grant, if you will, that it is a true theory, though this is more than we believe, it is only a theory, and can change nothing in human affairs, save as it is reduced to practice. It is not yet the actual solution of the social problem, but merely its theoretical solution, and must be applied before it can be an actual solution. Where, then, is your power to apply it? This power is not in the theory itself; otherwise it would not remain a theory. Then it must be obtained, if obtained at all, from abroad. The life is not in your theory, and, therefore, you must obtain, from some other source, the power to give it life. Whence will you obtain this power? From the human heart? Not at all; for has not our falsely organized society perverted the human heart, and is it not expressly to rectify this perverted human heart, to bring it into harmony with what you call the laws of the Creator, that you propose the practical realization of Fourierism? If the human heart, all perverted as you allege, has the power to realize Fourierism, then Fourierism is not needed. If it is needed, then the human heart cannot give you the power you need to realize it. You must look, then, elsewhere, or abandon its realization.

Will you obtain the power from man, without stopping to specify whether from head or heart, or both combined? You then assume that man, in case he has the true theory of life, has, in himself, the power to realize it. That is, teach a man what he ought to do, and he has the power, without further assistance, to do it. This, we suppose, is the doctrine of the Fourierists, as of all reformers; for they all tell us that ignorance is the cause of all vice and evil. Let us see if this be so. We have seen that the history of the race, thus far, gives no support to this hypothesis. But, Platonists as we are, we shall not question the fact, that all ideas, whether human or otherwise, have a certain potency, and can and do, produce cer-

tain effects. Nor shall we deny that man has, within given limits, the power to realize his own ideas, or views of truth; for we hold, that man was created in the likeness of his Maker, and is, therefore, essentially creative. But all man's creations must be *inferior* to what he himself is, at the moment of creating. He can, then, realize no ideas, the realization of which transcends himself.

But Fourierism is proposed as a scheme of reform, and its realization is intended to be something superior to what man now is. To say, then, that he has power to reduce it to practice, must be either to deny that its realization would be a reform, or else to assert that man's creations may surpass himself, the stream rise higher than the fountain, the creature be greater than the creator. If, then, your Fourierism is to be the introduction of something superior to what is, you cannot obtain from man the power to introduce it. Whence, then, will you obtain the power?

Do you reply, that, to admit our objection, is to deny to man the inherent power of progress. Admitted. What then? This inherent power of progress is precisely what we have all along been denying, and that man does not possess it is the very thing we are endeavouring to demonstrate. From man you can get only man, and from perverted man, only perverted man. In order to get a product surpassing society as it now is, one of your factors, at least, must be superior to what society, as it now is, can furnish. Granted, your Fourierism sees a truth superior to what now is, yet the *seeing*, the conception itself, does not transcend what is, and, therefore, brings into society no power which it has not already. You can have in your product only the sum of the powers of your factors; and, if the factors are both taken from existing society, how can the product transcend existing society? Add, subtract, multiply, and it is always existing society, and nothing else. Man, we say very positively, and on a higher than human authority, is never able, of himself alone, to work out his own redemption. Nor is he, in himself, inherently progressive. This innate capacity of improvement, about which we talk so much in modern times, is all moonshine. Man is progressive, indefinitely progressive, *but only by virtue of a wisdom and a power not his own*, and which are graciously communicated to him from him "who is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption."

Suppose you undertake to realize Fourierism; either your

phalanx cannot get into operation at all, or it will only reproduce, under another form, all the evils of the existing social order. Aggregate your sixteen hundred and eighty persons in your phalanx, arrange them in your groups and series, and what have you got? Simply, the sum of moral life they brought with them. You have obtained no accession of life, no increase; and how, without an increase of moral life, are you to obtain a result superior to what you had to begin with? Will you say, "In union there is strength?" So there is, but only the sum of the strength of the parts. In the union of aggregation there is nothing more.

Here is the fundamental vice of all modern schemes of reform. All our reformers proceed on the false assumption that man is sufficient for his own redemption, and, therefore, are trying always with man alone to recover the long lost Eden, or to carry us forward to a better Eden. Here is the terrible sin of modern times. We vote God out of the state; we vote him out of our communities; and we concede him only a figurative, a symbolical relation with our churches, denying almost universally the Real Presence, and sneering at it as a popish error; we plant ourselves on the all-sufficiency of man, and then wonder that we fail, and that, after three hundred years of efforts at reform, nothing is gained, and a true state of society seems to be as far off as ever. Three hundred years of experiments and failures ought to suffice, one would think, to teach us, that no reforms, if at all worthy of the name, are ever possible, save by means of a more than human power. Men may cavil at this statement as they will, call us all the hard names for making it they please; but all experience asserts it, all sound philosophy demonstrates it, and all history confirms it.

But we shall be told, that this more than human power is granted us; and so it is, in God's own way, by the ministries he has appointed, and we have no right to expect it in any other way, or through any other medium. "But it is granted us in our higher nature, purer instincts, nobler aspirations, sublimer ideals." Nonsense! Go prattle this to beardless boys, and pretty misses in their teens, but talk it not to men with beards on their faces. Man is man, neither more nor less; with one simple nature, which is human nature. His instincts, aspirations, ideals, are himself, and, however lofty they may be, do not carry him

above himself. All the power that he has in this way is human power, and gives him no superhuman aid. Either he is sufficient for himself, or he is not. If he is not, you bring him not the power he needs, when you only bring him what he already has.

"But these are the divine in man." When is this Babel speech to end? When you call the tendencies, instincts, aspirations, of man divine, save so far as quickened by divine influences, that is, by the inflowings of divine efficacy *ab extra*, what do you but identify the human and divine natures, and either declare God to be man, or man to be God? If you identify man with God, what do you, when you demand reform, but blasphemously assert that it is God himself that needs reforming? Do you not also see, that all the divinity you get, by speaking of man's nature as divine, avails you nothing? What in this way do you get that transcends human nature? What do you get that man has not had from the beginning? These instincts, these nobler faculties of which you speak, are man himself, and, therefore, must needs be with him wherever he is, and as active as he himself. If, with all this divinity in his nature, and as active as he himself, man has been able to run into all the errors, vices, and crimes, and to undergo all the perversions, of which this very society you are seeking to reform is the exponent, what, we would ask in all soberness, is its value? If it has been insufficient to prevent, can it be all-sufficient to cure? Is it easier to cure than to prevent? How much more philosophic is the declaration, "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, but in *me* is thy help!"

Man is, *in no sense*, sufficient for himself. Strictly speaking, he is not *self-moving*, for he moves in God. He is, indeed, essentially active, and active from within; but only in conjunction with another activity, not himself, but meeting him *ab extra*. This applies equally to the most interior emotions of his soul, and to what are more vulgarly called his actions. And, not being himself pure spirit, but spirit in union with body, he can never come into relation, or hold communion, with spirit, save as that spirit, like his own, is embodied. The truth, the power that is to save him, and to be adequate to his wants, must, then, be not truth as pure spirit, God in the unapproachable and ineffable spirituality of his own essence, but truth embodied, instituted,—"God manifest in the flesh." This is the result to which we are driven.

Taking it for granted, now, that reforms are possible only by means of *superhuman* aid, and that this aid comes to us through some institution, that is, some divinely instituted medium, we may ask, What is this institution? Is it the state? Formerly, not comprehending that it is the truth itself, and not the true doctrine of truth, that saves, and, therefore, holding the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, instead of justification by the communication of Christ himself, I contended, that the state was the only institution needed. I looked upon Christianity—not always, and, in fact, rarely when it was the precise question before me, but, for the most part, in my theorizing—as the philosophy of life, rather than the life itself, life in its very principle. I sought to make it the basis of the state, and contended that the state would be the only organic body needed for its practical realization. I wished to get rid of the church as a *separate* organization, not in order to doom men to live without a church, but in order to transfer its chief functions to the state. According to my own thought, the state would have embodied the great principles of the Gospel, and reproduced them in its enactments and administration; while the outward service, the *cultus exterior*, would have been left, unorganized, to individual taste, reason, and conscience. This view I advocated when I first came into this community, under the name of the unity—not union—of church and state, and it is but at a comparatively recent day, that I have been forced, very reluctantly, to abandon it. But it is unsound, because the state does not embody Christ, and the same fact that makes it necessary to embody the principles of the Gospel to render them efficacious on the indvidual, makes it necessary to embody them to render them efficacious on the state. If, unembodied, if as an invisible kingdom of truth and righteousness, they were too remote from humanity to control the life of the individual, how should they be sufficient to control the state, and compel it to embody them in its laws and administration? I must make them predominate in individuals, before I can make them the basis of the moral action of the government; and yet, to make them predominate in the individual citizen is the great question, and the only reason for seeking to make them predominate in the government.

Appreciating this difficulty, but still groping in the dark, struck with the great power and utility of the church in the middle ages, I said, "We must have a church, a new church,

which shall influence legislators, and the administrators of government." Hence the demand I made for a new church, and my efforts to establish what I called the "Church of the Future." But the Essay was hardly sent forth before my old difficulty returned,—Where is my power to form the new church? Can man constitute a church which shall embody Christ? Is Christ unembodied? If so, is there any human power that can give him a body? No. Then, either Christ is embodied, and there is already existing a true church, through which he carries on his work of redemption, individual or social, or there is no redeemer, and no redemption for us. Man cannot raise himself, or construct, without going out of himself, a machine by which he can raise himself. Archimedes said, he would lift the world, but only on condition of having a stand-point outside of it. The fulcrum of your lever must rest on another body than the one you propose to raise. This is as true in morals as in mechanics, for one and the same dynamic law runs through the universe. If we have no stand-point out of man, no point of support in God himself, then have we no means of elevating man or society. Then either there is already existing the divine institution, the church of God, or there are no means of reform.

In coming to this conclusion, what have we done, but to apply to social reform the very principle of individual reform, which all Christians admit and contend for? Do we not preach from all our pulpits, that the sinner is not adequate to the work of his own moral redemption; that he can rise from his state of moral death, only through the new life given him by the Son of God? Is man, confessedly inadequate, through the waste of his moral powers by sin and transgression, to the work of his own individual redemption, yet adequate to the still greater work of social regeneration? Of what are social evils the result? You answer, of our viciously organized society, which perverts the minds, corrupts the hearts, and debilitates the bodies of its members. But whence comes your viciously organized society? What is the cause of that? Does society make man, or man society? Grant, what is undoubtedly true, that one acts and reacts on the other, yet, with holy men, could you have ever had a viciously organized society? With ignorant, depraved men, can you have a rightly organized society? How, then, except on the same principle, and by the same power, that you expect individual refor-

mation, can you look for social reform? Are not both to be obtained by virtue of one and the same law? Then, if the church be essential to individual salvation, so is it essential to social salvation. But does the church of God still exist? Doubt it not. Is it still living, and in a condition to do its work. Yes, if you will return to it, and submit to it. You may have abandoned the church, but *it* still exists, and is competent to its work, and all that reformers have to do is, to cease to be "Come-outers," and to return to its bosom, and receive its orders

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CHURCH UNITY AND SOCIAL AMELIORATION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1844.]

The great majority of our wise and liberal politicians, and not a few of our equally wise and liberal clergy, whose god is what they call *toleration*, profess to regard the division of the Christian world into separate and hostile communions as a very great blessing, and altogether preferable to a state of unity and catholicity; because these hostile communions, these jarring and rival sects, tend, by their mutual ambition and jealousies, to check and restrain each other, and thus prevent any one from gaining the preponderance. In their view, all communions are *sects*, and one, perhaps, not more or less so than another. There is no true church communion, separation from which constitutes sectarianism, but all communions are alike sectarian; and the aim of every friend of liberty should be, to prevent any one of them from gaining the ascendency, and swallowing up or suppressing the rest.

Now, what is the secret thought of these friends of sectarianism? Why, it is that the Christian church is a disease in the social body, which, since we cannot expel it altogether, we must study to break up, and scatter through the system as much as possible, so that it may not concentrate its virulence on any point? This was avowed to us in just so many words, the other day, by the excellent conductor of one of our city religious newspapers, which bears the name of *Christian*, and makes more than ordinary pretensions to piety, spirituality, and Christian philanthropy.

Now, what can more completely demonstrate a total want of faith in the church of God? If men believed that the church was founded by God himself, and that the Son of God, who is God, is its head, and always with it,—that it was founded by infinite wisdom and love, and must needs be protected by the same infinite wisdom and love, for the express purpose of exercising authority over men, even over their very consciences, could they regard it as a disease, or fear that its power could ever be too great, or in any possible contingency become dangerous? In plain terms, if they believed the church to be God's church, and its authority God's authority, could they possibly believe it necessary to guard against it, to interpose barriers to its progress, and to place restraints on its powers? Of course not. They do, then, really believe the church to be of man, of human origin and growth, and, like all things human, liable to abuse, and therefore needing to be restrained. The age, we are aware, is bold in its blasphemies, and all but boundless in its impieties; but we doubt whether, in its sublime politics, it would dare contend that we should restrain within due bounds the power of the all-wise and merciful God, and that some safeguards against the tyranny of the Almighty should be sought out. Evidently, therefore, the age regards the church as purely *human*.

Then, again, if these politicians and liberal clergymen believed the church to be of God, to be a divine institution, they would regard as evil whatever tended to break its unity, and for the very reason, that, in breaking its unity, they weakened its power, and impeded its operations. They would see and feel, that, the more they extended the power of the church, the further would they extend the kingdom of God on earth; for they would understand by the church the visible instrument, in the hands of the Redeemer and Saviour, of extending and consolidating his moral dominion over the hearts and consciences of men. Their jealousy of church dominion, and their friendship for sectarianism, both go to prove that they are no believers in the church, that they hold that the church has no office to perform in the affairs of mankind, that it is not needed for their moral progress, but is itself a moral disease, of which it would be desirable to be cured altogether, if possible. And yet, these men would be thought to be pious men, and would take it as a proof of our extreme *illiberality*, nay, of utter

want of Christian charity, if we questioned their right to be called and treated as Christians!

One hardly knows what to think. Infidelity, incredulity, indifference, and, what is worse than all, a cold, freezing rationalism, which can hardly claim to be as near to faith in Christ as the old-fashioned deism, but which nevertheless is baptized, *christened*, with the Christian name, and claims to be Christianity, in its greatest purity and simplicity, have taken so deep and so strong a hold on the community, that one hardly dares speak in the name of Christ, and for Christ's church, lest men straightway propose that he should be put into a strait jacket, or sent to the lunatic asylum.

We read, the other day, the speeches and proceedings of a Fourierist convention in the city of New York. Its president was an old and intimate friend of ours; several of the speakers were individuals with whom we have been often associated, and for whose sincerity we would vouch with our life. These men have, no doubt, high and benevolent aims, and really believe they are pursuing a course likely to benefit humanity. There these men met and repelled, with great indignation, the charge of infidelity, or of unfriendliness to Christianity, brought against Fourierism, and resolved that Fourierism is Christian, and that whoso says to the contrary is a slanderer. All very fine, Gentlemen, but who has constituted you judges of what is Christianity, and who will vouch for your own Christian faith, or be our surety that you yourselves are not, under the name of Christianity, setting forth as rank infidelity as was ever set forth by Paine, Volney, or Baron d' Holbach? We see in your speeches nothing but a subtle pantheism, or a disguised Epicureanism. Your very starting-point is at the opposite pole from Christianity, and your method is directly the reverse of that enjoined by the ever-blessed Son of God. You assume the perfection of human nature, the essential holiness of all man's instincts, passions and tendencies, and contend that the evil in the world comes from causes extraneous to man; from causes which restrain, repress, his natural instincts and passions, and hinder their free, full, and harmonious development. This is your starting-point. Christianity, all the world knows, teaches that evil comes from within, from man's abuse of the freedom essential to his being as man, and that, in consequence of this abuse, man's nature has become exceedingly disordered, his appetites and affections depraved, his moral tastes vitiated, so

that he craves and relishes the meat that perisheth, rather than the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. This is its starting-point, and yet, though you directly contradict it, we must not question your soundness as Christian believers, lest we be guilty of slander!

Christianity, again, is a system of means divinely devised and instituted for the recovery of man from sin, his restoration to justice and sanctity, and his growth in knowledge and love. This system of means you reject, and substitute therefor the discoveries of Fourier, and for the Christian church, its ministries, sacraments, and discipline, the Fourier phalanx, with groups, series, and alternations of labor. Not the Son of God has disclosed the law of life, not prophets and apostles have discovered the laws by which man is to be recovered, and social harmony produced,—but one Charles Fourier, a merchant, or merchant's clerk, of Lyons. And yet, you are good Christians, and it is a slander to question the eminently Christian character of Fourierism!

Christianity assumes that the evil originates in man's abuse of his freedom, that here is the cause of that evil in nature and outward circumstances, which reacts upon him with such terrible vengeance; it therefore proposes, as its method of recovery, to lay the axe at the root of the tree, to cut off the evil in its source, by purifying the heart, out of which are the issues of life. Teaching that our appetites, passions, and affections are disordered, depraved, and therefore not to be trusted, it lays down, as its first and great command, Deny thyself, take up the cross, and follow the Master. It would correct the outward by first correcting the inward, bring man into universal harmony by bringing him spiritually into union with God. Let man be right internally, and nothing in the outward will be evil to him, for all things work together for good to them that love the Lord. You reverse this; the natural instincts, appetites, passions, and affections of man, you hold, are all only so many revelations of the will of the Creator, and the fact that man possesses these is a sure indication that it was the will of God that they should be gratified. Instead of saying, Deny thyself; you say, very properly, taking your point of departure, Please thyself; and if thou canst not do it in society as it is, then reform, remodel, reorganize society, so thou canst please thyself, gratify to the fullest each and all of thy passions. If thou art inclined to chastity and canst

satisfy thyself with being the husband of one wife, or the wife of one husband, well and good,—join the group of the constant; if not, if thou hast a craving after change and variety and wouldst have a wide experience, pass on to another group, instituted expressly for such as thou, and in which thou mayest, without fear or reproach, indulge thy taste for variety and change, to thy heart's content. Yet we are slanderers, if we question at all your Christian character!

"But these are all pure-minded, pure-hearted, spiritual, lofty, all but saintly men; admitting that they may err in some of their views, you must own that they are *Christians*, at least, in their *lives*." What mean you by men's lives? The whole of what they think, say, and do? If so, how can you call that man a *Christian* in his life who uses the whole weight of his character and talents to bring Christianity into disrepute, and who proclaims boldly, in tones of earnestness, and of apparent philanthropy, doctrines which legitimate, nay, sanctify, the foulest lust and the grossest passions of our corrupt and fallen nature? The man who, in his private life, in secret, breaks every commandment in the decalogue, is a saint in comparison with him who corrupts the public conscience, perverts the principles of men and women, and under cover of morality, of a divine law, authorizes all that the revealed law of God forbids. We hold no man to be a Christian man in his life, who promulgates anti-christian or immoral doctrines. God has revealed to us the truth; he has instituted an interpreter of his Word; and error of doctrine is without excuse. A man may always know, if he will, what is the truth. If he will not, if he will not suffer himself to learn of God, and to be decided by God's Word, it is from the pride of his own heart, it is from moral depravity, it is from setting himself up against God; and no man who sets himself up against God is or can be a Christian.

Then, again, this Fourierism is nothing but a disguised Epicureanism. The chief end of man is, according to it, pleasure, or happiness. The end proposed is, simply, to enable man to enjoy all his natural instincts and passions, so that he shall experience no evil, be exposed to no jar or discord, and never find any cross; and this, not by purifying his heart and bringing him into harmony with nature and with God, but by bringing all out of man into harmony with man. What, according to Fourierism, is duty? Sim-

ply to enjoy, to provide for satisfying the passions. What is it to obey God? To constitute the town or parish so that man shall find, in its organization, no restraint on any of his passions or desires. Where, we demand, is duty in the Christian sense,—*duty* to love man, to love God, to live for God, and give one's self up to the commands of God? Nowhere. We find in your teaching nothing which appeals to any other motive in man than interest, or love of pleasure. We see nothing incompatible with the most perfect Epicureanism, save that the individuals who are seeking to introduce the reform are not necessarily selfish, but may be disinterested. But what, save Epicurean motives, do they hold out to induce us to join them? What in us do they address? Do they appeal to our sense of duty? No. They undertake to show the capitalist that it will be a profitable investment of capital, and the laborer that it will be a profitable investment of labor, and the voluptuary that he will there find a pleasing gratification for all his senses. The devil has grown bold, in very sooth, and no longer takes even the trouble to put on a disguise. It ceases to be necessary for him to put on the guise of an angel of light; he may venture forth in his own person, with his cloven foot and trident tail and all, and men will follow him in crowds, and swear he is a divinity; nay, *the* Divinity; and cry, "All hail, great Prince of Darkness! Welcome, thrice welcome among us!" Wealth and pleasure are the baits with which the devil allures us to our ruin, and wealth and pleasure are the attractions held out by our Fourierists. Yet, in the face and eyes of the command, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth," and of what our Lord says, "If a man seek to save his life he shall lose it," they are good Christians, and we are slanderers if we intimate any discrepancy between Fourierism and Christianity.

We know very well that Fourierists speak of God, of Christ, of revelation, and even of the church; but what do they mean by these awful, sublime words? Mean? Why, God is the force acting in our passions and instincts, blossoming in the trees, glowing in the stars, and constituting the sum and substance of what is; Christ is the ideal of perfect manhood, which, at the same time, is the ideal of perfect Godhood, and his significance is the identity of the human nature with the divine; and revelation means, that, inasmuch as the force acting in us, in our instincts, passions,

&c., is God, what these crave must needs be the revelation or manifestation of the will of God. The church is the house which man builds for God, not the house which God builds for man. Some men are to promenade their eyes over all existing sects, select out the true, and mould it into one complete and harmonious whole. Thus you will have the *one* faith; this one faith, working in the minds and hearts of men, will gradually gather around it, or rather build up around it, an institution which will represent or express it to the world, and that will be the *one* catholic church! So they are not only Christians, but Catholics; who, then, shall dare, henceforth, to question their orthodoxy, or hesitate to receive them as competent witnesses and judges of the orthodoxy of Fourierism? Fourierism *is* Christian in *their* sense, and if they are Christians. But, good friends, the church, that is, the church of God, if it be any thing, is an institution founded by God himself for man, not an institution developed from man, or gradually formed through the workings of men's notions of Christian truth. The one Catholic church is this divinely founded and sustained institution, and if you do not mean this institution by your church, then call your church by another name; if you are not Catholics, in the sense defined by the Catholic church herself, then, do not deceive yourselves and others by calling yourselves Catholics.

But we did not intend to go so fully into the religious, or rather, irreligious, character of Fourierism. We referred to it, merely as one of the evidences of how completely the sense of religion has been lost; so completely,—and we say it with deep humiliation, for the charge we imply might but a few years since have been brought with equal justice against ourselves,—that men of no mean intelligence, and of honest intentions, and even benevolent aims, fancy themselves firm believers in the Gospel of our blessed Lord, when rejecting it entirely as the kingdom of mediatorial grace, when denying its fundamental dogmas and precepts, and admitting it at all only as a bungling statement of the veriest naturalism. The patient is never in a more dangerous condition than when he believes himself to be in perfect health. The last century was characterized by open, avowed, unblushing infidelity; the present century, thus far, has to no inconsiderable degree been characterized by an infidelity equally intense, and all the more dangerous from its believing itself to be faith. The German rationalism of Paulus,

Röhr, and others, is worse than the deism of Voltaire, or the atheism of d'Holbach; and rationalism itself is comparatively orthodox by the side of the mawkish sentimentalism of De Wette, the pantheistic spiritualism of Schleiermacher, and the naturalism of Strauss and his feeble echoes in this country. Infidelity using, and with apparent sincerity, the language of faith and piety, is the most dangerous species of infidelity the devil has as yet succeeded in inventing. Our age is full of this species of infidelity. Our literature is full of it; our speculations overflow with it; it drops from the sanctuary; it flows out in the political oration, and penetrates even the decision of the judge. We are all good believers; we are all enlightened, liberal believers; we believe in all sacred books; we hold the sacred books of all nations to have been inspired,—all religions to be of God; for they are of man, and man is God; and wherefore, then, call us unbelievers? Sure enough. Nevertheless, a great work is to be done, not merely to bring men back to the simplicity of the Gospel, but to make them perceive even a fundamental difference between the New Testament and the Koran, the Christian church and the institutions of the Arabian impostor.

The worst feature of our age is its miserable eclecticism. It reads all, collects and accepts all, and comprehends nothing. It starts with the notion, that all religions, all worships, all symbols, all rites, are *symbols* of facts, of partial truths; or, in other words, that each represents a correct, but partial view of truth. Thus, paganism has its truth; Mahometanism its truth; Christianity its truth; Catholicism its truth; Protestantism its truth; Calvinism its truth; Arminianism its truth; Trinitarianism its truth; Unitarianism its truth; but no one is *the* truth, the *whole* truth. Christianity is a special department of religion in general, and of course can comprehend only a part of what is essential to religion. Alas! Where is this to end? Did not Jesus say, "I *am* the way, THE TRUTH, and the life?" Do you credit him? Then how dare you say that paganism or Mahometanism has a truth which is not in all its integrity in Christianity? Are all the so called Christian denominations merely *sects?* Or shall we say, that, in point of fact, among these, after all, is the one true catholic apostolic church? Does the true apostolic church still subsist? If you say it does not, you give the lie to Christ, who declared that he would build his church upon a rock, and the gates of

hell should not prevail against it; if you say it does exist, can you conceive it possible for there to be any *truth*, in any of the sects, which it has not in its purity and in its integrity? Do, then, take some position; either accept the Son of God, or reject him; either accept the church as it is, or reject it altogether. For if it has become corrupt, it is a false church, was always a false church, and always must be a false church; and if it be not corrupt, but the true church, then to refuse to accept it is to refuse to submit to God. .

We press this point upon those who are demanding social ameliorations. We showed in the article, *No Church, No Reform*, that there is no reform possible without the ministry of the church, which not only represents our faith in the supernatural, but which actually embodies supernatural power, and brings down the Holy Ghost to the aid of human effort. We now say, and proceed to show, that this church must be ONE and CATHOLIC, or still it can afford us no aid. No church, no reform, we began by saying; we now say, No reform under sectarianism. With the Christian world cut up into hostile sects, each with its special idea, special point of view, special law, no scheme of reform, however wisely devised, or however just and practicable in itself, can avail any thing.

This position we could demonstrate from history, and we hold it not difficult to prove that the general condition of society, in a temporal as well as in a spiritual point of view, has deteriorated, and been steadily deteriorating, ever since the great schism in the sixteenth century; but we choose, for the present, to take a shorter course, and to demonstrate it by considerations which all can appreciate, and which none can gainsay.

We will add here, however, that we may avoid all occasion for misapprehension, that we are not opposed to industrial associations, nor do we at all question the importance —if you will, the necessity—of organizing industry on new and better principles; but we are decidedly opposed to all associations for reform in any case, or in any department, not founded on the principles, and under the sanction and control, of the church. Either God has established the church as the medium of the good he designs us to receive or to work out, or he has not. The church either is this medium, or it is not. If it is not, then we have nothing more to say, and nothing to do but to fold our hands and remain inactive, till Providence interferes anew in our

behalf; if it is this medium, the divinely appointed instrument of human regeneration, of social as well as individual progress, then we should be contented with it, and confine ourselves to its principles, and to such modes of action as it ordains. A multitude of associations have sprung up in our midst, that we shall one day see cause to regret. The church is superseded in the affections of a great majority of our church-going people, by abolition societies, moral reform societies, temperance societies, and the like. Temperance is, no doubt, a cardinal virtue; but associations out of the church, for the suppression of intemperance, ought not to be tolerated, can be tolerated by no consistent churchman; for they say at once, the church is inadequate to the work of maintaining the morals of the community, which is to condemn the church in the severest terms, and to declare it utterly unworthy of our support.

Associations within the bosom of the church, authorized and controlled by it, as a part of its own ministry, as it were, may be very proper, and of the highest utility. So associations formed for the purpose of ameliorating our social condition, of rendering more just and equal our industrial relations, to remove the great disparity of conditions which now obtains, to elevate the poorer and more numerous classes physically as well as morally and intellectually,—formed, not on Fourier principles, but on those of the Gospel, under the express sanction and control of the church, we are far from believing would be mischievous; nay, we believe they might do much, very much, toward realizing the kingdom of God on earth, and hastening forward the time when the whole earth shall be the Lord's, and all its inhabitants filled with his spirit, and sealed for immortality. But these associations, by whatever name they are called, must look not to Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, or to Robert Owen, for the theory of life on which they must build, and the exposition of the principles after which they must organize the human race; but to Christ the Son of God, and to the authorized interpreters of his will; and moreover, they must associate, not because they would gain more in wealth and pleasure, but because they would make greater sacrifices for God, and attain to higher degrees of Christian sanctity. The feelings, the convictions, which carry men into the association, must be those which led to the establishment of monasteries and convents, although the rules may be different. Yet we have some

doubts, whether the associations which do not recognize celibacy, as one of the fundamental rules, will ever succeed. The experiment of a married order, which was tried in the thirteenth century, failed, became so corrupt that it was suppressed by the authority of the church; and the miserable remains of the party concerned are now known only as an heretical sect, which passes generally under the name of Beghards,—the forerunners, as some term them, of Protestantism,—really so, we may believe, of the Anabaptists. But be all this as it may, we mean to offer no objections to such associations for industrial reforms, or the reorganization of industry, as may be formed, as we have said, on the principles of the Gospel, and under the sanction and control of the church.

But here comes up a serious difficulty. What do you mean by the church? Do you mean that the association should be formed on the principles, and under the sanction and control, of some one of the religious *sects?* If so, *which* sect? And why that sect rather than another? Here we are. We have proved that we can accomplish nothing without the church; but we see now that we can accomplish nothing with it, if it be but a mere aggregate of conflicting and hostile sects. Suppose we get the phalanx established. While we are working to get it established, zeal for association, the excitement of the labor itself, sustains us, and we do not feel very deeply the absence of religious faith and worship. We satisfy ourselves with the idolatrous worship we offer to association. But we will suppose this labor over, that the phalanx, or township, is organized, the groups and series all constituted, the music-box wound up, and set to playing the tunes it is constructed to play. Well, one of two consequences must necessarily follow: 1. Either total indifference to all religious matters, and then the association must fall to pieces for the want of an organic principle; or, 2. Sectarian controversies will arise, and the phalanx will be dissolved through the bitterness and alienation of the members.

Fourierism proposes to organize families into the phalanx or township; townships into counties; counties into states; and states into one grand harmonic association for the race. The phalanx, in its grand scheme of association, is the unit, of which groups, series, and individuals are the fractions. Now this unity, or integer, that is to say, this *whole* number, is composed of say some fifteen hundred or two thousand individuals, distributed into groups and series according to

their natural temperaments, aptitudes, and attractions ; and, of course, unless perfect harmony can be maintained between the individuals in the series, and between the series in the group, and the groups in the phalanx, there can be no *phalansterian* harmony, the whole plan must fail, and Fourierism fall to the ground. Fourier and his disciples seek the guaranty of this harmony in human nature. They say, man and nature are constructed originally in harmony, that one is adapted to the other. The principles of this harmony Fourier has discovered ; he has ascertained all the original passions of human nature, and, by the rule of permutations and combinations, determined the number of changes and variations it is possible to introduce ; then he has passed from man to nature, and ascertained the same in regard to that, and has given the result of the whole in his theory of association, or doctrine of universal unity. Now, once arrange all the outward circumstances which are to affect men, according to the ascertained laws and possible changes and variations of man and of nature, and, of necessity, the desired harmony is produced and secured. So a Fourierist cannot comprehend the necessity of any thing to preserve the harmony of the phalanx, when once it is established. The security is in the *phalansterian* arrangement itself, and cannot fail, unless either man or nature shall undergo a fundamental change.

But this, plausible as it may seem, is not conclusive. If man and nature were originally created in harmony, if one was perfectly adapted to the other, and started, so to say, in tune, whence the present discord ? And if, notwithstanding the original harmony and perfect mutual adaptation, this discord has been possible, what shall hinder it from being still possible after the organization of the phalanx ?

The Fourierist must assume one of two things ; either that man is free, or that he is not. If he is not free, and is only a sort of music-box, he may again get out of harmony, for he has nothing to keep him in harmony, which he had not at first ; if he is free, therefore capable of abusing his freedom, what shall guaranty us that he will not abuse it again, as he did in Eden ? The Fourierists resolve that they are Christian believers ; then they must own that man had in Eden every desire gratified as perfectly as will be the case in the phalanx, and yet he abused his freedom, sinned, and involved all humanity in the guilt of his transgression. Shall we be told that there will be no temptation to sin ?

Why not, and as much as there was in Eden? Why may not the serpent find his way into the phalanx, and a new Eve, moved by curiosity or wantonness, put forth her hand and pluck the forbidden fruit? More than all this, is it certain that no man can sin without an external temptation or solicitation to sin? Nay, do our Fourierists need to be told, that the very prosperity they promise would be itself a source of sin, that man under it would wax proud, rebellious, and therefore sinful? "Jeshuron waxed fat and kicked." When men grow fat, we must expect them to kick, and against all laws, human and divine.

We say, then, that you cannot find in human nature the organic principle you need, nor the necessary guaranties of harmony, even if once introduced. This organic principle and these guaranties can be found only in religion, in the life of the Gospel. If this life, which is the life of love and sacrifice, be suffered to die out, and men become indifferent to all spiritual matters, with their thoughts and affections confined to this life and to this planet, with all their appetites and passions gratified, they become too near akin to the brutes that perish, to be able to maintain any thing like social order, or a communal arrangement. The phalanx would have no bond, no principle which would hold it together, even as to its form.

But, on the other hand, suppose the members to be deeply interested in religious matters, but belonging to different and hostile sects, would there be harmony in the phalanx? O, they would tolerate each other's differences! Toleration is, however, the very thing which is impossible to a sincere and earnest mind for any thing which is not held to be indifferent. Now, you must either make the members more interested in something else than they are in religion, so much so, that they become indifferent to religion, and then the phalanx fails through religious indifference; or you must suffer them to hold religion to be the paramount consideration, the one thing needful, and then toleration is out of the question. Sincere, earnest individuals, members of different communions, will not, cannot, have that warm, cordial fellow-feeling without which the Fourier phalanx cannot operate. So again, differences of faith and worship would alienate one phalanx from another. The Protestant phalanx will hold no intercourse with the Catholic, and the Calvinistic phalanx and the Unitarian will be merely two phalanxes drawn up for battle. The same remarks are

applicable to all other divisions. If, then, we are to have association at all, under any circumstances which can promise any thing, we must get rid of sectarianism, and have one only catholic church.

In our view, contrary to the views of the associationists, the church is the highest, the paramount association; and without unity, harmony, in that, it is in vain to look for it in any thing below it. We can never consent to an order of things which would raise industrial associations above the church, or render our interest in what concerns our industrial relations superior to our interest in what pertains to our relations to the eternal God, and to the world to come. The religious interests, represented by the church, must always be, in every normal state of society, the great and engrossing interests; if they are so, you can effect nothing in subordinate interests, while in relation to these religious interests you are divided, separated, alienated, and hostile. Our first duty, then, is, if we would effect any thing by way of association, to return to the unity of the church, through which we may come to one faith, one baptism, one calling, one spirit. Having, thus, unity in that which is highest, we may easily obtain it in that which is lowest. We pray our associationists to consider this, and learn that the church question is the first and paramount question. Return to the unity and catholicity of the church,—and then?

And then, what? Perhaps then it will be found that the *phalansterian* organization of society will not be necessary; perhaps then it will be found that to organize society, with a special view to wealth and enjoyment, is not, after all, either the Christian method, or that which man's highest good here or hereafter demands. But be this as it may, we shall have then an authority competent to resolve our doubts and to direct our labors.

It is strange how slow we are to believe him who rebuked us for being troubled about many things, and declared that "one thing only is needful." If we would diminish the poverty and suffering of the world, we should not labor to multiply material riches, or to facilitate the acquisition of this world's goods, but to restrict men's bodily wants, and turn their activity in a moral and spiritual direction. St. Bernard, living on the water in which pulse had been boiled, laboring at the head of his monks, is more to be envied than Apicius at his feast; and far better was it for Lazarus, who begged the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table,

than for the rich man who fared sumptuously every day. On wishes, wishes grow; one desire gratified, a stronger takes its place; one demand answered, another and a greater is made. The richest man in this world's goods has more wants he cannot satisfy, than has the poorest beggar himself; and to die of starvation is not more terrible, view the matter rightly, than to die of a surfeit. You must once more make voluntary poverty honorable, and canonize anew, not your rich old sinner, gorged with the spoils of the widow and orphan,—whose eyes stand out with fatness, whose heart vaunts itself against the Lord,—but the man who voluntarily submits to poverty, that he may lay up riches in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal. You cannot serve God and Mammon; and the Fourier attempt to reconcile the service of the one with that of the other will turn out a miserable failure, and cover with merited disgrace all concerned in making it.

God has told us what is the kingdom of heaven, in what it consists, and how we may enter therein. He has not left us to the dim, uncertain light of our own unillumined minds, but has himself pointed out the way; has himself given us the law which is a lamp to our feet and a light to our path. We must follow his law, walk in his way, or all our efforts, however well meant, however sincere and earnest, will be worse than vain. O, why can we not consent to believe that God is wiser than man, and that his thoughts are above our thoughts, and his ways better than our ways? Believe us, dear friends, we show more wisdom in adhering to God's word, in following his church, than we do in leaving the fountain of living waters, and hewing out cisterns for ourselves, broken cisterns that can hold no water. Raise man above the world, if you would make him blessed while in the world.

BISHOP HOPKINS ON NOVELTIES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1844.]

The Anglican church, from which the Protestant Episcopal church in this country derives, appears to have been founded on compromise. In organizing it, and settling its articles, canons, homilies, and liturgy, there were two tendencies to be consulted and conciliated: One, the Catholic tendency, which would retain as much of the Catholic church, and separate as little from Rome, as possible, with the rejection of the papal supremacy; the other, the Protestant tendency, which would retain as little of Catholicism, and depart as far from Rome, as possible, without resigning the Christian name altogether.

The internal history of Anglicanism is the history of the struggles and alternate victories and defeats of these two tendencies. Henry VIII., the first to break with Rome, was a Catholic, saving so far as concerned the papal supremacy, and making the monarch the head of the church. He wrote in defence of the Catholic faith against Luther, and made the profession of Protestantism a capital offence. Under his reign, the Catholic tendency was sustained in the church, and very few changes were made at the demand of Protestantism or in accordance with its spirit.

Under Edward VI., the son and successor of Henry, the Protestant spirit gained the ascendency, and the church of England was made a *Protestant* church, and conformed, substantially, save in outward organization, to the model of the Protestant and reformed churches of the Continent. Important changes were introduced into its doctrines, discipline, and ceremonies. Severe denunciations of the doctrines, discipline, and usages of the Roman church were pronounced, and the greater part of religious antiquity was disowned. Mary followed, reopened communion with Rome, and did what she could to restore the ancient Catholic order. The daughter of Katharine of Aragon inherited many of

**The Novelties which disturb our Peace. Four letters addressed to the Bishops, Clergy, and Laity of the Protestant Episcopal Church.* By John Henry Hopkins, Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont. Philadelphia: 1844.

the better qualities of her mother, and deserves a more honorable mention in history than she receives. She was devout, sincerely attached to the church, but her injudicious zeal weakened her own cause, and strengthened the Protestant tendency of the country.

Elizabeth, daughter of Henry and Anne Boleyn, had strong Catholic tendencies, and would, most likely, have continued the Anglican church in communion with Rome, if she could, on Catholic principles, have maintained her right to the crown. But, in the eyes of the Holy See, and of all good Catholics, her birth was illegitimate. She was, therefore, obliged to be a Protestant, in order to secure her seat on the throne; and, in return, compounded with her conscience by being in all other respects as Catholic as possible. Under her reign, the Anglican church received its definite form, and was finally settled. It was less Catholic than under Henry, and more so than under Edward. The Catholic tendency, in reality, predominated, though the Protestant tendency was strong, and powerfully resisted it. Neither, however, could entirely suppress the other; and the principle seems to have been finally adopted, and acted upon, of making the basis of the church so broad, and of expressing its faith in terms so general and indefinite, that the great body of those affected by either tendency might come within its pale. The thirty-nine articles have been said to be "articles of peace," and they seem to us to have been drawn up, not for the purpose of defining the faith of the church, but of leaving it so equivocal that either of the two parties might conscientiously interpret it in its own favor.

The Catholic tendency, though powerfully resisted, maintained, however, under Elizabeth and the Stuarts, the predominance in the church, if not in the kingdom; and for a moment, under Archbishop Laud,—a much calumniated prelate,—it appeared not improbable that the Anglican church herself might return to the communion of the Holy See. But in the Revolution of 1688, Protestantism gained the victory, and, with the accession of the House of Hanover, was firmly, and, we fear, permanently, established. During the whole of the eighteenth century, the most inglorious period of the Anglican church, it reigned without a rival; the Catholic tendency seemed to have wholly died out; and scarcely a sign of life was discernible, if we except the

spasmodic twitches and contortions of the Evangelicals, till the recent movement of the Oxford divines.

After the revolutionary fanaticism, which marked the conclusion of the last century, had in some measure subsided, and men began to feel the impotence of the naturalism which had been its concomitant, a reaction in favor of religion and the church commenced throughout Christendom. This was seen in the movement of the Evangelical party in Germany, to revive the old forgotten symbols of the early Protestants; but more especially among the Catholics of Germany and France. The man who contributed, perhaps, more than any other to this reaction was the Abbé de La Mennais, then a genuine Catholic priest, and not unworthy of his high and sacred calling. His *Essai sur l'Indifférence en Matière de Religion* was a clap of thunder from a cloudless sky. It startled the world from its sleep of death to the fatal consequences of the Protestantism, philosophism, deism, atheism, and indifferentism, which they had followed, and which could be averted only by a sincere and hearty return to the church of God. That book sealed the doom of French infidelity, and, under Providence, has been a powerful means of preparing a religious future for the French people.

Oxford felt, no less than Paris, the reaction against the rationalism and infidelity which had been so madly fostered and so widely diffused. A devout spirit, a meek, humble, self-denying, Christian spirit, was reawakened, and, with this the old Catholic tendency revived. Always, in the history of the Anglican church, do we observe, that, just in proportion as learning, piety, religious zeal, and devotedness revive, as its members become more simple-minded, less worldly, more self-mortifying, more devout, more willing to spend and be spent in the cause of Christ, do the old Catholic tendency and party revive, and acquire new force and prominence. It is only as men grow fanatical, or cold, worldly, proud, arrogant, self-conceited, self-willed, rationalistic, turbulent, or disorderly, that the Protestant tendency and party predominate. The movement of the Oxford divines, though not in all respects unexceptionable, was yet, at bottom, a truly religious movement. Its exponents felt something of the old Christian spirit working in their hearts,—something of that spirit which had tamed the savage and barbarian, enriched the history of the race with myriads of saints and martyrs, covered Europe

over with the monuments of zeal for God and of love for man, and made the whole earth hallowed ground,—and they felt that they, too, might be sons of the great Christian family, and heirs of its sacred traditions and precious memories.

This movement renewed, in the bosom of the Anglican church, the old struggle between the Catholic and Protestant tendencies, which that church had accepted in its origin, but which it had never reconciled. We have watched this movement with alternate hope and fear; but, alas! at present, only the fear remains. For a moment, we ventured to hope that the Catholic tendency would carry the day, and the Anglican church become, in very deed, a living branch of the church universal; but, unhappily, that church is under the Erastian curse; completely subject to the secular power; bound hand and foot; and, what is worse, seems to love her chains, and to glory in her shame. The civil power in England is, and must be, Protestant. The crown swears to defend the Protestant religion, and to maintain the Protestant succession. The king, nay, the *queen*, is the spiritual head of the church, and no good can come of it till it breaks its accursed thraldom, and reasserts and maintains religious liberty. We see no hope for the Anglican church, till there is requickened in her bosom the old martyr spirit; till her sons come to feel that they are the descendants of those to whom rich livings, the pride, pomp, and power of kings and civil rulers, nay, bonds, imprisonments, and death, were but the veriest trifles, when in the way of Christian duty, and, above all, when in the way of Christian sanctity. Restore us, O God, this glorious martyr spirit! restore us the power to count all things but dung and dross, if we can but win Christ, and merit that crown of life which thou hast laid up for them that love thee, and which thou wilt give to all who fight the good fight, and finish with honor the work thou hast given them to do! O, is it true that the race of English saints expired with the separation from Rome, and that no saint adorns the English calendar, born since that fatal epoch?

In this country, the Episcopal church is, providentially, free from all subjection to the state, and in possession of the most perfect religious liberty. Here there is no Protestant sovereign to repress her Catholic tendencies, and prevent her from developing the Catholic elements she has saved from the general wreck of the sixteenth century.

With double interest, therefore, have we watched, and do we still watch, the struggle between the two hostile tendencies,—and the more so, because we ourselves, alas! are without a home. Feeling our own sad condition, we naturally turn towards the Episcopal church. It is professedly the church of our ancestors; it speaks our own mother tongue; and to enter it is not to go among strangers, to desert one's friends and kindred. In it, we have felt we might sit down with our own kith and kin, with our friends and neighbors. We have asked ourselves, What is to be the result of the present struggle? Will the church succumb to the Protestant tendency? Will she shake off her Protestantism, and take her stand on truly Catholic ground? Will she become a true mother to us, afford a home to us, who have been storm-tossed on the tumultuous sea of sectarianism,—poor shipwrecked mariners, cast naked and starving upon a foreign strand, waiting for the blessed angels of mercy and charity to come to our relief?

We have feared and hoped, and hoped and feared, and nothing has tended more to depress and dishearten us than these Letters by the able and accomplished bishop of the diocese of Vermont. We had felt, that, whatever might be said of the irregular origin of the present Anglican church, she might, in her American branch, at least, so develop her Catholic elements as to be able to satisfy the Catholic faith and longings of a soul which has burned to abjure Protestantism. We had counted on Bishop Hopkins, a zealous churchman, as one likely to stand forward in the contest, and to become a powerful champion of the Christian movement commenced by Froude, Newman, and Pusey. We are grieved and disappointed at finding him, on the contrary, taking the lead in the opposition, and contending, with all his zeal, wit, eloquence, learning, and ability, for views which we had supposed quite too ultra-Protestant for the great body of even the so-called Evangelical sects. We feel these Letters the more, for they seem to us to have some foundation in the articles and faith of the Episcopal church, and because we are not able to refute them, without placing that church, in some respects at least, in contradiction with herself. They show us that she does really contain a Protestant element, which is not reconcilable with her catholicism.

Yet, on the other hand, these "Novelties," of which the Bishop speaks, are evidently no novelties. They are, and

have been from the first, maintained by the greatest and most authoritative names in the Anglican church, and are supported by its liturgy, canons, and homilies. It cannot, we think, be denied, that the Episcopal church is somewhat deficient in unity, and that it is now suffering from the vague and indefinite terms originally adopted for the sake of peace. But what in these days should be the duty of a true churchman? Should he seek to enlarge the Protestant element, and to widen the breach, even at best too wide? Or should he not rather seek to free his church from the inconsistencies which, in troublous and unsettled times, were suffered to creep in, by bringing out its Catholic elements, and placing it as nearly in harmony with religious antiquity as the nature of the case will admit?

We can make many allowances for Bishop Hopkins' Protestantism. He has been engaged in a controversy with the Roman Catholics, in defence of the Protestant reformation, and that reformation is not defensible on Catholic principles. But is it necessary to defend it? In point of fact, is it defensible on any principles compatible with established ecclesiastical order? Our Oxford divines are severe enough, in all conscience, against Rome; but they have not succeeded, and, so far as we are able to see, cannot succeed, in justifying the reformers in their separation from the Holy See. If we understand their church system, they hold that the church is not an aggregate body, but a body corporate, and, therefore, that it can exist and act only in its corporate capacity. The unity of the church, in their view, is not merely the unity of faith, the unity of spirit, of discipline, of usage, but also the unity of the body, that is, of the corporation.

They hold, indeed, as do all Catholics, that the church is herself subject to the law communicated through Christ and the apostles,—the law given originally by the great Head of the church, from which she may not depart, and contrary to which she may decree nothing. But then she is the witness, the keeper, and the interpreter of the law. Though she does not make the law, she authoritatively declares what the law is, and from her decision there lies no appeal. She is, then, so far as concerns her members, supreme in all matters pertaining to faith and practice. Hence, whatever she decrees must, for them, be the law, the word of God, to which they may offer no resistance, and in no case refuse obedience.

Now, prior to the reformation, the church either did or did not exist. If it did not, then either Christ founded no church, or the church he founded had failed. If he founded no church, he made no provision for our salvation, and therefore cannot be called our Saviour; if he founded a church and it has failed, then he himself has failed, and cannot be relied on, for he declared his church should not fail.

If the church did exist, it existed, according to our Oxford divines, as a corporation. Was the church of England this corporation? or only a member of it? If she was it, her acts could bind all the faithful throughout the world. Will this be pretended? But if she was not it, in its unity and integrity, she could not, of herself alone, speak and act in its name, and with its authority. She could speak only in the one voice of the whole. How, then, could she separate herself from the rest of the church universal, without resisting the authority and breaking the unity of the church? The act of separation could be orderly only on condition of being authorized by the church in its corporate capacity. But it was authorized only by the church of England, whose acts were not, and could not be, the acts of the church, in its corporate capacity. On what ground, then, can it be pretended that the act was not disorderly and schismatic?

When we define the church to be a corporation, we necessarily assume it to have some visible centre, a visible head, and a visible order; for otherwise it would have no unity, no individuality, and no corporate faculty. There would be no intelligible distinction possible between the acts of the church, and the acts of a disorderly assembly of individuals claiming to be it, and to speak with its authority. Was this visible centre, this visible head, in England? Was England the centre and head of the ecclesiastical order? Was it from England that all circulated, as the blood from the heart to the extremities? Of course not. Rome, it cannot be denied, was the acknowledged centre of unity, and the pope the acknowledged visible head of the ecclesiastical body. Where was the authority competent to set this order aside? Could there be any authority competent to do it, but the church herself acting in her corporate capacity? But the church could thus act, only when acting under and through the corporate head, that is to say, through the constituted authorities, as its legal organs. The members of the church, when acting without or against authority, are a disorderly or revolutionary body. They are the church, only when act-

ing according to its order, under the established authority, and through legal forms. But the church of England, in her act of separation, acted without and against the established order of the church, against its legal authority. How, then, could her separation be justified, save on mobocratic or revolutionary principles?

It may be alleged that the church of Rome had apostatized, that the pope had transcended his powers, and exercised an authority which was illegal, oppressive, and demoralizing. Be it so. But where was the authority to take cognizance of the fact, and to institute measures for redress? Only the church in its corporate capacity, of course; for in any other capacity the church does not exist. Irregularities are never to be irregularly redressed; for the redress itself would be an irregularity, requiring to be redressed. Now, the church of England, not being the church, but only a member of it, was not competent to sit in judgment on Rome and her bishop, nor to undertake, on her own responsibility, to redress the abuses she might believe to exist; for a part can never erect itself into a tribunal for judging the whole; since, save in union with the whole, the part does not even exist.

All that England had a right to do, on Catholic principles, was, to exert herself, as a member of the Catholic church, in a legal and constitutional way, in submission to the constituted authorities, to redress such abuses as she believed to exist. To attempt, in church or state, to redress abuses by rejecting the constituted authorities, and breaking up the established order, is to attempt revolution; and the right of revolution, we all know, is incompatible with the right of government, for the one negatives the other. If you assert your right to revolutionize the church, you deny the supremacy of the church, which you began by asserting. We say, again, therefore, that we do not see how our Oxford divines can justify the proceedings of the English church in separating from the corporation of which she was a member, if they assume the unity of the church as a corporate body.

Shall we be told, as we have been, that the church of England was originally a free and independent church, possessing within herself all the rights and prerogatives of the church of Christ, that she originally owed no allegiance to the Roman See, or the Roman Pontiff, and that in the sixteenth century she merely asserted her ancient freedom, and suppressed the errors and corruptions caused by the papal

usurpations? We reply, that this is not historically true, either in relation to the ancient order, or in relation to the reformation; and, moreover, if it were, it would falsify the whole church theory of the Oxford divines themselves. They hold the church to be one body, and not a body aggregate, but a body corporate. To assert the independence of the Anglican church is to assert her existence as a church polity complete in itself. Then she was either the Catholic church in its unity and integrity, or the Catholic church is not a single corporation, but an aggregate of several corporations. The first will not be pretended; the second denies the unity of the church as a corporation; which we understand the Oxford divines to assert.

Here, we suspect, is the original fallacy in the reasoning of our Anglican divines. They assume, consciously or unconsciously, that each *national* church is one independent church polity, complete in itself. That the temporal powers have always favored this doctrine, there is no question; and that their struggles to reduce it to practice have occasioned all the calamities which have befallen the church since the days of Constantine, there is just as little question. But this doctrine is incompatible with the freedom and independence of the spiritual power, which demands a common centre of unity, unaffected by geographical lines, or national distinctions. This the temporal power saw clearly enough; but the freedom and independence of the spiritual power was precisely what the temporal power did not want. It would have no power in the nation not subject to itself. It would itself be supreme in spirituals, as well as in temporals, and rule according to its own will. But this it felt was impossible, if the clergy or their superiors held their appointments, or investments, from a power independent of it, and if accountable to a tribunal it could neither constitute nor control. Here is the secret of the struggles of the temporal powers against the ecclesiastical. The haughtiest monarch dared not lay violent hands on the humblest parish priest, and the monk's cowl symbolized a mightier power than the diadem. This was not to be endured; it was too great a restriction on civil despotism; and the temporal power, therefore, sought with all its force to maintain each national church independent of all foreign ecclesiastical authority, in order to be able to subject the church in its own dominions to its own will, and make it the tool of its ambition, or the minister of its vices, corruptions, and

oppressions. This is the secret of the long continued struggles of the ecclesiastical and civil powers, the one to maintain the unity, the other to break it up into separate and independent national establishments, on the principle of dividing to conquer.

The distinction of national churches was not, in the original constitution of the church, that of separate and independent church polities,—for this were pure independency,—but merely a distinction for the necessities and convenience of local administration. The church, in her true, normal constitution, knows no geographical lines or national distinctions; and the apparent independence, or partial independence, of national churches, which we sometimes meet in ecclesiastical history, is an anomaly, an irregularity, which the church has not been able to bring within the rule against the resistance, and too often armed resistance, of the temporal powers.

But admitting that our Oxford divines cannot, on their church theory, and, we may add, on the true Catholic theory, defend the original separation of the Anglican church from the rest of the church universal, does Bishop Hopkins succeed any better? The bishop is a sincere Protestant; he avows it, and glories in it. He reverences the men who labored in the sixteenth century to free the church from the corruptions of Rome. He believes that their estimate of the church of Rome was the true estimate, and he is not ashamed to say so. He is filled with their spirit, and would honor and continue their work. All this is manly, and honorable to him as a Protestant bishop. But has he been able to strike out a ground of defence more tenable than that of the Oxford divines? He rejects their theory of the church, and places the unity of the church, not in the unity of the corporation, but in the unity of the faith. The church is not a body corporate, but a body aggregate; and all professedly Christian bodies or associations, which maintain the apostolic faith, are integrally portions of the church of Christ, and together constitute the one holy Catholic Apostolic church. This, if we understand him, is the bishop's view.

Taking this view, the bishop contends that separation from Rome was not only justifiable, but a high and imperative duty, because Rome had apostatized from the true faith, and had become so corrupt in doctrine, as well as idolatrous and superstitious in practice, that no one who valued his

Christian character could longer continue in her communion. It is, he tells us, on this ground, and this alone, that Protestantism is to be justified, and in this we are unable to dispute him.

But, if we take this ground, we must admit, first, that there is a standard of orthodoxy; and, second, that there is also, somewhere, an authority competent to say what does and what does not conform to that standard. As to the standard, we will raise, at present, no difficulty. We will accept the Protestant doctrine of the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and say, that the standard is the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, *rightly interpreted.* But who, where, or what, is the authority competent to say what is, or what is not, their right interpretation?

To this question one of three answers must be returned, for only three answers are possible, namely: 1. The church; 2. The state; 3. The individual reason. If the bishop adopts the first answer, and contends that the church is the authoritative interpreter, as his own church teaches, he must abandon his notion of the church as a body aggregate, and concede it to be a corporation. For the church cannot act, has no function, at all, unless it exist as a corporation, as an individual, a personality, with an official voice, and an official organ through which it may speak.

But, if the bishop recoil from his aggregate church, and concede it to be, after all, a body corporate, he must also concede it to be either a one single corporation, or several distinct, separate, and independent corporations. If he assume it to be a single corporation, he exposes himself to all the objections we have just urged against what we have called the Oxford theory. The church of England was not this one single corporation, and therefore could not speak in its name, or with its authority. She, then, was not competent to receive the impeachment of Rome and her bishop, or to convict them of heresy. But, on the bishop's own principles, till she had convicted them of heresy, she had no right to separate from their communion; for the separation, he tells us, was justifiable only on the ground that Rome and her bishop had apostatized from the orthodox faith,—corrupted the pure word of God.

Protestantism assumes that the church herself, in her corporate existence, had become corrupt and heretical. The party to be tried for heresy was, then, the church herself. Protestantism must impeach and convict the church herself

of heresy, before it can justify itself. But before what tribunal can it bring its charges against the church, and demand conviction? Before the written word of God? But the church is the authoritative interpreter of the word, and it is her very interpretation that is in question. She herself is the highest court for the trial of herself, and before what court can you try her? By impeaching her you deny the authority of the only tribunal competent to take cognizance of the accusation you bring against her.

Granting, then, that Rome and her bishop had corrupted the pure word of God, since she was the centre of unity and her bishop the visible head of the corporation, there was no church before which either could be summoned to answer to the charge of heresy, no legal tribunal that could, against their consent, or without their authority, take cognizance of the fact. For any number of churchmen coming together, without being convoked by their authority, however numerous or respectable, would not be the church, any more than a political caucus is a legal convention; and their acts would be no more the acts of the church, than the resolutions of a mob, or a disorderly assembly, would be the enactments of the state.

If the bishop abandon the notion of the church as a single corporation, and assert the existence of distinct, separate, and independent church polities, he falls into independency, of which, we doubt not, he has as much horror as we ourselves. Each of these polities must be complete in itself, and supreme over its own members. They must be equals. Then what is decreed by one stands on as high authority as what is decreed by another. What one decides to be orthodox is as orthodox as that which is decided by another. Rome is equal to England, and England is equal to Rome. Rome decrees one interpretation, England another. Which is right? Which is wrong? Where is the umpire to decide between them? Why shall we assume the interpretation of Rome to be less orthodox than that of England? or that of England more orthodox than that of Geneva? Why shall we hold the decision of the Episcopal church to be more authoritative than the decision of the Presbyterian church, the Congregational church, or the Unitarian church?

But only those churches are authoritative in which the pure word of God is preached. Agreed. But what *is* the pure word of God? What the church declares it to be. Agreed,

again. But *what* church? The true church. Agreed, once more. But which *is* the true church? That in which the pure word of God is preached. Here we are, turning for ever in a circle. Each church, doubtless, declares its own doctrine to be the pure word of God; all the churches are equal; by what authority, then, is the doctrine of one declared to be orthodox, and that of another to be heterodox?

Shall we say those churches are to be regarded as true churches, whose doctrines are accepted by a majority of the whole number of churches? This is to abandon the ground of the sufficiency of each church for itself, and to make something besides the church a competent interpreter of the word of God. It subjects each particular church to the will of the majority, and makes the criterion of truth a plurality of voices. How was it when nearly all the particular churches, except Rome and Alexandria, were Arian? when, during the temporary lapse of the Pope, St. Athanasius was almost the only Catholic bishop left? If the majority are to decide,—then, if the majority establish Arianism or Socinianism, Arianism or Socinianism must be held to be orthodox, and all who adhere to the Nicene and Athanasian creeds must be unchurched, and declared to be no portions of the body of Christ. The bishop's argument presupposes that a church may lapse into heresy. If one may, why not another? And then what guaranty have we that the majority have not departed from the faith, and that, in point of fact, the pure word of God is preached now only in a feeble minority of the so-called churches?

This doctrine of separate and independent churches, each a competent interpreter of the word of God, gives us as many competent, authoritative interpreters, as there are separate bodies calling themselves churches. It lays the foundation for all the sectarianism which now desolates Christendom. The decision of one neutralizes the decision of another. Orthodoxy is one thing at Rome, another at Geneva, another at London, another at Edinburgh, and still another at Boston. We lose, on this ground, not only the unity of the body of Christ, but the unity of faith itself; that very unity, which Bishop Hopkins, and all who believe in the church at all, hold to be essential to the very *being* of the church.

Will the bishop adopt the second answer, and seek an authoritative interpreter in the state? To make the state

the authoritative interpreter of the word of God would be to make it supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, to destroy religious liberty, to deny conscience, to rekindle the flames of persecution, and to give the state the same right to burn for heresy, that it has to imprison for theft, or to hang for murder. Moreover, it would not answer the bishop's purpose. The states must all be held to be mutually independent; and each, therefore, to be free to enact, within its own dominions, such reading of the word of God as it pleases. So we should have, under another form, all the evils of independency. Italy may enact Catholicism; Geneva, Calvinism; Prussia, Lutheranism; England, Episcopacy; Scotland, Presbyterianism; France tolerate all religions, and the United States recognize none. One state may establish Trinitarianism, another Unitarianism; one decree justification by faith, another justification by works. The subjects of each nation must adopt the state religion, on pain of heresy, civil disability, punishment here, and damnation hereafter. Where would be the umpire between independent states? What uniform standard of orthodoxy would be possible? What means of maintaining unity of faith would be left us? Nay, what right should we have to undertake to convert to the Gospel the subjects of even a heathen prince, against his consent? Or what right would a subject of the Grand Turk, for instance, have to embrace Christianity?

This answer cannot be accepted, at least so long as we remember Henry VIII. Then nothing remains but the third and last answer, namely, the individual reason. This constitutes each individual his own judge of what is the pure word of God. And the genuine orthodox faith must be held to be what each individual judges it to be. This sets up the individual above the church, justifies dissent in all its forms, nay, the absolute individualism and no-churchism of our modern come-outers. The reason of one man must be held to be equal to the reason of another, and one man's views can no more be called orthodox or heterodox than another's; heresy and schism become unmeaning terms. No established order in church or state can be maintained; no reverence, respect, or subordination exacted. All falls into disorder, where each man is at liberty to do whatever is right in his own eyes.

The bishop is too good a churchman, at least too strenuous an advocate of episcopal authority, to be able to accept

this answer. The proposition, the *novel* proposition, which he puts forth in his last Letter, for changing the constitution of his church, and establishing a central board or council, clothed with more than papal powers, proves very satisfactorily that he is no friend of undue individual liberty, and no enemy to the most plenary ecclesiastical authority. What, then, does he gain by rejecting the Catholic theory? He wishes to maintain the church, to maintain it as an authoritative body, supreme over faith and conscience, over words and deeds. And can it be necessary for us to tell him, that the church is maintainable as an authoritative body only on the Catholic theory? The legitimacy of episcopal authority is defensible only on the ground of its divine institution, and, we will add, only on the ground, that the church, as a corporate body, is founded by Christ himself, who miraculously preserves it from error in faith or practice, and that episcopacy is absolutely necessary to the *being* of the church, as well as to the *order* of the church. Whoso is not prepared to take this ground is not prepared to be an Episcopalian,—except at the expense of his logic. When, therefore, Bishop Hopkins rejects this ground,—when in order to keep clear of Rome, he lays down principles which place any Congregational minister in as high church relations as he himself holds, he but mocks our understandings by calling upon us to become Episcopalians. He has, he can have, no solid argument, drawn from the armory of the Gospel, to show why, by becoming Episcopalians, we should be any more in the church than we are by remaining in the Congregational church.

But, we shall be told, if we adopt the Oxford theory, we must go to Rome. Well, if we must have a church, and cannot have one without returning to the Roman communion, then, let us go to Rome. Either accept no-churchism and say no more about it, or have the courage to accept and avow principles on which a church is defensible. It may be a great humiliation to return and submit to the church which we have been for three hundred years warring against, and many of us may not yet be prepared to do so; but it is far better to return and submit to Rome than it is to remain under the dominion of absolute Individualism, the real man of sin, the very anti-christ, dragon, old serpent, the devil, who was to be let loose against the saints, and who would, if possible, deceive the very elect. We own that we are waiting for our Episcopal friends to show us some

ground on which we may defend the reformation, or rather, the reformers, in separating from the Roman communion; but we must tell Bishop Hopkins, and we do it with all becoming respect, that to Rome we certainly ought to go, if his is the only ground of defence his church has to offer.

COME-OUTERISM: OR THE RADICAL TENDENCY OF THE DAY.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1844.]

That all our social arrangements are very imperfect, and that there is ample room for the freest, fullest, and most energetic reforming spirit, no man in his senses can doubt. Even here, in this country, where we boast of our political enlightenment and our advanced social state, we are far from having realized the highest moral, political, or social ideal. There are causes at work among us, which, though in some respects securing a temporary and local prosperity, must ultimately, if not arrested, deprive us of all our boasted advantages. Our industrial system is working gradually, but surely, the subjection of the great mass of the operative classes; and when our new lands shall have been exhausted, and the price of land become so high that the laboring man can no longer hope to become a proprietor, as is already, to no inconsiderable extent, the case in the older states, we shall find established all over the country an industrial feudalism, of which the military feudalism of the middle ages was but a faint prelude. All is settling down into this new feudalism, and the whole legislation of the country, in relation to banks, tariffs, and corporations generally, is rapidly hastening it. The tendency this way is so strong that there is, at present, no power in the country able to resist it. We take up a Whig newspaper and run the eye over the programme of Whig principles and measures, and we marvel to see how admirably all is devised to secure this result; and these principles and measures will prevail, substantially, let which party will succeed in the election. The business interests of each of the great parties are the same; and no party, except it enlist its due proportion of

business men for its leaders and managers, can be of sufficient importance to exert any influence on legislation, and the general policy of the government. Your Wrights and Buchanans, when the Whigs need help to fasten an iniquitous tariff on the country, stand always ready to assist them; and a Democratic party, pledged against it, will, with a majority in Congress of nearly two to one, be unable to repeal or even essentially to modify it.

Under a political point of view, we have little to hope. Our institutions have resulted from our condition, from the general equality which originally obtained amongst us; they have not created that equality, and they are impotent to preserve it. Our government does less to aid or secure our general social prosperity and well-being, than does the Prussian government for the Prussians, or the Russian for the Russians. Prussia and Russia started in the race of nations but a little prior to ourselves,—for we must not date our national existence from the Declaration of Independence,—and the comparison between them and us would be far from flattering to our national vanity.

In regard to religion, the case stands still worse. Religion, in any high and significant sense of the word, hardly exists among us. We have no church, no faith; we have only miserable sectarianism, indifference, hypocrisy, or fanaticism. We have no memories that go back to the founding of the Christian church. Our religious establishments date from 1517. All before that we virtually disown. Our sects are mainly preoccupied each with the struggle for the ascendency. They generate very little piety, command very little religious zeal, and sustain themselves, for the most part, either by leaguing with Mammon, or by the application of artificial stimulants, and cunningly devised revival machinery, which produces now and then a sort of galvanic motion, but no genuine religious life.

Such being the real state of the case with us, it is not astonishing that our land should be overspread with pretended reformers of all sorts, with men and women uttering one long and loud, deep and indignant protest against the whole existing industrial, political, and religious order, or rather, disorder. The existing order is really only a wild disorder; and it is perfectly natural that men and women, who see this fact, and feel it, should lift up the voice, and exclaim, "Come ye out, come ye out from the midst of Babylon, and be ye no longer partakers in her iniquity;

drink ye no longer of the wine of her abominations!" Here is the origin, and here the good side, of what has received, we know not from whom, the uncouth name of Come-outerism. Viewed solely in this light, as a protest against the existing disorder, and an earnest demand for efforts to realize a higher and truer ideal, we confess that Come-outerism is worthy of sympathy and support.

But this is not the only aspect under which we are to consider Come-outerism. This is its ideal side, not its real; what we may term it in our closet speculations, but not what we shall find it, when we go forth to meet it in actual life. Men may have a zeal for God which is not according to knowledge, and fancy, nay, verily believe, that they are serving God, when they are in reality only following the devil disguised as an angel of light. And such we believe to be actually the case with our Come-outers. We believe them wholly deceived, and, so far as capable of exerting any influence at all, capable only of retarding the very end they are professedly seeking.

In speaking of Come-outerism, we use the word with considerable latitude, to characterize a wide and deep tendency of our times. As it presents itself to our minds, it is simply a continuation of the revolutionary spirit of the last century,—and why may we not say, of the Protestant spirit of the sixteenth century, of which the French revolution was only one of the necessary expressions? The Come-outers seem to us to be the Jacobins of the eighteenth century, the Independents and Fifth Monarchy men of the seventeenth, and the Protestants of the sixteenth.

All Christian men and women are and must needs be reformers, for, if they were not, they would not be Christians. There have always been reformers in the church and in the state, and always will be till Christianity fails. But there are two principles of reform, or rather two different methods of seeking reform. One method is, to accept the existing order, and through it, by such modes of action as it tolerates or authorizes, to seek the correction of abuses, and a more perfect development. The other method is, to resist the existing order, to abjure its laws, and to attempt to introduce an entirely new order. The first we may term the *conservative* method of reform; the second, the *revolutionary* method. Gregory VII. is a notable instance of the conservative reformer; Luther of the revolutionary reformer.

Which of these methods is the true one? Which is the one we have a right to adopt? Which is the most likely to be effectual? If a dozen years ago we had been asked these questions, we should have decided in favor of the revolutionary method, both on the ground of right and of expediency. Most young men, of more benevolent feeling than actual experience, and more enthusiastic zeal than practical wisdom, we believe, are prone to decide in the same way; while, on the other hand, men, as they grow older, as they take a wider survey of things, and feel more deeply the necessity of moral obligation, of stability in institutions, and regular and determinate modes of action, are, for the most part, disposed to decide in favor of the conservative method. Hence, we frequently find the man, who in his youth was a flaming radical, a staneh conservative in his maturer years. And this is usually, in our times, urged as an accusation, and such a man is pointed at as a renegade, as having in his age forgotten the dreams of his youth, and deserted the cause of human improvement. The crude notions of youth are, therefore, supposed to be more worthy of our respect than the sober and chastened convictions of age! But, when we see the young radical, the youthful revolutionist, converted into the staid and stanch conservative, and for "Liberty" substituting the cry of "Order," we are not necessarily to infer that he has forgotten the dreams of his youth, that his heart has grown insensible to the wrongs and outrages of which man is the cause or the victim, or that he is less able, less willing, or less determined to sacrifiee himself for the progress of his race. All that we are at liberty to infer is, that he has satisfied himself that the revolutionary method is not the true one, and that he can do more good, and more effectually realize the end contemplated in his young dreams, by adopting the conservative method.

There may be times when the old order has become corrupt, and must give place to a new order; but no man has the right, *on his own individual authority*, to attempt its destruction. Jesus does not even authorize his apostles to make direct war on either Judaism or paganism, though both were to give way to the Gospel. He authorizes them to do only what they may do, as quiet, orderly, and peaceable citizens. So the apostles authorize no resistance to the Roman government, but command their followers to be "in subjection to the powers that be." They were to trust to

the silent, but effectual, workings of the truth in the minds and hearts of men to bring about in a regular and peaceful manner all needed political and social reforms. They were never to resist authority actively; but, if they must resist it at all, it must be by passively suffering its unjust penalties. If the existing authorities required of them that which they could not yield without proving false to God, they were indeed to withhold obedience, but at the same time meekly submit to the penalty these authorities might choose to inflict.

The revolutionary spirit is essentially at war with the religious spirit. The religious spirit does not oppose reform, does not oppose progress, for it is itself a perpetual aspiration of the soul to God, that is to say, a continual hungering and thirsting of the soul after righteousness, after higher and yet higher degrees of sanctity; but it does oppose the spirit of rebellion and revolution. The meek, quiet, orderly, peaceable spirit, that would overcome the world, not by slaying, but by being slain, is the true religious spirit; the bold, daring, rebellious spirit, that recognizes no established order, and will submit to no fixed rule, is what the Scriptures everywhere teach us to regard as the *satanic* spirit. One feels this at almost every page of the Old Testament. The rebels, the revolutionists, the innovators, the Come-outers, are everywhere condemned; but never are reformers condemned. Young King Josiah is held up to us as a pattern prince, and he is a most zealous and indefatigable reformer.

The church has also taken, always, the same view. She has, from the first, enjoined submission to the constituted authorities, as if no good could come from the disobedient and rebellious;—obedience of children to their parents, obedience of servants to their masters, of subjects to the magistrate, of citizens to the state, of the faithful to their pastors. She held out always that all were under law, and that the great virtue, the parent of all the virtues, was obedience. Enforcing this lesson of obedience with maternal authority and maternal affection, she tamed the savage, she softened the barbarian heart, she spread the Gospel through heathen lands, and covered the earth over with monuments of religious zeal and benevolent affection. So long as her sons obeyed her, so long as they submitted to her discipline, and meekly received the law at her hand, she was able to carry on her glorious work of regeneration,

—and the progress of the race, in all that truly adorns and enriches humanity, was steadily and rapidly onward.

But the Anakim remained in the land. The giants, that is, the *earth*-born, and mighty men of old, forgot that the first of Christian graces is humility, and the first of Christian virtues, obedience; they felt that submission was a degradation, even a debasement, and resolved that they would rule and no longer serve. Like Lucifer and his rebel hosts, they set themselves up against authority. They challenged supremacy with the Almighty. Then broke forth the revolutionary spirit, and, with a large portion of the professedly Christian world, Christian virtue was assumed to consist, not in obedience, but in defiance. Submission to superiors was anti-christian. There *were* no superiors. This showed itself, in the sixteenth century, in ecclesiastical rebellion. Luther defied the pope, and he and his followers, together with Zwinglius and Calvin, shook off the authority of the church, and set up for themselves. The ecclesiastical rebellion was followed by civil rebellion, in the insurrection of the peasants; after an interval, in the revolt of the Netherlands; then in the English rebellion. The revolutionary spirit, checked for a moment, increased in intensity, and soon, in the eighteenth century, broke out all over Europe, and finally culminated in the French revolution. Voltaire, it has been gravely argued, by a popular writer in a religious periodical, continued the work of Luther. Luther overthrew the infallibility of the pope; Voltaire, the infallibility of the written word, and finally emancipated the mind from its thraldom, and proclaimed, henceforth and forever, absolute freedom of mind.

That our modern Come-outerism is the offspring of this very satanic spirit, there can be no doubt. This spirit has taken full possession of modern literature. All our popular literature is Titanic, and makes war on the Divinity. It is profoundly revolutionary. What else is the dominant spirit of the more applauded portions of German literature? Kant, Schiller, even Goethe, the Privy Councillor, with his calm, conservative exterior, are of the old Titanic or Anakim race, the children of Cain, not of Seth. What else shall we say of Byron, Shelley, Bulwer, and even Carlyle? or of the nightmare school of France, with its Victor Hugo, de Balzac, and George Sand? And of what other parentage are your Owens, Fouriers, and Saint-Simons?

The watchword of the whole party affected by this spirit,

whatever its Protean shapes, is LIBERTY. This is the angel of light, whose disguise the devil has chosen and in which he walks abroad, to and fro in the earth, seeking whom he may devour. Liberty is a sacred name; the name of all that is dear, precious, and thrilling to the human heart; the name of that to which all that is generous, noble, and praiseworthy in our nature aspires; the name of the very end for which we were made,—for our highest end, as our highest good, is, to become free, to become able to "look into the perfect law of liberty." Once make it appear that yours is the cause of liberty, and you rightfully enlist all our sympathies on your side, and prove, that, in fighting against you, we are fighting against God. Whoso blasphemes liberty blasphemes his Maker. All, therefore, that Satan has to do is, to persuade men that his cause is the cause of freedom; and then he can make even their consciences work for him, and all that is noblest and most energetic in their nature urge them on in his service.

The specific form of what among ourselves is called Come-outerism has been determined by the Abolition movement. The providential mission of this country is liberty; the realization of liberty, not of classes, castes, or estates, but the liberty of man as a moral, intellectual, social, and religious being. Here Christianity was to do her perfect work, in freeing man from every species of bondage, and of ushering him into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. This is the end Providence has appointed us. But this is precisely the end the devil would defeat. Liberty is precisely the thing he hates. He must defeat liberty, or have no foothold on this continent. How shall he defeat it? By making direct war upon it, that is, by direct and open opposition to our deepest and holiest instincts? The devil is too cunning for that; for he knows perfectly well, that, were he to do so, the whole land would perceive his real character; would detect him, and know him to be the arch-enemy of mankind, and therefore be prepared to withstand him. He can ruin liberty only in the name of liberty, accomplish his purposes only by appealing to our purest and holiest instincts, and making us believe and feel, that, while we are serving him with our whole hearts, we are really not serving him, but God. He must contrive to usurp the place of the Almighty, and to make himself believed to be God, and worshipped as God. He must then chime in with our sentiments, our instincts, even stimulate our devotion to liberty,

and defeat liberty by compelling us to seek it in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or by improper means.

The error of the Abolitionists is not, that they love liberty, or that with heart and soul they seek to realize it, and for the black man as well as the white man. The religion of Jesus knows no distinctions of caste or of color. All are children of one common Father, have one common Saviour, and one and the same moral destiny. The end they seek—we mean the sincere and honest among them—is praiseworthy, is a strictly lawful end; but they forget that they are never to seek even a lawful end by unlawful means. Here is their error. In seeking to abolish slavery at the South, they have found both the church and the state in their way; that is, they have found both the church and the state in the way of their doing it in the time and manner they propose. But is man made for the state and the church? or are the church and the state made for man? Is not liberty the very end for which man was made? Has not every man a right to be free? Can any state, or any church, which opposes freedom, which prohibits me from rushing to the rescue of the captive, from breaking the fetters of the bound, of bidding the slave go free, be of God, or in any sense worthy of my support? No. Then down with the church! Down with a corrupt ministry! Down with the state! Down, as we heard an Abolition leader exclaim in a public meeting, Down with the star-spangled banner! Down with the army and navy! Down with the executive! Down with the judiciary! Down with the legislature! Down with all your governmental and ecclesiastical establishments! And up with the Rights of Man!

Now, we are perfectly willing to admit that the state and the church exist for man, and that the true freedom of man is paramount to either. We are perfectly willing to admit, that, in case either should become really hostile to human freedom, it would cease to be worthy of our support. But who has the right to decide the question? Here is manifest the satanic spirit of Come-outerism. It assumes that the individual is his own judge; that, when he has decided for himself that a certain end is, in itself considered, good and holy, he has a right to seek it against all established authority. The constitution is in his way, and he gets up, as actually did, some time since, a leading Abolition orator, in Faneuil Hall, and exclaims, "My *curse* on the constitution!" Here, he sets up his own individual conviction, or his own

individual crotchet, and assumes that he has a right to follow it, let it lead where it will. He recognizes no authority but that of his own conviction, and claims the right to do whatever he pleases. He is wiser than church and state; he is above church and state; and there is no law to which he owes obedience, but the law which he is to himself. This is the satanic element of Come-outerism. The Come-outer can justify himself only by making good his claims to a divine commission, and to immediate and plenary inspiration. No authority but that of God can absolve a man from his obligation to obey the existing order; and he must show that he has that authority, or be convicted of the satanic spirit. Have our modern Abolitionists a warrant from the Almighty to set aside church and state?

But this is not all. Suppose the Come-outers, for instance, could get rid of the state, could trample the star-spangled banner in the dust, abolish the constitution, abolish all forms of law, wipe out all traces of outward government, and proclaim universally the rights of man, what would they gain? What protection would they have for the rights of man? What would prevent the strong from oppressing the weak, the cunning from overreaching the simple? Even the Come-outers themselves cannot in their own affairs get on without organization, and must have their committees, and their moderators. But is there nothing in the way of freedom but human government? Is it government that causes all the slavery there is? And, if the restraints of government were taken off, and all men left to their individual passions, instincts, convictions, and crotchets, would each man stand up a true freeman, in the glorious image of his Maker? Would no one seek to gain any advantage over another? Who will pretend it? It is government and law that protect these very men themselves, even while reviling government and law,—and us also from Come-outer vengeance, while defending law and order.

Suppose, again, the Come-outers could succeed in destroying the Christian ministry, in demolishing the church, and resolving all into a perfect moral and religious chaos, what would they gain? Is there no sin in the human heart but is caused by the church and the clergy? Do the church and the clergy plant all these vindictive passions in our breasts, cause all our selfishness, our worldly-mindedness, our wrongs and outrages one upon another? It were madness to pretend so. Abolish, then, the church and the clergy, and the

cause of the evil would remain untouched. We should have all the indwelling sin, the inbred corruption, all the lusts which now cause all the evils of which man complains, or to which he is subject. So, even, if the individual had a right to set aside the state and the church on his own responsibility, he would gain nothing, and would, to say the least, find himself in no better condition than he was before.

It is always lawful to seek to redress wrong, to labor to remove evil, whatever or wherever it is, *but only by lawful means;* and what are lawful means, the individual is not his own judge. We all of us, from the highest to the lowest, owe obedience to authority, to the state in civil matters, and to the church, authorized to speak in the name of Christ, in spiritual matters; and we have no *right* to use any methods or means of redressing wrongs, to labor for any ameliorations, but in submission to these.

From this conclusion, however, many, who are by no means reckoned among Come-outers, will dissent. The truth is, and there is no use in seeking to disguise it, Come-outerism is only the common faith of the country pushed to its last consequences. Thousands and thousands of those who condemn, in no measured terms, Garrison, Rogers, Foster, Abby Folsom, and their immediate friends and associates, adopt and defend premises, of which the wild notions of these are but the logical conclusions. In politics, the great majority of our countrymen assert the sacred right of revolution, and hold that government derives its just powers from the assent of the governed; in religion, nearly all of us hold to the right of private judgment, that the individual is morally as well as politically free to choose his own religion. Doubtless, in practice we deny these principles, doubtless we resist their practical application, but they are the deliberately, the solemnly proclaimed faith of the country, and no man can maintain his standing in our community who calls in question their theoretic soundness. Assuming individualism in religion, and no government without the assent of the governed, and the right of revolution in politics, we defy any man, who can reason logically, to escape the conclusions of our Come-outers. We may say there is no occasion for the extremes to which they carry matters, we may dispute about this or that practical point, but we cannot object to their doctrines. They are consistent; we who oppose them are inconsistent. They have the courage

to be true to their principles. We cowardly shrink from the legitimate consequences of our own faith.

Here is the danger. If there was nothing in the national faith to serve as the basis, the logical *data*, of Come-outerism, we should have no fears. But every people, in its collective life, tends to carry out, in their logical order, the great, fundamental principles on which that life is founded; and though practical good sense may for a time arrest the tendency, it can never prevent it from ultimately reaching its end. We are the children of revolution in the state, and of dissent in religion. We see nothing sacred in government, we feel nothing binding in ecclesiastical establishments. Our youth are early imbued with a sense of the supremacy of the individual; and all of us, who think seriously at all, grow up with the conviction, that our own judgment is in all cases to be our rule of action. When we step forth, in the glow and enthusiasm of youth, to write or speak to our countrymen, it is with this conviction burning in our souls. We would stand on our own two feet. What is antiquity to us? What is it to us what others have believed, or do believe? What to us the voice of the church, —a mere association of individuals, and of individuals no wiser or better than ourselves? What to us the state, also a mere association of individuals? and what the laws, made by our servants, and in nine cases out of ten by men who know not half so much as we? Here is the tone, the feeling, with which we enter upon life; and this tone, this feeling, is in perfect consonance with the settled faith of the country. What wonder, then, that men engaged in what they believe a good cause should, on finding themselves resisted or not aided by church or state, assume the right to set church or state aside, and to proclaim the absolute freedom of the individual in regard to either?

Our countrymen, if they would but stop a moment and consider, would read their own condemnation in this very horror or contempt of Come-outerism, which they feel when disclosing itself in its real character, and standing forth before them in its nakedness. Doubtless, there are sounder elements in our national faith than these which we have pointed out; doubtless, there are sound religious principles, and the foundations for a deep and genuine respect for law and order; but still, Come-outerism, in its principle, is— seek to disguise or to palliate the matter as we will—the active, dominant faith of the country. Is it not time, then,

to ask ourselves, and very seriously too, if, with this faith active and dominant, it is possible, in the nature of things, to maintain a fixed and permanent order in either church or state? Have we seen the worst? Have we reached the lowest deep? Are not, in point of fact, matters growing worse each year? Is not law losing its hold on our affections? Are not principles boldly avowed, and bravely defended, in high places as well as in low places, which make no distinction, intelligible or possible, between the acts of the mob and the acts of the state? Who will question, that, in the recent disturbances in Philadelphia, the majority of the citizens sympathized with the rioters? On what principle, then, can an advocate of the doctrine set up by Mr. Dorr and his friends condemn them? On what principle can our no-government men, our Come-outers, either those who hold to the absolute supremacy of the majority, or those who hold to the supremacy of the individual, justify the authorities in calling out the military to suppress them? And where is this matter to end?

There are two great doctrines which in their nature are opposed one to the other, and one or other of these we must take. A compromise between them may be attempted, often is attempted, with serious and praiseworthy motives, but never with success. One or the other must predominate, and we must have the courage to accept one or the other, and to accept it with all its legitimate consequences. Either we must accept the conservative doctrine, and give to authority the sole right to take the initiative in all reforms, and suffer the individual to work only under and through law; or else we must accept pure and absolute individualism, proclaim the absolute freedom and independence of individual reason, individual conscience, individual whim or caprice, and individual action, leaving each individual to answer to his God for his entire life, as best he may,—which is simple, unadulterated Come-outerism.

Now, here is our difficulty. We will as a people adopt, simply and entirely, neither the one or the other. Some of us will be strict conservatives in politics, but absolute Come-outers in religion and morals; others, strict conservatives in religion and morals, but absolute Come-outers in politics. We affirm a principle, follow it to a certain extent, in regard to certain things, and condemn all who, believing in the soundness of the principle, would carry it out in all its

legitimate consequences. Now, this is miserable folly and poltroonery. Either your principle is sound, or it is not. If it is sound, you have no right to stop short of its legitimate consequences; you have no right to say to us, "Thus far, but no further." If it is unsound, you have no right to act on it at all. But be it one or the other, you need not flatter yourselves that you can restrain the mass who adopt it within your prescribed limits. Logic is invincible; and, in spite of all your wise saws about extremes, all your preaching of moderation, and the imprudence of pushing matters too far, they will carry out the principle, and go to the very extreme it demands. There is no such thing as pushing a sound principle too far. If your principle will not bear pushing to its extreme, you may know that it is false, and that the error is, not in pushing it too far, but in adopting it at all.

But, in our folly and timidity, we deny this. The good people of the country, the practical people, the worshippers of common sense, the *via-media* folks, who believe the panacea for all ills is compounded of equal doses of truth and falsehood, courage and cowardice, wisdom and folly, consistency and inconsistency, will admit nothing of all this. They will permit us to condemn results, when we must not touch causes; the consequences, when we must respect the principle. When the principle goes a little further than the mass are prepared to go, but still in the direction they are going, we may condemn the extreme, but not it. We may declaim against Come-outerism, we may denounce or ridicule the Come-outers, show up their follies and extravagances, and the great multitude will applaud; but let us trace Come-outerism to its principle, let us condemn that principle, and set forth and defend, in opposition to it, the only principle on which we can logically or consistently combat Come-outerism, and forthwith we ourselves are condemned. The very multitude, who applauded us to the echo, turn upon us and say, "Why, friend, we did not mean that. This is carrying the matter to extremes, and all extremes are dangerous, and your extreme seems to us no less so than the one you are opposing."

Nor is this all. It is impossible to make up the true issue before the public. If you take the conservative side of the question, and resolutely resist the radical tendency of the day, you are instantly declared to be an enemy of the people, an enemy of reform, the enemy of progress, the advocate

of the stand-still policy, the friend of old and superannuated institutions, of crying abuses, of iniquitous privileges,—one, in fact, who would war against the laws of God, resist the whole tendency of the universe, and stay the mighty tide of improvement. You are overwhelmed with obloquy; you are driven from the field by the hoots and hisses of a whole army of popular declaimers. He who speaks for law and order, he who demands submission to authority, and forbids impatient zeal, impatient benevolence to move, till it has received a commission from authority, can bring no echo to his words. The heart of the multitude does not thrill at the sound of his voice, or respond to his eloquence. In consequence of this, through fear of being misapprehended, of being placed in a false position, of being accused of opposing that for which their hearts are burning, and, through a natural diffidence, a distrust of their own judgments which is produced by their very principles, many who see the evil, keep silent, shrink from the task of interposing themselves before the multitude, and of doing their best to arrest what they see and feel to be a ruinous tendency.

On the other hand, he who takes the radical tendency,—provided he does not leap too far at a single bound,—who calls out for liberty, for reform, for progress; who speaks out for man, for humanity; declaims against tyrants and oppressors; paints in the glowing tints of a fervid eloquence the wrongs and outrages of which man is both the cause and the victim; denounces the state, defies authority, sneers at the church and its pretensions, at fat and lazy monks and priests, with their doctrines of submission, and mulish lessons of patience and resignation, touches a chord that vibrates through the universal heart. He has at his command all the materials of the most effective eloquence. The young, the ingenuous, the ardent, the enthusiastic are kindled. Mass after mass ignites, and the whole nation flames out in a universal conflagration. In a country like ours, he can enlist all passions, good as well as bad, and render himself irresistible. All the inducements are, therefore, on the side of radicalism; whoever would coöperate with his countrymen, whoever would lead the multitude or use them for good purposes or evil, must espouse it, and support it with all his energy. We have but to proclaim the supremacy of man, to call out for freedom, and demand the institution of the worship of humanity, and thousands

hang breathless on our words and respond to our tones. Change our ground, take the conservative side, and he, who yesterday was the master spirit of his age and country, speaks only to listless ears; his power is gone; there is no eloquence in his voice, no magic in his words. The few who may applaud, who may hope to use him for their own purposes, half despise him, and he sinks into insignificance. Hence, all conspires to push on radicalism to its legitimate results. Christianity gives place to socialism, and the ever-blessed Son of God, to your Owens, Fouriers, or Saint-Simons.

Now, here we are; the great mass of us, unwilling to accept, to accept fully and unconditionally, the conservative method, countenancing the radical method in its principle, and opposing it only in its results; while all the active and energetic tendencies of the country conspire to swell its force and consolidate its dominion. What is to be done? What is our resource? Where is our safety? One or the other of the two principles must predominate, must become supreme; and the advantage is now all on the side of the radical tendency, however much it may be decried in colleges and saloons; and not only with us, but throughout Christendom. The great active causes in Europe are working in harmony with it, and even the conservative press of England is beginning to be affected by the socialist tendency, and the young Catholics of France and Germany are, in but too many instances, carried away by it. Is it not time to pause, and make up our minds to accept bravely one tendency or the other? Peace between the two is out of the question. The human race aspires to unity, and society cannot, and will not, consent to be torn forever by this destructive dualism.

For ourselves, we have made our choice. We began our career with the radical tendency. We accepted it in good faith, and followed it till we saw where it must necessarily lead. We recoiled from its consequences, and sought, by an impotent eclecticism, to reconcile the two principles, to harmonize authority and the independence of the subject, till we found our speech confounded, and saw the attempt was as idle as that of the builders in the Plain of Shinar, who would build a tower that should connect earth with heaven. Nothing remained but to take our stand on the conservative side, and submit ourselves to authority, and take the ground that reforms are never to be attempted in

opposition to established authorities; that is, on individual responsibility alone. We abandon no love of progress, we give up no hope of improvement, but hold that improvement is to come from high to low, not from low to high. It is God that decends to man, the Word that becomes flesh; not man that ascends to God, not humanity that becomes Divinity.

The question is, no doubt, a grave one; it has, no doubt, two sides, and men may honestly differ in their decisions. But to one decision or the other they must come, and that right early, or it may be too late. We have wished to state the question, and show that this Come-outerism, which so many condemn, and, in our judgment, so justly condemn, is in reality only the legitimate logical result of the great political doctrine, that government derives its just powers from the assent of the governed, and the kindred doctrine of the supremacy of the individual reason in matters of faith. The right of private interpretation and government by consent of the governed once granted, no logical mind can stop short of Come-outerism; and if you add the Quaker doctrine of individual inspiration, of the "light within," you not only legitimate Come-outerism, but establish it on a divine foundation, and clothe it with divine authority.

But, after all, we will not suffer ourselves to despair either of the country or of humanity. We do, in the profound darkness which envelopes the land and the age, behold a gleam of light. One ray, at least, breaks through the gloom, and reveals to us the glorious truth, that there lies a bright heaven beyond, in which rides in his majesty the Sun of Righteousness. The reaction, we have elsewhere pointed out, in favor of religion and the church, the deep and absorbing interest which many are beginning to feel on the great question of the church, unsteady and uncertain as all may be as yet, is a favorable indication that we may possibly have reached the lowest deep, and that the upward tendency is commencing; that Providence has not wholly abandoned us, nor given us up to a reprobate mind; and that the great and conservative spirit of the Gospel is still powerful, and will ultimately overcome the world, and subdue all things to the Lord and his Christ. We call upon the religious-minded, the lovers of the Lord, and the true friends of humanity, to hope and work, to pray without ceasing, and continue in well-doing. Let our trust be not in man, nor on an arm of flesh, but in God; let us submit our-

selves to him, lay aside human vanity and human pride, and walk in the way he has ordained, and the evil will be arrested, and the good retained.

SPARKS ON EPISCOPACY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1844.]

Our own general estimate of the Protestant Episcopal church, when reviewed in relation to unity and catholicity, may be easily collected from a foregoing article. We are compelled to regard it as a *Protestant* communion; and we are unable to find any ground on which Protestantism, taken as a separation in doctrine or communion from the Holy See, can be defended, without rejecting all notions of the church as an organic body. We know not what new light may break in upon our minds, but, so far as at present informed, we are compelled, by what seems to us to be the force of truth, to look upon the separation of the reformers from the Roman communion, in the sixteenth century, as irregular, unnecessary, and, we must add, as a serious calamity to Christendom. We deny not that there was a necessity for a thorough reform of manners; but we cannot but think and believe, that, if the reformers had confined themselves to such reforms, and to such modes of effecting them, as were authorized or permitted by the canons of the church, they would have much more successfully corrected the real abuses of which they complained, and done infinitely more service to the cause of religion and social progress. Their separation, if not a terrible sin, was at best a terrible mistake, which all sincere lovers of the Lord and his Spouse should deeply lament, and over which no one should permit himself to exult.

**Letters on the Ministry, Ritual, and Doctrines of the Protestant Episcopal Church, addressed to Rev. Wm. E. Wyatt, D. D., Associate Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Baltimore, and Professor of Theology in the University of Maryland, in Reply to a Sermon exhibiting some of the principal Doctrines of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States.* By Jared Sparks, formerly Minister of the First Independent Church of Baltimore. Second Edition. Boston: 1844.

Taking this view of the Protestant reformation, we are compelled to regard all Protestant communions as schismatic in their origin, at least, as irregular and censurable. From the charge here implied, we can find no special grounds for excepting the Protestant Episcopal church. Her pretensions to Catholicity we do not find supported; and although she retains much of the old Catholic faith, and many Catholic elements rejected by her sister communions, yet she cannot, and even dares not, call herself *the* Catholic church. We have no wish to disguise the fact,—nor could we, if we would,—that our ecclesiastical, theological, and philosophical studies have brought us to the full conviction, that, either the church in communion with the See of Rome is the one holy catholic apostolic church, or the one holy catholic apostolic church does not exist. We have tried every possible way to escape this conclusion, but escape it we cannot. We must accept it, or go back to the no-church doctrine. Our logic allows us no alternative between Catholicism and Come-outerism. But we have tried Come-outerism to our full satisfaction. We are thoroughly convinced in mind, heart, and soul, that Christ did institute a visible church; that he founded it upon a rock; that the gates of hell have not prevailed, and cannot prevail, against it; and that it is the duty of us all to submit to it, as the representative of the Son of God on earth.

But, notwithstanding this, we have felt that the primary question for us, who have been born and brought up in Protestant communions, is not so much, Which is the true apostolic church? as, What is the apostolic model? and that our first work should be, to bring our respective communions, in their constitution, doctrine, discipline, and usage, into strict conformity with that model. This may, perhaps, be disputed; but certainly we must believe that to ascertain, from our own stand-points, what is the apostolic model, and to labor to conform our respective communions to it, cannot be a work unprofitable, nor unacceptable to the great Head of the church.

We take it for granted that no serious Protestant can be satisfied with the present state of our Protestant world. The foundation of all moral and social well-being is in religion; and religion cannot coexist, at least, not in its efficacy, with our sectarian divisions, dissensions, and animosities. Union is loudly demanded. We hear the cry for it from all quarters. But union in error is out of the question.

We can unite only on the truth, and, as Christians, only by conforming in all things to the apostolic model. Then, what is this model? This question necessarily opens up the whole question of the church,—the great question of what it really is, of its place and necessity in the economy of Providence, and its means and method of recovering sinners and aiding the growth and sanctity of believers. This question is to be answered only by a philosophic appeal to the apostles and fathers, to the Bible interpreted by the light of ecclesiastical antiquity.

The church is the divinely instituted body for the recovery of sinners, and the growth and sanctification of believers. It is not an anomaly in God's universe, but contemplated by the original plan of creation, and essential to its complete realization. All the works of the Creator, and all the events of Providence, presuppose it, and point to it, as that in which they are to receive their fulfilment. It is necessary, on the same ground and for the same reason that the Incarnation was necessary, that is to say, because man can commune with God only by virtue of some medium through which he is revealed. No man hath seen God at any time; no man can see him and live; and no man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and him to whom the Son reveals him. We behold the glory of the Father only in the face of Jesus Christ, who is the revelation of God. We see nothing without a medium. We can behold no object but through the medium of that which is distinguishable from both ourselves who behold, and the object beheld; namely, the light. Light is neither ourselves nor that which we see, but the simple medium of sight, without which there would be no sight. So the only begotten Son of God is the light by which we behold the Father, by which the invisible becomes visible, the unapproachable becomes accessible. The Gospel is all here in the mystery of the Incarnation,—"the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh."

We are obliged here to separate from our Unitarian brethren, with whom we have for many years been in some degree associated, among whom we have so many friends, and to the learning, ability, singleness of purpose, and great moral worth of many of whom we can bear full and willing testimony. Yet we owe it to them and to ourselves to say, frankly, that we cannot reconcile the denial of the Incarnation, the proper divinity and proper humanity of Christ, "the mystery of godliness," with faith in Christianity at

all. The Gospel, according to our Unitarian friends, appears to us to be *another* Gospel, and wholly incompatible with the Gospel of our Lord, and wholly incompatible with any sound doctrine of life. Whoso denies that the Word, consubstantial with the Father, was made flesh and dwelt among us, denies the faith once delivered to the saints; and whoso perceives not the reason and necessity, in the economy of Providence, of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and of the union, without confusion, of the two natures, the human and the divine, in the one person of Jesus, it seems to us, must needs perceive nothing of the reason and necessity of the Gospel, nor of the profound significance of Christian redemption.

But for the same reason that it was originally necessary that the WORD, which is God, should be incarnated, that is, embodied in space and time, so that we, who are creatures of space and time, might have a medium of communion with that which transcends space and time,—a medium of access to the Father,—is it still necessary that the Word should continue to be embodied and dwell among us. The incarnation of the Word two thousand years ago would not avail us, if there were no present incarnation. Jesus, independent of all present embodiment in space and time, would be to us precisely what he was before he was born of the Blessed Virgin. He would be to us pure spirit, for all is pure spirit that pertains to eternity, and therefore invisible and inaccessible. We should, then, have no more regular or certain way of coming into a spiritual relation with the Father of spirits than we should have had, if he had not come at all. The whole rests on this great fact, that we can commune with spirit only as embodied, that is to say, through the medium of a "prepared body." Hence, when Jesus says, "Lo! I come to do thy will, O God!" he adds, "For a body hast thou prepared me."

The radical necessity of the church is in the radical necessity of this "prepared body;" and the radical idea of the church is, that it reproduces and continues the incarnation of the WORD. It is, as St. Paul says, the "body of Christ;" and in it we find continued the same union, without confusion, of the human and divine, which was in Christ himself. As Christ was the revelation of the Father, the light by which human eyes may behold the Divinity, mortality behold immortality, so is the church the revelation of Christ, the light by which we behold him in whose face shines the

glory of the Father. Hence, Jesus, addressing his disciples, as the church says, "Ye are the light of the world."

In the church is ever present the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, but who is one with the Father and the Son. As in the days when Jesus, as son of Mary, tabernacled in the flesh, we would have approached him bodily, and sat at his feet in order to come to God and learn of him; so now we must approach the church, the reproduction and continuation, so to speak, of his body, and learn his will, receive his spirit, and by him be united to God, the Father of life and the Fountain of blessedness. Such is our radical conception of the church. It is to Christ what Christ was to the Father; and as the Son spoke in the name and by the authority of the Father, because the Father was in him, and he in the Father; so the church speaks in the name and by the authority of Christ, because he is in the church and the church in him.

The radical conception of the church, as the body of Christ, is necessarily that of an authoritative body, but of a body whose authority is divine, not human. Here is the source of the error of Mr. Sparks's work on "Episcopacy." Mr. Sparks is a Unitarian, and takes up the subject from the Unitarian point of view. As a Unitarian, he cannot conceive of the union of perfect God and perfect man in the one person of Jesus; and for the same reason, he cannot conceive of the union of the human and divine, without confusion, in the church. Consequently, as he sees in Jesus only man, he can see in the church only human authority; and this authority he very properly rejects. His work is not properly a work against Episcopacy, but against the church as an authoritative body, and all the doctrines that would tend to made it an authoritative body. He denies the right, not merely of Episcopacy, but of the church herself, to claim or exercise any authority over the individual reason and conscience, and therefore, in principle, if not in fact, her right to exercise any control over the life and conduct of her members. The church, with him, therefore, disappears, and can at best be replaced only by a voluntary association of believers.

But, if there is any truth in the principles we have laid down, Mr. Sparks not only rejects the authority of the church, and therefore the church herself, but the Gospel of Christ, and denies, virtually, that God through Christ has made any permanent provision for the salvation of sinners,

and the growth and sanctification of believers. The question he raises is not a question between Episcopacy and Congregationalism, but between church and no-church, between apostolic Christianity and no Christianity.

But leaving Mr. Sparks and his Unitarianism, conceding to him that no *human* authority has any right to control us in faith or discipline, yet asserting that the church represents the authority of Christ, or rather, is the human medium through which Christ exercises his divine authority, as his body which was crucified was the medium through which he revealed his divine Sonship, we may still ask, Where is this authority lodged? Who are "the earthern vessels" to whom it is committed? Is it committed to the brotherhood, or to the apostolic ministry? Here is the true question between Episcopacy and Congregationalism. Both admit the church; both admit it to be an authoritative body; and both admit its authority to be not its, but Christ's; that is, not its authority in so far as it is human, but only in so far as it is divine. Both agree that no human authority is legitimate, and that the only authority which is legitimate is Christ's authority. Both agree, also, as to the nature and extent of this authority. The difference is solely as to its depositaries and administrators.

Congregationalism asserts that the authority is committed to the great body of the faithful, that is, to the brotherhood. This view is plausible, and seems to be countenanced to some extent by the opinions and practices of some individuals or portions of the primitive church. But the great body of the church has never accepted it in the purely Congregational sense. There may have been individuals who have contended for it; there may have been, here and there, a local congregation that virtually practised on it; but it was the exception, not the rule; an irregularity, an anomaly, not the established order.

Moreover, this view labors under several serious practical difficulties. The faithful must be the depositaries of this authority as individuals, or as a body corporate. If as individuals, does each individual possess it in all its plenitude? If so, you have absolute individualism, and, therefore, no ecclesiastical authority at all. Is it lodged with the majority? Then you transfer to the church what Dorrism is in politics, and enable any number of individuals, however disorderly, if they are the majority, to rule, and to administer the authority as they please; and, moreover, you have no crite-

rion by which to distinguish between the acts of the faithful, and those of others professing to speak in their name.

If you assume that they are entrusted with this authority only in their corporate capacity, that is, as one single corporate body, how will you bring together the whole body, which at this moment are so many millions, and enable them to act as a single corporation, with an official voice, through an official organ?

If you assume the faithful to be divided into separate congregations, and that each is an independent polity, possessing in itself the right to claim and exercise all the prerogatives of the church of Christ, we demand the principle of this division. May any number of individuals, at their own pleasure, come together and resolve themselves into a Christian congregation, and, therefore, into a church of Christ? Will such congregation be a true church? If so, you must treat it as a church, and extend to it all the courtesy, civility, fellowship, due from one Christian congregation to another. Suppose, then, a number of real infidels should come together, and resolve themselves into a Christian church, and their infidelity to be Christianity, you must extend your fellowship to them; for you have no right to judge them. A case bearing some analogy to this has actually occurred in our own neighborhood. We know a Congregational church whose minister is to all intents and purposes an unbeliever, and yet that church claims the fellowship of sister Congregational churches, and our Unitarian friends so interpret Congregationalism that they feel that they cannot disown either the church or its minister.

If you say, that there must be some authority outside of the congregation competent to decide whether it be or be not a Christian church, you depart from Congregationalism. But assume such authority,—Where is it? The practice is, we believe, for the churches already existing in the neighborhood, officially to recognize the new congregation. Whence the right of the neighboring churches to do this? Is the new church, when recognized, a true church? If so, according to your own principles, it is independent, and possesses plenary powers as the church of Christ. On what ground, then, in case it becomes heretical, can you so far judge it as to withdraw fellowship from it? On what ground, moreover, does this recognition by neighboring churches introduce the new congregation into the family of Christian churches? They must themselves have been

recognized by other churches, and these by others still; and where will you stop this side of churches founded by the apostles themselves? The churches recognizing must themselves be apostolic, or their recognition is good for nothing. How establish this apostolic character, without establishing their lineal descent from apostolic churches? Congregationalism, then, as well as Episcopacy, is obliged to resort to *Apostolical Succession.*

In the great questions concerning the church, and the regularity of Protestant churches, we have here, so far as we can see, all the difficulties usually alleged against Episcopacy, and, if the Protestant Episcopal church cannot make out the regular succession of her bishops, still less can Congregationalism make out the regular succession of Congregational churches. Partial as our education has made us to Congregationalism, we should be loath to undertake its defence on any ground whatever. For the same reason, if for no other, that we reject the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the people, would we reject the sovereignty of the brotherhood. We would much rather—if it must come to this—be under one tyrant than many. Moreover, we cannot conceive of a church with the authority lodged in the brotherhood. The minister, if commissioned by the congregation, is not placed by the Holy Ghost over it, is not immediately accountable to Christ, but mediately, through the very body over which he is nominally an overseer. How can he rebuke, warn, reprove, discipline, teach with authority, the very body from which he derives his authority, and which may revoke it at will? Make your clergyman absolutely dependent on his congregation, receiving his authority from it, and accountable to it for his doctrines, and for the manner in which he discharges his duty, and you deprive him of all authority as the minister of God. His congregation are his masters, his critics, his judges; and every time he preaches, he is virtually on trial, and the question is, whether his congregation shall acquit him or condemn him, continue him in his pulpit, or dismiss him, and send him forth to the world branded with their disapprobation. The evils of Congregationalism glare upon us from all sides, and deeply are they felt by not a few of our brethren; and sorry are we to find Bishop Hopkins and his brother Evangelicals taking a ground, we were about to say, even below that of our old-fashioned Congregationalism. Practically, the Congregational minister ceases, in New England, to be the min-

ister of Christ to the congregation. He is no longer a bishop, or overseer, placed by the Holy Ghost over the congregation. The congregation is his overseer; and in cases not a few, he becomes, is forced to become, or leave his charge, the mere tool of one or two ignorant, conceited, perhaps worldly-minded, but wealthy and influential members of his flock, or of some four or five good sisters, who indemnify themselves for their abstinence from the pleasures of the world, by getting up and managing all sorts of societies for the general and particular supervision of the affairs of their neighbors. Woe to the poor man, if he refuse to coöperate with the restless, the gossiping, the fanatical members of his congregation, ready to do any thing and every thing but lead "quiet and peaceable lives, in all godliness and honesty." He must be foremost in their daily and nightly *religious* and *philanthropic* dissipation, or else, alas! it will be instantly discovered that he is an unfaithful minister of Christ, unadapted to the wants of his congregation; and, broken in health, broken in spirit, poor and friendless, with a wife and children, it may be, to provide for, must be dismissed in disgrace, to make way for another,—a dapper little man, right from the seminary, and with just as little religion in his heart, as brains in his head.

No, we have had enough of Congregationalism. Not a few, if we may judge from the letters we receive, of our ablest and best Congregational divines are fully satisfied of the utter impracticability of the Congregational scheme. It has run itself out, and we are sorry to see the war that is raging against Episcopacy. We may not, indeed, be able to accept the Anglican church, or her American daughter, as the Holy Catholic Apostolic church; but she has departed less from the apostolic model than the other Protestant communions. The lay delegation admitted by the Protestant Episcopal church of this country, led on by her Duers, already begins to show the evil one day to be expected from it; and the original cause of her separation from the rest of the Catholic church, and the Protestant elements she originally accepted to conciliate the Protestant party, are now showing themselves, by destroying the simplicity of her speech, compelling her to speak with a double tongue, and rending her bosom with, we fear, an invincible dualism; but still she retains many of the essential features of the Catholic church, and, if we are to unite on any ground out of the Roman communion, she must be the nucleus of union for

all that portion of Protestantdom which speaks the English tongue. She has it in her power, if she will but free herself from her Protestant elements, bring out her Catholic elements,—elements which have survived the Goths and Vandals,—in their truth and consistency, to perform no mean part in recalling us all to the unity of Christendom, to the unity of the church, and enabling us of the Anglo-Saxon race to feel that the term of our banishment has expired, and that we may henceforth dwell in the home of our fathers.

THE ANGLICAN CHURCH SCHISMATIC.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1844.]

We have introduced *The Churchman* to our readers, because we have a high respect for the learning and ability of its distinguished editor, and because, as the organ of that section of the Anglican church, in this country, which has been supposed to have some Catholic tendencies, it undertakes to answer certain objections to Anglicanism brought forward in our review of the Letters of Bishop Hopkins on *The Novelties which disturb our Peace.* We stated, in our remarks, that we could not see how the Anglican church, on the principles of the Oxford divines, could justify her separation in the sixteenth century from the church of Rome. According to these principles, as we stated them, and as we understand *The Churchman* to accept them, the church of Christ is a single corporate body, existing and acting only in its corporate capacity, and therefore capable of manifesting its will only through corporate organs. Hence, the separation of any one member, or particular church, from the communion of another, not authorized by the church in her corporate capacity, speaking through her corporate organs, is not authorized by the church. The separation of one member from the communion of another, not authorized by the church, is *schism.* But the separation of the church of England from the com-

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* *The Churchman.* Edited by the Rev. Samuel Seabury, D. D. New York : No. 698. August 3, 1844.

munion of the church of Rome was not authorized by the church. Therefore, that separation was schism.

This was substantially our argument. *The Churchman* admits that the church is a corporation, and, therefore, that it can exist and act only in its corporate capacity; but to the assertion, that it can manifest its will only through corporate organs, and, therefore, that the separation of one member from the communion of another, not authorized by the church speaking through her corporate organs, is not authorized by the church at all, he opposes, or seems to oppose, 1. The invisibility of the corporation, that is, of the church, and 2. That the analogy of the corporate body to the natural body is inadmissible, and therefore no argument founded on the assumption of such analogy can be valid. He says:—

"If Mr. Brownson had termed a corporation an 'invisible body,' he would have had both truth and authority on his side; but we apprehend that he has neither, when he makes a 'visible centre' and a 'visible head' essential to the existence of such body. A corporation may have a particular place for the transaction of business, and an officer to preside in its proceedings; and this place and this officer may in an improper and metaphorical sense be called its 'centre' and 'head.' So far are they, however, from discharging the functions corresponding to the heart and head of the natural body, that they are mere accidents of the corporation, and not at all necessary to its unity, individuality, or corporate faculty."

The Churchman must pardon us for saying that we do not perceive the pertinency of this reply, even admitting its abstract truth, which, however, we are far from admitting. It is true, we applied the terms "visible centre" and "visible head" to the ecclesiastical corporation; but we evidently meant no more by them, in our argument, than that a corporation, if but one corporation, must have a visible unity, a unity of thought and will, and an official organ through which the thought and will are to be expressed and executed. *The Churchman* has apparently misapprehended our allusion to the church of Rome. He replies to us as if we had asserted that the pope and the church of Rome are the source of the authority of the corporation. But we asserted no such thing. We did not contend that it is essential to the existence of a corporation that it have a head ruling by virtue of its own inherent authority; but that the body cannot exist and act as a corporation without an official head through which it may

declare and execute its will. For aught that we said, the authority may be vested in the whole body. The question before us was not, Where is the authority of the church vested? but, What is the legal mode of expressing it? We assumed, that a corporation is a corporation only on condition of possessing corporate unity, and certain organs through which to act; and that it never does or can act, *qua* corporation, save in and through these organs. Is *The Churchman* prepared to dispute this? A corporation wanting unity, individuality, is obviously no corporation at all; and a corporation having no organs through which to act is at best a merely possible corporation, not an actual corporation; for it has no corporate faculty, that is, no ability to perform a single corporate act. The state without organs, that is, constituted authorities, is no true state; it is at best only the state in abeyance. It cannot act as the state; it can discharge none of the functions of a state.

Equally evident is it, that what is not done by the individuals composing the corporation through its corporate organs, or constituted authorities, is not done by the corporation. The resolutions of the people of Massachusetts, unless these be convened by legal warrant, cannot be the resolutions of the *State* of Massachusetts. The members of the two houses of the legislature, coming together as so many individuals, without form of law, are not the legislature; and however unanimous they may be in their acts, their acts cannot be laws, unless passed in accordance with the constitution, the forms of law, and signed by the proper officers. So of any incorporated company. Its acts are corporate acts, authorized by the corporation, and binding on it, only when done by it legally convened, as the corporation, and acting through its proper officers.

The principle here contended for must apply equally to the church, if the church be a corporation. It must be an organic body, organized into an artificial individual, and have appropriate organs through which to express and execute its will; and then only what is done through these organs is done legally, that is, by the church. This is what, and all, we contended for. We did not contend that the pope is the *sovereign* of the church, but simply that he is its visible, official head, through which the will of the church must be expressed and executed, in order to be legally expressed and executed. More than this we of course

believe; for we hold the pope to be, not the vicar of the church merely, but also the vicar of Christ; but this is all that was assumed in our argument, and all that we judge it necessary to assume in order to convict the Anglican church of schism.

Admitting, then, for the moment, that the analogy of the corporate body to the natural body is not complete, our argument is not invalidated; because we do not found our argument on the assumption of such analogy, in any sense in which *The Churchman* has objected to it. He denies that analogy only when the head of the corporation is assumed to govern the corporation in the sense in which the head governs the natural body; but we have asserted the head not as governing the corporation, but simply as the organ through which the corporation must govern. A head in this last sense is essential to the very existence of a corporation as an actual corporation.

Nor better founded is the objection, that the corporation is "an invisible body." In this objection *The Churchman* asserts the invisibility of the church, that is, that the church is an invisible body; and from the invisibility of the church he apparently concludes, though his reasoning is exceedingly vague and uncertain, to the invisibility of its organs, and therefore that an act of the church, or any portion of it, in order to be legitimate, does not need to be done through visible organs. Consequently, admit that the separation of the church of England was an act not authorized by the corporation speaking through visible organs, it does not follow that it was not authorized by the church; for it may have been done by the church speaking through its invisible organs. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that the separation was schismatic. If this is not his argument, we do not comprehend the force of his objection, nor wherefore he should have quoted Blackstone's assertion of a corporation, namely, "A corporation, being an invisible body, cannot manifest its intentions by any personal act or oral discourse."

But to this we object, 1. That, strictly speaking, a corporation is not an invisible body; and 2. That, though a corporation may not be able to manifest its intentions by a *personal* act or oral discourse, yet it must be able to manifest its intentions, and, therefore, have organs through which to manifest them, or be at best only a merely pos-

sible corporation, not an actual corporation. To all practical purposes, otherwise, it would be as if it were not.

A single legal authority will suffice to sustain our first objection.

"A corporation," says Mr. Kyd, as quoted with approbation by Angell and Ames, "is as visible a body as an army; for, though the commission or authority be not seen by every one, yet the body united by that authority is seen by all but the blind. When, therefore, a corporation is said to be invisible, that expression must be understood of the *right* in many persons collectively to act as a corporation, and then it is as visible in the eye of the law as any other right whatever of which natural persons are capable."—*Angell and Ames on Corporations*, p. 5.

But even admit that the corporation, *qua* corporation, is invisible, yet the individuals composing it, and the organs through which it acts, are visible, and this is all the visibility we contended for. The authority of the church, all admit, is invisible; for it is the authority of Christ, who is its invisible Head. But the question we raised does not turn on this, but on the visibility of the organs through which that authority is expressed. Is *The Churchman* prepared to deny that the church is the visible depository of the doctrines, and the visible medium of the authority, of Christ on earth? Does not *The Churchman* hold, as well as we, that Christ both commissioned his church to teach all nations, and commanded us all to *hear* the church? But, if the church, that is, the *ecclesia docens*, be not visible, how are we to recognize it, to know when we hear its voice and receive its teachings, or when we do not?

The validity of the second objection we have already established, in establishing the necessity of organs through which the church may manifest its intentions. The church is to teach; but how can it teach, if it have no organ for teaching? We, the *ecclesia discens*, are to hear it; but how can we hear it, if it have no voice? And how can it utter its voice without a vocal organ? And if the organ be not visible, cognizable, how shall we distinguish the voice of the church from any other voice, or know it to be the voice of the church? *The Churchman*, as well as we, demands obedience to the voice of the church. Then he must abandon the fiction of an invisible church, and concede the church to be a visible, organic body, existing in space and time, with visible organs for the perceptible manifestation of its intentions.

Furthermore, the best legal authorities sustain the anal-

ogy of the corporate body to the natural body much more fully than *The Churchman* seems to suspect. Chief Justice Marshall defines a corporation to be,—

"An artificial body, possessing certain properties; among the most important of which are *immortality*, and, if the expression may be allowed *individuality;* properties by which the perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual."—*Angell and Ames on Corporations*, p. 2.

Jacob, in his Law Dictionary, as well as Tomlins, in his, defines a corporation (*corporatio*) to be,—

"A body politic, or incorporate; so called, as the persons composing it are made into a body, and of capacity to take and grant, &c. Or, it is an assembly and joining together of many into one fellowship and brotherhood, whereof one is head and chief, and the rest are the body; and this head and body knit together make the corporation: Also, it is constituted of several members *like unto the natural body*, and formed by *fiction* of law to endure forever."

Another authority adds,—

"A corporation aggregate [as distinguished from a corporation sole] is an artificial body of men composed of divers constituent members *ad instar corporis humani;* the ligaments of which body politic, or artificial body are the franchises and liberties thereof, which bind and unite all its members together; and the whole frame and essence of the corporation consist therein."—1 *Bacon's Abridgment*, p. 500.

The analogy of the corporation to the natural body is recognized and insisted upon by all these authorities. They all go to prove that a corporation *qua* corporation, must be an individuality, and possess a central will or unity of volition, together with a head or organ for its expression. The church, then, since it is conceded to be a corporation, must possess the same; and its whole frame and essence, as a corporation, must consist in its being knit and bound together into one artificial body, with a central will, and unitary organs for expressing and executing it. All this is involved in the very conception of it as a body corporate, or corporation, in distinction from a mere aggregation.

This assumed, we return to our former argument. The separation of one member of the church from the communion of another, not authorized by the church in its corporate capacity, is not authorized by the church at all, and is therefore irregular and schismatic. The antecedent we have proved from the admission of the church as a corporation, and from the very conception of a corporation itself. The

conclusion is evident from the fact, that the church is one body, and all the members are members one of another. *Sicut enim in uno corpore multa membra habemus, omnia autem membra non eundem actum habent: Ita unum corpus sumus in Christo,* SINGULI AUTEM ALTER ALTERIUS MEMBRA, Rom. xii. 4, 5; and again, *Sicut enim corpus unum est, et membra habet multa; omnia autem membra corporis cum sint multa, unum tamen corpus sunt; ita et Christus* ..... *Vos autem estis corpus Christi,* ET MEMBRA DE MEMBRO, 1 Cor. xii. 12, 27. It is by the intercommunion of member with member, each with each, and each with the whole, that the unity or *solidarity* of the whole is effected and maintained. He that is in communion with a member is in communion with the body; and consequently, he that withdraws or separates from the communion of the member withdraws or separates from the communion of the body. Therefore, the member separating from the communion of a member, without the authority of the body, is guilty of schism; for schism is the unauthorized separation from the body.

The separation of one member of the church from the communion of another, without the authority of the church, is schism. But the church of England separated from the communion of the church of Rome, without the authority of the church. Therefore, the church of England was guilty of schism. The church of England, by confession of *The Churchman*, was not the church, in the unity and integrity of the corporation, but only a member of it. Admit, what however we admit merely for the sake of the argument, that the church of Rome was also only a particular church, and therefore, only a member of the corporation. Yet, to separate from the communion of Rome, according to the principles we have established, was, still, to separate from the church of Christ, unless the church of Rome had separated herself, or been separated by a competent authority, from the church of Christ. But the church of Rome had not separated herself, nor been separated by a competent authority, from the church of Christ. Therefore, the church of England, in separating from her communion, separated from the communion of the church of Christ.

We prove the minor by plain historical facts. Prior to the reformation, the whole church of Christ, save condemned heretics and acknowledged schismatics, was in com-

munion with the church of Rome; and no act of the ecclesiastical corporation can be pleaded, cutting her off from the communion of the Catholic body. She possessed and exercised all the rights and immunities incident to an integral member of the church of Christ.

But you say, that she had separated herself virtually, if not actually, from the church of Christ, by having corrupted the word of God, and departed from the faith once delivered to the saints. By her corruptions and heresies, she had ceased to be an integral portion of the church of Christ. Therefore, to separate from her communion was not to separate from the church of Christ.

Admitting the premises, we must of course concede the conclusion. But against these premises we allege, first, that the faith of the Roman church, prior to the reformation, was the faith of the whole Christian world, with the exception of condemned heretics and schismatics, not to be counted. If Rome had departed from the faith, the whole church, *qua* church, had departed from it and become heretical, and therefore had failed. But Christ has promised that his church shall not fail, and given it assurance of exemption from error, in promising it the spirit of truth, which shall lead it into all truth, and to be with it himself all days unto the consummation of the world. But Christ is God, and it is impossible for God to promise and not to fulfil. Therefore, his promise made to the church could not fail. But, if the promise of Christ could not fail, the church could not lapse into heresy. Then the church of Rome, since its faith was that of the whole Christian church, had not lapsed into heresy, and therefore was not corrupt and heretical, as the argument presupposes.

But, secondly, admitting that the church of Rome had become corrupt and heretical, the fact needed to be known and judicially established by a competent tribunal, before any particular church could have the legal right to withdraw from its communion. The only competent tribunal to take cognizance of the question, and to convict Rome of heresy, which alone could justify separation from her communion, was the ecclesiastical corporation in its unity and integrity, acting in its corporate capacity, and speaking through its official organs. Now the church of England was not this ecclesiastical corporation, and therefore was not in herself alone competent to establish judicially the fact, that Rome was corrupt and heretical. But she estab-

lished it by no authority but her own. She then did not establish it by a competent authority. Then she did not establish it at all. Then she had no right to assume it as established, and to make it the basis of her separation. To separate from the Roman communion, before that communion was convicted of heresy by a competent tribunal, was schism, according to the principles established, and which *The Churchman* cannot gainsay. But the church of England did separate before that communion was convicted of heresy. Therefore, the separation was schism. We see no possible escape from this conclusion.

Will *The Churchman* plead the authority of the word of God, written and unwritten? But no particular church or member of the universal church is the *ultimate* judge of what the word of God teaches. Before he can plead the word of God in his justification, he must adduce a decision of the universal church, in its highest judicial capacity, declaring, that, by the word of God, the doctrines of the church of Rome are heretical. But no such decision was adduced, no such decision can be adduced. Therefore he cannot appeal to the word of God, for such appeal would be a mere begging of the question.

Will he go further, and contend that a *national* council is competent to declare authoritatively the word of God, and to determine what is or is not heresy; and say, that the national council of England condemned Rome as heretical, and therefore the church of England was not guilty of schism in separating from the Roman communion? We have too much confidence in his principles as a sound churchman to believe that he will take this ground; but if he should, we reply,—

1. That it contradicts the acknowledged principles of the church, according to which it is only a universal council that is competent to declare what is or is not heresy; and a national council, when it goes beyond matters of local discipline, is of no authority, unless its decisions are accepted or assented to by the universal church. But, waiving this, we deny,—

2. That the church of England proceeded by the authority of even a national council. First, no council, provincial, national, or œcumenical, is really a council, unless convened by legal warrant from the chief pastor of the church. The church is an independent polity in itself, and in no sense dependent on the civil government. The authority of the

council is not derived from the emperor or prince by whose permission or edict it is assembled, but from the official head of the ecclesiastical corporation. The consent or warrant of the prince is essential only so far as concerns the peaceable assembling of the council, and so far as the council may deliberate on matters purely temporal. Now in England, at the time of the reformation, no legal council was called, for none was called by the consent or warrant of the authority competent to convoke a council. But waiving this, in point of fact, the condemnation of Rome was not pronounced by a council, nor was the separation authorized by a council, but by *act of parliament.* There may have been a convocation, but everybody knows that there was no free council. The whole matter was begun, carried on, and completed, by the authority of the king and parliament, an authority unknown to the ecclesiastical corporation. Bishop Jewell, in his *Apology of the Church of England*, says,—

"Neither have we done that we have done *altogether* without bishops, or without a council. The matter hath been *treated in open parliament*, with long consultation, and before a notable synod and convocation."

On which the editor of the edition before us, the present Protestant Episcopal bishop of the diocese of Maryland, remarks,—

"Jewell's cause would have been no worse, if it had wanted this plea. The best friends of the church of England have ever been ready to acknowledge, that it would have been happy, had *parliament* possessed a far less conspicuous share in its reformation. The measure was one of *necessity;* for although the great body of the people, and the principal nobility, were friendly to the reformation, yet a large majority of the clergy retained their attachment to the distinguishing dogmas of popery, and were strenuous in their opposition to the measures which were taken for their suppression. *Left to themselves, they would, in all probability, have quietly relapsed into submission to the yoke of Rome.* LAY INFLUENCE WAS EMPLOYED BY THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (!) TO EFFECT THE PURIFICATION OF HIS CHURCH." *

Here the great and important fact is admitted. The separation was not by authority of the church of England, *qua* church; for, if left to herself, she would have continued in the communion of Rome. The separation was effected by *lay* influence, an influence, as such, not recognized in the church of God, which vests the authority, not

Apology of the Church of England. By John Jewell, Bishop of Salisbury. New York: 1831. pp. 192, 193.

in the laity, but in the pastors and teachers. The simple fact is, a portion of the laity of England, wielding the civil authority, aided by a few of the clergy, against the wishes and convictions of the *church* of England, violently separated her from the communion of Rome. Let it not, then, be said, that it was done by a free council deliberately convicting Rome of heresy, and therefore forbidding communion with her. No council ever met in England during the sixteenth century, that would, if free, have passed any condemnation on the church of Rome. By what authority, then, of the church, has Rome ever been declared heretical, and a solid ground of separation from her communion established? By none at all.

But *The Churchman* goes further, and contends that the church of England has never separated from the communion of the Catholic church. "We deny," he says, "that the church of England has ever separated itself from the rest of the universal church; and we deny that the rest of the universal church, acting in its corporate capacity, has ever separated from the church of England." To this we reply,—

1. That the church of England, in separating from the communion of the church of Rome, while that church was, as we have seen it was at the time of the separation, an integral part of the Catholic church, did separate from the communion of the Catholic church. So long as the church of Rome was unconvicted of schism or heresy, before a competent tribunal, separation from it was separation from the Catholic church. But particular churches, according to the acknowledged constitution of the church, intercommune through their bishops or chief pastors. Consequently, to withdraw from the communion of a bishop or chief pastor is to withdraw from the communion of the church over which he presides. But *The Churchman* confesses that the church of England did separate from the communion of the *pope* or *bishop* of Rome. Therefore, it separated from the communion of the *church* of Rome. Therefore, again, it separated from the communion of the Catholic church, of which the church of Rome was an integral member. But we reply,—

2. That, whether by her own act or that of the universal church, the church of England *is* separated from the communion of the Catholic church. *The Churchman*, we presume, will not contend that his church is in communion with

the non-episcopal churches, whose orders it does not recognize. It certainly is not in communion with the church of Rome, or with any of the particular churches, such as the Spanish, the French, the German, &c., which recognize the authority of the Holy See. Nor is it in communion with the Greek church, the Armenian, the Nestorian, or any of the eastern churches, which are not in communion with Rome. There is no church that intercommunes with the Anglican. As a question of fact, it is a solitary church, extending communion to, and receiving it from, no other Christian body on earth. Now, of two things, one: Either the church of England, as existing in the British dominions and in this country, is the one Holy Catholic church, the church corporation in its unity and integrity, or it is a body distinct and apart from the Holy Catholic church. It is not the first, by the confession of *The Churchman*, and of all Anglicans, none of whom dare call it the whole Catholic church, or pretend that it is any thing more than a part, a branch, of the Catholic church. It is not a part or branch, because the parts or branches all intercommune, and it, as we have seen, communes with no ecclesiastical body but itself. Then we are forced to adopt the second conclusion, that it is a body distinct and separate from the Holy Catholic church.

Now, it matters not whether this separation be by her own act, or by that of the Catholic church. She is in either case alike a schismatic body. If she has separated herself by her own act, she is guilty of schism; and if she has been excluded from the communion of the Catholic church by an act of the Catholic church, she has been excluded by the competent authority, and is schismatic by judgment of the universal church. How will the church extricate herself from this dilemma? It is in vain that she attempts to deny the fact of the entire separation between her and all other churches extant, for the fact of such separation is unquestionable; and this fact proves of itself, either that she is the one Holy Catholic church, or no part of it.

Will *The Churchman* contend that the separation does not really exist, because there can be pleaded no formal act of the church of England separating herself from the communion of other churches, and none of other churches separating themselves from hers? We reply, first, that a formal act to this effect is not necessary. The separation exists as a *fact*, and is acquiesced in by the whole body of the

Anglican church, which is *prima facie* evidence of her approval of it. It is acquiesced in, assented to, by all other churches, which is all that is needed on their part. The universal acquiescence or assent of the whole church is always taken and deemed to be the decision of the church.

But we reply, secondly, that it is *not true* that there is no formal act, on the part of England, of separation from the Catholic church, and that there is none on the part of the Catholic church cutting her off from the Catholic communion. She herself, as an integral member of the Catholic church, declared the Greek church to be in a state of schism, and therefore could not commune with her, after her separation from Rome, without being guilty of schism by her own judgment and confession. The same may be said, so far as concerns all the eastern churches condemned as heretics or schismatics prior to 1534, when she formally broke with Rome. By the formal act of her parliament, in 1534, when she abolished the authority of the pope, not in temporal matters only, but also in spiritual matters, and made a layman the supreme head of the church in all matters, spiritual as well as temporal, she formally separated herself from the communion of Rome, and from all the churches continuing in that communion. Then, on the other hand, nobody can deny that she is, if not by name, at least in fact, condemned, and cut off from the communion of the Catholic church by the Council of Trent, accepted, so far as the present question is concerned, by all the churches, except those whom she herself had, prior to her separation, condemned or disowned as heretics or schismatics. If the Catholic church existed anywhere out of England, it was represented in the Tridentine Council, and expressed its judgment in that council, either then formally, or since virtually, by accepting its decrees. But it did exist out of England by her own confession. Then, inasmuch as she was virtually condemned in that council, she has been condemned by the Catholic church.

But perhaps *The Churchman* will contend, that his church is in communion, if not with existing ecclesiastical bodies, at least with the primitive Catholic church. The church is catholic, in time as well as in space; and the body in communion with the primitive church is by that fact in communion with the Catholic church, although it should not be in communion with any other extant body. But the church is a body corporate, and must needs exist, if catholic,

in time as well as in space, *as a perpetual organic body.* It can never disappear from the earth as an organic body. That body which remains in communion with the primitive church continues and perpetuates it by regular succession. If the church of England do this, it is the Catholic church, and it, and such particular bodies as are in communion with it, are not only Catholic, but the whole Catholic body. This argument, then, proves nothing, for it proves too much. It proves that the church of England is the Catholic church in its unity and integrity, which is more than she claims. She must either say boldly, that she is the one universal church, or abandon this argument, and admit that she is no part of the universal church.

We stated in our former article, that the church of England was not competent to sit in judgment on the church of Rome and her bishop, because Rome and her bishop were the acknowledged centre and head, under Christ, of the ecclesiastical corporation. To do so would be for the part to sit in judgment on the whole, which is not allowable; and furthermore, the church of England could not be legally convoked as an ecclesiastical court without the authority and consent of Rome and her bishop. Whether this was the original constitution of the church or not, such had been its constitution for many ages, and no authority below that of the universal church was competent to set it aside, or to adopt a new constitution. *The Churchman* appears to have felt the force of the argument; and therefore denies positively, that the church of England "has ever sat in judgment, not merely on the church universal, but even on the church of Rome, or refused its communion." We are not a little surprised at this statement. We presume *The Churchman* will not quibble on the fact, whether it was the *church* of England, or the *parliament* that adopted the thirty-nine articles. In strictness, we own they were imposed on the church by lay authority; but the church, in accepting and subscribing to them, made herself responsible for them. Now, in these articles, we find several very positive condemnations of the church of Rome. We read in the nineteenth article, "As the church of *Hierusalem*, *Alexandria*, and *Antioch* have erred, so also the *Church of Rome* hath erred, not only in their living and manner of ceremonies, *but also in matters of faith.*" Here is a judgment rendered. Again, article twenty-two: "The *Romish* doctrine concerning purgatory, pardons, worship-

ping, and adoration, as well of images as of relics, and also invocation of saints, is a fond thing, vainly invented and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the word of God." Is not here a judgment of condemnation of the Roman communion?

Does not the church of England *refuse* the Roman communion? What communion has there been between the two churches since the days of Elizabeth? Does the church of England recognize the ecclesiastical authority of Rome, or Rome that of England? Do the bishops of one church receive "the letters dimissory of the bishops of the other?" Not at all. Nay, the church of England in her 27th canon, by implication, at least, declares all adherents to the Roman communion schismatics, and forbids the minister from communicating to them the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The church of England has never refused the communion of Rome! If so, would King James, the British Solomon, the supreme head of the church of England, have discoursed in the following manner?

"As I have said in Parliament-house, I can loue the person of a Papist, being otherwise a good man and honestly bred, neuer having knowen any other religion; but the person of an Apostate Papist I hate. And surely for those Polypragmaticke Papists, I would you would studie out some seuere punishment for them; for they keepe not infection in their owne hearts onely, but infect others, our good Subjects. And that which I say for *Recusants*, that same I say for Priests. I confesse I am loth to hang a Priest onely for Religion sake, and saying Masse; but if he refuse the Oath of Allegeance (which, let the Pope and all the deuils in Hell say what they will) yet (as you finde by my booke and by diuers others, is meerely civill) those that so refuse the Oath and are Polypragmaticke Recusants; I leaue them to the law; it is no persecution, but good Iustice.

"And those Priests, also, that out of my Grace and Mercie have bene let goe out of prisons, and banished, vpon condition not to returne; aske mee no questions touching these, quit me of them, and let me not heare of them: And to them I ioyne those that breake prison; for such priests as the prison will not hold, it is a plaine signe, nothing will hold them but a halter. Such are no Martyrs, that refuse to suffer for their conscience. *Paul*, notwithstanding the doores were open, would not come foorth. And *Peter* came not out of the prison till led by the Angel of God. But these wil goe foorth, though with the angel of the Diuell."*

* "*His Majestie's Speach in the Starre-Chamber, the xx. of Iune, Anno* 1616. Imprinted at London, by Robert Barker, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Maiestie."—pp. 48 and 49.

If the church of England accepts the Roman communion why has she kept, and why does she still keep up, an independent church establishment in Ireland, at an enormous expense, and to the great vexation of the immense majority of the Irish people? Really, *The Churchman* is joking us, and trying to see how we shall contrive to prove what is as obvious to all eyes as is the fact that the sun is round.

"What order of the universal church," asks *The Churchman*, "has the church of England ever violated?" We answer, she has violated the order of the universal church itself, by bringing the spiritual corporation into subjection to the civil; which she did when she made the king, the civil ruler, a layman, supreme head of the church, and conferred on him, not only the management of church temporalities, but supreme authority in spirituals also, as was done by act of parliament, in its session from November 3 to December 18, 1534, substantially confirmed under Elizabeth in 1559, ordained in the first canon of *The Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical* of the church of England, and proclaimed by James the First in his preface to *The Book of Common Prayer* in 1603. By this, the independence of the church as a body politic, complete in itself, is destroyed, and the exercise of pastoral functions, necessary to its very being, is made to depend on the good-will and pleasure of the prince. No bishop can be chosen in the church of England without a *congé d'élire* from the king to the chapter or consecrated without his permission, or have jurisdiction, but according to his pleasure. Is this compatible with the constitution of the church as an ecclesiastical corporation? Is this according to primitive usage? Did the apostles recognize the authority of the Roman emperor, in choosing and consecrating bishops, and in conferring on them spiritual jurisdiction? The most that the church has ever conceded to princes, the most that it ever can concede without being suicidal, is to permit them to put the bishop into the possession of the temporalities of his see; and even this, which leaves the spiritualities untouched, is quite too much. It is true, the prince may have endowed the see; but the endowment, when made, becomes a vested right of the church, and ought to pass under the exclusive control of the spiritual authority, the temporal power having rightfully no authority in the matter, but simply that of protecting the church in the peaceful and full possession and management of it. But, even admitting that the tem-

poral power may retain the control of it, or may even resume it, without breaking the order or constitution of the church, it assuredly cannot go further, and claim authority as to the persons who shall exercise spiritual jurisdiction, or prescribe the conditions on which spiritual jurisdiction shall be exercised, without striking at the very foundation and existence of the church as a corporation complete in itself.

The church of England has also broken the order of the universal church, by declaring herself, as an ecclesiastical polity, independent of the universal church; which she did when she threw off the authority of Rome, and prohibited the recognition of any authority, spiritual or temporal, not within the realm. For the church is a single corporate body, one and catholic, not an aggregation of separate and independent ecclesiastical polities. She broke the unity of the corporation by asserting the principle of independency; for, if the corporation be a single corporation, it can have only a single government, which must ramify through all the members, in due subordination, from a common centre, binding them all into the unity of the body. This fact is of itself decisive, and alone convicts the Anglican church of schism.

The church of England has, furthermore, broken the order of the church in its rejection of the authority of the archbishop of Rome as *primate* of the western churches, of which we are not aware that it has ever been denied that the church of England was one. What were the rights and immunities of the primate may be somewhat uncertain; but it is evident from the sixth canon of the Council of Nicæa, whatever view we may take of that canon, that the primate had some authority over the churches within his jurisdiction. But the church of England threw off *all* authority not within the realm, and therefore rejected the authority of the archbishop of Rome as primate no less than as pope. This is so obvious to all who know any thing of what is called the English reformation, that the assertion of *The Churchman*, and the authorities he quotes to prove that the church of England still admits the primacy of Rome, are without force, and we are not a little startled to find any Anglican divine pretending to the contrary. The primacy means more than the chief place in the procession,—it is a primacy of authority, not of mere order. We all know that the church of England has rejected it, and she has even in fact rejected it as a simple primacy of order, and

ought to reject it, to be consistent with herself, since she officially in her *homilies*, and semi-officially in Jewell's *Apology*, treats the pope as *antichrist*. We have no doubt that many members of the Anglican church deeply regret their state of ecclesiastical isolation, and would gladly return to the communion of Rome, and accept, not the primacy merely, but also the papacy; but it is hardly laudable in them to attempt to deceive themselves or others by concealing or disavowing facts which stand recorded against them.

The Churchman asks again, "What definition of faith the church of England has ever rejected." She has rejected the Transubstantiation, and, in point of fact, the *Real Presence*. We are not ignorant of what the Oxford divines allege on this point, but we appeal to the symbols of the church herself. She admits no change in the elements, which remain after consecration bread and wine as they were before; and the only presence of Christ she admits at all is not, strictly speaking, a presence of Christ in the sacrament, but in the soul of the faithful communicant. The faithful, indeed, partake in a mysterious manner, of the body of Christ; but to the wicked, as we collect from her articles, catechism, and homilies, there is no presence of the Lord's body, but the mere outward sign of the sacrament, to wit, the bread and the wine; and, consequently, the wicked who partake of these are not to be condemned for eating unworthily, not discerning the Lord's body, since it would be absurd, nay, unjust, to condemn them for not discerning the Lord's body where not present. She rejects also the sacrifice of the Mass, deprives herself of both altar and victim, and of the means of replenishing her divine life at its infinite Source. She rejects five out of the seven sacraments, and mutilates the two she retains. She rejects the Catholic doctrine of works, prayers for the dead, purgatory, reverence and invocation of saints, &c.

But we did not, in our argument, charge the Anglican church with heresy, but with schism. We of course believe the church of England to be heretical as well as schismatic, and though we do not look upon her as having lapsed so far into heresy as some of her sister Protestant churches, yet we are far from holding her sound in the faith. But on this point we have, for the present, no controversy with *The Churchman*. We will willingly consent to discuss this point hereafter; but at present we will consent to no new issue. Our objections to the Anglican church were not based on its

supposed unsoundness in the faith. We charged it with being schismatic, which it may well be without being heretical. Nor did we, in fact, charge it with being *absolutely* schismatic, but only so in case we adopt the principles of the Oxford divines, that the church is a corporation, and, therefore, must needs be one in the unity of the corporation, and then in its corporate authority, as well as one in the unity of faith and charity. Now, if the church be a single corporation, that is, a single body corporate or politic, as it must be if it is one corporation, and not an assemblage of corporations, the Anglicans, in breaking the unity of the corporation, and declaring their church an independent corporation, as we all know they did, were guilty of schism. Now, is the church a corporation, or is it not? Is it a single corporation, or is it an assemblage or collection of distinct and independent corporations? If you say the latter, you deny the unity of the church as a corporation, and assert independency, which, in principle, is repugnant to all ecclesiastical authority, to the church itself as an authoritative body. If you say the former, then is the church of England this ecclesiastical corporation, or is it not? It is not, by the confession of *The Churchman* itself. Is it, then, a member of that corporation? We answer, it is not a member. It can be a member only on condition of being joined to the body, and participating in its authority. The government of France is not a member of that of Great Britain, nor the government of Great Britain a member of that of France, because they are two distinct, independent governments, and neither participates in the authority of the other. But the church of England is a distinct, independent polity, participating in the authority of no other body, and holding communion with the authority of no body but itself. It, therefore, is not a *member* of the Catholic body. It, since it is an independent body, either is that corporation in its unity and totality, or no part of it. It is not it, and therefore is no part of it, but another and a totally distinct body. This is the inevitable conclusion to which we must come, if we adopt the doctrine that the church is a single corporate body. Now, it is to this point we wish *The Churchman* to confine his attention; to the argument we have here summed up, we wish him to reply. We tell him that the claim of his church to absolute independency as an ecclesiastical polity negatives its claim to be a *member* of the ecclesiastical corporation; and as he himself concedes

that it is not the church in its unity and totality, we demand of him to show us how it can be other than a totally distinct and separate body from the church of Christ, without denying the unity of the Catholic church as a body corporate, and asserting the principle of independency, which he must concede to be destructive of all rule and of all unity of the governing body. When he has answered this demand, we will go into the question of heresy, and discuss the question, whether his church is sound in the faith or not, to his heart's content.

Our limits do not permit us to remark on all the statements in *The Churchman's* reply to us, that we could wish to notice; but there is one statement of so extraordinary a character, that we cannot let it pass without comment.

"As to appointments and investments," he says, "it should be remembered that the church of England made no *new law*, and asserted no new liberty, at the time of the reformation; the parliamentary statutes on this subject being merely declarative of old laws which had been continuously asserted in almost every successive reign, from the time when the exercise of these powers in England was first claimed by the pope. Neither is it correct to say, that, in revoking these powers from the court of Rome, the church of England yielded them to the temporal power as such; for the representatives of the temporal power were then a portion of the church, and, in suffering appointments and investments to revert to the crown, the church of England did no more than acknowledge the element of lay co-operation in the management of church temporalities."

This statement opens up a great subject, into the discussion of which we cannot now enter. We can only remark, that it is hardly true, to say that the church of England made "no new law, and asserted no new liberty, at the time of the reformation." The old laws, to which allusion is made, were, in the first place, never assented to by the church; and it may be a question, whether, the connexion of the church with the state then existing considered, the protest of the pope was not sufficient to destroy their force as laws; and, in the second place, they were never executed, but had been suffered from the first to remain on the statute-book a mere dead letter. They had never been laws in force in the realm. They were merely acts of the temporal government, and could, therefore, have been rightfully enforced, even at best, only so far as they concerned the temporalities of the church. The temporal government never had in England, or in any other country, the right to make laws touching the spiritualities of the church. But these laws

did touch the spiritualities of the church, and were therefore, so far at least, null and void from the beginning, *de jure*, as they proved to be *de facto*.

The Churchman does not state the case correctly, when he says, that, "in suffering appointments and investments to revert to the crown, the church of England did no more than acknowledge the element of lay co-operation in the management of church *temporalities*." We surely need not tell him that investment carries with it spiritual jurisdiction. It was on this fact that the pope grounded the right of the spiritual government to invest, and denied it to the temporal government. If the temporal government grant investiture, it confers spiritual jurisdiction, which gives it complete control in spirituals as well as in temporals. To say that the giving of this right to the crown was merely acknowledging "the element of lay co-operation in the management of church *temporalities*," is an assertion hardly compatible with a correct knowledge and faithful statement of the real points involved in the controversy.

But we have no space left us for further remarks. We confess, that, the more closely we examine the claims of the church of England, the more untenable we find them. We had almost worked ourselves into the desire to connect ourselves with that church; and we are not certain but we should have so done, had it not been for the Letters of Bishop Hopkins, which we found ourselves unable to refute on Anglican principles. We confess that Bishop Hopkins appears to us to be true to his church, and to interpret her constitution and doctrines according to the genuine principles of its founders. His brethren, who differ from him, have more with which we sympathize than he has; but they are, in our judgment, less faithful to Anglicanism. They would fain have us receive their church as Catholic, and disingenuously in their publications call it Catholic; but it is a *Protestant* church, Protestant in spirit, in doctrine, in position, and in name, and we cannot reconcile it to our sense of honesty and frankness to seek to call it by any other name. It seems to us ridiculous to call it *Catholic*.

Even *The Churchman* itself calls its church "The *reformed* Catholic church," which admits its fallibility; for if it had not been fallible, it could never have needed reforming; and being fallible, who shall assure us that it may not need reforming again? This is enough for us. We have been forced by our own errors, mistakes, misapprehensions,

self-contradictions, and frequent changes of opinion on all subjects, even the most vital, to admit that our own reason alone is not adequate to settle the great questions which concern our peace and salvation. We must have a guide, but do not mock us with a fallible guide. Talk not to us of a church, unless you have an *infallible* church to offer us. We have followed a fallible guide long enough. We believe Christ did found an infallible church, rendered infallible by his perpetual presence and supervision. To that church we willingly yield obedience. But your church is not it; for yours, by your confession, is fallible. We have, therefore, been obliged to look beyond Anglicanism, to a church which at least claims to be infallible and which demands our obedience only on the ground that it is infallible.

Believing, as we do, that the church of Christ is infallible, and authoritative because infallible, we have no sympathy with those who seek to restrain its authority as a body politic. It is a kingdom supreme and complete in itself, established and endowed by Christ, its Founder and invisible Governor, for the express purpose of governing mankind. All attempts to control it, to restrain its free action, or to bring it into subjection to authority foreign to itself, we look upon as treason against the eternal King, and as a betrayal of the true interests of man and society. All such attempts are wrong in principle, and necessarily disastrous in their results, of which the history of the Greek and Anglican churches affords us striking proofs. Let civil governors and temporal princes learn this, and cease from their insane warfare against the Lord and his Anointed. It was the madness of the court of Constantinople that drew the Greek church into schism, and ruined the eastern empire, or at least deprived the church of the power to convert its conquerors. It was the mad ambition of European princes, seeking to make the church their tool, that fostered the spirit which effected the Protestant schism, which, however much its children may sing its praises, has already proved a serious calamity, and will yet be looked upon as the severest curse that could have befallen the nations involved in its guilt.

Nor have we any sympathy with the war of *The Churchman* against the papacy, and, whether we find few Romanists or many to go with us, we would not destroy the papacy, nor lessen in the least the power of the Pope, if we could. We dare be known to be one of those who believe that the

papal authority is none too great; and we fully believe, if the all but martyred Gregory VII. had succeeded in securing to the church the independence he asserted, and for which he struggled through life, a far different and a far happier world had been realized for us and our children. We fear not the power, but the weakness, of the papacy; and we have no sympathy with those who would make the pope a mere presiding officer, and only allow him the place of honor at the feast, or in the procession. We find Anglicanism more objectionable in its rejection of the papacy than in any thing else. This was its primal sin, its mother error, from which has come, as a natural progeny, its whole brood of errors. Had it not been for the papacy, the church, humanly speaking, had failed long ere this. In the institution and preservation of the papacy, we see the especial providence of God. We shrink not from the abused name of papist; and we only regret that the ambition and wickedness of civil rulers have been able to prevent the papacy from doing all the good it has attempted. No man must think to frighten us by the cry of "Popery." Happy are we to acknowledge the authority of the Holy Father; more happy shall we be, if we can so live as to secure his blessing.

END OF VOLUME IV.

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